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the 


PROBLEM  OF  EVIL. 


^ranslaieft  from  tfi*  jFnntl)  of 


M.  ERNEST  NAVILLE, 

Author  of  “La  Tie  Eternelle,”  “Le  Pere  Celeste,”  “Maine  de  Biran,  sa  Vie  et  sea 

Pensees,”  etc., 


* 


By  JOHN  P.  LACROIX, 

PROFESSOR  IN  THE  OHIO  WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY,  AND  TRANSLATOR  OF  FRESSENSE’S 

“REIGN  OF  TERROR.” 


[THE  ONLY  AUTHORIZED  TRANSLATION.] 


jlEW  y OFfJC  : 

CARLTON  &  LAN  AH  AN. 

SAN  FRANCISCO:  E.  THOMAS. 
CINCINNATI:  HITCHCOCK  &  WALDEN, 

1872. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1871,  by 
CARLTON  &  LANAHAN, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 

“  c 


NOTE  OE  THE  TRANSLATOR. 


The  author  of  these  Lectures,  Mr.  Ernest  Naville,  is 
becoming  well  known  to  the  Christian  world  as  one 
of  the  most  wide-awake  and  eloquent  defenders  of 
evangelical  religion.  His  writings  on  the  Jife  and 
doctrines  of  Maine  de  Biran  have  procured  for  him 
honorable  recognition  in  contemporary  philosophy  : 
while  his  brilliant  and  charming  books,  La  Vie 
Eterrielle  and  -Le  Pere  Celeste ,  have  made  him  a 
popular  favorite  throughout  French  Protestantism. 

Of  the  character  and  worth  of  the  present  volume, 
I  will  -attempt  no  analysis,  but  will  simply  adopt  the 
words  of  M.  de  Pressense  in  the  Revue  Chretienne  of 
August,  1869.  b  After  remarking  that  the  book  forms 
one  branch  of  a  “  vast  monument  of  apologetics,  or, 
more  properly  speaking,  a  citadel  of  solid  granite, 
well  able  to  resist  the  assaults  of  contemporary  infi¬ 
delity,”  M.  de  Pressense  thus  proceeds :  “  These 
lectures  are  none  the  less  profound  for  being  thrown 
into  an  animated  popular  form.  The  questions  are 
looked  squarely  in  the  face,  and  the  admirable  clear- 


4 


Note  of  the  Translator. 


ness  of  the  expression  is  but  a  fit  counterpart  to  the 

author’s  keen  and  comprehensive  insight  into  the 

abstrusities  of  philosophy.  Nothing  is  more  false 

than  to  confound  obscurity  with  profundity  ;  that 

which  is  obscure  is  often  vague  and  inexact.  The 

haze  which  hovers  over  the  landscape,  though  but  an 

aerial  vapor,  is  yet  sufficient  to  disenchant  the  whole 

outlook.  This  discussion  of  the  Problem  of  Evil 

grapples  boldly  with  the  central  difficulty  of  religion 

and  of  theodicy  in  general.  The  eloquent  orator 

frankly  admits  the  difficulty  ;  he  places  us  face  to 

face  with  that  knot  of  our  destiny  which,  as  Pascal 

expresses  it,  was  tied  in  the  abyss  of  the  Fall.  He 

does  not  solve  it  with  a  sword-stroke  by  resorting 

to  a  dogmatic  system  ;  such  a  procedure  has  no 

validity  save  for  those  who  are  convinced  already. 

His  method  is  purely  philosophical;  he  presents  the 

Christian  solution  as  he  would  present  any  other, 

asking  only  that  it  be  examined  with  honesty  and 

candor — without  preconceived  prejudice.  The  most 

interesting  portion  of  this  excellent  book  is  that 

which  treats  of  solidarity ,  that  mysterious  and  real 

• 

bond  which  unites  all  the  children  of  humanity,  and 
attaches  them  to  a  common  source,  as  branches  of 
the  same  trunk.  But  it  is  not  possible  to  give  an 
adequate  idea  of  such  a  work  in  a  brief  notice.” 

With  this  high  appreciation  of  the  book  I  think 


Note  of  the  Translator. 


5 


most  readers  will  heartily  coincide.  It  certainly  has 
two  very  happy  tendencies  :  to  acquaint  us  more 
fully  with  the  inmost  depths  of  our  own  hearts,  and 
to  enable  us  better  to  understand  and  appreciate  the 
great  moral  crises  of  history.  Though  dealing  with 
the  subject  of  Evil  in  its  most  naked  and  terrible 
manifestations,  the  impression  produced  by  the  book 
is  the.  very  opposite  of  sad  and  dispiriting.  It  so 
uniformly  confronts  the  dusky  and  hideous  figure  of 

Evil  that  is  with  the  auroral  beauty  of  the  Good  that 

• 

ought  to  be,  that  we  are  hardly  conscious  of  gazing 
into  a  pandemonium  of  darkness  and  crime — we 
rather  seem  to  be  beholding  in  prophetic  vision  the 
transfigured  forms  of  Truth  and  Virtue  and  Joy 
triumphing  over  the  despairing  and  yielding  hosts  of 
Night. 

On  laying  the  book  aside  we  are  enabled  to  look 
upon  humanity  with  more  confidence  and  hope,  and 
ive  are  pretty  sure  to  go  to  our  daily  toil  with  a  more 
cheerful  contentment,  realizing,  in  a  higher  sense 
than  Fichte  meant  it,  that  our  existence  is  not  vain 
and  purposeless,  but  that  we  are  each  a  real  link  in 
the  endless  chain  of  being,  and  that  if  we  but  faith¬ 
fully  fulfill  the  humble  duty  that  falls  to  us  individu¬ 
ally,  we  are  then  actual  co-workers  with  God,  work¬ 
ing  for  the  good  of  all,  as,  in  his  plan,  all  should  be 
working  for  the  good  of  us. 


6 


Note  of  the  Translator. 


As  to  the  style  of  the  work  I  need  say  but  a 
word.  As  it  was  written  expressly  for  the  “  people  ” 
it  discards  all  metaphysical  jargon,  and  presents  the 
profoundest  thoughts  of  philosophy  in  language  so 
familiar  and  objective  as  to  be  within  the  easy  grasp 
of  the  humblest  reader, 

I  hope  to  have  preserved  in  the  translation  some 
degree  of  the  directness  and  transparency  of  the 
original.  J.  P.  L. 

Delaware,  Ohio,  June,  1S70. 


AUTHOR’S  PREFACE  TO  THIS  TRANSLATION. 


The  volume  which  Mr.  Lacroix  here  presents  to  the 
American  public  forms  one  part  of  a  series  of  works, 
the  general  nature  and  object  of  which  can  be  readily 
stated  in  a  few  words. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  last  century  a  large  number 
of  minds,  yielding  to  the  spirit  of  the  times,  adopted 
the  opinion  that  there  exists  between  Christian  faith 
and  reason — between  the  Gospel  and  philosophy — a 
radical  antagonism.  This  was  especially  the  case 
with  certain  gifted  French  authors  whose  works 
exerted  a  great  influence  throughout  the  reading 
world.  This  same  manner  of  thinking  reappears  in 
our  own  day  under  the  name  of  Free  Thought,  a  title 
that  is  often  assumed  by  the  enemies  of  the  Gospel, 
as  if  to  imply  that  he  who  makes  a  free  use  of  his 
understanding  must  necessarily  reject  Christianity. 
Study  and  meditation  have  led  me  to  a  view  the  very 
opposite  of  this.  Passing  over  the  minor  details,  and  • 
fixing  our  attention  upon  the  great  essential  features 
of  religion,  I  am  convinced  that  the  demands  of  rea- 


8  Author's  Preface  to  this  Translation. 

son  when  seriously  weighed,  and  the  solutions  which 
Christianity  gives  to  the  great  problems  of  life,  will 
be  found  to  be  in  perfect  harmony.  This  belief  is 
necessarily  included  in  the  faith  of  the  Christian 
who  thinks  himself  in  possession  of  -the  truth,  for  it 
is  impossible  to  admit  that  there  can  be  a  disagree¬ 
ment  between  truth,  which  is  the  light  of  the  intelli¬ 
gence,  and  reason,  which  is  the  eye  designed  for  per¬ 
ceiving  that  light.  If  we  ever  speak  of  reason  as 
opposed  to  the  truth  it  is  only  of  a  perverted  reason, 
or,  more  properly,  of  a  mind  which  has  allowed  its 
reason  to  become  obscured. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  have  faith  in  the  harmony 
of  reason  and  the  Christian  doctrines,  and  quite  an¬ 
other  thing  scientifically  to  demonstrate  this  harmony. 
It  is  toward  this  demonstration  that  I  wish  to  .contrib¬ 
ute  the  weight  of  my  labors,  taking  advantage  for 
this  purpose  of  those  philosophical  studies  in  which 
I  have  been  engaged  for  the  past  thirty  years,  and 
of  which  I  have,  from  time  to  time,  expounded  the 
results  to  the  auditors  of  the  Faculty  of  Letters  in 
Geneva.  To  determine  with  precision  the  problems 
raised  by  philosophy  as  they  present  themselves  in 
the  history  of  human  thought ;  to  state  the  various 
solutions  that  have  been  proposed  ;  to  examine  these 
solutions  with  that  perfect  liberty  without  which  there 
can  be  no  true  science  ;  to  show  that  the  solutions 


Author's  Preface  to  this  Translation.  9 

contained  in  the  Gospel  are  the  most  satisfactory  of 
all  those  which  have  been  proposed  to  science ; 
finally,  to  conclude  that  the  Christian  faith  contains, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  germ  of  the  best  of  philoso¬ 
phies,  as,  in  the  order  of  social  life,  it  contains  the 
germ  of  the  best  of  civilizations — such  is  the  object 
which  I  have  set  before  me  in  a  series  of  works  in¬ 
tended  for  a  wider  public  than  that  of  the  schools 
and  universities. 

I  began  by  a  series  of  lectures  entitled  La  Vie 
Eternelle .  This  was  followed  by  a  series  entitled  Le 
Pore  Celeste.  The  next  fruit  of  my  studies  is  the 
volume  in  the  hands  of  the  reader.  It  will  be  fol¬ 
lowed,  should  God  grant  me  the  necessary  time 
and  strength,  by  a  series  of  discourses  on  Jesus  of 
Nazareth. 

These  lectures  on  the  Problem  of  Evil  were  de¬ 
livered  to  the  public,  first  of  Geneva  and  afterward 
of  Lausanne,  during  the  winter  of  1867-68,  under 
the  title  of  a  philosophical  discussion.  As  the  audi¬ 
ences  were  large  and  of  all  classes,  it  became  neces¬ 
sary  to  discard  the  terms  and  formulas  of  the  schools, 
and  to  clothe  the  results  of  my  studies  in  a  style 
intelligible  to  all.  But  it  was  equally  necessary,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  philosophical  -character  of  the 
discussion,  to  grapple  with  the  most  obscure  phases 
of  the  problem,  and  to  avoid  none  of  the  difficulties. 


io  Author's  Preface  to  this  Translation. 

I  have,  therefore,  striven  to  throw  my  thoughts  into  a 
pleasing  literary  form,  without,  however,  sacrificing 
the  requirements  of  a  rigorous  discussion. 

At  my  express  request  the  auditors  proposed  to 
me,  during  the  process  of  the  delivery  of  the  lectures, 
various  questions  and  objections.  At  the  close  of 
the  series  I  devoted  a  special  hour  to  the  discussion 
of  the  points  thus  proposed.  In  preparing  my  lec¬ 
tures  for  the  press  I  have  taken  advantage  of  these 
queries  and  objections  to  recast  and  improve  as  far 
as  possible  the  work  which  I  am  now  enabled,  thanks 
to  the  esteemed  labor  of  Mr.  Lacroix,  to  commend  to 
the  favor  of  the  public  of  America  and  England. 

Ernest  Naville. 


Geneva,  March  i,  1S70. 


Page 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE  I. . 

The  Good .  13 

1.  Definition  of  the  Good .  16 

2.  Characterization  of  the  Good . . .  34 

3.  Guarantee  of  the  Good . ; .  59 

LECTURE  II. 

Evil .  6S 

1.  Evil  in  Nature . . . . .  69 

2.  Evil  in  Humanity .  Si 

3.  The  Negation  of  Evil . 96 

LECTURE  III, 

The  Problem .  118 

1.  Deceptive  Solutions .  121 

2.  An  Incomplete  Solution . 129 

3.  Characteristics  of  Evil . *..... . .  135 

(a)  Its  General  Prevalence .  135 

(<5)  Its  Essentiality . e . . . .  14S 

LECTURE  IV. 

The  Solution .  159 

1.  The  Solution  Proposed . 161 

2.  Historical  Sources  of  this  Solution. . . .  165 

3.  Primitive  Condition  of  Humanity . 174 

4.  Origin  of  the  Present  Condition  of  Humanity .  183 


12 


Contents . 


LECTURE  V. 

The  Proof .  193 

1.  Nature  of  the  Proof. .  193 

2.  Presentation  of  the  Proof .  200 

3.  Solution  of  Difficulties .  212 

LECTURE  VI. 

The  Conflict  of  Life .  241 

1.  Point  of  Departure.., .  244 

2.  Scope  of  our  Efforts .  251 

3.  Shoals .  255 

4.  Plan  of  the  Conflict .  262 

LECTURE  VII. 

The  Source  of  Strength .  275 

1.  Food  of  the  Soul .  277 

2.  Prayer .  285 

3.  The  Question  of  Faith .  302 

Index .  325 


THE 


PROBLEM  OF  EVIL. 

- <+*•*. - - 

LECTURE  I. 

THE  GOOD. 

There  is  need  neither  of  much  art  nor  of  many  words 

to  impress  you  with  the  importance  of  the  General  in¬ 
terest  of  the 

subject  which  has  called  us  together.  The  subject. 
Problem  of  Evil !  Who  of  you  has  not,  time  and 
again,  proposed  it  to  himself.  Looking  abroad 
over  the  face  of  society,  how  much  discontent  is  ob¬ 
servable — how  many  complaints  of  political  oppres¬ 
sion  and  cruel  revolutions  !  of  excessive  luxury  on  the 
one  hand,  and  squalid  poverty  on  the  other  !  The 
history  of  nations  is  but  too  often  a  tissue  of  crimes 
and  a  web  of  misfortunes.  And  to  the  conflicts  of 
society  are  to  be  added  the  convulsions  of  nature  : 
tempests  engulfing  navies  ;  earthquakes  swallowing 
up  cities  ;  famine  decimating  populations.  Thus,  on 
looking  without,  we  meet  the  problem  of  evil  in 
history  and  in  nature.  And  when  we  turn  our  eye 
within,  we  find  it  reappearing  under  the  form  of 
sorrow  and  suffering.  Is  it  not,  in  fact,  our  almost 


14 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


unvarying  lot  either  to  suffer,  or,  what  is  worse  still 
for  many  hearts,  to  see  suffer  ?  Finally,  whoever  will 
descend  into  the  sphere  of  conscience  and  duty  will 
there  hear  a  voice  ceaselessly  upbraiding  him  for 
having  himself  perverted  his  moral  liberty;*  and  the 
problem  of  evil  will  reappear  in  the  agonies  of  re¬ 
pentance  and  the  bitterness  of  moral  impotency. 

In  approaching  this  problem  we  are  not  influenced 

Motives  to  its  by  mere  intellectual  curiosity:  higher  inter¬ 
discussion.  es{-s  are  aj-  stake<  There  is  danger  lest,  by  the 

contemplation  of  so  much  evil  without  us  and  within, 
our  judgment  hesitate  to  believe  in  the  good  ;  lest  our 
heart,  growing  discouraged,- dare  no  longer  hope  for 
happiness  ;  lest  the  soul  finally  come  even  to  doubt  of 
God.  And  it  is  natural  enough  that  the  poet,  in 
shaping  this  thought  into  musical  words, f  should 
awaken  in  our  souls  a  lively  response.  In  grappling 
with  the  problem  of  evil  I  do  not  hope  to  raise  all  the 

*  Une  voix  sera  la  pour  crier  a  toute  heure  : 

Qu’as-tu  fait  de  ta  vie  at  de  ta  liberte  ? 

Alfred  de  Musset. 

t  Pourquoi  done,  6  Maitre  supreme  ! 

As-tu  cree  le  mal  si  grand, 

Que  la  raison,  la  vertu  merne, 

S’e’pouvantent  en  le  voyant  ? 

Comment,  sous  la  sainte  lumiere, 

Voit-on  des  actes  si  liideux  ; 

Qu’ils  font  expirer  la.priere, 

Sur  les  levres  du  malheureux  ? 

Alfred  de  Musset. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


15 


vails,  to  dissipate  all  mysteries,  to  answer  all  questions. 
Excuse  me  from  such  presumption. 

What  I  wish  and  hope  to  do  is  this.  The  study  of 
this  sad  subject  has  been  profitable  tome  g  iritofthe 
personally.  During  a  protracted  survey  of  ,Uscusslon- 
the  shadowy  domain  of  evil,  I  have  successively  risen 
to  brighter  visions  of  the  light  of  good.  This  expe¬ 
rience  has  given  me  courage  to  undertake  to  confront 
the  great  difficulties  of  the  discussion  which  we  com¬ 
mence  to-day.  My  hope  is  to  associate  you  with 
my  thoughts  ;  to  conduct  you  along  the  path  which, 
though  arduous,  was  yet  so  salutary  to  myself.  I  am 
not  an  artist  seeking  to  captivate  by  beauties  of  speech, 
nor  a  master  teaching  with  authority ;  I  am  simply  a 
fellow-traveler  who,  thinking  that  he  has  made,  in 
the  obscure  valley  which  we  are  all  traversing,  a  few 
steps  in  the  direction  of  the  light,  would  gladly  show 
you  the  way. 

Our  aim  to-day  will  be  to  define  the  idea  of  the 
good,  then  to  characterize  more  fully  its  nature,  and, 
lastly,  to  seek  what  guarantee,  what  assurance,  we 
can  have  of  the  reality  of  this  idea.  The  General 

heads  of  the 

order  of  our  lecture  will  therefore  be,  Defini-  first  lecture, 
tion  of  the  Good,  Characterization  of  the  Good,  Guar¬ 
antee  of  the  Good. 


1 6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


I.  Definition  of  the  Good. 

If  light  did  not  exist  we  would  have  no  idea  of 
darkness.  We  cannot  clearly  comprehend  the  nature 
of  evil,  save  as  we  have  an  exact  idea  of  the  good. 
But  this  word,  which  plays  so  large  a  part  in  the 
Three  uses  speech  of  men,  is  of  diverse  application. 

of  the  word 

‘•good.”  These  varieties  of  application  of  the  word 
“  good,”  however,  may  all  be  reduced  to  three. 

When  man  is  on  the  point  of  acting,  he  hears  an 
interior  voice  speaking  with  authority  and  saying  to 
him,  Do  this,  and  avoid  that  !  It  is  the  voice  of 
conscience.  That  which  constitutes  conscience  is 
1.  As  reiat-  simply  this  primitive  feeling  of  obligation 

ing  to  flie 

oon  science.  binding  our  will  to  do  this  and  to  avoid 
that.  This  obligation  is  not  desire,  for  it  often  op¬ 
poses  the  most  ardent  desires  of  our  hearts  ;  it  is  not 
constraint,  for  it  appeals  to  our  liberty ;  but  it  is  a 
primitive  part  of  our  nature,  distinct  from  every  other, 
and  constituting  the  basis  of  obligation  ;  that  is,  it  is 
a  commanding  power  which  we  feel  and  admit  to  be 
legitimate.  We  are  free,  but  we  are  not  the  arbiters 
of  our  liberty.  “  We  should  not,  like  voluntary  com¬ 
batants,  have  the  presumption  to  place  ourselves 
above  the  idea  of  duty,  and  pretend  to  act  only  of  our 
own  prompting,  without  need  of  orders  from  a  supe¬ 
rior.  .  .  .  Duty  and  obligation  !  these  are  the  only 
words  suitable  for  expressing  our  relation  to  the  moral 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


17 


law.”  Thus  speaks  Kant  in  his  Critique  of  the  Prac¬ 
tical  Reason .  He  says,  “  our  relation  to  the  law,”  and 
he  is  right.  Conscience  does,  in  fact,  command  us 
in  the  name  of  a  law — a  law  which  is  universal,  and 
which,  under  like  circumstances,  prescribes  absolutely 
like  duties  to  all.  There  exists  a  law  proposing  duty 
to  the  free  will,  and  we  say  that  the  will  is  good  when 
it  fulfills  the  duty  or  obligation. 

I  know  that  this  obligation  and  this  law  have  been 
denied.  There  is  a  certain  class  of  thinkers  and  of 
men  of  the  world  who  say  that  the  words  “obligation,” 
“virtue,”  “moral  law,”  are  but  deceptive  words  involv¬ 
ing  at  bottom  only  motives  of  self-interest  and  vanity. 
We  will  not  undertake  here  a  general  examination  of 
this  theory  ;  we  submit  but  one  remark.  The  idea 
of  the  good  is  that  alone  which  gives  dignity  to  life. 
Those  who  deny  the  moral  law  and  obligation  have 
no  other  alternative  than  either  to  be  inconsistent 
and  to  be  better  than  their  theory,  (which  in  fact  is 
often  the  case,)  or  to  call  down  upon  themselves  the 
contempt  both  of  others  and  of  themselves.  To  do 
the  good  is  to  accomplish  obligation  or  duty.  And 
the  good,  in  the  first  sense  of  the  word,  constitutes  the 
law  of  our  will. 

But  we  employ  the  word  in  a  second  sense  when 
we  speak  of  th e  goods  of  life  :  health,  fortune,  pleasure, 
reputation,  power.  But  what  is  it  that  we  seek  in 
riches,  or  power,  or  reputation  ?  what,  alas  ]  in  the 


1 8  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

gratification  of  envy,  and  revenge  ?  It  is  always  one 
and  the  same  thing.  In  the  objects  of  all  our  passions, 
2.  As  rent-  bad  as  well  as  good,  we  seek  but  this  one  thing : 

ing  to  the 

heart.  pleasure,  delight.  Whatever  we  desire,  we 
desire  it  as  a  means  of  enjoyment.  If  the  miser 
sacrifices  every  other  pleasure  for  the  possession  of 
gold,  it  is  because  the  possession  of  gold  is  to  him  a 
pleasure  surpassing  all  others,  and  for  no  other  reason. 
Enjoyment  is  the  food  of  the  soul ;  deprived  of  this 
aliment  it  languishes  and  pines  away.  Our  hearts 
are  so  skilled  in  its  pursuit  that  they  succeed  in  find¬ 
ing  it  even  in  suffering  itself ;  so  that  the  poets  can 
without  the  least  absurdity  sing  of  the  delights  of 
melancholy  and  the  charms  of  sadness.  The  desire 
of  happiness  is  like  the  sentiment  of  obligation,  a 
primitive  indestructible  part  of  our  nature.  You  could 
as  easily  persuade  the  water  to  abandon  its  natural 
channel,  as  man  to  abandon  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 

Here,  again,  we  meet  with  a  certain  philosophy  op¬ 
posing  itself  in  the  paths  of  truth — a  false  wisdom, 
whose  erroneousness  we  must  detect.  True  wisdom 
The  creed  of  teaches  that  there  are  false  goods  which  must 

Epicurean¬ 
ism.  be  renounced  if  we  would  find  the  true  good, 

false  happiness  which  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  true  ; 

inasmuch  as  tfue  happiness,  that  for  which  aur  nature 

is  intended,  can  be  found  only  in  a  life  regulated  by 

the  law  of  conscience.  True  wisdom  teaches  that 

the  soul,  even  when  called  to  sacrifice  to  duty  all  ex- 


The  Problem  of  Evil , 


19 


ternal  enjoyments,  can  find  in  the  simple  accomplish¬ 
ment  of  duty  a  joy  transcending  all  other  joys.  And 
experience  confirms  these  teachings  of  wisdom ;  in 
meeting  with  but  satiety  and  disgust  in  evil  pleasures, 
man  is,  to  some  degree,  driven  back  by  the  very  na¬ 
ture  of  things  to  the  true  pleasures  which  form  a  part 
of  his  destination.  Such  is  the  general  result  of  sage 
reflection  and  common  experience. 

But  a  different  view  has  been  held.  It  has  been 
held  that  we  can  eradicate  from  our  soul  the  desire 
for  happiness,  and*  reduce  ourselves  to  a  state  of  abso¬ 
lute  disinterestedness.  So  thought  some  of  the 
ancients  ;  so  some  of  the  mystics  in  all  ages  ;  0f  4sceti. 
and  so  a  few  of  our  modern  moralists.  This  C!Sn1, 
view  is  the  basis  of  the  celebrated  Buddhist  system, 
which  proposes  to  obtain  from  man  a  sweeping  re¬ 
nunciation  of  all  desire.  However,  when  you  come 
carefully  to  examine  the  expounders  of  this  theory 
you  will  find  that  they  invariably  speak  thus  :  “  In  the 
paths  which  we  commend  you  will  find  repose,  you 
will  find  peace.”  In  other  words  they  say,  “  Re¬ 
nounce  happiness  and  you  will  be  happy!”  To  en¬ 
courage  us  to  the  sacrifice  of  all  joys  they  promise  us 
joy  itself  as  our  recompense.  Thus  nature  finds  her 
triumph  in  the  very  contradiction  in  which  she  in¬ 
volves  her  contradictors.  The  soul  seeks  joy,  happi¬ 
ness,  as  its  good ;  and  the  second  sense  of  the  word 
M  good  ”  is  happiness. 


20  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

But  it  has  a  third  sense.  And  we  use  it  in  this 
3.  As  relating  sense  when  we  apply  the  idea  of  good  in 

to  the  rea¬ 
son.  cases  where  there  is  neither  volition  nor 

feeling,  and  where  consequently  there  can  be  neither 
happiness  nor  obligation.  In  this  third  sense  we  call 
an  object  good  when  it  answers  its  purpose.  A  lamp 
is  good  when  it  gives  light  well,  because  a  lamp  is 
designed  to  give  light.  A  road  being  a  means  of  in¬ 
tercommunication,  we  call  it  good  when  it  admits  of 
prompt  and  easy  passage.  In  saying  that  an  object 
answers  its  purpose,  we  have  reference  to  a  certain 
correlative  fitness  to  a  certain  order;  and  we  affirm 
that  this  order  is  realized.  In  this  third  and  most 
general  sense,  the  word  good  means  simply  order , 
fitness. 

There  are,  therefore,  three  varieties  of  good :  obliga¬ 
tion,  duty,  which  is  the  good  of  the  conscience  ;  hap¬ 
piness,  joy,  which  is  the  good  of  the  heart  ;  and  order, 
fitness,  which  is  the  good  of  the  reason.  Thus  we 
have  three  senses  for  the  same  word  ;  but  for  this 
single  and  unique  word  can  we  not  succeed  in  finding 
one  single  and  all-embracing  sense  ?  The  applica¬ 
tion  of  a  common  term  implies  generally  a  likeness 
of  ideas  ;  for  languages — the  expression  of  human 
thought — are  not  formed  by  hazard.  The  one  general 

Oood  and  definition  which  I  venture  to  propose  is  this  : 
eva  defined.  ^jie  js  fjl(lf  which  ought  to  be  ;  and  the 

evil  is  consequently  that  which  ought  not  to  be.  Con- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


21 


sider  well  these  two  statements,  for  they  are  the  sum 
and  substance  of  my  whole  theory  of  evil.  Practically, 
we  are  to  do  the  good  and  avoid  the  evil,  as  you 
already  know  ;  and  I  have  no  notion  of  teaching 
any  thing  else.  And  theoretically,  my  rule  shall  be 
this  :  to  reject  all  doctrines  which  deny  that  the  good 
ought  to  be,  or  tend  to  justify  the  existence  of  evil, 
and  to  accept  the  doctrine,  whatever  it  may  be,  which 
shall  leave  intact  our  two  fundamental  definitions. 
As  these  definitions  are  of  so  great  importance  in  the 
investigation  which  we  are  undertaking,  it  is  essential 
that  we  accurately  determine  their  force  and  scope. 

In  order  to  determine  what  ought  to  be,  it  is  neces¬ 
sary,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  to  have  *The  .  d<r_ 
in  mind  a  plan  expressive  of  what  is  legiti-  ment"s°0<r 

°  implies  a 

mate  order,  what  is  the  purpose  of  things,  and  plan- 
*  which  enables  us  to  pronounce  that  the  condition  of 
things  is  or  is  not  in  harmony  with  that  plan.  Sup¬ 
pose  an  object  of  whose  purpose  or  final  cause  we  are 
entirely  ignorant :  we  cannot  say  that  it  is  good  or 
that  it  is  bad.  Take,  for  example,  some  machine,  and 
ask,  Is  it  a  good  one?  You  cannot  answer  before 
learning  for  what  it  was  intended.  Is  it  a  sewing- 
machine  ?  a  thrashing-machine  ?  Until  you  determine 
this  you  can  pass  no  judgment  upon  it ;  being  ignorant 
of  its  purpose,  you  cannot  say  whether  it  is  or  is  not 
adapted  to  that  purpose. 

Now,  if  the  good  is  always  that  which  ought  to  be, 


22  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

in  the  sense  which  we  have  just  indicated,  it  would 
seem  that  it  is  the  good  of  the  reason  which  is  the 
one  and  all-comprehensive  sense  of  the  good.  Yes, 
as  the  good  is  always  the  realization  of  an  order,  a 
purpose,  a  plan,  all  forms  of  the  good  are  goods  of  the 
reason,  or  rational  goods,  and  we  see  at  once  that  the 
The  third  plea  of  cinswevin ?  to  its  purpose  embraces 

sense  of  a>  s  j: 

“good”  in-  also  the  two  other  senses  of  the  word  good, 

eludes  the 

two  others,  provided  only  that  we  admit  that  the  will  is 
made  for  duty,  and  the  heart  for  happiness  ;  that  is, 
that  the  purpose  of  the  will  is  obligation,  and  that  of 
the  heart,  happiness.  But  it  is  essential  to  observe 
that  the  “  ought  to  be  ”  of  the  reason  would  not  exist 
in  our  thoughts  if  we  did  not  derive  from  conscience 
the  primitive  and  unique  idea  of  moral  obligation. 
While  the  idea  of  obligation  is  wanting  there  are 
also  wanting  the  ideas  of  good  and  evil,  right  and 
wrong.  If  we  suppose  a  being  capable  of  thought 
and  feeling  but  without  moral  consciousness,  we  can 
comprehend  that  he  should  have  notions  of  the  agree¬ 
able,  the  useful,  the  true,  the  beautiful,  but  not  of  the 
good,  in  our  sense  of  the  word  ;  for  that  idea,  such  as 
we  have  it,  springs  from  the  conscience.  We  pass 
from  the  law  of  our  will  to  the  conception  of  a  gen¬ 
eral  law  of  things  ;  from  the  idea  of  what  we  ought  to 
do,  to  the  idea  of  what  ought  to  be  done.  The  judg¬ 
ment  “  good,”  in  its  widest  scope,  always  includes 
the  thought  of  an  obligation  for  a  will  ;  the  judg- 


The  Problem  of  Evil  23 

ment  “  evil  ”  includes  likewise  the  thought  of  the  fault 
of  some  will.  The  idea  of  the  good  is  consequently 
conceived  by  the  reason,  but  under  condition  of  the 
co-operation  or  active  presence  of  the  conscience. 
There  is  a  moral  element  in  every  judgment  relating 
to  the  good. 

That  which  has  often  deceived  philosophers  on  this 
point,  and  led  them  to  make  an  entire  separation  be¬ 
tween  moral  good  and  what  they  have  called  meta¬ 
physical  good,  is  the  fact  that  the  word  good  is 
applied  to  objects  without  volition,  and  which  conse¬ 
quently  cannot  be  the  subjects  of  obligation.  But 
these  volitionless  things  may,  however,  be  objects  of 
obligation  for  the  volitions  of  free  beings.  A  house, 
for  example,  is  under  no  obligation  ;  but  the  predicate 
bad,  as  applied  to  a  house,  includes  at  bottom  a  com¬ 
plaint  against  the  architect,  who  ought  to  have  made 
it  good.  In  the  “  ought  to  be  ”  of  the  reason  there  is 
always  an  element  of  conscience,  since  without  the 
conscience  the  word  ought  would  have  no  meaning. 
In  the  idea  of  the  good  there  is  realized  thus  The  word 

good  always 

an  intimate  union  between  reason,  which  implies  uiti- 

.  ,  rnately  an 

conceives  a  plan,  and  conscience,  which  at-  “  ought.” 
taches  thereto  the  idea  of  obligation.  When  reason 
conceives  the  good  it  becomes  in  some  sort  the  organ 
of  the  absolute  conscience,  and  pronounces  an  “  ought 
to  be  ”  which  is  valid  throughout  the  universe. 

These- statements  can  be  justified,  I  think,  by  a 


24  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

detailed  review  of  all  the  cases  in  which  we  use  the 
predicate  “  good.”  It  can  be  shown  that  in  every  in¬ 
stance  where  the  word  is  not  perverted  from  its  prim¬ 
itive  and  natural  signification  its  employment  presup¬ 
poses,  together  with  the  idea  of  a  plan,  also  that  of  a 
power  which  ought  to  realize  it,  and  which  does 
wrong  if  it  does  not  realize  it.  But  this  demonstra¬ 
tion  would  necessarily  be  very  long,  and  perhaps 
superfluous.  I  therefore  confine  myself  here,  in  gen¬ 
eral  terms,  to  showing  the  unity  of  the  three  above- 
mentioned  forms  of  the  good  ;  that  is,  to  showing 
the  harmony  of  happiness,  which  is  the  good  of  the 
heart,  and  order,  which  is  the  good  of  the  reason, 
with  duty  or  obligation,  which  is  the  good  of  the  con¬ 
science.  Let  us  begin  with  happiness  or  pleasure. 

It  may  seem  harshly  paradoxical  to  pretend  that 
there  is  in  pleasure,  happiness,  a  moral  obligation, 
and  that  the  conscience  and  heart  may.be  reduced 
to  harmony.  From  the  tragic  agonies  of  the  Cid  of 
Corneille,  wavering*  between  his  honor  and  his  mis¬ 
tress,  to  the  prosaic  case  of  a  student,  hesitating  in 
the  morning  between  his  place  in  school  which  awaits 
him  and  the  charms  of  his  bed  which  retain  him,  is 
not  our  whole  life  one  continual  conflict  between 
those  two  elements  of  which  I  affirm  the  concord, 
namely,  the  conscience  and  the  heart  ?  It  is  true 
there  are  bad  pleasures  ;  it  is  true  the  law  of  the 
heart  is  not  fully  coincident  with  the  lavy  of  the  will ; 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


25 


and  when  we  affirm  that  pleasure  is  obligatory,  we 
do  not  mean  that  we  are  under  obligation  to  seek  all 
kinds  of  pleasure,  “  Do  what  you  should,  come  what 
may,”  *  is  the  universal  law  of  conscience.  But  from 
the  facts  that  there  are  bad  pleasures,  and  that  our 
exclusively  personal  happiness  is  not  the  law  of  our 
will,  it  does  not  follow  that  pleasure  is  not  obligatory 
in  some  sense,  and  for  some  forms  of  volition.  We 
can  readily  see  that  the  happiness  of  one  may  be  the 
duty  of  another.  Is  not,  for  example,  the  happiness 
of  the  father  the  duty  of  the  son  ?  the  happiness  of 
the  wife  the  duty  of  the  husband  ? 

But  take  the  question  in  its  most  general  form.  Is 
it  not  true  that  when  the  law  of  the  will  is  obeyed 
the  law  of  the  heart  ought  also  to  be  fulfilled,  and 
that  happiness  ought  to  follow  the  accomplishment 
of  duty,  so  that  happiness,  without  being  the  object 
of  our  will,  is  in  fact  the  result  of  a  good  volition  ? 
To  some  degree  we  realize,  in  what  we  call  the  appro¬ 
bations  of  conscience,  that  it  is  a  fact  that  happiness 
attends  the  practice  of  duty.  But  I  do  not  speak 
of  the  fact,  which  often  realizes  itself  only  very  im¬ 
perfectly;  I  speak  of  what  ought  to  be.  Wherever 
every  duty  is  accomplished,  there,  all  admit,  nappiness 
happiness  ought  to  result ;  and  this  connec- 
tion  of  happiness  with  duty  is  conceived  by  duty- 
reason  as  one  of  the  laws  of  universal  order.  Plato 

*  Fais  ce  que  dois,  advienne  que  pourra. 


26 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


lias  depicted  an  imaginary  just  man  who,  while 
worthy  of  all  the  rewards  of  virtue,  was  yet  covered 
with  all  the  opprobrium  of  vice.*  Place  yourselves 
now  in  the  suffering  presence  of  this  just  man.  Can 
you  possibly  avoid  coming  at  once  to  the  thought 
that  the  world  in  which  this  just  man  suffers  is  an  ab¬ 
normal  world  ?  Whenever  a  being  suffers,  it  must 
be  that  there  is  some  volition  to  blame  for  the  dis¬ 
order  ;  it  must  be  that  his  suffering  is  the  result  either 
of  his  own  fault  or  of  the  fault  of  others  ;  otherwise 
we  would  have  to  say  that  there  is  injustice,  and  that 
the  nature  of  things  is  evil.  But  the  nature  of  things 
is  but  a  mere  phrase  expressive  of  facts,  but  ac¬ 
counting  for  nothing.  Consequently,  in  the  presence 
of  a  world  in  which  every  duty  should  be  accom¬ 
plished,  and  where,  notwithstanding,  we  should  still 
find  sorrow  and  suffering,  the  being  who  should  be 
the  victim  of  this  injustice  would  feel  himself  better 
than  the  nature  of  the  universe  ;  he  would  rise  up 
against  its  Creator  and,  “  agonizing,  cry  out,  Thou 
hast  mocked  me  !  ”  f  A  world  of  creatures  continuing 
in  moral  order  and  yet  enduring  suffering  would  be 
inconsistent  with  divine  wisdom.  Hence,  happiness 
ought  to  follow  the  accomplishment  of  duty ;  it  forms 
a  part  of  our  destination  in  the  plan  of  the  universe  ; 
it  ought  to  be ,  and  enters  therefore  into  our  definition 
of  the  good. 

°  “Republic,’1  Book  II.  f  Rousseau. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


-7 


Let  us  now  try  to  reduce  and  embrace  under  the 
same  definition  the  good  of  the  reason.  Let  us 
show  that  order,  fitness,  as  conceived  by  the  reason, 
is  good  only  because  the  conscience  attaches  thereto 
the  notion  of  obligation.  Wherever  we  see  Eyerv  form 
order  accomplished  we  invariably  approbate  ot^odcalls 

1  j  j.  i  forth  appro- 

the  agents  who  realized  it.  We  judge  thus  Nation, 
of  the  works  of  men  ;  and,  when  we  stand  in  the 
presence  of  the  spectacle  of  nature,  our  mind  and 
heart,  if  not  paralyzed  in  their  natural  functions, 
are  constrained  to  approve  and  adore  the  Archi¬ 
tect  of  Worlds,  the  Supreme  Artist.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  wherever  we  meet  with  disorder  we  in- 
stinctively  search  for  a  responsible  and  guilty  will. 
Whenever  any  thing  conflicts  with  our  desires  we 
are  inclined  to  complain  of  somebody.  When 
the  waters  of  Lake  Leman  rise  a  little  too  high 
on  the  Vaudois  shores,  our  neighbors  of  Lausanne 
find  fault  with  the  authorities  of  Geneva,  who,  say 
they,  have  obstructed  the  course  of  the  Rhone  at  its 
exit  from  the  lake  ;  and  when  the  Rhone  suddenly 
rises  and  overflows  the  streets  of  Lyons,  the  Lyonese 
complain  of  their  neighbors  above  for  having  swept 
the  forests  from  their  hills  and  valleys.  Wherever 
we  see  evil  we  are  inclined  to  blame  some  Every  form 

of  evil  calls 

free  will,  and  this  instinct  does  not  mislead  forth  blame, 
us.  What  does  mislead  us  is  our  over-readiness  in 
most  cases  to  blame  others  when  we  ought  to  blame 


28 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


ourselves,  whether  for  our  own  active  faults  or  for 
our  presuming  temerity  of  judgment.  If  it  is  a  case  . 
of  disorder  observed  in  a  sphere  where  neither  our 
wills  nor  those  of  our  fellows  have  any  evident  part, 
what  is  too  often  our  course  of  conduct  ?  We  rise 
up  with  objections  against  Providence,  and  it  is  the 
prevalence  of  this  perverse  tendency  which  has  mainly 
Purpose  of  occasioned  me  to  undertake  these  lectures. 

these  lec¬ 
tures.  It  is  to  answer  to  objections  to  the  exist¬ 
ence  and  attributes  of  God,  that  I  undertake  to  dis¬ 
cuss  the  Problem  of  Evil. 

If  we  find  in  evil  an  objection  to  the  existence  of 
God,  it  is  because  we  believe  that  the  good  ought  to 
be ,  and  that  it  would  be  if  there  existed  a  Being 
capable  of  realizing  that  order  which  we  conceive  as 
legitimate.*  The  objection  cannot  be  understood 
otherwise.  The  thought  at  bottom  is  this  :  Where- 
ever  we  discover  an  evil  which  us  beyond  all  human 


power,  there  we  are  ready  to  think  God  fails  to  do 
as  he  ought.  But  the  statement  in  this  naked  form 

God  is  primi-  soimds  shocking.  Let  us  explain  it.  Crea¬ 
tively  under  tures  such  as  we  owing  OU1'  all  tO  the  Al¬ 
ii  o  obliga-  0 

lion.  mighty,  can  primitively  have  no  claims 
whatever  on  God  ;  and,  God  being  originally  the  sole 


*  If  God  is  under  no  obligation  primitively,  he  can  never  asmme 
any  obligation,  h'or,  under  what  obligation  is  he  to  maintain  that 
assumption  ?  He  has  a  perfect  right  to  falsify.  Or,  rather,  right  has 
no  meaning.  One  thing  is  as  right  and  as  wrong  as  another.-D.D.w. 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  •  29 

and  absolute  existence,  there  could  not  possibly  be 
any  duties  or  obligations  on  his  part,  since  there  can 
be  no  obligation  without  an  object.  “If  God  had 
limited  our  life  to  two  days,  this  would  still  have 
been  a  favor,  and  we  would  have  been  bound  to  spend 
these  two  days  in  pleasing  and  loving  him.”  *  It  is 
no  saint  who  says  this  ;  it  is  Voltaire.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  as  Rousseau  has  justly  remarked,  God 
has,  so  to  speak,  obligated  himself  by  the  manner  in 
which  he  has  constituted  our  soul.  That  which  he 
himself  has  caused  us  to  judge  good,  this,  his  own 
nature,  or,  as  we  say,  his  own  glory,  obligates  him 
to  do.  Is  it  not  in  this  sense  that  the  Hebrews 
sang,  “  Xot  unto  us,  O  Lord,'  not  unto  us,  but 
unto  thy  name  give  glory,  for  thy  mercy  and  for 
thy  truth's  sake?”  Thus  we  conceive  for  But  he  has 

obligated. 

the  Absolute  Being,  not  an  obligation  sub-  himself 

.  .  1  •  •  ,  -  ,  .  relatively 

jecting  him  to  an  objective  law — for  this  to  us. 
would  be  absolutely  inconsistent  with  his  nature — • 
no,  but  an  obligation  of  which  he  himself  is  the 
author. 

Let  us  sum  up  these  observations.  There  is  a 
good  of  the  conscience,  a  good  of  the  heart,  and  a 
good  of  the  reason  ;  but  these  three  forms  of  good 


*  “  Si  du  Dieu  qui  nous  fit,  l’eternelle  puissance 
Eut.  a  deux  jours  au  plus,  borne  notre  existence, 
II  nous  aurait  fait  grace  ;  il  faudrait  consumer 
Ces  deux  jours  de  la  vie  a  lui  plaire,  a  l^aimer.” 


30 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


are  reducible  *  to  one.  The  good  is  that  which  ought 
to  be.  It  includes  always  an  obligation  for  ourselves, 
for  others,  or  for  God,  in  the  sense  which  we  have 
just  indicated.  The  good  is  not  an  entity,  a  thing  ; 
it  is  an  order  determining  the  relations  of  beings, 
relations  which  ought  to  be  realized  by  free  wills. 
When  the  order,  the  relations,  are  fulfilled,  when  the 
law  prescribed  for  the  will  is  executed,  happiness 
ought  to  ensue.  Thus,  the  good  is  the  resume  and 
the  goal  of  all  the  tendencies  of  our  nature.  It  is 
the  common  object  of  the  reason,  the  conscience, 
and  the  heart :  of  the  reason  as  order,  of  the  con¬ 
science  as  duty,  of  the  heart  as  happiness. 

By  the  help  of  til  is  view  we  can  now  more  worthily 
appreciate  one  of  the  most  beautiful  conceptions  of 
ancient  wisdom,  the  comparison  in  which  Plato  rep¬ 
resents  the  good  as  the  sun  of  spirits.!  We  all  know 
the  role  of  the  sun  in  nature.  Melchthal,  in  Schiller’s 
William  Tell ,  on  learning  that  a  ferocious  tyrant  had 
put  out  the  eyes  of  his  aged  father,  thus  exclaims  of 
light :  “  O  noble  and  celestial  gift !  all  creatures  live 
of  light ;  every  happy  thing,  the  plant  itself,  turns 
joyfully  to  the  light.  But  he  must  sit,  groping  in 
night,  in  eternal  gloom  !  ”  The  sun  of  nature  holds 

*  Not,  I  think,  reducible  to  the  ought,  but  coverable  by  it.  It  is 
not  reduction  to  a  simple,  but  bringing  under  a  more  generic,  predi¬ 
cate.  The  ought  is  a  threefold  ought. — D.  D.  W. 

f  “  Republic,”  Book  VII. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


31 


intimately  associated  in  its  rays  warmth  and  light, 
and  for  this  reason  the  plant  turns  toward  it.  The 
good,  the  sun  of  spirits,  the  true  light  of  reason, 
holds  inseparably  associated  in  its  rays,  duty,  The  soul 
and  happiness,  and  for  this  reason  our  souls 
turn  to  it.  Yes,  our  souls,  when  not  per-  g00<L 
verted  from  their  natural  orbit,  gravitate  toward  the 
good  and  love  it.  This  statement,  perhaps,  surprises 
some  of  you.  To  see  us  act,  one  would  hardly  sus¬ 
pect  our  natural  love  of  the  good,  and  on  looking  into 
our  hearts  we  hardly  perceive  it  ourselves.  As¬ 
suredly  we  do  not  often  enough  love  the  good  with 
that  effectual  virile  love  which  issues  in  works.  Our 
exact  condition  is  this  :  we  do  not  welcome  the  good 
when  it  comes  under  the  form  of  duty,  for  then  it 
commands  and  condemns  us  ;  but  in  and  of  itself  we 
love  it,  for  it  is  the  supreme  beauty,  and  whenever 
we  are  personally  out  of  the  question,  this  natural 
love  makes  itself  felt.  O,  if  we  could  only  be  good 
without  effort,  without  sacrifice,  what  numberless  dev¬ 
otees  virtue  would  have !  This  is  readily  seen  in 
circumstances  where  we  are  personally  disinterested. 
Cicero  narrates  that  “  an  aged  man  of  Athens  having 
come  to  the  theater,  not  one  of  his  fellow-citizens 
offered  to  help  him  to  a  place  ;  but,  having  approached 
the  embassadors  of  Lacedemon,  who  occupied  re¬ 
served  places,  these  rose  up  all  of  them  and  received 
him  among  themselves.  The  entire  assembly  broke 


32 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


out  in  applause.  This  gave  occasion  to  the  remark, 
that  the  Athenians  knew  the  good,  but  were  unwill¬ 
ing  to  do  it.”*  How  many  of  such  Athenians  are 
to  be  found  elsewhere  than  at  Athens  !  Observe 
Homage  of  what  transpires  in  our  public  spectacles. 

vice  to  vir¬ 
tue.  Represent  a  young  woman  in  prey  to  the 

most  terrible  of  temptations,  to  the  seductions  of 
flattery  and  gold,  to  the  most  diabolical  of  treacheries, 
so  that  she  shall  see  on  the  one  hand  vice  and 
fortune,  and  on  the  other  conscience  and  poverty. 
Cause  her  to  maintain  her  purity,  to  pass  through 
corruption  untouched,  and  to  prefer  poverty  and  a 
good  conscience.  Do  this,  and  you  will  be  sure  to 
excite  applause  ;  you  will  make  even  hardened  liber¬ 
tines  weep  with  sympathy. 

This  throws  light  upon  one  of  the  mysteries  of 
Providence  in  the  government  of  the  world.  How 
is  it  that  the  moral  law  has  succeeded  in  maintaining 
itself?  Many  centuries  ago  Sophocles  did  honor,  in 
Greek  tragedy,  to  this  sublime  law  which  oblivion 
can  never  abolish.  This  law,  in  fact,  has  always 
survived.  Time  has  swept  away  many  thrones  and 
republics,  many  charters  and  constitutions,  but  the 
moral  law  still  stands  fast.  And  yet  what  law  has 
been  more  violated,  more  denied,  more  assailed,  than 
it  ?  And  it  still  exists  in  all  its  vigor,  with  its  two 
terrible  sanctions :  remorse ,  the  punisher  of  accom- 

*  Dc  Seiiectute,  xviii. 


33 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

plished  crime,  and  ennui ,  the  scourge  of  wasted  lives. 
Our  very  manner  of  assailing  the  moral  law  betrays 
our  conviction  that  it  is  unassailable.  Though  sue- 
ceeding  but  too  often  in  accrediting  false  maxims  to 
justify  our  bad  conduct,  still  it  is  not  so  Bad  men  do 
much  the  moral  law  that  we  deny,  as,  rather,  } 

that  we  plead,  in  excuse  for  violating  it,  the  morallaw- 
force  of  exceptional  circumstances  in  our  own  case. 
We  will  the  good,  the  right ;  we  even  approve  and 
love  them — in  others. 

Take  the  case  of  that  statesman,  for  example,  who 
meditates  the  duping  of  his  confreres ,  acting  out  the 
maxim  that  speech  was  given  to  man  to  disguise  his 
thoughts  ;  who  supposes  that,  even  in  the  sphere  of 
politics,  this  man  pretends  to  believe  in  the  propriety 
of  deception  as  a  general  maxim  ?  Let  one  of  his 
clerks  prepare  for  him  a  false  political  report,  and  he 
is  as  ready  as  any  one  else  to  insist  on  the  duty  of 
truthfulness.  That  banker  who  enriches  himself  by 
criminal  abuse  of  the  confidence  of  his  creditors,  and 
who  is  preparing  bankruptcy  for  others  and  infamy 
for  himself,  does  he  think  of  dignifying  theft  into  a 
universal  moral  law  ?  Let  one  of  his  subordinates 
appropriate  a  few  dollars  from  his  safe,  and  he  will 
very  soon  recall  the  chapter  of  the  catechism  which 
enjoins  respect  for  the  rights  of  property.  His  sub¬ 
ordinate  is  a  thief,  but  for  himself  there  is  some  ex¬ 
ceptional  circumstance  to  plead.  It  is  thus  that 


34 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


we  are  prone  to  seek  excuses  for  violating  duty  in 
special  cases,  while  at  the  same  time  we  admit  the 
validity  of  the  moral  law  in  general.  We  approve 
of  the  law  ;  we  apply  it  to  others  ;  we  practice  it  in 
the  world— save  where  we  find  selfish  pretexts  for 
violating  it.  And  all  the  sophisms  to  which  we  then 
resort  in  self-justification  are  but  so  much  homage 
rendered  by  vice  to  virtue.  We  are  made  for  the 
good,  and-,  when  it  does  not  come  into  conflict  with 
our  evil  proclivities,  we  choose  it  and  love  it. 

The  good  is.  an  order,  a  state  of  relations,  which 
ought  to  be.  This  definition  embraces  the  reason 
which  conceives  the  order,  and  the  conscience  which 
pronounces  it  obligatory  ;  and  as  the  good  commends 
itself  to  the  heart  by  its  own  peculiar  attraction,  so 
all  the  powers  of  the  soul,  provided  they  are  not  per¬ 
verted  from  their  normal  direction,  are  turned  toward 
the  good.  We  must  now  more  specifically  character¬ 
ize  the  nature  of  the  good,  answering  the  question, 
What  is  this  order  which  ought  to  be  ? 

II.  Characterization  of  the  Good. 

That  which  ought  to  be,  among  intelligent  moral 
agents,  is  the  accomplishment  of  the  moral  law.  But 
what  is  this  law  ?  Cannot  its  manifold  prescriptions 
be  reduced  to  one  all-embracing  expression  ?  I  think 
so,  and  propose  for  your  acceptance  this  formula : 
That  the  duty  which  comprehends  in  itself  all  duties 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


35 


is  the  consecration  of  each  member  of  society  the 

moral  law 

to  the  general  good  of  the  whole,  (his  own  is, 
good  included),  that  is,  to  the  happiness  of  man¬ 
kind-meaning  by  happiness,  not  transient  pleasures 
which  may  be  in  conflict  with,  but  a  state  of  happi¬ 
ness  which  cannot  be  realized  save  in  that  condition 
of  order  whose  expression  is,  the  moral  law. 

All  duties  may  be  reduced  to  three  classes  :  Threeclass. 
duties  of  dignity ,  which  forbid  us  to  abase  esolduties- 
ourselves  to  the  rank  of  brutes  by  enslaving  the  mind 
to  the  body,  and  by  prostituting  speech,  the  organ  of 
reason,  to  the  service  of  falsehood  ;  duties  of  justice , 
which  require  us  to  respect  in  our  fellows  the  rights 
of  personality,  property,  reputation  ;  duties  of  benevo¬ 
lence ,  which  enjoin  upon  us  to  solace  our  fellows  in 
their  spiritual  and  temporal  necessities.  Such  is  the 
classification  of  our  duties  which,  after  careful  study* 
of  the  matter,  has  seemed  to  me  best.  Now  the  for¬ 
mula  which  I  have  above  proposed  embraces  these 
three  classes  of  duties.  For,  in  fact,  it  is  essential 
to  the  realization  of  the  good  of  rational,  spiritual  so¬ 
ciety  that  each  of  its  members  should,  so  to  speak, 
spiritualize  himself  by  rising  above  an  animal  life, 
(dignity)  ;  it  is  essential  that  each,  by  respecting  the 
rights  of  others,  should  contribute  to  render  society 
truly  spiritual,  that  is,  free,  (justice)  ;  and  it  is  essen- 

*  In  a  course  of  lectures  on  Ethics  delivered  at  Geneva  in  1865 


a. id  1 006. 


36 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


tial  that  each  will  should  be  prompted  to  the  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  general  good,  (benevolence).  Imagine  a 
society  of  moral  agents  in  a  condition  of  progressive 
development,  and  in  which,  on  the  basis  of  justice, 
there  should  flourish  more  and  more,  mutual  love  ; 
would  not  that  society  be  good  ? 

What  word  shall  we  now  find  for  designating  this 
devotion  of  each  to  the  common  good  of  the  commu- 
nity  ?  this  supreme  virtue  which  embraces  all  others  ? 
Comte,  the  founder  of  Positivism,  has  tried  to  answer 
the  question  by  inventing  a  new  term,  altruisme , 
“  othersomeness,”  interest  in  others.  Moral  progress, 
thinks  he,  consists  in  the  progressive  giving  place  of 
egotism  to  altruisme,  or  concern  for  others.  But  there 
is  a  better  word.  Charity,  a  term  which  in  common 
usage  has  come  to  be  almost  synonymous  with  alms¬ 
giving,  signifies  primitively,  not  only  in  the  language 
of  the  Gospels,  but  also  in  that  of  Cicero,  unselfish 
love — the  consecration  -of  each  to  the  good  of  the 
others.  Prestige  being  therefore  in  favor  of  this  word, 
•  we  will  retain  it.  We  hold  that  charity  is  a  suitable 
general  expression  for  the  relations  which  ought  to 
subsist  between  moral  agents  as  members  of  society. 
This  being  the  case,  the  good,  as  far  as  concerns  the 
Charity  the  relations  of  men  with  each  other,  is  the  reali- 

sum  of  all 

moral  duty,  zation  of  charity,  or  the  direction  of  the  will 
of  each  toward  the  happiness  *of  all. 

IIow  now  shall  we  conceive  of  the  good,  as  involved 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


37 


in  the  relations  of'physical  nature  to  humanity  ?  The 
body  evidently  ought  to  be  the  instrument  of  the 
spirit.  External  nature  ought  to  be  the  condi-  The  minist 
tion  of  the  life  of  the  body ;  ought  to  give  im-  ot  nature* 
pulse  to  the  investigations  which  culminate  in  science ; 
to  the  works  of  industry  which  establish  the  dominion 
of  man  over  matter ;  to  the  instinct  of  art  which,  taking 
physical  beauty  as  a  starting-point,  soars  aloft  in 
search  of  the  ineffable,  the  ideal.  Nature  in  submis¬ 
sion  to  spirits,  spirits  submitting  to  the  law  of 
charity — would  not  that  be  a  good  state  of  things  ? 
It  is  to  you,  the  great  public,  that  I  appeal  for  an 
answer.  I  have  not  come  here  to  teach  you  any  thing 
new,  but  rather  to  remind  you  of  what  you  already 
know ;  to  aid  you,  perhaps,  to  brush  away  the  dust 
from  the  depths "  of  your  souls  that  you  may  read  the 
characters  that  are  there  engraved.  I  ask  you,  Do 
you  not  perceive — I  do  not  mean  in  your  practice,  but 
in  your  conscience  and  your  reason — the  image  of  the 
good  which  I  have  just  described  ?  Do  you  not 
admit  as  a  certain  truth  one  that  forces  itself  upon 
your  judgment,  that,  in  the  order  of  fitness,  in  a  le¬ 
gitimate  and  good  condition  of  the  universe,  material 
bodies  are  made  for  spirits,  and  spirits  for  charity  ? 
Does  this  conception  bear  any  traces  of  the  arbitrary, 
the  individual,  the  national  ?  Is  it  I  merely*  or  you, 
or  a  Russian,  or  an  American,  who  conceives  of  the 
good  under  the  form  in  which  I  present  it  ?  or  is  it 


38 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


not  all  and  each  of  us,  or,  rather,  humanity  itself  as  it 
exists  in  each  of  us,  free  from  all  individual  and  na¬ 
tional  peculiarities  ?  Is  there  one  of  you  who  fails 
still  to  distinguish  this  deep  primitive  voice  of  human 
nature  from  the  discords  of  the  surface  ?  In  fact,  this 
voice  is  too  often  drowned  by  the  clangor  of  the  pas¬ 
sions,  the  tumult  of  disorderly  tendencies  ;  but  it 
finally  succeeds  in  making  itself  heard  by  every  soul 
that  is  earnest  and  calm.  The  destination  of  the  soul 
is  to  rule  our  nature.  To  will  the  general  good  is 
the  supreme  law  of  moral  agents.  These  thoughts 
find  an  echo  in  the  depths  of  every  conscience. 

And  here  we  come  in  conflict  with  a  doctrine  as 
ancient  as  human  letters,  but  which,  ridiculously 
enough,  certain  writers  of  the  day  are  attempting  to 
rejuvenate  under  the  title  of  modern  science.  We  are 
told  that  there  is  no  good  per  se,  no  real  and  absolute 
good  ;  that  there  are  customs,  and  that  these  vary  ; 
but  that,  aside  from  these  customs  and  their  history, 
some  deny  there  is  no  permanent  law  of  the  good — no 
unvanin'/  moral  principles.  We  are  told  that  many 
moral  law.  things  judged  bad  in  Europe,  are  judged 

good  in  Asia  ;  that,  for  example,  a  young  American 
Indian  obtains  the  praise  of  his  father  and  the  smile 
of  his  mother  for  returning  home  with  the  scalp  of 
his  foe,  an  act  with  which  European  parents  would 
hardly  be  pleased.  And  from  a  large  number  of  facts 
such  as  these,  it  has  been  inferred  that  the  conscience 


The  Problem  of  Evil ’ 


39 


has  no  invariable  character ;  that  it  is  like  soft  wax, 
shaping  itself  indifferently  to  whatever  pressure  is 
applied.  This  view  is  aptly  presented  in  these  words 
of  Montaigne,  as  stated  by  Pascal  in  his  P msecs : 
“  One  sees  scarcely  any  thing  just  or  unjust,  which 
does  not  change  character  in  changing  climate.  Three 
degrees  of  polar  elevation  reverse  the  whole  system 
of  jurisprudence.  One  meridian,  more  or  less,  over¬ 
throws  a  truth.  .  .  .  Admirable  justice  which  is  limited 
by  a  river  !  Truth  on  this  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  error 
on  the  other  ;  .  .  .  the  mockery  is  so  great,  the  caprice 
of  men  is  so  fertile,  that  there  is  not  a  single  law  that 
is  universal.  Theft,  incest,  the  murder  of  infants  and 
of  parents,  every  thing  has  had  its  place  among  virtu¬ 
ous  actions.”  Resting  on  considerations  of  this  na¬ 
ture,  it  has  been  declared  that  the  good  is  only  an 
idea  of  relative,  variable,  local,  temporary  character, 
so  that  it  is  impossible  to  determine  it  in  a  general 
absolute  manner.  These  declarations  are  so  grave 
that  their  admission  would  undermine  the  very  pillars 
of  our  moral  system.  Let  us,  therefore,  examine  them 
briefly,  but  seriously  and  in  good  faith. 

Moral  views  vary.  To  understand  well  the  nature 
and  scope  of  this  incontestable  fact,  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  more  closely  than  we  have  yet  done  the  na¬ 
ture  of  moral  phenomena. 

That  which  we  call  conscience  is  the  sentiment  of 
obligation  which  enjoins  upon  us  certain  modes  of 


40 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


action,  and  forbids  others.  Without  this  unique  senti- 
Diversity  of  ment  there  would  exist  for  us  neither  good 

practical 

moral jud-  nor  evil,  esteem  nor  contempt.  Now,  the 

merits  ac- 

counted  for.  idea  oi  good  and  evil,  and  the  sentiments 
therewith  associated,  constitute  an  essential  element 
of  human  nature  ;  the  individual  who  should  be  de¬ 
void  of  them  would  be  what  naturalists  call  a  monster ; 
but  the  existence  of  monsters  does  not  disestablish  a 
species.  The  idea  of  the  good  exists  wherever  man 
exists  in  the  integrity  of  his  nature  ;  to  this  there  are 
no  exceptions.  But  What  is  good?  or,  in  other  words, 
What  ought  man  to  do?  It  is  at  this  point  that  di¬ 
versity  begins.  We  cherish  our  aged  parents,  and 
think  we  do  well.  Certain  savages  kill  them  to  save 
them  from  the  ills  of  old  age,  and  think  likewise  that 
they  do  well.  Now  whence  this  diversity  of  rules  of 
conduct  ?  It  arises  from  difference  of  belief.  We 
hold  that  man  has  no  right  over  the  life  of  man  ; 
savages  who  kill  their  aged  parents  hold  a  different 
view.  It  is  from  diversity  of  views  as  to  the  nature 
and  destination  of  creatures  that  diversities  of  moral 
Conscience  practice  arise.  Conscience  is  not  a  faculty 

not  product¬ 
ive  of  ideas,  productive  of  new  ideas  ;  it  applies  the  senti¬ 
ment  of  obligation  to  the  realization  of  certain  intel¬ 
lectually  perceived  relations  ;  it  conforms  itself  to  the 
truth,  but  it  does  not  derive  the  truth  from  itself. 
Truth  is,  however,  the  aliment  of  the  conscience. 
There  is  not  one  form  of  ethics  for  the  conscience, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


4i 


and  another  for  the  reason.  Reason,  alone  and  of 
itself,  has  no  moral  law  ;  and  conscience,  alone  and  of 
itself,  contains  only  the  sentypent  of  obligation,  the 
object  of  which,  however,  cannot  be  determined,  save 
by  the  intervention  of  the  reason.  Hence  all  rules  of 
practical  morality  are  necessarily  subject  to  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  speculative  beliefs.  Hence  it  is  very  evident 
that  that  new  theory  of  the  day,  la  morale  independante , 
which  pretends  to  sever  the  dependence  of  morality  on 
speculative  beliefs,  requires  of  its  devotees  to  ignore 
or  forget  the  most  incontestable  results  of  anthropo¬ 
logical  science. 

But  the  views  of  practical  morality  do  vary  con¬ 
siderably.  We  admit  it.  It  is  easy  to  refute  such 
theorists  as  deny  it.  But  I  propose  to  submit  three 
observations  which  will  prevent,  as  I  think,  the  de¬ 
duction,  from  this  incontestable  fact,  of  the  inferences 
which  skepticism  too  hastily  draws.  First  observa¬ 
tion  :  The  diversities  in  moral  views,  though  real, 
are  not  so  extensive  as  a  superficial  examination  might 
lead  to  suppose.  There  exist  every-where  in  the  sphere 
of  morals  two  quite  distinct  currents.  The  one  is 
formed  by  usages  and  institutions,  and  by  the  maxims 

which  look  to  the  justification  of  the  usages  The  morali¬ 
ty  of  public 

and  institutions.  This  is  the  morality  of  the  me. 
world,  and  it  varies  very  extensively  ;  but  the  cause 
of  these  variations  is  easily  discoverable.  Formerly, 
for  example,  certain  publicists  of  the  Southern  States 


42 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


of  America  constructed  theories  in  justification  of 
slavery.  The  pressure  that  was  exerted  on  the  social 
conscience  by  institutions  and  interest  is  in  this 
case  very  evident.  We  see  analagous  facts  very  fre¬ 
quently  in  the  works  of  writers  on  politics,  who  indeed 
seem  to  have  a  large  assortment  of  moral  theories  by 
which  to  explain  and  justify  the  events  they  narrate, 
and  in  which  they  have  often  shared. 

But  alongside  of  this  zigzag  and  broken  current, 
The  moraii-  there  is  another.  There  is  a  morality  which 

ty  of  the 

conscience,  we  call  the  morality  of  the  conscience,  with¬ 
out  forgetting  that  it  is  participated  in  by  the  reason, 
and  influenced  by  speculative  views.  This  current 
of  morality  varies  less  than  the  former,  and  varies 
only  in  developing  itself  in  a  uniform  direction.  We 
are  not  justified  in  attributing  to  the  morality  of  the 
conscience  the  variations  which  belong  only  to  the 
morality  of  society.  Institutions  and  usages  do  not 
always  give  a  correct  idea  of  the  true  thoughts  of  a 
people.  Our  foundling  hospitals  do  not  prove  that 
family  duties  have  no  sanction  in  our  theories  of  mo¬ 
rality.  Now,  we  often  judge  half-civilized  and  illiter¬ 
ate  nations  by  their  usages  and  institutions  ;  and  yet, 
perhaps,  among  these  same  nations,  conscience  finds 
true  champions,  but  whose  protests  against  certain 
immoral  usages  remain  unknown  to  us.  But  in  cases 
of  nations  which  have  a  written  history  it  is  easy  to 
show,  that  the  morality  of  the  conscience  varies  less 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


43  . 

extensively  than  is  usually  supposed.  The  ancient 
books  of  India,  of  China,  and  of  Persia  contain  some 
very  pure  rays  of  truth,  some  very  high  conceptions 
of  the  good.  To  cite  but  a  single  example,  the  an¬ 
cient  Sanscrit  poem  of  Valmiki,  Ramayana ,  contains, 
among  many  fantastic  fancies,  some  traits  of  virtue 
from  which  we  might  derive  instruction.  The  heroine 
of  the  poem,  Sita,  is  a  woman  of  admirable  purity  ; 
and  the  author  addresses,  more  than  once,  to  the  per¬ 
sonages  whom  he  would  present  to  us  as  worthy  of 
praise,  the  encomium,  that  they  find  their  pleasure  in 
the  pleasure  of  all  creatures. 

Notwithstanding,  therefore,  the  considerable  varia¬ 
tions  in  usages  and  institutions,  and  in  the  maxims 
which  justify  them,  we  find  nevertheless  among  man¬ 
kind  a  substratum  of  convictions  which  gives  to  the 
idea  of  duty  a  greater  degree  of  fixity.  As  civiliza¬ 
tion  begins  and  advances,  these  fundamental  bases  of 
morality  are  recognized  and  brought  out  into  stca(J 
increasing  light ;  and  this  process  takes  place  gl^^alof 
wherever  culture  finds  footing.  Christian  knowledge, 
morality  alone,  in  my  opinion,  has  placed  in  its  true 
light  the  fundamental  law  of  moral  order,  and  thus, 
by  enlightening  the  conscience,  has  enabled  it  fully  to 
accomplish  its  normal  functions.  Nevertheless  we 
find  among  the  sages  of  Greece  and  Rome,  and 
among  those  of  the  far  Orient,  the  enfeebled  and  scat¬ 
tered,  but  real,  rays  of  that  light  which  illuminates 


44 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


us  to-day.  It  is  only  a  superficial  examination  of 
facts  that  can  lead  to  the  notion  that  there  is  no 
limitation  to  the  discordancy  of  moral  beliefs  ;  a 
deeper  study  corrects  this  impression. 

Second  observation  :  When  truth  is  presented  to 
the  conscience  it  recognizes  it,  adheres  to  it,  and, 
Conscience  save  in  exceptional  cases,  (jvhich, constantly 

retains  the 

light  which  recur  in  the  sphere  of  morals,  for  the  reason 

it  once  re-  .  .  . 

ceives.  that  it  is  the  domain  of  liberty,)  never  again 
separates  from  it.  When  man,  carried  away  by  pas¬ 
sion,  forsakes  the  good  which  he  has  known,  it  is 
generally  the  case  that  his  conscience  continues  faith¬ 
fully  to  remind  him  of  the  laws  which  his  conduct 
is  violating.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  of  the  indis¬ 
pensableness  of  distraction  to  those  whose  lives  .are 
guilty ;  they  flee  from  themselves,  so  to  speak,  only 
in  order  to  avoid  the  sight  of  an  unwelcome  light 
which  beams  forth  in  the  soul  as  soon  as  it  is  in  re¬ 
pose,  and  sheds  too  bright  a  glare  upon  the  darkness 
of  an  external  life  of  disorder. 

The  general  history  of  humanity  already  illustrates 
the  same  truth.  When  it  is  asserted  that  every 
nation  has  its  peculiar  ethics  as  well  as  its  religion, 
and  that  we  have  no  good  reason  for  supposing  our¬ 
selves  in  the  right  rather  than  the  Hindoos,  the 
The  potency  Chinese,  or  the  Greenlanders,  it  is  forgotten 

of  a  civili¬ 
zation  the  that  diverse  forms  of  civilization  do  not 

Normalcy,  enter  as  equal  factors  in  the  development 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  45 

of  mankind.  When  two  forms  of  civilization  come 
into  contact,  and,  after  a  long  conflict,  finally  shape 
themselves  into  a  new  civilization,  what  is  the  result  ? 
Morally,  the  more  corrupt  form  usually  corrupts  the 
other ;  intellectually,  the  more  enlightened  brings  the 
other  to  its  light.  Without  turning  over  widely  the 
pages  of  history,  look  simply  at  what  is  transpiring 
under  our  own  eyes.  European  civilization— -or,  to 
call  it  by  the  name  which  indicates  its  source, 
Christian  civilization- — 4s  visibly  accomplishing  the 
conquest  of  the  world.  Its  triumph  is  but  a  question 
of  time,  as  all  admit.  It  advances,  it  attacks,  but 
has  no  need  of  self-defense.  Christians  are  busy  in 

putting  down  the  immoral  and  cruel  practices  of 

% 

Asia  and  Africa ;  but  the  Indians  make  no  attempts 
to  introduce  among  us  the  system  of  caste  or  of 
human  sacrifice,  and  the  blacks  of  the  equator  send 
no  missionaries  to  convert  to  the  barbarism  of  their 
customs  the  people  of  France  and  England.  The 
principles  of  dignity,  of  justice,  and  of  benevolence, 
which  form  the  basis  of  our  ethical  views,  are  the 
sole  principles  in  which  the  conscience  recognizes  its 
true  nature. 

It  is  vain  to  object,  that  this  is  only  our  opinion, 
and  that  contrary  opinions  have  exactly  the  same 
value  for  those  who  adopt  them.  We  have  in  favor 
of  our  view  the  weight  of  an  immense  and  incon¬ 
testable  fact.  Our  opinions  are  taking  possession  of 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


the  whole  globe ;  Asiatics  and  Africans  will  affirm 
The  future  it  as  well  as  we.  The  future  of  the  world 
woridbe-  bei°n&s  to  our  moral  ideas  ;  our  free-thinkers 

Christian  even>  do  n°t  doubt  it.  Do  you  wish  a  proof 
civilization.  0f  this  ?  Hear  what  they  say,  and  read  what 

they  write,  when,  not  engaged  in  defending  their 
skeptical  views,  they  betray  their  real  thoughts.  We 
repeat  it,  the  history  of  the  race,  and  an  examination 
of  its  actual  condition,  refute  the  notion  that  the  con¬ 
science  yields  equally  to  all  forms  of  moral  doctrine. 
That  moral  doctrine  which  has  vital  power  to  destroy 
all  others,  and  to  possess  itself  progressively  of  the 
human  race,  is  manifestly  the  doctrine  which  is 
adapted  to  man,  and  which  man  does  not  renounce 
when  once  he  has  received  it.  This  fact  is  of  im¬ 
mense  significance. 


Third  observation  :  When  a  man  has  ascended  a 
degree  in  the  scale  of  moral  conceptions,  he  can  see 
well  enough  how  false  notions  of  virtue  should  be 
formed  in  the  inferior  regions.  But  the  inverse  is  not 
the  case  ;  the  mind  that  is  blinded  by  a  belief  in  false 
virtues  cannot  understand,  and,  in  fact,  absolutely 
Higher  vir-  misconceives,  the  nature  of  true  virtue.  He, 
derptoodTy  f°r  example,  who,  like  Zamore  in  A  hire,  be- 
lower,  but  peves  that  vengeance  is  a  virtue,  sees  only 

not  vice  a  ’  J 

verm.  weakness  and  cowardice  in  the  man  who 
forgives.  But  when,  after  a  violent  inward  struggle, 
the  Emperor  Augustus  brings  himself  to  pardon 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  47 

Cinna,  who,  though  overwhelmed  with  benefits,  had 
yet  conspired  to  assassinate  him,  we  can  readily  im¬ 
agine  the  exalted  emotions  which  this  triumph  over 
self  called  forth  in  his  soul.*  And  while  in  this  state 
of  mind  he  understood  well  enough  the  false  virtue 
of  vengeance,  and  saw  with  all  clearness  the  error  of 
the  violent  and  passionate  man,  who  sees  only  weak¬ 
ness  in  the  spiritual  triumph  of  him  who  forgives. 

I  hope,  by  the  light  of  these  three  observations,  to 
put  you  on  your  guard  against  the  approaches  of 
moral  skepticism,  which  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  most 
dangerous  forms  of  the  spirit  of  doubt.  Doubtless 
we  are  as  yet  very  far  from  possessing  moral  truth 
in  its  most  perfect  developments  and  applications, 
for  we  are  far  from  having  fully  profited  by  the  light 
which  we  have  already  had.  But  our  Christian  mo¬ 
rality  has  an  all-conquering  vital  power,  and  it  en¬ 
ables  us  to  understand  all  the  lower  degrees  of  moral 
development ;  it  gives  a  perfect  explanation  of  the 
origin  and  nature  of  the  false  maxims  which  passion 
has  generated,  and  of  which  we  discover  the  germs 
in  ourselves. 

*  Je  suis  maitre  de  moi  coniine  de  l’univers. 

Je  le  suis,  je  veux  l’etre.  O  siecles,  6  memoire  ! 

Conservez  a  jamais  ma  derniere  victoire. 

Je  triomphe  aujourd’hui  du  plus  juste  courroux 

De  qui  le  souvenir  puisse  aller  jusqu’a  vous. 

Soyons  amis,  Cinna,  c’est  moi  qui  t’en  convie. 

Cinna.  act  v,  scene  3. 


48 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Conscience  is  not  like  soft  wax,  taking  indifferently 
every  shape.  Let  me  suggest  a  better  comparison. 
Those  of  you  who  have  climbed  our  Alps  have  per¬ 
haps  noticed  near  the  limits  of  woody  vegetation 
certain  trees  clinging  desperately  to  a  rocky  surface. 
The  uncongenial  soil  has  tortured  their  roots  ;  snows 
and  ice-slides  have  disfigured  their  trunks  ;  the  cold 
has  dwarfed  the  growth  of  the  branches,  and  the  teeth 
of  the  chamois  have  put  the  climax  to  their  deformity. 
Conscience  These  wretched  trees  adapt  themselves,  it  is 

com  para  ole,  1  ’ 

not  to  wax,  true,  to  these  deforming  influences.  But 

but  to  the 

vital  princi-  they  have  within  themselves  a  vital  principle 

pie  in  vege¬ 
tation.  — the  principle  of  a  far  different  growth  and 

development.  This  development  they  can  only  attain 
under  the  conditions  of  fertility  of  soil  and  abundance 
of  sunlight.  But  even  here  it  is  not  the  soil  and  the 
sun  which  determine  their  superior  forms  ;  it  is  only 
when  they  find  congenial  nutriment,  soil,  light,  moist¬ 
ure,  that  their  genuine  germinal  nature  is  enabled 
to  realize  itself.  Now  it  is  thus  of  the  human  con¬ 
science.  Conscience  is  primitively  adapted  to  recog¬ 
nize  true  moral  principles,  but  it  has  not  the  power  of 
producing  them  unaided.  Error,  passion,  interest, 
deform  it.  But  give  it  only  the  soil  of  truth,  and  it 
will  spring  up  to  a  far  different  development.  Until 
you  have  accepted  this  thought,  you  cannot  under¬ 
stand  the  history  of  humanity.  You  will  be  unable 
to  account  for  certain  great  facts  so  long  as  you 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


49 


refuse  to  admit  that  the  will  has  a  law  which  it  seeks, 

# 

and  that  the  conscience  can  find  satisfaction  only  in 
a  definite  conception  of  the  good. 

There  is  a  positive  principle  of  good  and  evil,  and 
in  the  diversities  of  our  theories  and  usages  we  more 
or  less  approximate  this  existing  law,  I  hope  to  in¬ 
duce  you  to  admit,  that,  despite  the  doubts  that  may 
have  passed  over  the  surface  of  your  minds,  you  have 
never  seriously  thought  otherwise — never  can  think 
otherwise. 

Consider,  that  if  in  the  sphere  of  morality  there 
was  nothing  but  fluctuations,  but  no  permanent  law, 
the  very  words  better  and  worse ,  which  pre-  Th0  words 

J  r  ‘“better”  and 

suppose  the  good  as  a  standard  of  compari-  “worse” pre¬ 
suppose  an 

son,  would  be  utterly  without  sense.  Some  unvarying 

,  _  <  standard  of 

modern  writers  have  wished  to  substitute  for  comparison, 
the  idea  of  good  the  idea  of  progress.  But  this  was 
surely  thought  run  mad.  Progress  being  simply  an 
approaching  of  the  good,  we  cquld  not  conceive  of 
progress  save  in  view  of  some— obscure,  it  may  be, 
but  yet  positive  and  real — idea  of  the  good.  Without 
the  idea  of  the  good  in  our  thoughts  we  could  know- 
nothing  either  of  progress  or  decadence,  but  only  of 
mere  changes.  Attempt,  if  possible,  to  think  in  this 
manner.  Attempt  to  think  that  a  generous  and  de¬ 
voted  man  is  different  from  an  egotist,  who  basely 
sacrifices  the  interests  of  his  fellows  to  his  own  per¬ 
sonal  desires,  but  that  he  is  not  better.  Try  to  think 


L 


50  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

that  the  moral  condition  of  the  lowest  savages,  who 
pass  from  murder  to  debauch,  and  from  debauch  to 
murder,  is  different  from  the  moral  condition  of  the 
most  upright  people  of  Europe,  but  that  it  is  not  worse. 
You  may  attempt,  but  you  cannot  succeed  in  so 
thinking.  Doubtless  you  may  say  so  ;  but  if,  on  seri¬ 
ously  examining  your  inmost  thoughts,  you  still  per¬ 
sist  in  saying  so,  then  you  would  evidently  present  a 
case  to  which  the  remark  of  Spinosa  would  apply — 
that,  in  order  to  cure  a  doubt  which  exists  only  in 
words,  there  is  need  not  for  arguments,  but  for  a 
specific  against  obstinacy. 

In  the  variations  of  morals  and  ethical  ideas  there 
are  progresses  and  decadences,  as  no  one  seriously 
denies.  There  are  changes  which  are  generally  ad¬ 
mitted  as  true  progress  ;  there  are  others  which  are 
universally  considered  as  steps  backward.  Let  us 
examine  some  of  these  changes,  and  we  will  encounter 
again  the  true  idea  of  the  good. 

The  practical  application  of  steam  and  electricity 
are  improvements  of  which  our  century  is  justly 
proud.  We  do  not  sympathize  with  those  narrow 
spiritualists  who  speak  with  disdain  of  what  they 
rhe  signifi-  call  “  mere  material  conquests.”  But  what 

material  do  we  see  here  ■  We  see  the  human  mind 
conquests.  mastering  more  and  more  the  agents  of 

nature,  and  succeeding,  to  some  extent,  in  triumph¬ 
ing  over  space  and  time.  These  are  surely  noble 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Si 


conquests.  But  if  these  victories  over  nature  were 
employed  only  in  satisfying  the  body,  in  multiplying 
the  delights  of  the  flesh — -if  telegraphs  and  railroads, 
instead  of  contributing  to  spread  over  the  globe  intelli¬ 
gence  and  spiritual  light,  contributed  only  to  increase 
the  luxury  and  practical  materialism  of  life-— who  then 
would  hesitate  to  call  them  steps  backward?  You 
will  not  dispute  these  two  statements  :  mind  pro¬ 
gresses  in  conquering  nature  ;  it  declines  in  becom¬ 
ing  subservient  thereto. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  the  social  sphere.  When  we  see 
justice  prevailing  more  and  more  in  institutions,  the 
poor  and  the  rich  equally  favored  in  the  sanctuary 
of  the  law  ;  when  we  see  benevolence  increasing  in 
our  customs,  the  different  classes  of  society  laying 
aside  their  feuds  and  mutually  aiding  each  The  good 
other  in  ameliorating  the  evils  inseparable  *,je  oi 
from  our  earthly  condition — that  we  call  pro®1,ess- 
progress.  No  one  can  think  otherwise.  Can  you 
possibly  think  that  it  would  be  well  that  force  should 
supplant  right,  and  trample  justice  under  foot  ?  that 
hatred  and  war  should  take  the  place  of  mutual  good¬ 
will  ?  Can  you  admit  that  barbarism  is  not  worse 
than  civilization?  You  cannot. 

There  are,  therefore,  degrees  of  progress,  incontest¬ 
able  progress.  In  our  relations  to  nature,  progress  is 
the  increase  of  the  domination  of  mind  over  matter. 
In  the  relations  of  men  to  each  other,  progress  is  the 


52 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


development  of  that  charity  which  crowns  justice 
with  benevolence.  Now,  progress  is  simply  advance¬ 
ment  toward  the  good.  In  admitting  the  forms  of 
progress  which  we  have  just  passed  in  review,  we 
declare  that  it  is  good  that  nature  be  subject  to  mind, 
and  that  mind  be  subject  to  the  law  of  charity.  Our 
formula  is  therefore  justified  ;  the  good  is  known  to 
us.  That  nature  be  subject  to  mind,  that  mind  be 
subject  to  the  law  of  charity,  is  the  legitimate  order 
of  the  universe,  as  conceived  by  reason,  and  as  de¬ 
clared  obligatory  by  the  conscience. 

We  are  able  now  to  construct,  above  and  outside  of 
our  widely  variant  national  and  individual  usages  and 
tastes,  the  great  outlines  of  the  edifice  of  the  good  as 
it  is  conceived  by  man  as  man.  Let  us  do  so.  Let 
society  as  us  suppose  a  society  which  is  good.  Let  us 

conscience  -  .  ..  1  i  r 

calls  for  it  take  trom  it  all  war,  tyranny,  revolt,  theft, 
prostitution,  murder — in  fact,  all  the  shameful  and 
bloody  plagues  of  humanity.  Let  the  men  be  tem¬ 
perate  and  strong,  and  let  them  be  successively  gain¬ 
ing  the  mastery  of  nature  by  the  light  of  science  and 
the  labor  of  industry.  Let  the  women  be  chaste  and 
dutiful,  transmitting  to  the  rising  generation  the 
heritage  of  their  virtues.  Suppose  the  families  and 
the  state  to  abound  in  that  peace  which  springs  of 
mutual  love.  Such  a  society  would  be  happy  indeed, 
for  the  treasures  of  joy  of  which  the  human  heart  is 
capable  are  almost  infinite. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


53 


Have  you  ever  gone  over  in  thought  the  long  cata¬ 
logue  of  joys  which  we  lose  by  our  own  fault  ?  I  was 
returning  into  Geneva,  not  long  since,  on  a  radiant 

autumnal  evening.  The  air  was  tranquil,  the  a  reminis¬ 
cence  of  the 

sun  had  just  sunk  behind  the  chain  of  the  author, 
jura,  a  calm  transfiguring  glory  crowned  the  mount¬ 
ain  peaks.  It  was  a  joy  to  respire  and  gaze,  and  I 
thought  of  the  many  for  whom  this  joy  was  lost  by 
their  own  faults.  Above  all  I  thought  of  myself,  and 
of  the  occasions  when,  absorbed  with  profitless  cares', 
I  had  neglected  pure  joys  that  are  always  at  hand. 
How  numberless  are  the  joys  offered  to  us  in  the 
contemplation  of  nature,  in  the  relations  of  family  and 
friendship,  and  in  honest  and  successful  labor  !  How 
happy  the  world  if  we  could  .eliminate  from  it  all  evil ! 
But  would  that  be  enough  ?  would  that  fully  satisfy 
our  aspirations  for  the  good  ?  No!  And  why?  Be¬ 
cause  of  death.  So  long  as  the  thought  of  death,  of 
real  death,  is  before  us — of  that  death  which  is  not  a 
transformation  of  life,  the  passage  from  one  stage  of 
existence  to  another,  but  an  end  of  life,  an  annihila¬ 
tion — so  long  as  the  thought  of  death  is  before  us  we 
may  enjoy  some  elements  of  good,  but  not  the  full 
good  to  which  our  soul  aspires,  the  supreme  good. 

In  youth  we  are  full  of  confidence  in  life ;  and  death 
itself,  appearing  only  at  the  distant  horizon,  and 
shrouded  in  the  mists  of  the  future,  has  even  some¬ 
thing  of  the  poetic  and  melancholic.  But  let  age 


54 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


advance,  and  the  limit  of  life  begin  to  be  felt ;  let  the 
The  fearful-  somber  fingers  of  death  begin  to  assume 
Death.  more  definite  lineaments,  and  we  wake  up  to 
the  thought  that  each  hour  is  bringing  us  nearer  to 
our  coffin,  and  is  hollowing  out  the  grave  for  the  loved 
ones  about  us  ;  we  feel  that  the  river  of  life  is  flow¬ 
ing  without  rest,  and  that  the  river  leads  to  the  abyss. 
And  then  a  profound  sadness  takes  hold  on  the  soul ; 
for  it  is  horrible  to  feel  that  all  that  we  have  and  are 
is  passing  from  us.  This  is  one  reason  why  so  many 
men  fear  to  look  into  their  own  hearts  when  alone. 
Some,  as  we  have  said,  fear  this  because  solitude 
renders  audible  the  voice  of  remorse ;  but  others 
dread  it  lest,  in  the  silence  of  the  hum  of  the  world, 
they  hear  in  their  souls  the  terrifying  voice,  “  Mortal, 
thou  art  to  die  !  ”  Death  contradicts  our  nature.  It 
is  vain  to  speak  of  the  leaves  which  fade  and  fall, 
of  the  seasons  which  come  and  pass  ;  it  is  vain  to  try 
to  impress  upon  us  that  death  is  a  natural  function 
of  life  ;  we  refuse  to  admit  the  force  of  such  analo¬ 
gies — the  soul  protests. 

I  know  that  certain  materialists,  who  assume  to  be 
sages,  mock  at  the  pretentiousness  of  insignificant 
man  in  his  wish  to  live  forever ;  but  mock  as  they 
may,  they  also  in  their  sober  moments  think  and  feel 
just  as  we.  Their  laugh  is  the  hollow  laugh  which 
disguises  tears  ;  and  if  at  times  it  is  coarse  and  bois¬ 
terous,  it  is,  perhaps  unconsciously  to  themselves, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


55 


because  they  wish  to  stifle  the  voice  of  their  own 
hearts.  For,  in  fact,  death,  in  the  sense  of  ceasing  to 
exist,  would  be  a  disorder  contrary  to  our  whole 
spiritual  constitution  :•  to  the  conscience,  be-  Death  Pr°- 

tes ted  against 

cause  conscience  calls  for  an  unlimited  by  conscience, 

heart,  and 

growth  in  perfection,  which,  as  we  know  too  reason, 
well,  is  not  attainable  in  this  life  ;  to  the  heart,  be¬ 
cause  the  heart  is  made  for  perpetual  affections,  and 
is  rudely  broken  by  severance  from  the  objects  of  its 
love  ;  and  to  reason,  because  our  nature  is  so  mani¬ 
festly  constituted  for  life  that,  on  the  supposition 
that  we  are  actually  destined  to  death,  we  can  dis¬ 
cover  no  sort  of  correspondence  between  its  constitu¬ 
tion  and  its  destination. 

We  clearly  see  the  grand  outlines  of  the  good — that 
is,  of  the  order  of  things — which  would  fulfill  our  aspi¬ 
rations.  These  aspirations  claim  not  merely  the  pro¬ 
longation  of  life  such  as  it  here  is  ;  for  so  great  is  the 
disproportion  between  the  wants  of  the  soul  and  the 
actual  realities  of  this  life,  that  sometimes  we  become 
satiate  of  life  and  ripe  for  death.  We  aspire  The  goul  as_ 
"to  a  life  other  than  this — a  kingdom  of  the  £res  *°  a 
good,  of  whose  brightness  we  catch  some  than  this- 
positive,  though  confused,  glimpses  even  from  the 
midst  of  our  present  darkness.  And  if  this  visidh 
were  really  but  a  will-o’-the-wisp,  if  we  open  our  eyes 
on  the  marvelous  light  of  this  world  but  to  close  them 
finally  forever,  then  our  life,  were  it  prolonged  even 


5  6  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

to  patriarchal  age,  and  under  conditions  otherwise 
absolutely  good,  would  not  only  be  sad  because  of  the 
prospect  of  its  end,  it  would  be  absurd  in  itself. 
Either  our  conception  of  the  good  is  chimerical,  or 
we  are  constituted  for  life,  for  life  immortal. 

But  we  are  asked  for  proofs  of  immortality.  Let 
us  state  the  question  properly.  Ib  is  impossible  to 
study  the  tendencies,  the  aspirations,  the  needs  of  the 
soul,  without  being  forced  to  admit  that  life  is  the 
affirmation  of,  the  thesis  guaranteed  by,  our  spiritual 
constitution.  To  whoever,  therefore,  demands  proofs 
of  immortality,  I  answer  that  it  is  for  him  to  speak 
first,  and  I  ask  that  he  furnish  me  proofs  of  death. 
But  how  is  one  going  to  demonstrate  death,  in  the 
sense  of  a  cessation  of  personal  being  ?  Let  us  see. 

A  man  falls  sick.  His  heart  finally  ceases  to  beat ; 
his  limbs  become  motionless  ;  his  body  begins  to  de¬ 
compose  ;  it  is  carried  to  the  grave-yard.  The  grass 
springs  and  grows  green  on  his  grave ;  the  overhang¬ 
ing  willow  renews  its  foliage  ;  but  the  dead  comes  not 
again.  Let  us  state  this  in  the  language  of  science. 
Within  the  limits  of  our  present  experience,  the  soul- 
manifests  itself  only  by  the  means  of  our  present 
body.  But  is  that  all  the  proof  we  have  of  death  ? 
ft  is.  I  do  not  think  that  the  most  subtile  of  the  ma¬ 
terialistic  philosophers,  were  he  at  the  same  time  the 
best  of  modern  physiologists,  could  produce,  in  favor 
of  his  cause,  a  proof,  which  would  amount  to  'more 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


57 


than  this  simple  statement :  Within  the  limits  of  our 
present  experience  spirits  manifest  them-  present  ex- 

r  .  , .  ,  .  r  perience  not 

selves  to  us  no  more  alter  the  dissolution  ot  the  measure 
their  present  bodies.  But  who  can  assure 
them  that  there  is  no  other  experience  than  ence‘ 
the  present,  no  other  body  than  that  which  we  know, 
and  no  other  life  than  that  which  now  is  ?  But  this 
very  assumption  is  their  starting-point  and  the  sole 
basis  of  their  argument.  What,  I  ask,  have  they  in 
favor  of  their  assumption  ?  Nothing ;  absolutely  noth¬ 
ing.  Whatever  be  their  display  of  science,  their 
thought  at  bottom  never  contains  more  than  this 


trivial  commonplace  of  the  rabble  :  When  people 
die  we  see  them  no  more,  and  nobody  ever  came  back 
to  bring  us  news  from  the  other  world. 


Nobody  has  come  back  with  news  !  But  who,  then, 
has  returned  with  this  frightful  news,  that  death 
swallows  up  life  forever  ?  Who,  then,  has  traversed 
the  universe  from  point  to  point,  and  that,  too,  with 
senses  to  perceive  the  many  things  which  doubtless 
lie  beyond  the  reach  of  ours,  and  has  finally  returned 
to  tell  us  :  “  I  have  seen  every  thing,  even  to  the  limits 
of  space,  and  nowhere  have  I  found  the  dead  alive  !  ” 
Who,  then,  has  risen  from  the  dark  womb  of  Naught 
to  inform  us  that  the  abyss  has  actually  swallowed  up 
all  who  have  lived  ?  Our  dead  are  no  longer  with  us 
in  the  present  life  ;  we  know  it — our  hearts  suffer  so 
deeply  therefor  that  we  know  it  only  too  well.  If 


58 


The  Pioblem  of  Evil. 


you  say,  there  are  no  proofs  of  a  future  life  in  the  eyes 
of  science  as  you  understand  it — namely,  that  science 
which  admits  no  other  realities  than  those  which  fall 
under  our  five  senses  —  very  well;  but  when  you 
affirm  the  annihilation  of  beings  and  things  simply 
because  they  fall  no  more  under  the  observation  of 
our  actual  senses,  surely  you  reason  very  poorly. 
How  will  you  answer  the  heart  ?  the  conscience  ?  the 
reason  ?  I  insist  on  this  latter  word  reason ;  how 
will  you  answer  the  conviction  reached  by  reason, 
when  weighing  the  spiritual  facts  of  our  nature,  and 
attempting  to  account  for  them  ?  To  the  cry  of  human 
nature  in  its  totality,  and  aspiring  toward  life,  you 
oppose  the  objection  that  our  knowledge  is  the  meas¬ 
ure  of  all  that  exists — that  beyond  our  present  sensible 
experience  there  is  nothing.  Surely  that  is  a  very 
Cicero's  in-  narrow  style  of  thought.  And  I  can  well 

donation  at 

the  presump-  comprehend  the  slightly  haughty  disdain 
tks. 01  with  which  Cicero  treats  the  petty  philoso¬ 
phers,*  as  he  cajls  them,  who,  in  the  presence  of  a 
being  so  manifestly  formed  for  life,  dare  affirm  that 
the  soul  perishes  when  the  body  dissolves. 

No  one,  in  fact,  really  denies  the  fact  of  the  aspira¬ 
tions  of  the  human  soul,  which  we  have  just  affirmed. 
In  all  time  and  in  all  countries  man  has  desired — I 
do  not  say  has  invariably  believed  in — an  immortal 
future.  He  desires  it  because  he  is  conscious  of  the 

*  “  Minuti  philosophi.’’ — De  Scnectate ,  xxiii. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


59 


good,  and  because,  even  should  he  aspire  after  it  with 
all  the  powers  of  his  soul,  he  yet  feels  that  its  com¬ 
plete  realization  is  unattainable  in  this  present  state. 

The  good  presupposes  immortality,  and  the  heart 
is  athirst  for  immortal  life.  This  is  not  denied  ;  but 
still  it  is  asked,  What  does  all  that  prove  ?  The 
answer  to  this  depends  on  how  we  answer  this  other 
question  :  Does  there  exist  in  the  universe  so  great 
a  disorder  as  that  beings  manifestly  organized  for 
life  are  in  fact  destined  to  death  ?  This  problem 
was  the  ultimate  source  of  the  doubts  as  to  future 
life  in  all  ancient  philosophy,  whether  Greek  or  Indian. 
Now,  honest  doubt  is  but  one  of  the  phases  of  dis¬ 
couragement  ;  the  shadows  which  darken  the  future 
are  cast  from  the  clouds  which  vail,  from  us,  the  good, 
the  sun  of  souls.  When  the  soul  has  once  a  firm 
faith  in  the  good,  in  order,  reason  will  infer,  immedi¬ 
ately  and  without  a  shadow  of  hesitation,  from  man’s 
spiritual  constitution  to  his  eternal  destiny.  If  the 
good  is  to  be  realized,  then  life  does  not  cease  at 
what  we  call  death.  The  good  guarantees — presup¬ 
poses — life  ;  but  what  is  it  that  guarantees  the  good  ? 
This  is  the  last  question  which  our  subject  raises. 

III.  Guarantee  of  the  Good. 

What  is  it  that  guarantees  the  good  ?  I  Godtheonly 
answer,  God.  I  will  not  enter  here  upon  sufficient 

1  guarantee 

the  general  question  of  the  existence  of  God.  °f  the  good. 


6o 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


I  have  treated  that  elsewhere.*  Nature  and  humanity, 
heart,  reason,  and  conscience,  presuppose,  imply,  God. 
This  sacred  name  is  at  the  base  and  cap-stone  of 
every  thing — at  the  beginning  and  termination  of  all 
processes  of  healthy  thought.  The  existence  of  God 
is  not  demonstrated  like  other  truths,  for  it  is  the 
primitive  truth  on  which  all  other  truths  are  sus¬ 
pended  ;  so  that  we  have  no  other  alternative  than  to 
decide  either  for  faith  in  God,  or  for  doubt,  absolute, 
irremediable,  all-embracing.  I  limit  myself  here  to  a 
single  observation  :  The  good  presupposes  God,  and 
a  circle,  but  God  guarantees  the  good.  This  is  a  circle, 

not  a  vicious 

one.  but  a  circle  that  will  not  appear  vicious  to 
those  who  have  deeply  enough  examined  the  laws  of 
thought  to  know,  that  all  truth  terminates  ultimately 
in  a  circle  of  light,  whereas  the  characteristic  of  error 
is  inevitably  to  end  in  contradiction. 

The  good  implies  God.  To  understand  this,  let 
us  remember  that  the  idea  of  the  good,  as  held  by 
the  reason,  originates  in  the  conscience.  Conscience 
gives  orders.  Have  you  ever  reflected  on  the  two 
senses  of  this  word,  order.  An  order  is  a  plan,  and 
an  order  is  a  command.  Conscience  in  its  intimate 
union  with  reason  is  a  light  indicating  to  the  will 
what  it  should  do — it  reveals  an  order ;  and  con¬ 
science  is  a  power  enjoining  the  performance  of  what 
ought  to  take  place — it  issues  an  order  for  the  real- 


*  Le  P're  celeste. 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  6 1 

ization  of  the  order  which  itself  has  revealed.  It  is  a 
real  power,  making  itself  painfully  felt  by  those  who 
brave  it. 

Now,  the  good,  being  a  universal  idea  and  appli¬ 
cable  to  every  thing,  what  is  its  ultimate  origin  ? 
Where  exists  that  world-plan  of  which  we  assuredly 
know  but  a  few  outlines  ?  whence  springs  that  uni¬ 
versal  light,  of  which  a  few  of  the  rays  fall  upon  us  ? 
The  good,  being  obligatory  on  all,  what  is  that  which 
makes  itself  felt  bv  us  in  and  through  the  commands 
of  conscience,  and  which  we  conceive  as  a  universal 
power  bearing  on  all  volitions  ?  Assuredly  the  good 
is  not  a  mere  personal  conception  ;  it  is  not  we  who, 
in  the  conscience,  issue  orders  to  ourselves  ;  for 
these  orders  are  constantly  conflicting  with  our  per¬ 
sonal  preferences.  It  must  be,  however,  that  the 
plan  and  the  power  which  are  felt  through  the  con¬ 
science  do  actually  exist  somewhere  and  somehow, 
for  they  are,  in  their  kind,  just  as  positive  realities  as 
are  the  phenomena  of  matter.  But  a  plan  can  exist 
only  in  intelligence  ;  a  power  exists  only  in  a  volition  ; 
therefore,  the  plan  of  the  good,  whose  existence  is  uni¬ 
versal,  can  exist  only  in  a  universal  spirit. 

God  per  se  is  not  the  good,  for  the  good  is  not  a 
being.  God,  in  his  essence,  is  the  absolute  The  ^ood  is 
Being  ;  in  his  relation  to  the  universe  he  is  *  Goa^i pxe- 
the  Absolute  Cause  ;  but  the  good  being  the  cutton- 
order  established  by  God  for  all  creatures,  God  is  its 


62 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


personal  principle  or  origin,  and  it  is  the  direct  mani¬ 
festation  of  his  eternal  will. 

Abandon  thiif  position,  and  you  will  fall  into  the 
darkness  of  speculations  which  may  seem  profound 
because  they  are  obscure,  but  which  will  be  obscure 
only  because  they  are  false.  You  may,  no  doubt, 
busy  yourself  in  the  practice  of  the  good  without 
making  it  the  object  of  philosophical  speculation  ;  but 
so  soon  as  you  propound  the  question,  Where  and 
how  can  the  good  per  se  exist  ?  you  will  be  forced  to 
conclude  either  that  the  good  is  the  plan  of  God,  and 
the  conscience  the  manifestation  of  his  will — which 
will  give  you  firm  footing  for  your  thoughts — or  that 
the  good  and  the  conscience  are  absolutely  inexpli¬ 
cable  enigmas.  As  soon  as  you  reject  God,  con¬ 
science  and  the  good,  losing  all  support,  fall  away 
and  vanish  ;  and,  as  the  skepticism  which  then  enters 
the  soul  strikes  at  the  validity  of  reason  no  less  than 
of  conscience,  the  only -course  for  an  honest  person 
in  such  circumstances  is,  silence.  The  choice  which 
must  be  made  is  between  God,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
an  absolute  irremediable  skepticism  on  the  other.  I 
choose  God,  and  for  reasons  which,  I  repeat,  I  have 
elsewhere  given  at  large. 

The  good  is,  as  we  have  shown,  the  plan  of  God, 
revealing  to  our  conscience  that  which  we  ought  to 
do,  and  to  our  reason — through  the  mediation  of  the 
idea  of  duty  which  it  derives  from  the  conscience — 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


63 


that  which  ought  to  be  done.  Our  will  is  good  when 
it  accomplishes  faithfully  the  individual  task  proposed 
to  it,  and  thus  realizes,  for  its  part,  the  plan  of  the 
universe  ;  from  which  we  may  see  that  Plato  did  not 
unaptly  sum  up  all  goodness  in  the  single  expression, 
Likeness  to  God — which  may  well  be  translated  thus  : 
Harmony  of  the  created  will  with  the  creative  will. 

In  God  himself,  the  good  cannot  be  the  conforming 
to  a  rule  which  is  external  to  himself,  inasmuch  as 
nothing  exists  independently  of  him,  neither  matter, 
nor  spirits,  nor,  consequently,  the  good  itself.  The 
good,  being  in  fact  not  an  entity,  but  the  expression 
of  the  relations  which  ought  to  exist  between  beings, 
the  existence  of  the  good  independently  of  the  matter 
and  the  spirits  whose  relations  it  regulates,  is  a  mere 
abstraction  void  of  all  reality.  The  good  Thea.ood 
manifests  the  creative  will  in  the  relations  an1^G1od® 
of  creatures,  as  the  creatures  themselves  caL 
manifest  the  created  will  by  their  lives.  The  good 
is  therefore  identical  with  the  supreme  will.  To 
speak  of  the  good,  and  to  speak  of  the  will  of  God,  is 
to  speak  twice  of  the  same  thing. 

The  identity  of  the  good  with  the  will  of  God  is  a 
truth  of  immense  practical  importance.  To  make  a 
distinction  between  the  will  of  God  and  the  good, 
and  to  hold  that  these  two  ideas  have  a  separate 
validity,  is  a  dangerous  and  hurtful  error.  It  pro¬ 
duces,  on  the  one  hand,  in  many  devout  persons,  an 


64 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


•me  contra-  indifference  for  those  forms  of  charity  which 
tends1!!™  are  not  exclusively  ecclesiastical,  (as  if  there 

nesTmd5"  cou^  any  f°rms  of  good  which  the  Gos- 
fanaticism.  pe|  joes  not  commend,)  and,  on  the  other, 

it  leads  to  the  fatal  delusions  of  fanaticism.  I 
know  how  words  are  misused  ;  I  know  that  a  certain 
class  of  persons  stigmatize  as  fanaticism  all  sincere 
and  whole-hearted  devotion  to  one  cause  ;  I  know, 
that  to.  bring  it  into  reproach,  they  brand  with  this 
term  the  purest,  the  noblest  of  enthusiasms  ;  but  the 
word,  nevertheless,  has  its  proper  use,  and  designates 
a  real  and  dangerous  perversion  of  the  human  soul. 
Fanaticism  proper — that  which  is  intolerant  and  pro¬ 
scriptive — consists  in  believing  that  the  will  of  God 
may  be  separated  from  the  good,  and  that  evil  may 
be  done  to  promote  the  cause  of  God.  This  notion 
has  brought  great  scourges  upon  humanity  and  great 
reproaches  to  religion.  Fortunately  it  is  an  error 
that  is  essentially  repugnant  to  the  general  voice  of 
conscience  in  all  ages,  as  well  as  to  true  philosophy. 
The  most  ancient  odes  of  humanity  celebrate  the 
pure,  the  holy,  the  incorruptible ;  and  they*  never 
separate  the  thought  of  the  Author  of  the  world 
Conscience  from  that  of  moral  perfection.  The  religious 

p  ro  tested 

against poi-  sentiment  has  been  sadly  perverted  by  the 

ytlieistie  .  .  ..... 

Vice.  worship  of  the  immoral  divinities  of  pagan¬ 
ism  ;  but  the  perversion  was  perceived,  and  con¬ 
science  entered  its  protests.  The  great  poets,  those 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


65 


reflectors  of  popular  sentiment,  joined  with  Euripides 
in  his  protest  against  the  worship  of  vice :  “  It  the 
gods  do  wrong,  they  are  no  longer  gods.”  * 

Despite  numerous  and  sad  aberrations,  it  may  safely 
be  said,  that  the  natural  direction  of  the  religious 
sentiment  leads  it  to  recognize  the  indissoluble  union 
of  the  good  and  the  divine  will.  The  Lucifer  of 
Lord  Byron  can  alone  reason  otherwise ;  but  the 
human  race  thinks,  with  the  Adah  of  the  poet,  that 
“  Omnipotence  must  be  all  goodness.”  But  if  the 
race  in  general  thinks  so,  how  of  the  atheists  ?  The 
atheists  think  so  also,  as  I  think  I  can  convince  you. 
Wl®t  is  their  chief  argument,  the  one  which,  over¬ 
passing  the  limits  of  the  schools,  has  made  some 
noise  in  the  world  ?  It  is  this  :  "If  there  were  a 
God,  there  would  not  be  so  much  evil.”  What  now 

is  the  basis  of  this  argument  ?  It  is  the  idea  Atheists  as¬ 
sume  the 

that  God  is  essentially  goodness,  so  that  to  inseparable- 

.  ness  of  the 

show  that  the  world  is  not  good  is  to  dem-  ideas  of 
onstrate  that  it  is  not  the  workmanship  of  goodness. 
God.  Thus  the  chief  argument  raised  against  the 
existence  of  God  is  based  on  the  idea  of  his  good¬ 
ness.  Surprising  as  it  is,  we  see  here,  even  at  the 
foundation  of  this  saddest  of  intellectual  aberrations,  a 
lingering  glimmer  of  truth,  namely,  in  that,  as  a  final 

*  Justin.  Martyr  has  collected,  at  the  close  of  his  treatise  On 
Monarchy ,  this  passage  of  Euripides,  and  several  other  analogous  cita¬ 
tions  from  the-poets  of  paganism. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


•  t56 


homage  to  supreme  holiness,  man  prefers  the  mad¬ 
ness  of  atheism  to  the  crime  of  blasphemy. 

The  conscience  is  the  voice  of  God.  So  are  our 
children  taught  in  school  and  family,  and  so  teach  I 
here  before  an  assembled  people.  Loyalty  to  the 
truth  would  admit  of  no  other  teaching,  even  in  the 
select  audience  of  a  learned  society,  for  there  are  not 
two  systems  of  truth.  There  are  different  degrees 
of  knowledge  of  the  truth.  But  as  it  is  the  same  sun 
which  illuminates  all  bodies,  so  there  is  but  one  and 
the  same  sphere  of  truth  for  the  enlightenment  of  all 
spirits. 

Some  have  thought  otherwise  in  all  ages.  In  our 
own  day  some  writers  of  reputation  declare  that 
there  is  one  form  of  truth  for  the  masses — the  false  ; 
There  is  no  and  another  for  the  aristocracy  of  thought — 

esoteric 

truth.  the  true.  But  the  strangest  feature  of  the 
matter  is,  that  this  very  form  of  truth,  which,  by  its 
lofty  and  peculiar  nature,  is  destined  to  remain  the 
peculiar  secret  of  the  initiated  few,  is  the  form  of 
truth  which  those  writers  are  most  zealous  in  sowing 


broadcast  among  the  populace.  Thus  their  own 
practice  contradicts  their  haughty  assumption.  They 
have  no  pretended  pearls  which  they  do  not  eagerly 
parade  before  the  great  public.  Now  it  is  to  the 
public  at  large,  to  the  common  conscience,  that  we 
address  ourselves  also.  We  say  here,  as  we  would 
say  every-where,  The  conscience  is  the  voice  of  God  ; 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


6; 


or,  to  lay  aside  all  figures,  The  moral  law  is  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  the  Divine  plan,  and  the  binding  authority 
of  conscience  is  the  immediate  perception  of  the 
Supreme  Power. 

We  have  asked,  What  is  the  guarantee  of  the  good  ? 
We  now  know  the  answer.  The  good  is  the  thought 
or  plan  of  the  Eternal,  the  will  of  the  Almighty. 
He  said  to  matter,  Let  there  be  order !  and  the 
celestial  spheres  began  their  harmonious  revolutions 
in  the  depths  of  space.  He  has  said  to  his  free 
creatures,  Let  the  good  be  done  !  be  just,  and  ye 
shall  be  happy.  And  in  this,  the  promise  is  insepa¬ 
rable  from  the  command.  All  that  conscience  pre¬ 
scribes,  all  that  the  pure  heart  desires,  all  that  sound 
reason  conceives,  is  the  good  ;  and  all  that  is  good  is 
God's  will.  The  good  is  not  immediately  realized  by 
God,  because,  in  the  spiritual  sphere,  the  good  must 
be  accomplished  by  liberty  ;  the  creature,  made  in 
the  image  of  God,  must  become  a  worker  with  God. 
This  is  the  end,  the  goal  to  be  attained,  the  ideal  to 
be  realized  ;  it  can  fully  exist  at  first  only  in  the  plan 
revealed  to  the  conscience,  and  the  free  being,  who  is 
charged  with  the  accomplishing  of  the  law,  is  capa¬ 
ble  of  turning  aside  from  his  mission.  But  to  doubt 
the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  good  is  as  bad  season  for 

hopeful- 

as  practical  atheism.  Let  us,  therefore,  be  ness, 
of  good  courage  and  good  hope  ;  the  good  is  guaran¬ 
teed  by  the  Almighty  ;  that  which  o right  to  be,  will  be. 


68 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


LECTURE  II. 

EVIL. 

In  defining  the  good  we  have  at  the  same  time 
defined  evil,  which  is  its  contrary.  Evil  is  not  the 

absence  of  the  good ;  the  absence  of  a  thing  is  noth- 

< 

ing,  and  evil  is  not  a  nothing  ;  it  is  a  reality,  un- 
Evuthecen-  fortunately  very  real — the  contrary  of  the 

trary  of 

good.  good.  Just  as  the  good  is  not  an  entity,  a 
thing,  but  an  order  in  the  relation  of  beings  ;  so  evil 
is  not  an  entity,  a  thing  ;  it  is  a  disorder  in  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  beings  ;  it  is  a  disturbance  in  the  harmony  of 
the  universe.  There  exist  neither  beings  nor  things, 
nor  elements  thereof,  which  are  evil  per  se.  Nothing 
exists,  in  fact,  but  by  act  of  the  Creator,  and  this 
act— a  manifestation  of  the  Supreme  Good — has  con¬ 
stituted  each  creature  in  a  manner  appropriate  to  its 
destination.  In  a  world  without  free  creatures,  where 
every  thing  would  continue  to  be  a  direct  manifesta¬ 
tion  of  the  Supreme  Will,  all  would  be  well.  But 
wherever  there  is  liberty  all  may  be  perverted.  The 
reason,  the  heart,  the  will  of  spiritual  beings  may 
turn  aside  from  their  legitimate  functions,  and  thus 
disturb  the  normal  relations  of  such  beings  to  nature  ; 
but  when,  aside  from  the  derangement  of  functions, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


69 


we  consider  the  being  in  himself,  then  all  is  good. 
Evil  is  that  which  ought  not  to  be.  God  wills  it 
not— wills  that  it  should  not  be  ;  and  this  Supreme 
Will  constitutes  for  every  created  will  the  duty  of 
destroying  it.  We  propose  to  examine  the  General 
manifestations  of  evil,  first  in  nature,  and  g^iKmec- 
then  in  humanity  ;  and,  finally,  to  notice  some  ture' 
theories  which  deny  its  existence.  The  subdivision 
of  this  lecture  will,  therefore,  be  Evil  in  Nature, 
Evil  in  Humanity,  and  the  Negation  of  Evil. 

I.  Evil  in  Nature. 

Let  us  direct  our  attention,  first,  to  the  domain  of 
matter  in  its  simple  and  inert  form.  As  there  is  here 
neither  heart  nor  will,  neither  can  there  be  suffering 
nor  sin  ;  evil,  therefore,  can  present  itself  In  what 
only  under  the  form  of  disorder,  of  a  false  senseeyi1 
relation  between  objects  and  their  destina-  nature- 
tion.  Now,  so  far  as  matter  falls  under  our  observa¬ 
tion,  in  the  fields  of  physics,  astronomy,  and  geology, 
can  we  find  such  a  form  of  disorder  ?  The  question 
requires  to  its  answering  that  another  one  be  first 
answered.  To  be  able  to  pass  a  judgment  as  to  the 
good  or  the  evil  in  a  given  case,  it  is  necessary,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  know  the  plan  which  determines  what 
ought  to  be,  and  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  ob¬ 
jects  in  question  are,  or  are  not,  in  harmony  with  that 
plan. 


;o 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


But  do  we  know  the  general  plan  of  nature  ?  No. 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  judgments  as  to  good 
and  evil  could  not  be  made  in  this  realm.  However, 
incomplete  as  science  yet  is,  it  has  succeeded  by  the 
labor  of  centuries  in  determining  certain  principles 
which  throw  much  light  on  this  subject. 

The  phenomena  of  nature  are  regulated  according 
to  a  definite  order.  The  result  of  the  long  series  of 
Two  ascer-  evolutions  which  our  globe  has  undergone 

tained  facts 

as  to  the  has  been,  to  produce  the  conditions  which 

plan  of  na¬ 
ture.  (i)  permitted  life  to  appear  thereon,  and 

which  (2)  continue  to  sustain  it.  These  are  certainly 
two  ideas  relative  to  the  plan  of  the  universe  which 
are  definitively  ascertained.  And  we  are  constantly 
finding  new  confirmations  of  them  as  science  pro¬ 
gresses.  Phenomena  which  seemed  to  form  excep¬ 
tions  are  falling  under  the  rule.  What  appeared  as 

fortuitous  and  irregular  is  traced  back  to  constant 

* 

laws. 

As  to  our  own  globe,  we  can  pretty  surely  retrace 
the  marvelous  changes  which  have  wrought  out  its 
present  habitable  condition.  When  we  affirm  that 
there  is  evil  in  the  facts  which  produced  this  condi¬ 
tion,  we  pronounce  a  hasty  judgment.  Science  as  it 
advances  shows  that  every  thing  in  the  physical  uni¬ 
verse  is  order,  proportion,  harmony.  The  glaciers 
of  our  mountains,  for  example,  might  be  thought  to 
encumber  uselessly  vast  tracts  of  land,  but  closer 


The  Pi  obi  cm  of  Evil. 


examination  shows,  that  to  them  is  largely  due  the 
fertility  and  the  irrigation  of  our  valleys  and  plains. 
The  avalanche,  which  at  first  sight  seems  so  destruc¬ 
tive,  denudes  our  mountain  slopes  only  that  spring 
may  there  reappear  all  the  sooner.  The  earthquake, 
which  is  usually  regarded  as  such  a  frightful  evil,  is 
now  known  to  be  one  of  the  normal  incidents  of  the 
internal  constitution  of  the  globe.  In  fine,  our  ac¬ 
quaintance  with  nature,  though  as  yet  not  very  inti¬ 
mate,  enables  us  with  every  new  advancement  to  hold 
her  in  better  opinion. 

But  do  you  find  that  this,  my  answer  to  the  objection 
that  there  is  evil  in  nature,  is  entirely  satisfactory  ? 
If  you  do,  you  are  too  easily  contented.  The  order 
of  nature  is  admirable  ;  but  why  is  it  often  so  merci¬ 
less  toward  man  ?  The  storm,  though  it  may  purify 
the  atmosphere,  is  yet  the  cause  of  my  ruined  house 
and  my  overturned  orchards.  The  earthquake  may  be 
a  normal  incident  in  the  production  of  hill  and  valley 
and  lake,  but  it  swallowed  up  Lisbon  and  Pompeii. 
And  the  avalanche,  whatever  may  be  said  in  its 
favor,  yet  sweeps  away  and  buries  in  its  ruins  the 
cabin  and  the  vineyard,  the  shepherd  and  his  flock. 
These  are  facts  about  which  we  venture  to  complain. 
We  do  not  complain  that  there  are  disorders  Evil  in  na- 
in  nature  perse  ;  we  complain  of  her  relations  s^s  J^her 
to  us.  Why  is  beauteous  and  harmonious  ruations'to 
nature  so  severe  against  man  ?  While  gaz-  raan‘ 


72 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


ing  on  the  glories  of  sky  and  cloud,  of  mountain  and 
plain,  of  river  and  lake,  why  must  our  ear  invariably 
be  greeted  by  the  sighs  and  wails  of  suffering  hu¬ 
manity  ? 

And  here  the  question  assumes  a  new  phase. 
What  we  complain  of  is  not  that  there  is  disorder  in 
nature,  but  that  nature  inflicts  sufferings  on  us. 
What  we  term  evil  in  the  physical  world  is  only  a 
relation  between  nature  and  us,  a  relation  that  inter¬ 
feres  with  our  interests  and  shocks  our  sensibilities. 

The  question  presents  new  conditions  when  we 
enter  the  realm  of  animated  nature.  In  fact  this  is 
Evil  in  the  for  us,  as  yet,  a  realm  of  mystery.  Is  there 

world  a  among  animals  any  thing  corresponding  to 

mystery.  wpa^-  we  ca|]  gjn  ?  Jf  we  dei\y  to  them  the 

moral  sentiment,  have  they  not,  at  least,  instincts, 
proclivities,  which  become  in  us  sources  of  moral 
evil  ?  Do  we  not  observe  among  them  sensuality, 
jealousy  ?  Certainly  we  find  among  them,  war. 
How  many  of  the  organs  whose  structure  and  adapt¬ 
ation  the  naturalist  so  justly  admires,  are  simply 
defensive  and  offensive  arms,  instruments  of  resist¬ 
ance  and  means  of  assault !  As  far  back  as  we  can 
retrace  the  history  of  our  globe,  living  creatures  have 
pursued  and  devoured  each  other.  Fossil  bones  of 
animals  which  appear  to  have  preceded  the  advent 
of  man  on  earth  bear  the  traces  of  the  teeth  of  their 
enemies,  and  reveal  to  us,  after  so  many  centuries, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


73 

the  gigantic  and  bloody  combats  of  which  the  primi¬ 
tive  earth  was  the  theater.  Life  is  kept  up  only  by 
death,  and  most  frequently  by  a  violent  and  painful 
death. 

Let  us  cite  here  a  few  words  from  Joseph  de 
Maistre  :  “  In  the  vast  domain  of  animated  nature 
there  reigns  a  visible  violence,  a  species  of  Words  of 
rage,  arming  all  creatures  in  mutua  funercip  DeMaistre- 
Even  in  the  vegetable  world  we  perceive  the  begin¬ 
nings  of  this  law ;  from  the  immense  catalpa  to  the 
most  humble  grass-blade,  how  many  plants  die !  how 
many  are  killed !  But  the  moment  we  enter  the 
animal  kingdom  the  proofs  of  the  law  are  fearfully 
multiplied.  In  each  of  the  great  classes  of  animals 
there  are  a  number  of  species  whose  destination 
seems  to  be  to  devour  the  others  ;  there  are  insects 
of  prey,  reptiles  of  prey,  fishes  of  prey,  and  quadru¬ 
peds  of  prey.  There  is  no  instant  in  duration 
wherein  living  beings  are  not  devoured  by  others. 
And  pre-eminent  above  these  races  of  animals  stands 
man,  whose  destructive  hand  spares  nothing  that  has 
life — he  kills  in  order  to  feed  himself,  kills  to  clothe 
himself,  kills  to  ornament  himself;  he  kills  in  at¬ 
tack,  kills  in  defense,  kills  to  instruct  himself,  kills 
to  amuse  himself,  kills  for  the  sake  of  killing.  A 
king,  haughty  and  terrible,  he  has  need  of  every 
thing  and  is  resisted  by  nothing.  But  will  this  law  of 

*  For  mutual  destruction, 


7  4 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


destruction  stop  at  man  ?  No,  assuredly.  But  who 
is  it,  then,  who  is  to  exterminate  him  ?  He  himself. 
It  is  man  who  seems  commissioned  to  slaughter 
man.  But  how  can  he  accomplish  this  law  ?  he,  who 
is  of  a  moral  and  merciful  nature  ?  he,  who  is  born  to 
love  ?  he,  who  weeps  over  others  as  over  himself?  It 
is  war  that  will  accomplish  the  decree.  Do  you  not 
hear  the  earth  crying  and  clamoring  for  blood  ?  And 
it  does  not  cry  in  vain  ;  war  breaks  out.  Man,  pos¬ 
sessed  of  a  madness  which  has  in  it  no  element  of 
hatred  or  wrath,  rushes  into  the  field  of  battle  with¬ 
out  knowing  what  he  wants,  or  even  what  he  does. 
Nothing  is  more  contrarv  to  his  nature,  and  vet  he 
does  nothing  with  an  equal  eagerness  ;  he  is  enthusi¬ 
astic  in  doing  that  of  which  his  own  soul  has  horror. 

“  Thus  is  ceaselessly  fulfilled  in  the  whole  scale  of 
being,  from  the  worm  up  to  man,  the  great  law  of  the 
violent  destruction  of  living  creatures.  The  entire 
earth,  continually  drenched  in  blood,  seems  little  else 
than  an  immense  altar,  on  which  is  to  be  immolated, 
without  end,  or  measure,  or  rest,  every  thing  that 
has  life.”* 

To  come  into  being,  to  suffer,  to  die,  and  to  cause 
others  to  suffer  and  die — such  is  the  destinv  of  ani- 
mals  !  The  law  which  weighs  upon  us  is  only  an  ex¬ 
tension  of  the  general  law  of  all  earthly  life.  If  we 
do  denv  to  animals  the  moral  sentiment,  and  there- 

*  Abridged  from  the  Soirees  de  Sai nt- Petersbovrg. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


75 


with  the  possibility  of  sin,  it  is  at  least  difficult  not  to 
discover  evil  among  them  under  the  form  of  suffer¬ 
ing.  But  this  subject  is  involved  in  great  perplexity. 
Before  reasoning  on  the  destiny  of  animals  we  ought 
to  understand  what  it  is  ;  but  our  knowledge  has  not 
yet  reached  that  point. 

The  state  of  the  question  is  tiffs  :  We  possess  two 
very  distinct  conceptions  :  that  of  the  mechanism  of 
bodies,  where  there  exists  only  form  and  motion  ;  and 
that  of  the  functions  of  spirit,  whose  essential  condi¬ 
tion  is  consciousness  of  self.  From  these  two  con¬ 
ceptions  there  have  arisen,  as  to  the  nature  of  ani¬ 
mals,  two  rival  theories,  that  of  the  machine-animal, 
and  that  of  the  man-animal.  Let  us  examine  them 
briefly. 

The  theory  of  the  machine-animal  is  that  Theory  of 
of  the  disciples  of  Descartes,  as  also  that  of  ^  ma‘. 
a  small  number  of  consistent  materialists,  who  maL 
affirm,  without  faltering  at  any  of  the  consequences 
of  their  theory,  that  every  thing  in  the  world  is  sim¬ 
ply  mechanism.  According  to  these,  animals  are 
only  very  fine  automatons  ;  they  neither  feel  nor 
think  ;  they  move,  and  nothing  more.  In  support  of 
this  view  some  plausible  considerations  are  urged. 
It  is  said  that  in  the  infancy  of  the  race  man  uni¬ 
formly  imagined  a  soul  like  his  own  wherever  he  saw 
motion.  Thus,  for  example,  the  ancients  attributed 
souls  to  the  stars,  which  revolve,  and  to  amber,  which 


76 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


attracts  light  objects.  Gradually  science  has  done 
away  with  these  fancied  souls,  to  the  profit  of  pure 
mechanism.  To  deny  souls,  minds,  to  animals,  is 
but  the  legitimate  advance  of  the  slow  process  by 
which  humanity  overthrows  the  idols  of  its  infancy. 
But  this  theory  finds  earnest  opponents  ;  in  hunters, 
for  example,  who  live  long  and  familiarly  with  their 
dogs.  In  fact,  none  who  sustain  close  and  frequent 
relations  with  the  higher  orders  of  animals  will  con¬ 
sent  to  see  nothing  but  mechanism  in  creatures  whose 
looks  and  tones  they  have  learned  perfectly  to  under¬ 
stand.  The  thought  that  all  beasts  are  but  autom¬ 
atons  clashes  so  abruptly  with  our  natural  convic¬ 
tions,  that  it  reacts  in  favor  of  the  theory  of  the  man- 
animal. 

The  second  theory  is  largely  represented  in  modern 
Theory  of  literature  ;  for  example,  by  La  Fontaine,  and 

the  man- 

animal.  especially  by  Buffon.  Read  the  celebrated 
descriptions  of  the  latter  author — the  tiger,  the  lion, 
the  horse — and  you  will  be  surprised  to  notice  to  what 
degree  he  attributes  to  these  animals  the  sentiments, 
the  passions,  the  spiritual  qualities  of  man.  This 
method,  though  contributing  much  to  the  literary 
beauty  of  his  works,  detracts  from  their  technically 
scientific  value.  This  doctrine  of  the  animal-man  is 
also  that  of  those  inconsistent  materialists — a  large 
class — who  succeed  very  readily  in  proving  that  man  is 
only  an  animal  by  taking  for  granted,  as  a  starting-point, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


77 


without  waiting  for  very  overpowering  proof,  that  the 
animal  is  a  man.  It  has,  moreover,  in  its  favor  num¬ 
berless  facts  which  seem  to  indicate  the  presence  of 
sensibility  and  intelligence  in  brutes. 

The  main  objection  to  this  theory  is  the  fact  of 
civilization,  which  the  animal  races  entirely  lack.  It 
is  true  these  races  have  a  history,  but  their  fate  seems 
entirely  dependent  on  external  nature.  The  lack  of 
speech,  the  absence  of  progress,  seem  to  Have  ani_ 
suo-o-est  that  the  animal  has  not  full  pos-  mf!s  true 
session  of  himself ;  that,  consequently,  he  per-  sciousness  ? 
haps  lacks  strict  self-consciousness,  and  that  the  signs 
of  suffering  which  he  betrays  do  not  respond,  in  the 
same  sense  as  'with  us,  to  a  really  felt  suffering. 

Is  there,  between  these  two  theories  as  to  the  nature 
of  animals,  place  for  a  third  ?  Can  science  conceive 
of  a  mode  of  existence  which  is  neither  that  of  an  au¬ 
tomaton  nor  that  of  a  free  self-conscious  spirit  ?  Per- 

it 

haps.  It  may  be  that  we  possess  already  some  lines 
of  thought  and  observation  that  may  issue  in  such  a 
result.  In  any  case,  however,  the  question  is  far 
from  being  solved  ;  and  I  think  true  science  will  have 
frankly  to  admit  that,  as  yet",  it  does  not  un-  Examination 
derstand  the  nature  of  animals.  In  the  ab-  theories!™0 
sence  of  a  solution  of  the  question,  I  will  examine,  in 
their  bearings  on  the  problem  before  us,  the  two 
above-mentioned  theories. 

If  we  regard  animals  as  simply  a  manifestation  of 


78 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


mechanism,  as  instruments  of  universal  motion,  de¬ 
void  of  all  thought  and  sentiment,  then  assuredly 
there  is  no  evil  among  them  ;  all  is  well.  They  en¬ 
rich  the  soil,  transport  grains,  contribute  to  spread 
vegetation  ;  in  a  word,  they  are  admirable  channels  for 
the  circulation  of  matter.  All  is  order  and  harmony, 
as  they  perfectly  answer  their  destination.  Nor  can 
we  say  any  thing  against  those  animals  which  dis¬ 
commode  and  injure  us,  any  more  than  we  can  against 
poisonous  plants ;  for  all  these  facts,  like  inundations 
and  earthquakes,  appear  to  us  as  evil  only  because  of 
their  relations  to  humanity. 

Now  let  us  examine  the  other  opinion  :  Animals 
have  souls  like,  or  at  least  analogous  to,  ours  ;  they 
feel  the  same  disharmony  as  we  between  their  aspira¬ 
tions  and  their  actual  lot.  What  shall  we  say  ?  Does 
the  butterfly,  which  escapes  from  its  dark  chrysalis 
only  to  die  a  few  moments  later,  weep  over  the  brevity 
of  its  life  ?  The  mare  of  the  desert  who  sees  her  foal 
succumb  under  the  heat  of  the  sun,  and  perish  in  the 
parched  sands — does  she  also,  like  Rachel,  weep  and 
refuse  consolation  ?  The  sheep  which  is  ruthlessly 
taken  from  the  flock  and  butchered — do  its  compan¬ 
ions  weep  and  mourn  its  bloody  fate  ? 

Grant  for  a  moment  that  such  is  the  case.  Sup¬ 
pose  that  these  deaths  of  animals,  which  rise  to  mill¬ 
ions  every  hour  of  duration,  do  call  forth  the  same 
kind  of  tears,  the  same  anguish,  as  the  numberless 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


79 


hecatombs  of  men  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  war.  And 
what  shall  we  have  to  say?  We  shalfsay  simply  that 
the  realm  of  evil  extends  beyond  humanity.  But  will 
this  supposition  affect  the  question  before  us  ?  The 
problem  presents  itself,  in  man,  in  clear  and  definite 
terms.  Our  destination,  as  expressed  in  and  by  the 
constitution  of  the  soul,  is  contradicted  by  our  actual 
destiny.  Formed  for  the  good,  we  perceive  Whetheran- 

J  o  j.  imalsareim- 

evil  within  us  ;  organized  for  life,  we  are  the  Plicated  111 

the  problem 

prey  of  death.  And  the  problem  is  simply  of  evil,  does 

not  affect  its 

enlarged  in  proportion  as  we  attribute  to  solutions, 
animals  a  nature  like  or  analogous  to  ours.  But  as 
we  do  not,  as  yet,  really  know  the  nature  of  animals  ;• 
and  as,  even  in  case  the  problem  of  evil  should  extend 
to  them,  it  would  still  be  not  a  new  problem,  but 
simply  the  old  one  under  a  new  phase  ;  so  the  course 
of  wisdom  would  seem  to  be,  to  study  this  problem 
first  in  ourselves,  where  it  presents  itself  in  a  positive 
and  definite  shape.  And  if  we  succeed  here  in  find¬ 
ing  a  satisfactory  solution,  we  may  well  anticipate 
that  this  solution  will  apply  to  the  animal  races  in  the 
measure  that  science  may  hereafter  ascertain  that 
their  nature  is  analogous  to  ours. 


This  is  the  sole  safe  method.  To  study  the  problem 
of  evil  in  animals  without  understanding  their  nature, 
and  then  to  apply  the  results  of  this  study  to  man, 
would  be  very  unnatural,  and  would  expose  ourselves 
to  great  confusion  of  ideas.  To  seek  a  solution  in  a 


8o 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


sphere  which  is  full  of  mysteries,  and  not  in  the  well- 
ascertained  facts  of  our  own  nature,  would  be  the 
reverse  of  a  rational  procedure. 

But  though  we  are  forced  to  confess  our  ignorance 
Two  fain-  character  of  evil  as  found  among 

cies-  animals,  there  are  two  errors  in  connection 
with  this  ignorance  which  it  is  important  to  indicate 
and  correct. 

The  first  consists  in  imagining  that  we  have  ex¬ 
plained  the  presence  of  evil  in  humanity  by  affirming 
that  we  spring  from  the  animal,  so  that  our  passions 
and  sufferings  would  also  be  due  to  that  source. 
JEven  if  we  should  admit,  what  is  in  no  wise  proved, 
that  man  has  direct  kinship  with  the  animal,  this  con¬ 
sideration  would  be  far  from  solving  the  question 
before  us.  The  inquiry  would  still  remain :  Why  is 
man  clothed  in  this  animal  nature,  and  why  does  evil 
exist  among  animals  ? 

The  second  error,  which  is  only  the  first  under  a 
new  form,  consists  in  reasoning  thus :  Passions  and 
suffering  are  but  incidents  of  a  general  law  ;  what  we 
call  evil  is,  therefore,  simply  a  part  of  the  order  of 
nature ;  we  find  it  from  the  lowest  grades  of  animal 
life  up  to  man.  Now  all  that  which  is  incidental  to, 
or  included  in,  the'  general  order  of  nature  ought  to 
be  accepted  as  good.  The  utter  fallacy  of  such  reason¬ 
ing  is  so  evident,  so  unworthy  of  the  human  mind, 
that  I  scarcely  need  beg  those  who  have  not  yet 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


8r 


practiced  it,  never  to  be  guilty  of  saying,  “  Evil  is  a 
general  law  ;  therefore  every  thing  is  good,” 

The  study  of  evil  in  physical  nature  directs  us  in¬ 
evitably  to  humanity,  inasmuch  as  we  find  evil  here 
only  in  the  relations  of  matter  to  mankind,  and  not 
in  matter  per  se.  The  study  of  evil  in  animated  na¬ 
ture  also  directs  us  to  humanity,  inasmuch  as  we 
discover  evil  in  animals  only  in  so  far  as  we  attribute 
to  them  a  nature  analogous  to  ours.  Let  us,  there¬ 
fore,  pass  to  humanity. 

II.  Evil  in  Humanity. 

Evil  presents  itself  among  mankind  under  three 

forms  :  envy,  which  is  the  evil  or  faultiness  of  the 

reason  ;  sin,  which  is  the  evil  of  the  con-  Threefold 

science;  and  suffering,  which  is  the  evil  of  form of evlL 

the  heart.  To  show  that  error,  sin,  and  suffering  are 

evils,  it  is  only  necessary  to  show,  in  the  light  of  our 

definitions,  that  they  are  facts  which  reveal  a  disorder, 

that  is,  a  want  of  harmony  between  the  condition  of 

the  human  soul  and  its  destination,  as  indicated  by 
.  *  . 

its  constitution. 

First,  then,  error  is  not  ignorance.  To  prove  that  all 
ignorance  is  an  evil  would  require  us  to  demonstrate 
that  the  mind  is  destined  to  know  all  things  I)ifference 
at  once  and  immediately,  so  that  if  we  could  bctwecn  1?; 
not  tell  the  number  of  stars  in  the  skies,  or  error- 

of  sands  on  the  sea-shore,  our  soul  would  be  in  disorder. 

6 


82 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


But  this  is  not  evident,  and  would'  be  difficult  to 
prove.  Let  us  suppose  a  spirit  clearly  conscious  of 
what  it  knows  and  what  it  does  not  know,  affirming 
where  it  should,  denying  where  it  should,  and  sus¬ 
pending  judgment  where  it  has  not  sufficient  reasons 
for  either  affirming  or  denying  ;  and  suppose  that 
this  spirit  is  continually  growing  in  knowledge,  con¬ 
tinually  widening  in  every  direction  the  horizon  of 

• 

its  vision  :  in  such  a  case,  will  there  be  any  evil  ? 
will  not  all  be  good  ?  This  spirit  will  not  of  course 
possess  all  truth,  but  it  will  be  full  of  truth  ;  all  its 
judgments  will  be  true.  Ignorance  is  an  evil  only 
when  it  conflicts  with  our  immediate  destination,  so 
that  our  will,  deprived  of  light,  feels  the  need  of  acting, 
and  yet  has  not  the  means  of  acting  understandingly. 
Error  ai-  Error  consists  in  passing  false  judgments  ; 

ways  an 

evil.  it  is  an  evil  per  se,  and  in  all  cases.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  mind  is  destined  to  possess  the 
truth  ;  hence  error  is  in  conflict  with  order,  is  a  dis¬ 
order,  and  often  a  very  serious  one.  Our  errors,  for 
example,  as  to  the  source  of  true  happiness,  throw  us 
into  an  insensate  pursuit  of  a  happiness  tvhich  ever 
eludes  us  ;  and  our  errors  as  to  duty  give  rise  to  the 
mysterious  and  deplorable-  phenomenon  of  perverted 
consciences.  The  most  perplexing  facts  in  the  whole 
sphere  of  ethics  are  these  very  cases  where,  deter¬ 
mined  to  do  our  duty,  we  yet  deceive  ourselves  as  to 
what  it  is.  Evil  seems  to  result  here  from  the  very 


The  Problem  of  EviL 


uprightness  of  the  intention  ;  for,  as  Pascal  has  re¬ 
marked,  “  we  never  do  evil  so  thoroughly  and  enthu¬ 
siastically  as  when  we  do  it  from  conscience.” 

Error  constitutes  one  element  in  our  wrong  actions  ; 
but  error,  even  moral  error,  is  not  sin.  Socrates  held 
very  erroneous  views  on  this  point  He  held  that 
error  is  the  sole  origin  of  our  evil  actions,  that  men 
deceive  themselves  as  to  what  is  duty,  but  that,  with¬ 
out  exception,  “  they  do  what  they  regard  as  duty.”* 
The  poet  Euripides,  his  contemporary,  could  have  given 
him  on  this  point  a  lesson  in  true  philoso-  Difference 

between  er- 

phy  ;  for  he  wrote,  “  We  know  what  is  right,  ror  and  sin. 
we  are  familiar  with  it,  but  we  do  it  not.”  f  Error 
and  sin  are  closely  allied,  but  they  are  perfectly  dis¬ 
tinct  facts.  Error  is  seated  in  the  intelligence,  and 
sin  is  the  act  of  the  will 

I  will  define  sin  by  this  familiar  citation  :  “To  him 
that  knoweth  to  do  good  and  doeth  it  not,  to  him  it  is 
sin.”  Sin  is  the  violation  of  known  law,  the  revolt  of 
the  will  against  the  power  and  authority  of  conscience. 
But  it  is  important  to  observe,  that  when  the  law  is 
not  known  to  us  it  may  be  because  of  our  own  fault. 
If  our  ignorance  is  owing  to  our  own  neglect,  .we  are 
responsible  for  it.  He  who  violates  a  law,  of  which  at 
the  moment  he  is  ignorant,  sins  nevertheless,  in  case 
it  is  himself  who  has  shut  out  the  light  from  his  con¬ 
science. 

*  Xenophon's  Memorabilia.  f  Ilippolytus. 


84 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Such  is  our  characterization  of  sin.  As  to  the  thing 
itself,  we  know  it  only  too  well.  There  is  perhaps  no 
one  who,  without  thinking  back  very  far  over  the  past, 
will  not  recall  cases  when,  in  the  full  light  of  conscience, 
he  was  conscious  of  a  perversity  of  will.  To  have 
defined  sin  is  to  have  shown  that  it  is  an  evil,  since 
it  is  a  revolt  against  law,  and  therefore  ought  abso¬ 
lutely  not  to  be. 

As  we  know  the  essential  nature  of  the  moral  law, 
we  know  also  the  essential  nature  of  sin.  This  su~ 
I  preme  law  is  that  of  charity,  the  consecration  of  each 
to  the  good  of  all.  The  essence  of  sin  is  the  contrary 
of  this  law,  that  is,  the  disposition  to  live  only  for  self. 
Egotism,  in  the  full  and  etymological  sense  of  the 
The  root  of  word,  is  the  root  of  all, sin.  Instead  of  re- 

all  sin  is 

egotism,  maining  at  his  place  in  the  general  order  of 
things,  in  his  true  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  universe, 
the  individual  makes  himself  the  center  of  all,  sub¬ 
ordinates  every  thing,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  to  him¬ 
self — like  a  little  planet  or  mere  fragment  of  a  planet 
that  should  try  to  be  the  sun. 

This  excessive  seeking  of  self,  the  common  ground 
of  all  moral  disorder,  is  manifested  under  two  princi¬ 
pal  forms.  On  abandoning  his  true  place,  man  either 
descends,  animalizes  himself,  falls  into  sensuality,  and 
thus  forfeits  his  claim  to  membership  in  truly  spiritual, 
I  elevated  society  ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  he  attempts 
to  rise  above  the  place  which  his  relative  dignity 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


85 


assigns  to  him  ;  in  a  vain  hope  to  rise,  he  precipitates 
himself  into  the  abysses  of  pride.  Sensuality  and 
pride  are  the  two  chief  forms  of  egotism.  The  two 
And  as  it  has  two  forms,  so  has  egotism  [°™1dsee.j.^9 
also  two  degrees.  The  first  is  that  of  the  ofego*1STn' 
indifferent,  who,  turning  aside,  is  ever  ready  to  ask, 
“Am  I  my  brother’s  keeper?”  The  second  is  that 
of  him  who  is  wicked  positively,  and  who  crushes 
others  for  the  gratification  of  self. 

To  define  sin  is,  I  repeat,  to  prove  that  it  is  an 
evil,  since  it  is  the  violation  of  law,  the  contrary  of 
what  ought  to  be.  But  it  will  not  be  so  easy  to  prove 
as  much  of  suffering. 

Though  it  is  easy  enough  to  excite  the  human 
heart  to  protest  against  suffering,  it  is  quite  an¬ 
other  task  to  demonstrate  to  reason  that  suffering 
ought  not  to  be.  For  it  has  in  fact  numerous  and 
powerful  apologists.  Let  us  examine  this  line  of 
thought. 

What  is  it  that  develops  manhood  ?  Energy.  What 
generates  energy  ?  Active  resistance.  What  calls 
forth  this  resistance  ?  Suffering.  Eliminate  from 
human  life  all  suffering,  and  you  suppress  4po]o„i8ts 
all  contest,  all  development  of  energy —  of  suffering, 
you  have  a  creature  devoid  of  all  moral  vigor.  How 
salutary  an  influence  in  calling  forth  character  has 
often  resulted  from  the  most  dreaded  scourges  !  Some 
time  since  a  friend  wrote  to  me  from  Zurich  at  the 


86 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


time  the  cholera  was  there  raging.  He  said  that 
while  the  scourge  had  given  occasion  to  many  exhi¬ 
bitions  of  selfishness,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  had 
called  forth  so  much  moral  courage,  so  much  devotion, 
so  much  disinterested  sacrifice  for  the  good  of  others, 
so  much  forgetfulness  of  the  distinctions  of  social 
rank  under  the  impulse  of  the  noblest  and  purest  of 
sentiments,  that  for  no  consideration  could  he  think 
of  wishing  that  the  ravages  of  the  disease  had  not 
fallen  upon  his  native  city.  And  this  was  the  head 
of  a  family  ;  and  he  wrote  to  me  at  a  time  when  the 
scourge  was  yet  menacing  himself  and  his  friends. 
It  is,  therefore,  possible  to  pronounce  a  eulogy  on 
epidemics. 


And  war  !  What  has  not  been  said  in  its 
favor  ?  Does  not  war  give  fortitude  to  char- 


A  pologists 
of  war. 


acter  ?  The  comforts  of  peace — do  they  not  lead  to 
effeminacy  ?  And  in  general,  do  not  public  calami¬ 
ties  have  a  manifestly  salutary  effect  ?  Though  some 
may  be  driven  from  tender  thoughts  and  from  God 
by  experiencing  and  seeing  suffering,  is  it  not  more 
frequently  the  case  that  bereavement  and  sorrow  lead 
to  God  and  to  holy  thoughts  ?  Is  it  not  the  fury  of 
the  tempest  that  brings  the  otherwise  godless  sailor 
to  his  knees  and  to  prayer  ?  And  are  not  the  most 
terrible  convulsions  of  society  often  fruitful  of  great 
moral  ameliorations  ?  These  thoughts  are,  in  fact,  .so 
widely  prevalent  in,  society  that  there  is  scarcely  a 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


87 


modern  poet*  who  has  not  strung  his  lyre,  and  mani¬ 
foldly  sung  of  the  blessed  effects  of  trial  and  suffer¬ 
ing — of  the  baptism  of  tears,  of  the  sweet  that  springs 
of  the  bitter.  * 

And  suffering  has  not  only  its  apologists,  it  has  its 
devotees.  -  I  will  not  enlarge  on  the  incredi-  r)evotees  of 
ble  macerations  with  which  the  ancient  sutfermg‘ 
Brahmins  tortured  their  bodies.  In  our  own  day,  and 
in  our  own  frivolous  and  pleasure-seeking  society  of 
Europe,  there  are  still  men  who  voluntarily,  and  often 
after  having  thrown  aside  wealth  and  power,  are  sub¬ 
mitting  themselves  to  the  law  of  toil  under  conditions 
of  the  most  extreme  poverty. 

Have  you  ever  heard  of  the  Trappists  ?  Last  year 
I  visited  a  convent  of  this  order,  near  Mulhouse  in 
Alsace  ;  and  never  perhaps  did  I  experience  a  more 
lively  sense  of  contrast.  On  the  one  hand  there  was 
the  noisy,  bustling,  manufacturing  Mulhouse,  with  its 
prosperous,  philanthropic  and,  consequently,  happy 

*  Take  as  an  example  this  : 

L’homme  est  un  apprenti,  la  douleur  est  son  maitre, 

Et  nul  ne  se  connait  tant  qu’il  n’a  pas  souffert. 

C’est  une  dure  loi,  mais  une  loi  supreme, 

Vieille  coniine  le  monde  et  la  fatalite, 

Qu'il  nous  faut  du  malheur  recevoir  le  bapteme, 

Et  qu’a  ce  triste  prix  tout  doit  etre  achete. 

Les  moissons  pour  murir  ont  besoin  de  rosee  ; 

Pour  vivre  et  pour  sentir,  l’homme  a  besoin  de  pleurs. 

Alfred  df.  Musset. 


88 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


*% 

population — Mulhouse,  with  its  riches  and  luxury,  its 
culture  and  general  comfort ;  and,  on  the  other,  there 
stood  close  by,  the  vast,  chilly,  silent  barracks,  we 
may  say,  of  the  Trappists,  where,  even  in  the  rigors 
of  winter,  fire  is  never  kindled,  save  in  the  lamp  of  the 
altar  and  in  the  hurried,  preparation  of  their  scanty 
food.  And  the  oppressive  silence  of  the  sepul¬ 
chral  place  is  broken  only  by  the  hum  of  toil  or  the 
songs  of  worship!  At  this  very  hour  of  the  evening 
they  lie  there  stretched  upon  boards,  and  seeking 
sleep  after  the  hard  toil  of  the  day.  At  two  o’clock 
in  the  morning  they  are  awakened  by  the  bell,  and 
called  to  prayer.  On  the  morrow,  they  will  labor  in 
the  fields  and  workshops  till  ten  o’clock  before  tasting 
of  food.  To  refreshen  their  forces  they  will  then  be 
served  with  a  glass  of  beer,  and  a  ration  of  bread  and 
of  vegetables  gathered  from  their  own  fields.  And 
the  repast  of  the  evening  will  be  but  a  repetition  of 
this.  On  festive  days  they  receive  in  addition  a  piece 
of  cheese. 

In  comparison  with  these  men,  the  most  pinched 
of  our  day-laborers  leads  the  life  of  a  capitalist.  I 
express  no,  opinion  as  to  the  value  of  these  monastic 
institutions  ;  I  cite  them  merely  as  an  example  of  a 
class  of  men  who  seem  as  zealous  in  seeking  privation, 
as  we  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure ;  who  seem,  in  fact, 
to  ask  nothing  at  the  hands  of  the  world  but  the 
austere  delights  of  suffering.  Voluntarily  they 


The  Problem  of  Evil ’ 


8  9 


deprive  their  bodies  of  nourishment  to  the  last  possible 
limits  ;  they  deprive  their  minds  of  aliment  by  si¬ 
lence  ;  and,  what  appears  almost  terrifying,  they  cut 
oft'  their  heart  from  its  natural  source  of  life  by  the 
absolute  rupture  of  all  bonds  of  family  and  of  all 
social  affections. 

This  will  suffice  to  illustrate  our  remark,  that  suf¬ 
fering  has  not  only  its  apologists,  but  also  its  devo¬ 
tees.  Now,  in  the  face  of  the  arguments  of  its  apolo¬ 
gists,  and  of  the  practice  of  its  devotees,  does  not  our 
thesis,  that  suffering  is  an  evil  and  ought  not  to  be, 

m 

seem  to  be  very  far  from  established  ?  Let  us  first 
understand  each  other. 

It  is  easy  to  prove  that,  under  the  conditions  of 
our  actual  experience — note  these  words  :  of  o?ir 
actual  experience — suffering  is  inevitable,  and  even 
that  it  is  good.  But  how  is  this  proved  ?  Three  favor- 

«  1,  ,  .  r  ,  .  able  phases 

Ah  the  arguments  used  for  tms  purpose  may  0fsuffermg. 
be  reduced  to  three. 

First  :  Suffering  is  a  warning  of  the  presence  of 
disorder.  If  you  were  sick  without  knowing  it,  with¬ 
out  having  an  idea  of  the  evil,  you  would  not  seek  for 
a  remedy.  So  also  when  the  body  politic  ex-  lt  .ga 
periences -troubles  or  sufferings,  more  intense  inff- 
than  ordinarily,  it  is  admonished  to  search  out  the 
locality  of  the  disorder,  and  to  correct  it  by  one  of 
those  remedies  which,  in  politics,  are  called  reforms. 
To  be  admonished  of  a  disorder  in  order  that  it 


90 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


may  be  repaired,  is  useful  and  good.  Who  can 
deny  it  ? 


Second  :  Suffering  is  a  remedy.  From 
the  amputation  of  a  limb,  which  will  perhaps 


It  is  a  reme¬ 
dy. 


save  your  life,  to  some  misfortune  that  may  befall  you 
while  under  the  influence  of  a  culpable  passion,  and 
thus  awaken  you  to  serious  thoughts,  suffering  is  of 
most  wholesome  effects  ;  and  no  one  can  refuse  to 
say  with  Fenelon  :  “Who  can  call  evil  those  pains 
which  God  sends  us  to  purify  us  and  to  render  us 
worthy  of  him  ?  That  which  does  us  so  much  good 
cannot  be  an  evil.”  Suffering  purifies  us,  is  very 
necessary  to  us  ;  hence,  it  is  good. 


Third  :  Suffering  is  a  punishment.  Pun¬ 
ishment  is  an  incident  of  justice,  and  justice 


It  is  a  pun¬ 
ishment. 


is  good.  Have  you  never,  while  in  the  presence  of 
some  odious  crime,  felt  rise  within  your  heart  a 
voice  calling  for  justice  ?  And  criminals  also  some- 
times  hear  that  voice.  There  have  been  among  such 
as  were  condemned  to  death  those  who  would  have 
refused  a  pardon,  for  the  reason  that,  their  con¬ 
sciences  having  been  made  tender,  they  felt  that  they 
ought  publicly  to  expiate  their  crime.  Justice  is  good, 
and,  despite  the  mysteries  of  the  subject,  we  can  con¬ 
ceive  that  justice  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word  is  per¬ 
fectly  consistent  with  goodness  ;  that  it  is,  in  fact, 
only  one  of  the  forms  of  love.  The  moral  law  ex¬ 
presses  and  exacts  only  that  order  which  is  essential 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


91 


to  all  spiritual  society.  To  permit  the  violation  of 
the  moral  law  without  vindicating  its  rights  by  pun¬ 
ishment,  is  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  all  to  an  indul¬ 
gence  toward  the  few,  which  is  nothing  else  than  a 
weakness.  To  maintain  the  law  by  punishment  is  to 
protect  the  interest  of  all  against  the  disorder  of  a 
few  ;  it  is  the  work  of  goodness  directed  by  wisdom. 
In  the  form  of  punishment,  therefore,  suffering  is 
necessary ;  in  this  respect  also  it  is  good. 

All  candid  apologies  for  suffering  seem  to  fall  under 
one  of  these  three  arguments.  Certain  obscure  state- 
ments,  however,  have  also  been  used  for  this  purpose. 
We  will  notice  them  in  passing. 

A  free  being,  with  an  object  to  attain,  must  neces¬ 
sarily  desire  it,  and  make  efforts  to  realize  it.  It  is 
affirmed  that  all  desire  is  the  result  of  privation,  and 
presupposes,  consequently,  a  suffering  ;  and  that  all 
effort  is  painful.  Suffering  appears,  therefore,  to  be 
the  necessary  condition  of  liberty,  inasmuch  as,  if 
suffering  were  suppressed,  there  would  exist  neither 
desire,  nor  effort,  nor,  consequently,  any  exertion  of 
free  activity. 

The  bases  of  this  reasoning  are  not  solid.  Desire  and 
A  desire  conjoined  to  the  hope  of  its  realiza-  t'xertl"n  are 
tion  may,  in  fact,  be  a  most  pleasant  feeling  ;  sutferiDg- 
as,  for  example,  all  who  have  a  good  appetite  and  the 
means  of  gratifying  it,  very  well  know.  For  those 
who  are  physically  and  morally  healthy,  effort,  far 


92 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


from  being  painful,  is  one  of  the  purest  joys  of  existence. 
A  young  man,  with  the  health  and  the  will  for  it,  is 
far  from  suffering  while  playing  his  muscles  in  ascend¬ 
ing  a  mountain.  Desire  becomes  suffering  when  it  is 
deprived  of  satisfaction  and  hope  ;  effort  becomes 
pain  when  the  means  of  action  no  longer  respond  to 
the  will ;  but  all  desire  is  not  suffering,  and  all  effort 
is  not  pain.  The  action  of  a  free  being  does  not  in¬ 
variably  presuppose  pain.  It  is  important  to  avoid 
such  confusions  of  thought  as  would  imply  that  suffer¬ 
ing  is  necessary. 

As  to  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  usefulness  of 
suffering,  they  are  sound,  and  I  accept  them  all.  In 
affirming  that  suffering  is  an  evil  and  ought  not  to  be, 
I  would  not  be  understood  to  counsel  parents  to  take 
from  the  path  in  which  their  children  tread  all  the 
thorns,  or  to  deprive  them  too  largely  of  the*benefits 


of  the  rod.  I  do  not  counsel  generous  hearts 
to  alleviate  inconsiderately  all  suffering,  and 


Suffering'  not 
always  to  be 
prevented  to 


the  utmost,  never  to  allow  free  course  to  the  penal  con¬ 
sequences  of  idleness  and  sensuality.  I  do  not  coun¬ 
sel  judges  to  set  free  without  punishment  the  thief 
and  the  assassin.  On  the  contrary,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  judge  who  absolves  the  malefactor  who  has 
forfeited  his  rights  to  the  liberty  of  society  renders 
himself  in  some  degree  an  accomplice  in  the  new 
crimes  which  he  commits.  Such  a  judge  forgets  that 
justice  on  the  part  of  the  civil  power  (the  chief  ob- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


93 


jeet  of  which  is  to  further  the  public  good  by  re¬ 
pressing  the  disorders  of  the  few)  is  a  mercy,  and 
feebleness  a  cruelty.  And  above  all,  would  I  not  be 
understood  as  counseling  any  one  to  attempt  to 
quench,  in  souls  tormented  with  a  sense  of  their  sins, 
the  pains  of  repentance  and  the  salutary  bitterness  of 
remorse.  In  the  world,  in  its  actual  state,  pain  has  a 
great  mission,  as  it  has  a  large  place.  It  is  some¬ 
times  our  duty  to  let  it  run  its  course,  and  the  highest 
charity  often  requires  that  we  become  the  rigorous 
ministers  of  justice. 

Suffering  is,  therefore,  of  healthful  influence.  It 
may  be  good  ;  and  if,  for  all  that,  it  ought  not  to 
be,  still  this  is  not  true  in  an  absolute  sense,  as 
it  is  of  sin.  It  may  be  the  means  to  an  excellent 
end ;  and  the  maxim  that  the  end  justifies  the 
means,  though  severely  to  be  excluded  in  regard  to 
moral  duty,  may  nevertheless  find  here  a  legitimate 
application. 

Having  said  this,  let  us  now  examine  the  basis  of 

* 

the  argument  offered  by  the  apologists  of  suffering. 
Warning,  remedy,  punishment,  all  these  words  pre¬ 
suppose  disorder ;  they  place  the  necessity 

I  _  _  Suffering 

of  suffering  in  a  bad  condition  of  things,  good  only 

.  .  ,  _  inanabnor- 

All  the  arguments  in  justification  of  suffer-  mai state  of 
ing  are  based  on  our  actual  abnormal  con¬ 
dition.  In  the  midst  of  such  a  condition,  where  the 
natural  order  of  things  is  broken,  it  is  easy  to  prove 


94 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


that  warning  is  desirable,  that  punishment  is  good, 
and  that  a  remedy  is  beneficent.  But  suppose  once 
that  all  things  are  in  a  state  of  order,  and  you  can 
find  no  place  for  suffering.  Pain  is  not  nutriment,  it 
is  a  medicine  ;  and  in  a  condition  of  health,  remedies 
are  not  good.  Now,  as  pain  would  have  to  vanish 
as  soon  as  things  should  be  as  they  ought  to  be, 
it  is  very  clear  that,  in  an  absolute  sense,  it  ought 
not  to  be,  and,  hence,  that  it  is  an  evil.  And  if  it  is 
inevitable  that  in  this  world  we  must  suffer,  it  is  quite 
evident  that  the  world  is  not  in  a  condition  of  order  ; 
for  God,  who  created  our  heart,  did  not  create  it  for 
suffering. 


If  we  could  be  convinced  that  pain  is  good  in  itself, 

The  heart  and  an  absolute  sense,  the  most  disinter- 
not  made  ested  0f  the  functions  of  our  hearts  would 

for  Stoi- 

tism.  be  materially  paralyzed ;  pity  would  be 
quenched.  A  philosopher  of  antiquity,  while  tor¬ 
mented  with  the  gout,  is  said  to  have  cried  out, 
“  Pain,  thy  efforts  are  useless  ;  thou  wilt  never  force 
me  to  confess  that  thou  art  an  evil !  ”  This  'is  a 
proud  declaration,  and  when  made  of  one’s  self,  of 
one’s  own  actual  sufferings,  it  is  sublime.  But  in 
the  presence  of  the  sufferings  of  others  the  heart 
will  ever  exclaim,  “  Philosopher,  thy  words  are 
in  vain  ;  thou  wilt  never  induce  me  to  admit  that 
pain  is  not  an  evil.” 

Do  you  need  another  argument  to  prove  that  suf- 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  95 

fering  ought  not  to  be  ?  Here  is  one  which  seems  to 
me  unanswerable.  What  is  the  supreme  Bedllctioad 
law  of  practical  life  ?  The  law  of  charity.  (,l)*urdum- 
But  charity,  if  it  would  not  do  more  harm  than  good, 
if  it  would  not  counteract  the  salutary  working  of 
pain,  must  be  of  masculine  temper.  Now  charity  is 
essentially  gentle  and  mild  ;  its  mission  is  to  produce 
ultimate  happiness,  and,  until  that  point  is  gained,  to 
alleviate  as  far  as  possible  all  suffering.  Its  end  is 
to  produce  a  state  of  society  where  all  shall  be  order, 
where  there  shall  be  no  more  tears,  nor  mourning, 
nor  lamentation.  This  being  unquestionably  the  end 
of  charity,  it  would  follow,  on  the  assumption  that 
suffering  is  good,  that  the  supreme  law  of  duty 
would  tend  to  work  the  diminution  and  destruction  of 
the  good,  which  is  absurd.  If  charity,  therefore,  is  the 
law  of  the  good,  then  suffering  ought  to  be  destroyed, 
ought  not  to  be,  and  consequently  it  is  an  evil. 

I  conclude  :  error,  sin,  and  suffering  are  disturb¬ 
ances  of  the  true  order  of  things,  are  evils,  and  our 
mission  is  to  remedy  them.  This  seems  almost  as 
clear  to  me  as  a  theorem  in  geometry. 

III.  The  Negation  of  Evil. 

Human  society  presents  a  very  strange  spectacle. 

How  many  of  the  faces  we  meet  on  our  streets  are 

haggard  and  sad  !  how  many  of  the  heads,  Practical  ad¬ 
mission  of 

bowed  with  care  and  trouble  !  As  soon  as  evil. 


96 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


the  early  ardor  of  youth  is  dampened,  and  age  has 
begun  to  destroy  the  illusions  once  indulged,  it  is 
exceedingly  difficult  to  keep  alive  in  men  a  hopeful 
faith  in  the  good.  There  is  too  generally  prevalent 
a  deplorable  lack  of  courage  and  hope,  of  confidence 
in  the  future.  It  is  often  difficult  to  induce  men  to 
believe  that  the  passing  clouds  do  not  blot  out  the 
sun,  and  that  none  of  our  hazes  have  yet  succeeded 
in  destroying  the  eternal  azure  above  them.  Of  all 
the  wants  of  the  human  heart,  none  is  felt  more  uni¬ 
versally  than  the  want  of  consolation.  Such  is  the 
general  condition  of  practical  life. 

But  if  we  leave  the  beaten  paths  of  real  life,  and 
enter  the  select  circle  of  scholars  and  philosophers, 
every  thing  is  wonderfully  changed  ;  the  task  which 
then  is  most  difficult  is,  to  demonstrate  the  existence 
speculative  of  evil  as  against  the  affirmation  that  every 

tendency  to 

deny  it.  thing  is  good.  This  may  seem  a  strange 
statement,  but  a  slight  examination  of  the  subject 
will  show,  that  one  of  the  chief  currents  of  meta¬ 
physical  thought  in  the  past  has^constantly  included 
the  denial  of  evil.  It  has  been  so  up  to  the  present 
day.  On  several  points  of  the  intellectual  globe  there 
are  signs,  it  is  true,  that  a  better  future  is  beginning 
to  dawn,  but  up  to  the  present  the  results’ of  philoso¬ 
phy  have  too  often  justly  deserved  the  malediction 
of  Isaiah  :  “  Woe  unto  them  that  call  evil  good,  and 
good  evil !  ”  I  am  not  here  to  pronounce  woes  upon 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


97 


any  one,  though  I  am  convinced  that,  of  all  possible 
theories,  that  which  denies  the  reality  of  evil  is  cer¬ 
tainly  the  most  pernicious  in  its  consequences.  My 
special  task  is  to  appeal  to  your  reason,  and  show 
that  this  theory  is  false. 

The  negation  of  evil,  or  the  affirmation  that  all  is 
good,  is  in  harsh  contradiction  to  our  natural  senti¬ 
ments.  In  its  direct  and  unequivocal  expression 
this  doctrine,  as  I  have  said,  prevails  only  in  certain 
learned  circles.  An  effort,  however,  becomes  more 
and  more  apparent  to  popularize  it,  and  circulate  it 
among  the  masses,  through  journals  and  reviews  ;  I 
have  even  discovered  it  in  romances.  Many  of  the 
inferior  writers  who  retail  it  on  their  pages  have  little 
suspicion  of  its  origin  and  true  significance,  mst  as, 
of  the  many  who  drink  of  a  river,  only  a  few  know  its 
fountains  and  meandering  course. 

The  substance  of  the  argument  urged  against  the 
common  views  of  evil  is  this  ;  “  In  the  eyes  of  the 
true  savant  all  is  good.”  But  what  does  he  say  of 
what  we  call  evil?  He  says,  “  It  is  a  neces-  The  form  of 

the  denial 

sary  incident  of  all  existence.  It  is  neces-  ofevu. 
sary,  not  merely  in  reference  to  the  actual  state  of  the 
world,  not  merely  as  a  result  of  an  abnormal  condi¬ 
tion  of  Jiumanity ;  it  is  necessary  primitively  and  ab¬ 
solutely,  thus  constituting  a  part  of  the  nature  of 
things  and  of  the  plan  of  the  universe.  Now,  as  evil 

is  necessary,  so  it  ought  to  be  ;  and,  as  it  ought  to  be, 

7 


93 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


so  is  it  good.  There  is,  therefore,  no  evil ;  what  we 
call  evil  is  only  one  of  the  forms  of  the  good.  The 
existence  of  evil  is  an  intellectual  chimera,  a  mental 
disease,  from  which  philosophy  cures  us.” 

Such  is  the  kind  of  conversion  to  which  we  are 
recommended  by  a  certain  so-called  science.  The 
common  sense  of  mankind,  it  holds,  is  in  disorder  ; 
man  must  be  converted,  not  by  the  destruction  .of 
evil,  which  does  not  exist,  but  by  banishing  from 
him  the  idea  of  evil.  The  argument  is  logical :  if 
evil  is  necessary,  it  ought  to  be  ;  if  it  ought  to  be,  it 
is  good.  This  is,  in  fact,  our  definition  of  the  good. 
The  reasoning,  I. say,  is  irresistible  if  we  admit  the 
assumption  upon  which  it  rests,  but  this  is  what  we 
must  now  examine. 

Let  us  observe  at  once  that  the  question  is,*as  to 
the  positive  denial  of  the  reality  of  evil.  In  certain 
speculative  writings  you  will  find  the  arguments 
above  stated  under  this  heading,  Explanation  of 
Evil.  But  the  word  explanation  is  out  of  place  ; 
those  who  deny  a  fact  do  not  explain  it.  Toward 
the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  if  I  mistake  not, 
there  arose  a  great  discussion  about  a  child  which 
\  -oiden  was  born  with  a  golden  tooth.  There  was 
tooth.  a  great  commotion  among  the  physiologists. 
How  was  one  to  explain,  from  the  known  constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  human  body,  the  production  of  a  golden 
tooth  ?  Some  one  finally  settled  the  question  by 


The  Problem  of  Evil , 


99 


examining  the  extraordinary  child,  and  convincing 
himself  that  the  golden  tooth  did  not  exist.  But  was 
this  an  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  ?  No  ;  it  was 
the  suppression  of  it.  The  question  now  is,  Can  we 
as  easily  get  rid  of  evil  as  of  this  fabulous  tooth  ?  is 
the  true  solution  of  the  problem  the  denial  of  its 
object  ? 

To  come  now  to  the  heart  of  the  matter:  How  is 
it  attempted  to  prove  that  evil  is  necessary  ?  It  is 
proved  first  by  a  fallacious  method.  It  is  T1ie  fallacy 


of  applying 


assumed  that  the  processes  of  mathematics  the  method 


of  physical 
science  to 
the  sphere 
of  liberty. 


and  physics  are  applicable  to  universal  sci¬ 
ence.  Thus  are  applied  to  the  sphere  of 


liberty  those  methods  which  are  legitimately  appli¬ 
cable  only  where  no  element  of  liberty  exists.  An 
axiom  in  physics  is,  that  in  matter  there  is  no  prin¬ 
ciple  of  spontaneity,  so  that  the  facts  are  always  in 
conformity  to  laws,  and  there  is  never  a  difference 
between  what  is,  and  what  ought  to  be.  If  this 
process  is  applicable  to  the  moral  world,  it  is  only  so 
applicable  on  the  assumption  that  all  that  is  ought 
to  be,  evil  included.  The  necessity  of  evil  is  thus 
proved,  by  a  method  that  takes  that  necessity  for 
granted. 

But  the  argument  returns.  If  evil  exists,  as  con¬ 
science  affirms  that  it  does,  then  there  is  in  the 
moral  sphere  a  difference  between  what  ought  to 
be,  and  what  actually  is  ;  the  method  peculiar  to 


i  oo  The  Problem  of  Evil . 

physical  science  is,  therefore,  not  the  method  of  all 
science. 

Again,  the  necessity  of  evil  is  proved  by  assuming 
the  world  under  its  actual  conditions  to  be  the  meas¬ 
ure  of  all  that  might  be.  In  the  present  condition 
of  our  world,  good  and  evil  are  so  intermingled  that 
to  suppress  the  one  would,  it  seems,  amount  to  the 
suppression  of  the  other.  Thus,  a  world  exempt 
from  evil  appears  as  little  better  than  a  purely  Utopian 
imagination. 

This  reasoning  is  based  on  experience,  but  it  is  a 
very  limited  experience.  In  conceiving  of  a  world 
free  from  disorder,  and  fully  realizing  the  good,  it  is 
not  true  that  we  rush  into  the  sphere  of  chimeras. 
Common  ex-  To  the  experience  of  what  actually  is  wre 

perience  -op¬ 
posed  by  a  oppose  another  experience,  not  less  real,  not 

higher  ex-  .  . 

perience.  less  certain — -the  experience  oi  the  reason  and 
of  the  conscience,  which  proclaim  that  which  ought  to 
be,  and  assure  us  that  evil  ought  not  to  be.  To  estab¬ 
lish  the  necessity  of  evil  in  the  name  of  experience, 
is  to  forget  the  better  and  nobler  part  of  experience. 

Finally,  the  necessity  of  evil  is  proved  by  a  con¬ 
founding  of  ideas,  and  it  is  to  this  point  that  I  desire 
to  direct  your  apecial  attention.  We  must  enter  here 
into  the  darkest  labyrinths  of  philosophy  ;  but  one 
sees  clearly  every-where  if  one  is  only  provided  with  a 
good  lamp,  and  the  only  lamp  which  you  will  need 
Is,  a  close  attention. 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


IOI 


The  human  mind  possesses,  two  perfectly  distinct 
ideas  :  the  idea  of  more  and  less,  and  the  idea  of  good 
and  evil.  By  confounding  the  more  with  the  The  feiiacy 

of  confound- 

good,  and  the  dess  with  evil,  it  is  made  to  mg  themore 

with  the 

appear  that  evil  is  necessary.  But  by  care-  good, 
fully  distinguishing  these  ideas  we  will  restore  to  evil 
its  true  character. 

Represent  to  yourself,  if  you  please,  the  whole 
series  of  created  existences,  from  the  very  lowest  to 
the  highest  of  all ;  or,  to  speak  mathematically,  con¬ 
ceive  of  the  vast  multitude  of  beings  which  occupy 
the  space  between  zero,  on  the  one  hand,  and  infinity, 
on  the  other.  Begin  now  at  the  lowest  and  gradually 

ascend  the  scale.  As  to  matter,  you  will  see  a  con- 

0 

stant  increase,  both  as  to  the  space  occupied,  and  as 

to  the  density  and  the  richness  of  the  forms.  As  to 

spirits,  you  will  see  gradually  rising  to  higher  degrees 

the  power  of  the  heart,  of  thought,  and  of  volition. 

Thus  you  will  have  before  you  a  conception  The  hierar¬ 
chy  of  be- 

of  the  hierarchy,  or  scale  of  dignity,  of  the  mg. 
universe.  When  you  say  the  sun  is  more  than  the 
earth,  life  is  more  than  matter,  the  being  which 
thinks  is  more  than  the  being  which  thinks  not, 
you  lorm  judgments  which  we  shall  term  judgments 
of  hierarchy ,  or  of  dignity.  Pascal  has  used  this 
thought  with  telling  effect  on  the  page  where  he  con¬ 
trasts  the  being  who  thinks  with  the  universe  which 
would  crush  him,  and  on  that  in  which  he  exalts 


102 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


above  the  totality  of  all  worlds  and  of  all  intelligence, 
the  pre-eminent  worth  of  charity. 

Every  being  in  its  place  in  the  hierarchy,  or  scale 
of  existence,  has  a  purpose,  a  destination,  and  it  is 
good  or  evil  according  as  it  does  or  does  not  answer 
that  destination.  The  judgment  which  we  pronounce 
in  this  regard  is  a  moral  judgment.  I  call  it  moral 
even  when  it  relates  directly  to  inanimate  objects, 
taking  as  granted  what  I  have  said  in  my  first  lec¬ 
ture,  namely,  that  every  phase  of  the  good  includes 
directly,  or  indirectly,  the  participation  of  a  will. 
When  you  say  a  watch  is  out  of  order,  or  runs  poorly 
because  its  different  parts  do  not  all  fulfill  their  func¬ 
tions,  (which  implies  at  bottom  a  blame  against  the 
watch-maker,)  you  pronounce  a  moral  judgment,  and 
you  do  it  as  really  and  positively  as  when  you  say, 
envy  is  a  wrong  feeling,  or  theft  is  a  culpable  action. 
Hierarchic  Now,  the  hierarchic  judgment  and  the  moral 
different.  judgment  are  radically  distinct.  This  truth 

from  moral  Jo  J 

judgments.  js  so  weighty  that  I  will  adduce  three  con¬ 
siderations  in  its  support. 

First.  The  good  may  exist,  and  may  exist  equally, 
at  all  the  degrees  in  the  scale  of  being,  for  that  which 
Perfect  determines  the  degree  of  good  is  not  the 
poSbieat  place  which  the  being  occupies  in  the  scale, 
any  point  put  q-s  conformity  to  its  destination.  A 

in  the  scale  J 

of  being,  village  clock  whose  single  rude  hand  marks 
only  the  hours,  may  be  as  perfect  in  its  kind  as  the  most 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


103 


complicated  repeater.  The  most  humble  duty  faith¬ 
fully  performed  is  equal  in  the  order  of  conscience 
to  the  most  brilliant  virtue.  The  child  who,  while 
under  the  hands  of  the  dentist,  represses  the  cry  of 
nature  in  order  not  to  call  forth  the  frowns  of  its 
mother,  may  have  a  heroism  equal  to  that  of  Winckel- 
ried  when  receiving  to  his  breast  the  lances  of 

Austria.  Should  we  ignore  this  truth,  should  we 

• 

confound  the  degree  of  the  good  with  the  brilliancy 
of  the  good,  (which  latter  can  exist  only  in  excep¬ 
tional  conjunctures,)  we  would  open  the  door  to  a 
glory-seeking  vanity,  and  shut  it  to  humble  duty- 
fulfilling  conscientiousness. 


Second.  Evil  may  exist  at  any  and  every  e  vil  possi¬ 
ble  in  the 

stage  of  the  scale  of  being.  An  archangel  highest  as 

,  ...  1  .  ,  ~  n  well  as  in 

may  be  evil ;  a  worm  may  be  sick,  li  natter-  the  lowest, 
ers  are  a  detestable  and  fatal  environment  for  mon- 
archs,  it  is  simply  because  they  encourage  in  them  the 
sentiment  that  their  elevation  exonerates  them,  in 
some  sort,  from  the  obligations  of  moral  law,  and  that 
they  are  limited  only  by  their  own  good  pleasure.* 
Doubtless  Louis  XIV.  believed,  unconsciously,  it  may 
be,  that  what  would  be  culpable  in  the  simple  citizen 
was  right  enough  when  it  was  the  Great  King  who 


did  it ;  and  the  lesson  which  Racine  gave  him  in  some 
of  the  fine  verses  of  Athalie  was,  very  likely,  in  place. 
Third.  There  may  be  more  good  in  the  inferior  de- 


*  Qu’un  roi  n’a  d’autre  frein  que  sa  volonte  meme. — Athai.ie. 


104 


The  Problem  of  Evil , 


grees  of  the  scale  of  being  than  m  the  superior  degrees, 

H- her  (rocxi  The  widow's  mite  was  less  in  the  scale  of  in- 
possible  at  a  £rtnsic  Worth  than  the  alms  of  the  rich  ;  but 

lower  stage 

in  the  scale,  it  was  declared  greater  in  the  moral  scale. 
Epictetus,  if  he  was  as  good  as  his  books,  was  one  of 
the  best  men  under  the  sun ;  but  he  was  a  slave,  and 
stood  quite  at  the  bottom  of  the  social  hierarchy  ; 
while  Nero,  wh©  was  master  of  the  world,  has  left  an 
accursed  name. 

The  hierarchic  judgment  and  the  moral  judgment 
are,  therefore,  profoundly  distinct.  And  yet  they 
may  be  harmonized.  In  separating  them  we  attain 
to  a  part  of  the  truth  ;  but  it  is  only  in  bringing  to¬ 
gether  that  which  at  first  we  distinguished  that  we 
reach  the  whole  truth.  The  hierarchic  and  the  moral 
judgments  approach  each  other  in  the  idea  of 
progress. 

That  progress  is  a  good,  is  one  of  the  most  gener¬ 
ally  and  readily  accepted  truths  of  this  epoch  :  in  fact, 
in  progress  it  is  onty  too  readily  accepted,  inasmuch  as 

nizedhTerar'-  many  incautious  minds  are  thereby  led  to 
chic  and  welcome  every  novelty  as  an  improvement, 

moral  judg-  J  J  1  7 

meins.  and  every  change  as  a  progress.  Progress,  in 
the  sense  of  development,  is  the  law,  the  final  cause 
of  whatever  exists.  In  that  an  object  develops  itself 
it  realizes  more  and  more  its  destination  ;  it  rises 
from  less  to  more  ;  it  rises  from  zero  and  approaches 
the  plenitude  of  being.  In  the  idea  of  progress,  there- 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


fore,  are  intimately  harmonized  the  law  of  the  hie¬ 
rarchy,  which  expresses  the  passage  from  the  less  to 
the  more,  and  the  moral  law,  which  requires  that 
the  passage  from  the  less  to  the  more  be  effected. 

But  the  two  ideas,  though  harmonizing*,  are  none 
the  less  distinct,  inasmuch  as  progress  does  not  con¬ 
sist  in  the  fact  that  a  being  passes  out  of  its  Progress  is 

not  meta- 

OWn  order  and  nature  to  become  a  different  morpliosis, 
nature,  but  in  the  fact  that  it  realizes  fully  its  own 
peculiar  nature.  The  gardener  who  wishes  to  im¬ 
prove  a  rose  does  not  try  to  make  a  camellia  of  it  ; 
the  shepherd  who  wishes  to  improve  his  sheep  does 
not  aim  to  make  goats  of  them  ;  and  it  is  quite  con¬ 
ceivable  that  a  young  woman  might  be  perfectly  de¬ 
veloped  and  accomplished  without,  for  all  that,  being 
made  into  a  man — or  even  into  a  political  elector. 

The  good  may,  therefore,  exist  at  every  degree  in 
the  scale  of  being,  if  only  each  being  fulfills  its  own 
special  function.  A  limited  power  may  be  as  good  as 
a  greater  power,  for  the  good  does  not  consist  in  the 
quantity  but  in  the  direction  of  the  power.  Every 
thing  may  be  good,  perfectly  good,  in  its  place,  with¬ 
out  in  the  least  leaving  its  natural  sphere;  There  is 
only  one  thing  which  can  never  be  good,  and  that  is, 
evil;  for  evil  is  disorder,  and  disorder  has  no  legiti¬ 
mate  place. 

In  the  sphere  of  progress  every  thing  may  be  good, 
perfectly  good,  if  only  at  each  moment  of  duration  it 


io  6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


develops  itself  in  such  a  manner  as  to  realize  the 
capabilities  of  its  own  nature.  True  progress  con- 
Simpie  non-  sists  in  rising  from  zero  and  tending  toward 
is^never^an  the  plenitude  of  existence  ;  and  the  evil 
never  lies  in  the  distance  which  separates  a 
being  from  its  ultimate  end,  but  in  the  fact  that  it 
has  not  advanced  as  it  should  have  done,  or  that  it 
has  taken  a  false  direction. 

Let  us  now  return  more  directly  to  the  subject  in 
hand.  In  order  to  establish  the  necessity  of  evil,  the 
more  is  confounded  with  the  good,  the  less  with  the 
evil,  the  hierarchic  judgment  with  the  moral  judg¬ 
ment  ;  and  then  it  is  argued  :  Without  the  less  and 
the  more  there  would  be  no  hierarchy  (scale  of  being) ; 
without  the  hierarchy,  no  diversity  ;  and  without  di¬ 
versity  the  world  would  be  impossible.  The  less, 
which  is  the  evil,  is,  therefore,  the  condition  of  the 
existence  of  the  world  ;  hence  it  is  necessary. 

This  metaphysical  reasoning  is  generally  presented 
in  the  following  form  :  There  is  but  one  infinite  being, 


God  ;  whatever  is  not  God  is  limited  ;  this  limitation 

statement  of  *s  the  evil  ;  what  we  call  evil  is  simply  the 
argument  m  distance  which  separates  us  from  the  Infinite, 

eviL  that  is,  it  is  the  portion  of  nonentity  which 
yet  clings  to  us.  If  there  were  nothing  but  God, 
there  would  be  no  world  ;  it  is  an  essential  condition 
of  the  existence  of  the  world  that  it  cannot  be  in¬ 
finite  ;  therefore,  it  must  contain  evil.  To  demand 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  i  o 7 

0 

that  there  should  be  no  evil  is  to  demand  that  noth¬ 
ing  should  exist  but  God.  Evil  is  only  the  imperfec¬ 
tion  inherent  in  all  finite  being  ;  and  as  all  that  is 
not  God  is  finite,  imperfect,  therefore  evil  is  neces¬ 
sary.  With  these  arguments  a  fraction  of  the  skeptic¬ 
al  world  seems  to  triumph  ;  and  they  triumph  all 
the  more  as  they  exclaim  :  How  could  there  be  prog¬ 
ress  if  there  were  no  evil  ?  Progress  consists  in  the 
fact  that  an  object  develops  itself,  passes  from  imper¬ 
fection  to  an  imperfection  that  is  less,  that  is,  from 
evil  to  good.  To  suppress  evil  would  therefore  be  to 
suppress  progress,  which  all  admit  to  be  a  good. 
Evil  is,  therefore,  a  condition  of  the  good — constitutes, 
in  fact,  a  part  of  the  good. 

I  trust  you  already  fully  see  the  confusions  of 
thought  on  which  all  this  scaffolding  is  based.  To  be 
good  it  is  not  necessary  to  be  God  ;  it  suf-  it  rests  on  a 

confusion  of 

fices  that  we  be  at  the  place  in  the  hie-  ideas, 
rarchic  scale  which  God  has  assigned  to  us,  and  that  we 
fulfill  the  duties  which  he  has  prescribed  for  us.  That 
progress  which  removes  us  from  evil  is  not  progress 
proper;  it  is  a  restoration;  and  restoration  presup¬ 
poses  disorder.  Where  there  was  no  disorder  progress 
would  not  consist  in  getting  rid  of  evil,  but  in  getting 
rid  of  non-development,  of  nonentity,  and  in  realizing 
ever  more  and  more  the  plenitude  of  our  being. 

This  confusion  of  thought,  by  which  the  hierarchic 
idea  is  confounded  with  the  moral  idea,  evil  with  im- 


io8 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


perfection,  and  progress  with  getting  rid  of  evil,  leads 
to  deplorable  consequences.  If  all  finite  being  is  evil, 
and  evil  in  the  proportion  of  its  distance  from  the  in¬ 
finite,  then  all  created  beings  are  predestined  to  evil, 
and  to  evil  more  or  less  great  according  to  their 
relative  place  in  the  scale  of  being  ;  such  a  doctrine 
is  horrible. 

its  absurd  Note,  now,  some  of  the  inferences  in  which 

practical  con  - 

sequences,  you  involve  yourselves  by  holding  that  the 
development  of  a  being,  its  progress,  consists  in 
passing  from  the  evil  to  the  less  evil,  to  the  good. 
Have  you  never,  of  a  fine  June  day,  plucked  from  the 
hedge,  or  on  the  hill-side,  a  branch  of  eglantine  ? 
Perhaps  the  flower  that  was  as  yet  closed  attracted 
you  more  than  the  fully  opened  one.  A  bud  is  a 
flower  in  process  of  development,  an  imperfect  flower. 
But  has  it  ever  occurred  to  you  to  regard  a  bud  as 
only  a  poor  flower  ?  Behold  that  pretty  child,  whose 
mere  presence  is  the  joy  of  a  whole  family,  whose 
least  resemblance  of  a  half-articulated  word  calls  a 
smile  of  bliss  from  its  mother,  and  whose  first  attempts 
at  stepping  are  rich  entertainment  for  a  whole  com¬ 
pany.  That  child  is  a  man  in  process  of  develop¬ 
ment  ;  it  is  an  imperfect  man,  in  the  sense  of  incom¬ 
plete ;  but  has  it  ever  occurred  to  you  to  regard  a  child 
as  a  poor,  a  bad,  man  ?  The  thought  is  absurd. 

But  we  cannot  dismiss  it  as  a  mere  trivial  absurdity 
that  needs  but  to  be  mentioned  to  be  rejected  ;  it  is 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


109 


gravely  propounded  and  defended  in  pretentious 
tomes  of  metaphysics.  We,  therefore,  will  examine 
it  a  little  more  closely. 

Some  of  our  contemporaries  have  claimed  as  a  tri- 
umph  of  what -they  call  modern  science,  the  doctrine 
that  all  is  good.  To  obviate  this  anachronism  I  ex¬ 
tract  this  formula  from  a  Greek  writer  of  the  Alex¬ 
andrian  school.  “  Without  the  existence  of  It  is  of  an_ 
evil,”  says  Plotinus,  “  the  world  would  be  cient  date' 

less  perfect.”  *  And  that  we  may  have  no  doubt  as 

• 

to  his  meaning  he  expressly  mentions  “  wickedness  ” 
as  one  of  the  elements  that  contribute  to  the  perfec¬ 
tion  of  the  universe.  The  sense  of  the  doctrine  is, 
that  what  we  call  evil  is  only  a  phase  of  the  good,  a 
primitively  and  eternally  necessary  element  of  the 
universe.  All  the  errors  that  have  obscured  and  still 
obscure  the  human  mind  ;  all  the  sorrows  that  have 
rent  the  human  heart,  and  still  drape  it  in  mourn¬ 
ing  ;  all  the  crimes  which  cause  us  to  shudder ;  all 
the  meannesses  which  disgust  us  with  society ;  all  this, 

*  “  Must  we,  then,  regard  as  necessary  the  evils  which  are  found 
in  the  universe,  and  for  the  reason  that  they  are  the  consequences  of 
higher  principles?  Yes:  for  without  them  the  'universe  would  he 
imperfect.  The  majority  of  evils,  or  rather  all  evils,  are  useful  to  the 
universe  :  such  are  venomous  creatures  ;  but  often  we  do  not  know 
what  purpose  they  serve.  Wickedness  is  useful  in  many  respects,  and 
may  conduct  to  many  good  results  :  for  example,  it  leads  to  happy 
expedients;  it  obliges  men  to  the  practice  of  prudence.” — Second 
Etimad ,  Book  III,  chap,  xviii. 


I  10 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


according  to  this  theory,  is  good  ;  all  this  is  but  a 
condition  of  the  general  harmony.  It  is  only  our 
ignorance  that  finds  any  thing  to  object  to  in  the 
march  of  the  universe. 

Without  the  existence  of  evil  the  world  would  be 
less  perfect !  Let  us  develop  this  formula.  If  the 
what  the  Mexicans  had  not  annually  immolated  thou- 

theory  im¬ 
plies.  sands  of  human  victims  on  the  altars  of 

their  gods,  the  world  would  be  less  perfect.  If  the 
Spaniards  had  not  possessed  themselves  of  Mexico 
by  means  of  abominable  artifices  and  unheard-of 
cruelties,  the  world  would  be  less  perfect.  If  so 
large  a  portion  of  mankind  did  not  brutalize  them¬ 
selves  with  intemperance,  the  world  would  be  less 
perfect.  If  Roman  gladiators  had  not  been  accus- 
tomed  (as  discoveries  at  Pompeii  show  that  they 
were)  to  satiate  themselves  with  the  infamous  pleas¬ 
ures  of  debauch  before  butchering  each  other  for  the 
amusement  of  the  populace,  and  if  kindred  practices 
in  the  higher  walks  of  life  had  not  been  so  largely 
prevalent,  and  if  prostitutes  did  not  swarm  the  streets 
of  our  cities,  spreading  disease  and  infamy,  and  tempt¬ 
ing  the  innocent  into  the  snare  from  which  they 
themselves  cannot  escape,  the  world  would  be  less 
perfect. 

Let  us  continue  to  develop  it.  It  was  necessary, 
eternally  necessary,  that  the  negroes  of  America 
should  not  be  enfranchised  save  by  the  drenching 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  1 1 1 

of  the  soil  of  a  continent  with  blood  and  tears.  It 
was  eternally  necessary — in  fact,  it  was  a  part  of  the 
divine  plan  of  the  universe — that  Germans  should 
strew  the  plains  of  Sadowa  with  the  bleeding  and 
mangled  bodies  of  their  brother  Germans.  It  was 
necessary  that  there  should  be  seen  at  the  great 
Exposition  of  Paris  so  many  new  inventions  in  the 
art  of  slaughtering  men,  and  that  they  should  be 
universally  admired  as  so  many  signs  of  modern 
progress.  All  these,  and  innumerable  analogous  facts, 
were  necessary,  and  therefore  good.  Drunkenness 
and  debauch  are  but  incidental  graces  of  society ! 
The  massacres  of  war  are  among  the  finest  employ¬ 
ments  of  human  genius  and  power !  If  we  could 
suppress  the  bagnio  and  the  guillotine,  together  with 
the  criminality  which  establishes  and  justifies  them, 
there  would  be  something  lacking  to  the  harmony 
of  the  world  ! 

Let  us  pursue  the  development  a  step  further.  It 
is  necessary  that  there  should  be  falsehood  and  per¬ 
jury,  cruelty  and  assassination — necessary  that  there 
should  be  rich  sensualists  and  rich  misers,  indolent 
lazzaroni  and  envious  poor.  And,  worse  still,  when 
we  turn  aside  from  others  and  look  into  our  own 
hearts,  this  theory  requires  us  to  believe  that  but  for 
that  sin  that  burdens  our  conscience,  that  fault  which 
makes  us  blush  when  we  are  alone,  that  iniquity  of 
darkness,  the  world  would  be.  ...  I  will  not  finish 


1 1 2 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


the  monstrous  sentence.  To  prolong  this  develop¬ 
ment  would  be  to  insult  the  public  conscience. 

Against  the  conclusions  of  an  erroneous  philosophy 

% 

I  appeal  with  confidence  to  the  public  heart,  to  the 
public  conscience,  and  to  common  sense. 

But  how  is  it  possible,  it  may  naturally  be  asked, 
that  men  with  heads  and  hearts,  intelligent  and  honest 

How  possi-  men>  can  maintain  doctrines  so  monstrous 
tietomajn- in  pliejr  conclusions  ?  It  is  thus  i  These 

tam  suci.  a 

uieorr.  theorists  dwell  continually  in  the  lofty 
region  of  metaphysical  abstraction  ;  they  see  things 
in  grand  outline  and  from  afar,  and  never  deign  to 
descend  to  the  commonplace  sphere  of  experience 
and  facts  ;  they  do  feel,  in  fact,  and  seem  sometimes 
to  confess  it,  that  the  realities  of  life  are  not  in  har¬ 
mony  with  their  theories.  And  these  speculations, 
which  do  not  explain  the  ordinary  facts  of  existence, 
are  not  applied  even  by  their  own  authors  to  their 
own  practical  conduct  In  their  contact  with  the 
world  and  men,  these  philosophers,  while  maintain¬ 
ing  theoretically  that  all  is  good,  yet  practically  act 
and  feel  just  as  others.  They  blame  whatever 
itisnev«r  wounds  their  conscience,  grow  irritated  at 
SSfbvi-s  what  opposes  them,  and,  after  having  pub- 
champiens,  a  demonstration  that  whatever  is  is 

right,  complain  bitterly  of  those  journalists  who 
speak  evil  of  their  works,  and  still  more  so  of  those 
who  do  not  speak  of  them  at  all.  In  spite  of  their 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


*13 

theories,  therefore,  they  also  form  the  moral  judg¬ 
ments,  bad,  worse,  worse  still.  For  them,  life  and 
science  are  two  very  distinct  things* 

But  this  distinction  cannot  be  admitted.  We  do 
not  hold  that  algebraic  formula  for  true  which  cannot 
be  applied  to  real  quantities,  and  which  an  engineer 
could  not  apply  without  committing  a  prac-  True  theory 

not  absurd 

tical  blunder.  Nor  is  it  any  more  safe  to  in  practice, 
entertain  a  philosophical  theory  which  can  neither 
explain,  nor  be  applied  to,  actual  life. 

The  interest  at  stake  here  is  of  grave  import ;  it  is 
that  of  the  human  conscience.  Two  years  ago  a 
celebrated  writer*  declared  in  our  city  that  the  con¬ 
science  is  dead.  But  it  is  not  dead  ;  nor  will  it 
die  soon,  for  its  guardian  is  the  Eternal.  But,  with¬ 
out  dying,  the  conscience  may  become  sick,  and  the 
theories  I  here  combat  are  calculated  to  produce  this 
sad  result.  When  persons  believe  theoretically  that 
evil  is  necessary,  it  is  unavoidable  that  in  practice  they 
should  not,  more  or  less,  tolerate  evil,  both  in  others 
and  in  themselves.  The  founders  of  speculative 
schools  do  not  generally  suffer  the  consequences  of 
their  own  errors  ;  for,  as  Leibnitz  has  observed,  they 
are  preserved  by  their  very  habits  of  study  and 
thought  from  many  of  the  temptations  of  life.  Epi¬ 
curus,  the  patron  of  voluptuaries,  was  a  man  of  an 
almost  austere  sobriety.  The  Emperor  Marcus  Au- 

*  Edgar  Quinet. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


114 

9 

relius,  though  admitting,  theoretically,  the  necessity 
of  evil,  does  not  seem  to  have  experienced  much  in¬ 
convenience  from  a  doctrine  which  was  contradicted 
by  his  life,  and  often  by  his  writings. 

But  the  havoc  is  felt  in  the  ranks  of  the  disciples. 
The  belief  that  evil  is  necessary  acts  on  the  will  and 

immoral  conscience  as  a  sort  of  fatal  chloroform  ;  and 
tendency  of  s  cleleterious  action  makes  itself  widely 

explaining 

away  evfl.  fep  in  the  broad  level  of  practical  ethics. 
A  minister  of  the  Gospel,  while  exhorting  a  criminal 
whom  he  wished  to  lead  to  repentance,  received  this 
reply:  “But  what  do  you  expect,  sir?  You  know 
very  well  that  none  of  us  are  perfect.”  This  man 
confounded  what  we  have  called  the  hierarchic  judg¬ 
ment  with  the  moral  judgment,  and  placed  his  acts 
to  the  credit  of  the  imperfection  inherent  in  every 
creature.  And  he  was  a  double  parricide,  having 
murdered  both  his  father  and  his  mother !  The  ex¬ 
ample  is  extreme  I  know,  but  it  is  historical.  But 
if  this  extreme  culprit  excused  himself  thus,  we  may 
well  imagine  what  the  less  guilty  may  frequently  do. 

I  believe  in  a  profound  harmony  between  con¬ 
science  and  reason  ;  if,  however,  we  must  immolate 
% 

conscience,  let  us,  at  least,  not  immolate  it  on  the 
altars  of  sophistry.  Let  us  look  at  the  matter  a  little. 
You  hold  the  doctrine  that  every  thing  is  good.  You 
cannot,  however,  deny  that  humanity  possesses  the 
idea  of  evil,  and  judges  that  there  is  evil  in  the  world. 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


115 


% 

Thi$  judgment  brings  about  many  imprisonments, 
many  executions,  many  complaints  "about  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  society v  You  say,  now,  that  this  judgment  is 
an  error,  that  our  complaints  are  poorly  founded,  and 
that  you  will  set  us  to  rights  by  teaching  us  the 
truth  that  every  thing  is  good.  In  your  opinion,  then, 
we,  the  human  race,  are  in  error,  since  you  undertake 
to  correct  our  thoughts.  Is  not,  however,  this  error 
itself  an  evil  ?  It  is  an  evil,  even  in  your  opinion, 
since  you  undertake  to  cure  us  of  it.  In  proposing 
to  us  a  remedy,  you  admit  that  we  are  sick.  An  argu- 

rnentum  ad 

Now,  if  all  were  good,  as  you  affirm,  we  hominem. 
would  not  be  sick,  the  error  of  believing  in  the  evil 
would  not  exist,  and  you  would  not  have  the  trouble  of 
destroying  it.  If  your  doctrine  were  true  there  would 
be  no  need  of  proving  it  so.  The  mere  fact  that  you 
are  obliged  to  undertake  its  defense  refutes  it. 

Surely  this  is  a  strange  and  violent  contrast, 
namely,  that  of  humanity  on  the  one  hand,  groaning 
under  its  miseries,  and  this  of  philosophy  on  the  other, 
which  proclaims  that  every  thing  is  good.  And  to 
place  the  matter  in  its  true  light  will  be  no  easy  task. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  prove  the  reality 
of  the  good  in  the  face  of  the  practical  experience  of 
so  much  evil ;  and,  on  the  other,  to  demonstrate  to 
men  of  reason  the  actuality  of  evil  as  opposed  to  its 
speculative  denial.  The  fact  is,  that  reason,  even  in 
its  error,  seems  here  to  contain  a  partial  expression 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 1 6 

of  the  universal  conscience  ;  its  verdict  is  in  the  dlrec- 
tion  of  what  ought  to  be,  while  experience  reveals  to 
us  simply  that  which  unfortunately  is.  But  how  is 
it  that  that  which  is,  is  not  in  harmony  with  that 
which  ought  to  be  ?  This  is,  in  fact,  the  very  problem 
we  are  discussing  ;  it  cannot  be  solved,  however,  by 
denying  one  of  its  terms.  The  world  is  what  it  is  ; 
ideal  speculations  cannot  change  the  nature  of  things. 
You  may  place  the  crown  of  orange  on  the  brow  of 
a  guilty  woman  ;  you  may  write  on  the  back  of  a 
justly  condemned  culprit,  honor  and  virtue ;  but  you 
will  restore,  neither  to  the  one  her  purity,  nor  to  the 
other  his  innocence.  The  evil  is  there  ;  and  you  may 
vainly  say,  It  is  good  ;  you  cannot  believe  it,  and  your 
faltering  accent  will  not  unfrequently  betray  your  in¬ 
ward  conviction.* 

Evil  is  in  the  world.  Let  us  not  merely  confess 
it ;  let  us  proclaim  it  aloud.  The  denial  of  evil  is 
fraught  with  terrible  consequences.  The  affirmation 
that  every  thing  is  good  is  absurd  and  blasphemous. 
And,  whatever  certain  philosophers  may  say  to  the 
contrary,  the  world  in  its  history,  and  in  its  actuality, 
is  full  of  errors,  of  sins,  and  of  sufferings.  If  we  say 
the  good  is  already  realized,  we  thereby  forbid  our- 

*  Vous  criez  :  tout  est  bien ,  d’une  voix  lamentable. 

L’univers  vous  clement,  et  votre  propre  coeur 

Cent  fois  de  votre  esprit  a  refute  Terreur. 

II  le  faut  avouer,  le  mal  est  sur  la  terre. — Voltaire. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 17 


selves  to  conceive  of  any  thing  better  than  that  which 
is  ;  we  incapacitate  ourselves  for  forming  any  ideal 
higher  than  the  prosy  reality  about  us.  To  say  that 
there  is  nothing  to  look  for  higher  than  an  order  of 
things  similar  to  that  which  we  know,  is  to  deprive 
ourselves  of  ail  hope,  and  to  quench  the  instinctive 
aspirations  of  our  heart.  To  affirm  that  the  world  is 
not  in  disorder  is  to  blindfold  reason,  for  reason  con¬ 
ceives  of  a  better  order  of  things  than  that  of  this 
world.  To  maintain,  even  by  remote  implication, 
that  sin  is  not  evil,  is  to  outrage  the  conscience,  and 
to  do  all  that  is  possible  to  extinguish  it. 

With  what  have  we  to  do  here,  then  ?  With  sys¬ 
tems,  with  theories,  that  conflict  with — what  ?  With 
the  voice  of  God  speaking  from  the  depths  of  our 
nature  ;  for  it  is  the  Author  himself  of  our  constitu¬ 
tion,  who  prompts  us  to  call  evil,  evil;  who  en¬ 
joins  us  to  combat  it,  and  who  causes  to  dawn  in  the 
orient  of  the  soul  a  blissful  confidence  in  the  good. 
It  is  consequently  a  contest  of  pseudo-sages  against 
God  and  humanity.  Voltaire,  therefore,  though  so 
often  in  the  wrong,  was  grandly  in  the  right  when  he 
said,  “  Our  hope  is  that  one  day  all  will  be  right ;  to 
say  that  all  is  now  right  is  a  delusion  ;  theorists  may 
blind  us,  but  truth  is  truth.”* 

*  “  Un  jour  tout  sera  bien ,  voila  notre  esperance  ; 

Tout  est  bien  aujourcT kui,  voila  1’  illusion. 

Les  sages  me  trompaient,  et  Dieu  seul  a  raison. ” 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 1 8 


LECTURE  III. 

THE  PROBLEM. 

The  good,  being  the  fundamental  plan  or  order  of  the 
universe,  evil  is  a  disturbance  of  this  plan,  a  disorder. 
Whence  springs  this  disorder  ?  How  has  it  come  to 
pass  that  that  which  ought  not  to  be,  is  ?  How  is  it 
that  that  order  which  expresses  the  will  of  the  Al¬ 
mighty  is  not  realized  ?  Such  is  the  problem  that 
we  have  to  solve.  But  first  it  is  necessary  to  define 
distinctly  the  spirit,  the  scope,  and  the  limits  of  this 
discussion. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  investigate  the  history  of 

The  precise  evil,  the  manner  in  which  it  transmits,  repro¬ 
aim  of  these  ,  .  ,  r  T 

lectures*  duces,  and  perpetuates  itseli ;  1  am  searching 
for  its  origin,  its  cause.  When  one  of  your  neighbors 
gives  you  bad  advice,  and  you  follow  the  advice,  this 
is  an  occasion  for  evil  to  manifest  and  increase  itself, 
but  it  is  not  its  cause,  its  point  of  departure.  The 
accepting  of  the  evil  advice  presupposes  a  principle 
of  evil  in  him  who  gives  it,  and  a  capacity  for  evil  in 
him  who  receives  it.  A  temptation  from  without  is 
a  temptation  only  because  it  awakens  an  echo  within 
the  soul.  And  for  this  reason,  the  question  as  to 
primitive  man’s  having  been  tempted  by  a  fallen 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  1 1 9 

angel — certainly  a  very  grave  and  solemn  question — 
does  not  enter  into  the  scope  of  our  lectures  ;  it  be¬ 
longs  to  the  history  of  evil,  but  does  not  bear  on  our 
search  for  its  origin.  Suppose  that  a  naturalist  should 
succeed  in  proving  that  the  germs  of  life  were  de¬ 
posited  in  our  planet  by  its  coming  in  contact  with 
another  celestial  body  ;  this  fact  would  be  important 
as  bearing  on  the  history  of  life,  but  it  would  throw 
no  light  on  its  origin.  So  is  it  also  with  the  question 
which  occupies  us. 

We  ask,  Whence  originates  evil  ?  The  tempter 
offered  man  an  occasion  for  committing  it ;  this  pre¬ 
supposes  that  the  tempter  was  evil.  Man  yielded 
to  the  appeal  of  the  tempter  ;  this  presupposes  that 
the  germ  of  a  temptation  existed  in  him.  How  came 
it  that  there  was  a  germ  of  temptation  in  man  ? 
Whence  is  it  that  the  tempter  was  evil  ?  The  question 
is  driven  back,  but  it  is  not  solved.  Nor  does  it 
remedy  the  matter  to  assume  that  the  tempter  was 
evil  by  nature,  for  this  would  be  to  admit  the  ancient 
doctrine  of  dualism ,  namely,  that  there  exists  along 
with  the  good  principle  an  eternal  evil  one.  This 
doctrine  under  its  religious  form  prevailed  among  the 
Persians  ;  in  its  metaphysical  form  it  prevailed  among 
the  Greeks,  and  is  yet  found  in  a  few  modern  works. 
But  th£  history  of  religion  and  philosophy  shows  that 
reason  has  ever  striven  to  free  itself  from  dualism  as 
well  as  from  polytheism,  and  to  arrive  at  the  concep- 


120 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


tion  of  a  single  principle  of  the  universe.  Religious 
dualism  prevails  no  longer,  save  in  a  few  relatively 
obscure  sects.  And  it  is  owing  to  the  too  predomi¬ 
nant  influence  of  Greek  philosophy  that  there  are  yet 
traces  of  philosophical  dualism  in  modern  meta¬ 
physics.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  Christian 
Dualism  system,  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  two 

needs  no  ... 

refutation.  eternal  principles  has  fallen  outside  of  the 
great  current  of  human  thought.  And  the  study  of 
logic  abundantly  accounts  for  the  fact ;  for  a  close 
observation  of  the  process  of  thought  shows  that  it  is 
a  fundamental  tendency  of  reflection  to  seek  for  unity 
as  the  basis  of  the  multiple.  We  cannot,  strictly 
speaking,  demonstrate  the  unity  of  the  essence  of  the 
universe,  for  this  unity  is  the  basis  itself  of  reason, 
and  the  common  ground  of  all  demonstration.  The 
assumption  that  there  is  an  eternal  principle  of  evil 
will,  therefore,  be  passed  by  in  these-  lectures,  as  al¬ 
ready  condemned,  both  historically  and  logically,  by 
the  simple  fact  of  the  development  of  the  human 
mind  in  self-acquaintance. 

We  will  examine,  to-day,  some  deceptive  solutions, 
which  sedm  to  resolve  the  question  of  evil,  but  do  not 
d:o  so  in  fact ;  after  which  we  will  state  an  incomplete 
General  solution,  which,  while  partly  true,  does  not 

heads  of  tlie 

third  lecture,  account  for  all  the  facts.  We  will  then  de¬ 
termine  what  are  the  general  characteristics  of  evil, 
so  as  to  state,  in  closing,  the  true  position  of  the 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 2 1 


question.  The  points  in  our  lecture  will,  therefore, 
be :  Deceptive  Solutions,  Incomplete  Solution,  Char¬ 
acteristics  of  Evil. 

i .  Deceptive  Solutions. 

The  solutions  which  I  call  deceptive  have  all  of 
them  the  same  general  character.  They  stop  at  the 
occasions  which  permit  evil  to  manifest  itself,  and 
at  the  agents  which  propagate  it  ;  and  they  lead 
into  error  those  who  think  to  have  found  its  real 
source,  its  true  origin. 

Some,  for  example,  think  to  have  resolved  the  prob¬ 
lem  by  saying  that  the  body  is  the  source  of  evil ; 
that  the  spirit,  though  good  in  itself,  is  vitiated  by  its 
union  with  matter.  It  is  very  true  that  the  body  is 
the  occasion  of  many  evils  ;  it  is  the  recognized  seat 
of  the  sexual  passions ;  and  a  careful  study  of  the  re¬ 
lations  of  the  physical  and  the  moral  may  even  lead 
us  to  admit  that  the  bodily  organs  are  the  seat  of  all 
our  passions,  even  those  that  have  not  physical  en¬ 
joyment  for  their  object. 

These  considerations  have  an  important  bearing  on 
the  history  of  the  manifestations  of  evil ;  '  they  are 
useful  for  practical  life,  indicating  the  means  of 
ameliorating  our  moral  condition  by  a  wholesome 
discipline  of  the  body.  But  they  furnish  no  answer 
to  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  evil.  The  body 
per  sc  is  not  evil ;  we  can  readily  conceive  of  a  body 


122 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


free  from  disorder,  a  spiritual  body,  that  is,  one  serv- 
The  body  is  ing  as  an  instrument  to  the  spirit,  instead 
the  cause  of  of  debasing  it  to  depraved  appetites.  After 
determining  the  physical  seat  of  our  propen¬ 
sions,  it  remains  to  be  determined  why  the  relations 
between  our  soul  and  body  are  such  that  the  body 
uniformly  oppresses  the  mind.  The  essence  of  the 
problem  is,  therefore,  untouched. 

We  will  now  examine,  in  more  detail,  another  de- 
Bad  institu-  ceptive  solution,  namely,  the  theory  which 

tions  do  not 

clear  up  the  places  the  origin  of  evil  in  social  institutions. 
evil.111  °  This  doctrine  exists  in  germ,  and  more  or 
less  obscurely,  in  a  great  number  of  minds.  It  is  re¬ 
duced  to  systematic  form  in  the  notorious  system  of 
Charles  Fourier.  Establish  phalansteries,  say  the 
Fourierites,  allow  social  harmony  to  realize  itself, 
and  paradise  will  return  to  earth.  The  source  of 
evil  lies  in  existing  institutions  ;  good  institutions 
will  banish  all  the  evils  of  which  we  complain  ;  earth 
will  form  nuptials  with  heaven,  and  the  laws  which 
rule  the  stars  will  give  peace  to  man.*  So  think 
these  men. 

Without  wishing  to  throw  any  ridicule  on  the 
Fourierite  system,  I  will  show,  simply,  to  what  ab- 

*  La  terre,  apres  tant  de  desastres, 

Forme  avec  le  ciel  un  hymen, 

Et  la  loi  qui  regit  les  astres 

Donne  la  paix  au  genre  humain.1 — Bera*stger. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


123 


surdity  it  leads.  Parents  complain  much  of  the  diso¬ 
bedience  of  children.  A  Fourierite,  Victor  Conside- 
rant,  if  I  mistake  not,  has  given  an  infallible  prescrip¬ 
tion  for  drying  up  the  source  of  these  complaints. 
Never  command  children  to  do  any  thing  but  what 
pleases  them,  and  they  will  always  obey  ;  that  is  to 
say,  Give  no  commands,  and  you  will  suppress  diso¬ 
bedience  ;  abolish  all  forms  of  civil  power,  and  there 
will  be  no  more  place  for  the  evil  of  revolt.  The 
solution  is  simple  ;  but  is  it  good  ?  Let  us  examine 
it  in  its  general  bearing.  What  is  the  purpose  of  in¬ 
stitutions  in  respect  to  evil  ?  The  question  is  im¬ 
portant,  and  the  truth  will  be  found  in  the  middle 
point  between  two  errors,  which  it  will  be  well  to 
note. 

A  certain  class  of  moralists  say :  “  Men  are  every 

thing,  institutions  are  nothing.  Let  the  men  be 

» 

good,  and  all  the  institutions  will  be  good ;  but  if  the 
men  are  bad,  they  will  corrupt  the  best  institutions.” 
But  this  opinion  is  not  strictly  true.  Institutions  do 
good,  and  institutions  do  evil.  In  the  family,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  polygamy,  or  Roman  divorce,  (which  finally 
reduced  marriages  to  a  mere  transient  concubinage,) 
are  not  matters  of  indifference.  In  society  the  insti¬ 
tution  of  slavery  is  not  of  trivial  import.  It  is  But  institu¬ 
tions  are  po- 

true,  if  all  slaves  and  all  masters  were  perfect,  tent  occa- 

....  -it  sions  of  good 

a  society  might  be  happy  even  with  slavery ;  or  evil, 
but  as  slaves  are  not  perfect,  nor  masters  any  more 


1 24  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

so,  slavery  is  consequently  far  from  being  without  in¬ 
fluence  on  humanity  in  its  present  condition.  Some 
time  since  a  man  sat  with  pen  in  hand,  and  about  to 
sign  his  name  to  a  public  document.  That  single 
signature  was  going  to  transform  into  freemen  twenty 
millions  of  serfs  of  the  soil.  Suppose  some  one  had 
approached  the  Emperor  of  Russia  at  that  moment, 
and  said  to  him,  “  Sire !  you  are  going  to  create 
great  embarrassments  ;  you  will  introduce  very  per¬ 
plexing  complications  into  the  administration  of  your 
empire ;  you  will  have  a  fearful  crisis  to  pass ;  and  to 
what  purpose,  after  all  ?  What  signify  institutions  ? 
Let  the  masters  only  be  good,  and  the  serfs  will  be 
happy.”  And  I  doubt  not  that  this  reasoning  was 
urged  upon  the  Emperor  Alexander  more  or  less  ex¬ 
plicitly.  But  he  did  not  heed  it,  and  you  will  all 
agree  with  me  that  he  did  well.  Liberal  institutions 
develop  in  a  people  the  sentiment  of  personal  dignity ; 
tyrannical  institutions  tend  to  degrade  and  brutalize 
men.  Equitable  institutions  cultivate  and  develop 
the  sentiment  of  justice  ;  unjust  institutions  give  rise 
to  discontent  and  revolt.  There  are  pacific  in¬ 
stitutions  which  foster  mutual  good-will ;  there  are 
military  institutions  which  provoke  hostility,  hatred, 
and  all  the  evil  passions.  It  is  never  wise  to 
oppose  salutary  reforms  under  pretext  that  men 
are  every  thing  and  institutions  nothing.  The  er¬ 
rors  of  these  theorists  have  unfortunate  practical 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


125 


consequences.  In  times  of  social  conflict,  conserva- 
tists  make  use  of  them  in  opposing  desirable  political 
ameliorations. 

Institutions  continually  promote  either  good  or 
evil ;  but  they  are  evidently  neither  the  root  of  the 
good  nor  of  the  evil.  To  attribute  to  them  an  abso¬ 
lute  moral  power,  is  an  error  into  which  politicians 
are  apt  to  fall. 

This  error  of  politicians  is  taken  advantage  of  by 
revolutionary  passions  ;  but  it  produces,  together  with 
the  revolutions,  also  those  bitter  disappointments 
which  nearly  always  follow  them.  It  was  thought  to 
reach  the  source  itself  of  the  evil  by  changing  the 
institutions  ;  but  it  is  seen  finally,  and  with  grief,  that 
the  evil  re-appears  under  the  new  institutions,  what¬ 
ever  they  may  be.  Flatterers  surround  and  degrade 
the  throne  of  a  monarch,  and  the  enraged  people 
overthrow  the  throne ;  but  flattery  reappears  and 
addresses  herself  to  the  victorious  people,  and  is  some¬ 
times  as  base,  as  perfidious,  as  fatal,  as  when  she  ad¬ 
dressed  a  crowned  head.  Unprincipled  revolutionists, 
who  wish  to  get  themselves  into  public  employment, 
may  reach  their  purpose  through  a  political  commo¬ 
tion  ;  but  disinterested  patriots,  who  look  to  political 
changes  for  the  destruction  of  all  abuses,  are  always 
doomed  to  bitter  disappointment,  as  some  of  the 
recent  French  revolutions  have  abundantly  illus¬ 
trated.  A  change  of  institutions  may  be  advantage- 


126 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


•  ous,  or  it  may  be  the  opposite ;  but  the  ultimate 

Back  of  in-  soll]ice  °f  the  evil  is  not  in  them.  Back  of 
stitutions  is  institutions  lies  human  nature;  and  Tor 

tive  action  this  reason,  those  who  sav  that  man  is  every 

of  human  J  J 

nature.  thing,  are  nearer  the  truth  than  those  who 
look  too  exclusively  to  political  institutions. 

Let  us  illustrate  by  an  example.  We  hear  much 
said  recently  of  co-operative  societies  and  associations. 
Though  hardly  capable  of  an  opinion  on  the  subject, 
I  venture,  however,  to  regard  them  as  the  aurora  of 
a  better  future  for  our  over-worked  population.  But 
it  is  very  certain  that  if  you  establish  co-operative 
idleness  and  prodigal  associations,  you  will  not  obtain 
very  brilliant  results,  either  in  regard  to  labor  or 
economy.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  labor  for  the 
reformation  of  men,  and,  above  all,  that  each  should 
strive  to  reform  himself.  One  can  never  more  plausi¬ 
bly  work  for  public  reforms  than  after  having  consci¬ 
entiously  wrought  his  own  individual  reform.  Despite 
the  fact  that  sometimes  the  best  opinions  come  from 
those  who  have  acted  the  worst,  and  thus  discovered 
by  contrast  the  advantages  of  the  good,  there  exists, 
for  example,  a  very  natural  prejudice  against  taking 
the  opinion  of  bankrupts  in  financial  reforms,  and 
against  following  the  advice  of  idlers  in  the  organiza¬ 
tion  of  labor. 

Human  nature  lurks  behind  institutions,  and  the 
best  social  organization  will  be  paralyzed  in  its  effect- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 2J 


iveness  when  applied  to  bad  men.  Moreover,  these 
institutions  which  are  based  on  human  nature,  whence 
come  they  ?  They  did  not  fall  from  the  Institutions 
heavens  like  the  leaves  of  the  Koran  ;  they  growth  of 
spring  from  the  life  of  humanity,  and  partake  ture. 
uniformly  of  the  sentiments  and  desires  of  those  who 

J 

organize  them.  Their  origin,  however,  is  usually 
vailed  in  the  clouds  of  the  past.  But  there  are  some 
cases  where  we  can  clearly  see  it.  For  example, 
America  has  recently  been  drenched  in  blood  for  the 

j 

destruction  of  slavery.  But  whence  came  this  Ameri¬ 
can  slavery?  We  all  know’ its  origin,  the  perverse 
and  covetous  motives  that  led  thereto,  and  its  dis¬ 
astrous  consequences  and  bloody  end.  And  if  we 
cannot  say  so  much  of  every  evil  institution,  it  is 
simply  because  of  the  imperfection  of  recorded 
history. 

J 

Institutions  do  not  actually  create  evil :  in*  this  re¬ 
gard. politicians  are  prone  to  error  ;  but  institutions 
transmit  and  augment  either  good  or  evil.  They  are 
not,  therefore,  without  influence,  as  some  moralists 
erroneously  assume.  The  error  of  both  these  classes 
of  men  may  be  readily  illustrated.  Suppose  a  man 
engaged  in  raising  a  stone  with  an  excellent  lever. 

o  o  o 


The  property  of  a  lever  is  to  transmit  and  augment 
force.  Two  passers-by  stop  and  notice  the  man  at 
work.  The  first  says  :  “  If  one  has  arms  Two  errone- 

nn  .  .  .  i  r  0118  views 

sufficiently  strong,  there  is  no  need  ot  a  illustrated. 


128 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


lever ;  strictly  speaking,  the  arm  is  every  thing  and 
the  lever  is  nothing.”  This  is  the  moralist.  The 
other  exclaims  :  “  How  great  the  improvements  in 
modern  mechanics  !  we  will  ultimately  have  such  fine 
machines  that  there  will  be  no  more  need  of  arms/’ 
So  speaks  the  politician.  But  both  are  in  error. 
Let  us -improve  the  machines,  and  also  strengthen 
our  arms,  and  then  all  will  in  fact  gg  well ;  or,  to 
translate  this  figure,  let  us  sow  and  cultivate  the  germs 
of  good,  both  in  our  own  souls  and  in  those  of  our 
neighbors,  so  as  to  produce  men  of  intelligence  and 
good-will.  These  men  will,  in  turn,  ameliorate  the 
institutions ;  and  these  ameliorated  institutions, 
putting  into  play  more  and  more  the  principles 
of  true  liberty,  justness,  and  chari ty,  will  in  turn  con¬ 
tribute  to  augment  general  intelligence  and  good 
will ;  and  this  enlightened  public  opinion  will  again 
give  birth  to  still  better  institutions.  Such  is  the 
practical  consequence  to  which  the  above  ..con¬ 
siderations  lead.  Let  us  now  come  more  directly  to 
our  subject. 

Bad  institutions  are  agents  for  transmitting  and 
increasing  evil ;  but  to  make  them  the  origin  of  evil 
is  manifestly  erroneous.  And  it  will  be  easy  to  see 
that  such  is  the  case  with  various  other  analogous 
solutions  of  the  problem  of  evil,  which  are  met  with 
in  conversation  and  in  books.  They  seize  on  the 
occasions  which  transmit  and  aggravate  evil,  and  treat 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


129 


them  as  If  they  were  its  ultimate  source.  Let  us  pass, 
now,  to  the  incomplete  solution. 

IL  An  Incomplete  Solution. 

Order  being  the  basis  of  the  universe,  how  is  it 

that  disorder  has  come  to  exist?  In  order  to  create 

a  true  commencement  there  is  need  of  a  cause,  a 

producing  power — in  a  word,  of  liberty ;  for  Liberty  pos¬ 
tulated  by 

where  no  free  cause  intervenes,  there  there  <mi. 
can  only  be  a  combination  of  that  which  already  ex¬ 
isted— strictly  speaking,  nothing  can  begin.  Liberty ! 
this  is  the  watch-word,  of  modern  society,  but  it  is  not 
that  of  modern  science,  nor  of  science  in  its  general 
form.  Science  has  always  found  it  very  difficult  to 
admit  the  reality  of  liberty,  and  for  this  reason  : 
Science  seeks  to  rise  from  one  idea  to  another  by  a 
series  of  reasons,  each  of  which  is  the  necessary  result 
of  the  preceding.  The  scientific  spirit  has,  The  scientific 
in  fact,  from  of  old  down  to  our  own  day,  i^h^tuTto 
been  formed  chiefly  by  the  study  of  mathe-  hherty' 
matics  and  physics.  Now,  in  the  objects  with  which 
physics  juxdr  mathematics  busy  themselves  there  is 
not  the  least  element  of  liberty.  This  is  the  source 
from  which  the  most  prevalent  idea  of  general  science 
has  been  derived. 

Now,  if  science,  as  thus  conceived,  is  the  sole  and 

universal  science,  then  every  thing  in  the  universe 

is  fatalistic,  inasmuch  as  where  logical  necessity  pre- 

9 


130 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


vails,  there  there  is  no  place  whatever  for  liberty. 
An  atheistical  savant  said  one  day,  “  If  God  existed 
the  chain  of  science  would  be  forever  broken.”  That 
is  to  say,  when  we  come  into  the  presence  of  the 
Supreme  Will,  and  when,  to  the  question,  why  such 
a  thing  is  :  it  is  answered,  Because  God  has  willed  it, 
there,  reasoning  must  stop  in  the  presence  of  this 
free  cause.  This  is  why  science  has  so  much  diffi¬ 
culty  in  admitting  the  divine  freedom.  God  appears 
to  it  as  a  stumbling-block,  severing  the  logical  con¬ 
catenation  of  its  reasonings  ;  but  if  God  is  embarrass¬ 
ing  to  science,  man  is  none  the  less  so.  If  there  exists 
in  man  the  least  element  of  liberty,  it  must  inevitably 
occur  that,  in  some  measure,  the  reason  of  his  acts 
and  conduct  will  lie  in  the  decision  of  his  free  will. 
For,  if  all  the  actions  of  man  could  be  explained  by  a 
chain  of  necessary  reasons,  there  would  be  in  him 
no  element  of  liberty.  If  there  is  the  least  free  ele¬ 
ment  in  man,  then  there  is  in  human  actions  an  ele¬ 
ment  to  which  formulas,  like  those  of  mathematics, 
are  inapplicable. 

Scientists,  therefore,  who  deny  the  divine  liberty 
at  the  behests  of  science,  such  as  they  conceive  it, 
are  obliged  to  deny  human  liberty  likewise,  and  to 
affirm  that  all  the  facts  of  human  life  are  simply  a 
Theory  eon-  pure  mechanism.  Thus  they  teach  ;  but 

tradicted  by  _  # 

practice,  their  teaching  involves  them  in  strange  con¬ 
tradictions.  Many  men  who  hold  this  doctrine  take 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


i  ji 


active  part  in  politics,  and  figure  in  the  ranks  of  the 
liberals.  In  their  books  of  science  they  affirm  that 
human  liberty  is  a  chimera,  but  in  journals  and  in 
deliberative  assemblies  they  are  the  champions  of 
liberty.  The  consciousness  of  this  contradiction, 
which  they  themselves  cannot  always  suppress,  will, 
doubtless,  finally  turn  to  the  advantage  of  the  truth. 

It  is  surely  an  evidence  of  a  fallacy  somewhere, 
that  the  prevalent  idea  of  science  denies,  that  there  is 
liberty  in  this  universe,  whether  in  God  or  man. 
Man  forgets  himself  in  the  contemplation  of  0ccasion  of 
matter,  and  extends  its  mechanism  to  the  thelallacy' 
spiritual  world.  As  it  may  be  said  that  exclusive 
pre-occupation  with  self  is  the  essence  of  moral  evil, 
so  we  may  say  that  forgetfulness  of  self  is  the  essence 
of  great  philosophical  errors.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
take  into  consideration  the  nature  of  moral  and  social 
phenomena,  and  to  introduce  into  science  the  verdicts 
of  consciousness,  to  be  enabled  to  perceive  Tr 
at  once  that  the  act  of  volition  is  in  itself  an 
explanation,  a  sufficient  cause  of  facts,  and 
to  be  induced  to  admit  that  there  are  other  elements 
of  science  than  those  of  mathematicians  and  physi¬ 
cists  ;  that  is  to  say,  to  admit  the  reality  of  liberty. 
The  denial  of  liberty  would  not  permit  the  proposing 
of  the  question  which  we  are  now  discussing,  inas¬ 
much  as,  if  every  thing  were  necessary  there  would 
be  no  possibility  of  a  difference  between  that  which 


ue  science 
must  admit 
the  fact  of 
liberty. 


132 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


is  and  that  which  ought  to  be.  But  as  soon  as  the 
idea  of  liberty  is  admitted,  the  problem  of  evil  exists, 
and  a  way  lies  open  for  its  solution.  I  shall  now 
state  and  explain  what  I  shall  call  an  incomplete 
solution  ;  I  will  then  distinguish  that  part  of  it  which 
I  regard  as  true  from  that  which  I  cannot  accept. 

Liberty  implies  the  possibility  of  evil.  That  being 
Liberty  a  which,  in  the  presence  of  law,  would  not  be 
Risible  able  t0  execute  it  or  violate  it,  to  obey  or 
disobey,  would  not  be  a  free  being.  A  free 
being  is,  by  nature,  capable  of  evil.  To  *ask  that  a 
creature  be  incapable  of  doing  evil  is  to  ask  that  it 
be  not  free.  Capability  is  the  essence  of  a  free 
being ;  power  is,  in  it,  the  seal  and  image  of  the 
Almighty.  Capability  of  evil  is  the  seal  of  the 
creature  ;  as,  in  fact,  there  exists  only  one  will  which 
is  so  identical  with  the  good  that  to  suppose  it  evil 
would  be  an  absurdity  for  the  philosopher  and  a 
blasphemy  for  the  believer. 

If  the  creature  revolts  against  moral  law,  this 
Mere  voir  revolt  has  no  other  real  cause  than  the  mere 
volition  which  produces  it.  The  possibility 
of  revolt,  which  is  implied  in  the  idea  of  lib¬ 
erty,  is  in  no  wise  the  germ  of  actual  evil. 
The  cause  of  actual  evil  is,  the  free  decision  of  a  will 
to  violate  its  law.  To  seek  for  any  other  cause  is  to 
deny  liberty,  and  to  misunderstand  the  very  essence 
of  moral  phenomena. 


tion  the  sole 
and  suffi¬ 
cient  first 
cause  of 
evil. 


133 


The  Problem  of  Evil 

The  revolt  of  the  will  against  its  law  is  sin,  the 
primitive  form  of  evil.  Sin,  in  its  turn,  produces 
error.  If  you  deceive  yourself  it  is  always  Binthecause 
your  own  fault.  Never  affirm  until  you  have  oferror- 
clear  evidence  ;  in  the  absence  of  evidence  suspend 
your  decision,  and  you  will  never  be  deceived.  In¬ 
tellectual  error  results  from  the  fault  of  the  will,  in 
leading  the  understanding  to  form  hasty  and  rash 
judgments.  Moral  error  is  also  uniformly  the  fault 
of  him  who  commits  it.  If  we  do  not  take  the  trouble 
to  read  the  law  inscribed  in  our  conscience  we  are 
guilty  of  negligence.  If  to  justify  our  evil  inclina¬ 
tions  we  invent  sophisms  to  obscure  the  light  we 
already  have,  we  become  finally  incapable  of  discern¬ 
ing  the  law ;  but  our  ignorance  of  the  law,  if  thus 
voluntary  in  its  origin,  cannot  excuse  us. 

Sin  having  once  produced  error,  suffering  follows 
both  the  error  and  the  sin.  To  this  place  belong  the 
apologies  of  suffering  which  we  have  already  dis¬ 
cussed,  and  to  which  we  now  simply  refer.  As  soon 
as  the  world  is  invaded  by  sin  and  error,  suffering 
makes  its  appearance  as  warning,  as  remedy,  and  as 
punishment ;  it  is  then  just  and  beneficent  in  its 
workings. 

Let  us  sum  up  these  arguments.  The  universe  is 
based  on  order — an  order  which  is  the  ex-  Summarv 
pression  of  the  Divine  Will.  Evil  originates 
in  a  misuse  of  liberty.  The  possibility  of  solutlun- 


*  34 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


evil  is  included  in  the  idea  of  liberty,  it  being  im¬ 
possible  to  conceive  a  free  being,  save  God,  who  is 
not  capable  of  evil.  But  liberty  itself,  what  shall  we 
say  of  it  ?  Is  it  an  evil  ?  It  is  not  only  good,  it  is 
more  than  good  ;  it  is  the  necessary  condition  of  all  • 

good,  as  it  is  the  condition  of  the  existence  of  a 
spirit.  Shall  we  reproach  God  for  having  created 
spirits,  that  is  to  say,  free  personalities  ?  “  What  !  ” 

exclaims  Rousseau,  “  to  render  man  incapable  of  evil, 
would  we  have  him  lowered  to  mere  brutal  instinct  ? 

No  !  God  of  my  soul,  I  will  never  reproach  thee  for 
having  made  me  in  thine  own  image,  so  that  I  might 
be  good,  free,  and  happy,  like  thyself.”  Such  is  the 
solution  which  I  call  incomplete.  Let  us  now  make 
some  distinctions. 

The  origin  of  evil  must  be  looked  for  in  the  acts 

of  created  wills  ;  this  is  the  doctrine  of  all  self-con- 

* 

sistent  spiritualistic  philosophy.  I  accept  and  main¬ 
tain  this  part  of  the  solution.  But  the  solution,  more¬ 
over,  supposes  that  the  sole  origin  of  evil  lies  in  the 
individual  exercise  of  volitions,  and  that  all  sin,  all 
suffering,  all  disorder,  are  to  be  explained  by  the 
misuse  which  all  and  each  of  us  have  made  of  our 
personal  freedom.  This  part  of  the  solution  I  reject. 

It  is  the  characteristic  of  that  doctrine  which  I  shall 
designate  as  individualism ,  and  which  I  hold  to  be 
incomplete.  We  will  discover  its  incompleteness  on 
examining:  further  the  characteristics  of  evil. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


135 


III.  Characteristics  Of  Evil. 

Evil,  as  presented  to  our  observation,  has  two  chief 
characteristics,  its  generalness  and  its  essentiality. 
To  these  two  phases  of  the  matter  let  us  successively 
devote  our  attention. 


(1.)  General  Prevalence  of  Evil. 

No  one  will  deny  the  general  prevalence  of  error. 
None  of  the  sciences,  save  perhaps  the  pure  Generalness 
mathematics,  are  developed  simply  by  ac-  oterror* 
cessions  to  the  truth  already  known,  which  would  be 
their  normal  condition  ;  but  they  are  developed  by 
refuting  and  overthrowing  the  errors,  prejudices,  false 
theories,  and  fallacious  maxims  which,  from  of  old, 
have  largely  formed  the  general  fund  and  current  of 
human  thought.  This  fact  is  so  manifest  that  some 
philosophers,  taking  the  general  expression  of  that 
which  is  for  the  formula  of  that  which  ought  to  be, 
have  assumed  that  it  is  a  normal  characteristic  of  in¬ 
telligence  to  pass  through  error  in  order  to  arrive  at 
the  truth. 

Nor  will  the  general  prevalence  of  suffering  be 
denied.  In  this  respect  our  every-day  life  Generalness 
is  full  enough  of  complaints.  And  if  we  otsulfenns- 
consult  that  great  oracle  in  which  humanity  testifies 
to  itself  of  its  own  condition,  I  mean  literature,  we 
will  recognize  at  once  that  its  general  background 


1 36  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

is  sadness,  I  do  not  forget  that,  from  Anacreon 
down,  there  have  occasionally  been  gay  and  merry 
songsters  ;  these  are,  however,  but  rare  and  except 
tional  sounds  mingling  themselves  faintly  in  the 
mighty  and  doleful  chorus  of  human  woe.  The  gen¬ 
eral  verdict  as  to  life  is  that  it  is  sad  ;  and,  for  those 
who  lack  a  firm  faith  in  the  good,  a  faith  which 
implies  confidence  -in  God  and  in  immortality,  this 
verdict  is  almost  despairing.  For  example,  take  this 
unique  citation,  to  which,  however,  it  would  be  easy 
to  add  similar  ones  from  the  literature  of  all  ages  and 
countries.  It  is  Cicero  who  says:  “After  the  su¬ 
preme  happiness  of  not  being  born,  and  of  avoiding 
the  shoals  of  life,  the  most  happy  lot  for  every  one 
who  has  come  into  the  world  would  be  to  die  on  the 
spot,  and  escape  from  life  as  one  escapes  from  a  con¬ 
flagration.”  But  why  shall  I  add  more  ?  my  cause  is 
already  more  than  gained.  It  is  less  important  to 
rehearse  the  sorrows  of  life,  than  to  call  to  mind  the 
blessings  with  which  it  abounds,  and  which  we  lose 
by  our  faults.  Instead  of  complaining,  it  were  well 
to  resort  more  freely  to  the  sources  of  happiness 
which  are  liberally  opened  to  us.  So,  at  least,  we 
are  abundantly  taught ;  but  when,  after  having  been 
brought  to  reflection  by  age  and  experience,  we 
finally  give  attention  to'  this  teaching,  it  too  often 
only  awakens  in  us  a  regret  for  joys  which  are  no 
longer  within  our  grasp,  and  thus  adds  another  drop 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  *  1 3  f 

to  the  ocean  of  human  sorrow.  Let  us  now  notice ' 
the  general  prevalence  of  sin. 

But  first  we  must  come  to  an  understanding  as  to 
the  sense  of  the  word  law ,  which  we  shall  wrat  law  is. 
have  frequently  to  use.  What  we  call  law,  as  to 
natural  phenomena,  is  simply  a  general  expression 
of  facts.  The  law  of  gravitation,  for  ex-  Inthem3te_ 
ample,  expresses  the  general  fact  that  bodies  nal  worI<L 
are  attracted  toward  each  other.  In  this  order  of 
things  the  facts  are  always  in  harmony  with  the 
law,  as  there  exists  in  matter  no  principle  of  action, 
no  caprice,  no  rebellion.  But  in  the  spiritual  world 
law  is  a  command,  an  expression  of  what  In  the  spirit- 
ought  to  be  ;  and,  as  a  command,  it  ad-  ual"orl(L 
dresses  itself  to  free  beings.  The  facts  may  be,  or 
may  not  be,  in  accordance  with  the  command.  There 
are,  therefore,  laws  which  are  a  general  expression 
of  that  which  is,  and  others  which  are  the  expression 
of  that  which  ought  to  be.  The  first  are  realized  in 
nature :  the  second  are  proposed  to  free  wills  in  the 
moral  world.  There  may,  however,  be  in  the  moral 
world  laws  expressive  of  the  general  character  of 
facts  ;  but  these  laws  will  not  be  absolute  like  those 
of  nature  ;  there  will  be,  or  may  be,  exceptions.  For 
example,  there  are  men  who  fast ;  but  this  does  not 
annul  the  general  law  that  man  eats  when  he  is 
hungry.  There  are  mothers  who  murder  their  chil¬ 
dren  ;  but  this  does  not  annul  the  general  law  of  fact 


135 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


that  mothers  nurture  their  children.  Having  made 
these  explanations  as  to  the  nature  of  law,  we  must 
now  ascertain  what  is  the  law  of  duty,  or  the  com¬ 
mand,  then  determine  the  law  of  fact,  or  the  general 
usage,  and  thereupon  compare  the  two  classes  of 
laws.  If  the  law  of  facts  is,  with  slight  exceptions,  in 
accord  with  the  law  of  duty,  we  will  say  that  the 
state  of  things  is  good.  But  if,  in  the  large  majority 
of  cases,  the  law  of  facts  contradicts  the  law  of  duty, 
then  we  will  say  that  the  state  of  things  is  bad. 
How  is  it  now,  in  this  respect,  with  mankind  ? 

Let  us  begin  at  the  beginning.  A  child  is  born. 
Let  us  pause  at  this  phenomenon  of  birth.  The  re- 
The  sexes  in  production  of  the  race  has  been  confided  to 
an  instinct  which  we  have  in  common  with 
animals.  This  instinct  is  associated  with 
another,  which  is  designed  to  safeguard  the  dignity 
of  the  person — shame  ;  and  it  is  placed  under  the 
protection  of  a  law— the  law  of  chastity.  The  law  of 
reproduction  leads  normally  to  the  union  of  the  sexes 
under  well-known  moral  conditions,  and  in  view  of 
certain  ends  and  consequences.  The  condition  is 
that  the  union  of  the  bodies  should  be  preceded  and 
justified  by  the  union  of  the  souls,  leading  to  a  free  and 
real  consent :  this  is  the  part  of  the  heart  in  the  law 
of  chastity.  The  end  is  the  transmission  of  life,  and 
the  relation  of  the  means  to  the  end  is  readily  seen  ; 
this  is  the  part  of  reason  in  the  law  of  chastity.  The 


their  nor¬ 
mal  rela¬ 
tions. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


139 


consequence  is  the  concurrence  of  the  father  and 
mother,  which  presupposes  a  lasting  union  in  order 
that  maternal  tenderness  and  the  sterner  duties  of 
fatherhood  may  co-operate  in  the  physical,  intellect¬ 
ual,  and  moral  education  of  the  child  ;  this  is  the  part 
of  conscience  in  the  law  of  chastity. 

Now,  is  not  this  the  moral  law  in  the  matter?  I 
do  not  ask  whether  the  law,  in  all  the  extent  of  its 
consequences,  is  difficult  or  easy  of  fulfillment  in  the 
present  condition  of  our  nature.  The  question  is, 
Is  this  the  law  ?  is  it  possible  for  us  to  think  other¬ 
wise  ?  To  settle  this  question  soundly  it  were  better 
not  to  regard  it  as  a  mere  matter  of  practical  morals, 
for  morals  imply  a  barrier  to  custom,  and  the  passions 
are  ever  ready  to  invent  sophisms  to  evade  the  ap¬ 
plication  of  moral  rules.  Let  us  examine,  therefore, 
how  mankind  invariably  reason  on  this  subject  when 
considering  it  otherwise  than  from  a  moralizing 
stand-point. 

That  free  consent  is  the  legitimate  condition  of  the 

union  of  the  sexes,  no  one  doubts.  The  These  rela¬ 
tions  are 

idea  of  violence  excites  horror ;  the  penal  generally 

.  .  .  and  well 

code  provides  against  it ;  and  all  constraint,  understood, 
whether  material  or  moral,  awakens  reprobation  -and 
disgust.  Free  consent  in  the  matter  now  before  us 
is  the  most  common  of  maxims,  and  lies  at  the  basis 
of  nearly  all  of  our  romances  and  poetry.  As  to  the 
end,  consult  any  treatise  on  physiology,  and  you  will 


140 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


see  maintained  without  the  least  hesitation  the  dis¬ 
tinctions  of  the  functions  which  relate  to  the  produc¬ 
tion  of  the  species  and  the  preservation  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  And  as  to  the  consequences,  all  economists 
assume  that  the  bringing  of  children  into  the  world 
implies  the  duty  of  providing  for  them,  and  civil  law, 
as  far  as  within  its  scope,  becomes  the  partial  organ 
of  the  conscience,  and  imposes  on  parents  the  obli¬ 
gation  of  nourishing  and  raising  their  children.  On 
this  subject  Christian  ethics  has  not  so  much  intro¬ 
duced  new  ideas,  as  collected  into  a  focus,  and  sealed 
with  divine  authority,  that  which,  in  the  eye  of  reason, 
is  the  law  of  nature.  This  law,  though  often  violated 
by  practice,  by  institutions,  and  by  maxims  framed 
to  justify  them,  has  revealed  itself  more  than  is  gen¬ 
erally  supposed  to  all  those  who  have  essayed  to  de¬ 
cipher  the  characters  inscribed  on  the  conscience 
and  reason  of  humanity.  Even  in  the  darkest  days 
Duties  of  of  Roman  decadence,  at  an  epoch  when 

chastity 

known  and  morals  were  truly  frightful,  certain  pagan 

defended  at  .  ....... 

times  of  authors  explained,  almost  m  their  whole  ex- 
corruption.  tent  and  rigor,  the  duties  of  chastity. 

The  law  of  duty  is,  therefore,  known.  But  what  is 
the*  law  of  facts  ?  We  repeat  it,  in  the  sphere  of  lib¬ 
erty  there  are  no  fatalistic  laws.  There  are  persons 
who  resist  the  temptations  of  the  flesh  and  remain 
pure.  To  doubt  this  is  to  inflict  self-chastisement, 
self-contempt.  In  one  of  the  most  striking  pages  of 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


141 


modern  literature,  Alfred  de  Musset,  a  sad  victim  of 
earthly  passion,  has  depicted  the  tortures  of  the  liber¬ 
tine,  who,  a  prey  to  terrible  doubts,  confesses  with 
anguish  that  he  has  culpably  rendered  himself  in¬ 
capable  of  believing  in  purity. 

The  law  is  not  fatalistic.  The  steps  to  its  viola¬ 
tion  are  easily  traced.  A  man  under  the  influence 
of  passion  finds  himself  in  the  presence  of  the  seduc¬ 
tions  of  life  ;  his  conscience  warns  him,  but  he  has 
not  courage  to  obey  it.  A  morbid  curiosity  leads 
him  to  attend  spectacles  which  awaken  his  senses, 
leads  him  to  entertain  corrupt  communications,  or 
prompts  him  to  read  books  which  fill  his  imagination 
with  impure  images.  A  defiled  imagination  perverts 
his  senses,  vice  is  contracted,  and  the  guilty  one 
writes  his  sins  to  the  score  of  nature  ;  he,  perhaps, 
even  calls  science  to  his  aid  to  prove  the  necessity  of 
the  disorders  of  which  he  has  rendered  himself  the 
victim.  #  Lacordaire,  a  man  who  may  rightly  speak 
on  this  subject,  as  one  who  had  struggled  and  con¬ 
quered,  says  :  “  When  we  have  not  taken  the  pains 
to  overcome  our  passions  we  console  ourselves  in 
our  vices  by  declaring  them  necessary,  and  clothe 
in  the  mantle  of  science  the  testimony  of  a  corrupted 
heart.” 

There  is  no  fatal  law  consigning  us  to  impurity  ; 
but  what  is  the.  general  fact  in  this  respect,  as  ex¬ 
hibited  in  human  life  ?  Is  it  a  general  fact  that 

o 


142 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Prevalence  infancy  is  perfectly  pure,  that  youth  is  truly 

of  impuri¬ 
ty.  chaste,  and  that  children  brought  up  by  irre¬ 

proachable  parents  uniformly  make  exemplary  hus¬ 
bands  and  wives  ?  Examine  your  own  life,  and  what 
you  know  of  the  life  of  others,  and  listen  to  the  voice 
of  history.  Sin  is  very  prevalent ;  nations  violate 
the  law  of  chastity  without  restraint,  and  the  rulers 
of  nations  seem  sometimes  to  employ  their  excep¬ 
tional  position  and  power  only  to  hand  down  to  re¬ 
motest  posterity  the  reputation  of  adulterers  and  de¬ 
bauchees. 

The  law  is  violated  ;  but  how  it  avenges  itself ! 
How  many  are  the  tombs  prematurely  opened  by 
vice  !  how  many  constitutions  undermined  and  de¬ 
stroyed  !  how  many  withered  bodies  !  how  many 
blighted  intellects  !  You  turn  toward  the  fountains 
of  life,  and  you  see  rise  from  them  only  the  vapors 
of  death.  On  this  point  we  cannot  have  exact  statis¬ 
tical  data  ;  but  I  do  not  think  those  in  error  who 
Eavatres  of  estimate  that  debauchery  alone  robs  human- 
unchastity.  -j.y  more  vital  forces  than  the  combined 

ravages  of  war,  pestilence,  and  famine.  Such  is  one 
illustration  of  the  prevalence  of  evil.  It  relates  to 
the  origin  of  life  ;  let  us  now  turn  to  another. 

When  man  is  born  he  needs  nourishment.  Is  the 
practice  of  mankind  faultless  in  regard  to  this  ?  The 
Food  and  law  of  alimentation  is  well  known.  Food 

drink  nor¬ 
mally.  and  drink  look  to  the  maintenance  01  the 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


H3 


forces  of  body  and  mind.  I  have  no  sympathy  with 
asceticism  ;  there  is  here  a  means  of  sociality  which 
should  not  be  neglected.  The  family  table  is  the 
place  of  reunion  of  father,  mother,  and  children. 
When  a  friend  joins  himself  to  the  circle,  a  few  addi¬ 
tions  to  the  attractions  of  the  repast  is  only  a  mark 
of  cordiality,  a  sign  of  welcome,  which  cannot  be 
blamed.  And  if  on  some  natal  or  festive  anniversary 
a  moderate  use  were  made  of  a  generous  liquid  which 
cheers  the  spirit  and  contributes  to  the  innocent  joy 
of  friends,  there  would  be  nothing  to  condemn.  But 
it  is  evident  that  when  excessive  food  fatigues  and 
destroys  the  forces  instead  of  repairing  them,  and 
when  drink  paralyzes  the  intelligence  instead  of  pro¬ 
moting  its  normal  exercise,  then  there  is  disorder, 
there  is  evil. 

Now,  what  is  the  general  fact  in  this  respect  ?  We 
do  not  speak  of  that  open  intemperance,  of  those 
habits  of  drunkenness  which  so  ravage  society.  We 
ask,  What  is  the  general  usage  in  regard  to  eating  and 
drinking?  The  general  fact  is  that  there  The  abuse 

of  food  and 

is  excess  ;  the  truly  temperate  are  the  ex-  drink, 
ceptions.  In  the  majority  of  cases  little  daily  excesses 
fatigue  the  organism,  waste,  the  forces,  and  gradually 
sap  the  sources  of  life.  It  is  only  too  often  that  we 
see  the  animal  kill  the  man,  and  finish  by  killing 
itself. 

But  shall  we  continue  our  comparison  of  facts  with 


144 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


the  law  ?  Shall  we  pass  to  the  laws  of  truth,  of  justice, 
and  of  charity  ?  I  need  not  enter  into  details  ;  you  all 
sin  waiver-  know  only  too  many  of  them  already.  In 
the  presence  of  law,  the  perfect  law,  how 
many  are  ji*st  ?  There  are  none,  no,  not  one  ;  an 
honest  examination  of  the  facts  will  prove  not  only 
that  sin  is  general,  but  that  it  is  universal  All,  it  is 
true,  do  not  sin  equally ;  crime,  as  well  as  virtue,  has 
its  degrees.*  All  do  not  sin  against  all  the  phases 
of  moral  law  ;  but  who  does  not  transgress  many  of 
the  precepts  which  constitute  it  in  its  totality  ? 
None  ;  sin  is  all-prevalent  This  is  one  of  the  truths 
which  is  least  contested,  especially  when  others  are 
concerned. 

But  we  must  here  make  an  important  distinction. 

o 

There  is  a  morality  of  the  conscience  which  places 
Distinction  us  'm  ike  presence  of  God,  the  author  of  the 
from  ethical  ^aw-  But  there  is  another  morality,  that  of 
morality.  society.  I  do  not  speak  of  the  corrupt  mo¬ 
rality  of  the  world  ;  I  speak  of  a  social  morality  which 
is  good  and  legitimate,  and  which  ought  to  be  care¬ 
fully  encouraged.  Society  judges  each  of  its  mem¬ 
bers  according  to  his  acts,  because  it  does  not  know 
his  motives,  and  it  judges  the  acts  of  each  in  their 
bearing  on  the  rights  of  others.  From  this  stand¬ 
point  there  are  men  who  are  honest ;  there  are  others 
who  are  less  so,  or  not  so  at  all ;  and  these  distinc- 

*  Ainsi  que  la  vertu,  le  crime  a  ses  degres. — Racine. 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


*45 

tions  ought  to  be  kept  up.  There  are  men  who, 
when  in  society,  may  well  move  with  downcast  eyes, 
and  who  had  even  better  not  show  themselves  abroad 
at  all ;  for  some  of  their  public  acts  have  outraged 
the  public  conscience.  But  there  are  others  who 
may  well  move  among  their  fellows  with  upright 
countenance,  and  who  have  the  right,  and  sometimes 
the  duty,  to  rise  up  against  outrage,  and  repulse  -with 
just  indignation  the  assaults  of  calumny.  If  we  ignore 
•this  distinction  between  the  morality  of  conscience 
and  that  of  society,  we  involve  ourselves  in  contra¬ 
diction  and  foster  a  morbid  humility. 

There  are  persons  who  may  rightly  claim  from 
their  fellows  the  title  of  honest  men  ;  but  he  who 
looks  into  his  own  conscience  and  compares  himself 
with  the  absolute  law,  that  which  looks  at  the  inten¬ 
tion  as  well  as  the  act,  and  which  is  not  limited  to  mere 
social  relations,  will  perceive  in  his  heart  all  the  germs 
of  evil,  and  will  be  convinced  that  it  was,  e  . . , 
perhaps,  only  the  occasion  that  was  wanting  rallty  Wlth* 
to  have  made  of  him  an  actual  malefactor.  root- 
While  standing  in  the  presence  of  a  criminal  and 
thinking  over  his  history,  have  you  never  asked  your¬ 
self  whether,  if  you  had  been  placed  in  the  same  cir¬ 
cumstance,  you  would  not  also  have  become  what  he 
is,  or  perhaps  worse  still  ?  Have  you  never  con¬ 
ceived  of  yourself  as  in  the  presence  of  some  great 

temptation,  and,  on  asking  what  would  have  become 

10 


146 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


of  you,  felt  the  blood  curdle  in  your  veins  ?  In  this 
consultation  of  conscience,  even  those  who  pass  for 
just  among  men  will  learn  three  things  :  thankfulness 
to  God  for  having  preserved  them  from  the  greater 
temptations  of  life,  indulgence  for  their  fellows,  and 
severity  for  themselves. 

We  are  all  more  or  less  involved  in  sin  ;  but  what 
shall  we  say  of  certain  ones  who  imagine  themselves 
without  reproach  ?  Shall  we  admit  that  they  are 
exceptions  to  the  common  rule  ?  If  a  man  should 
Plenty  of  declare  himself  without  reproach,  not  only 

Pharisees, 

but  no  real  from  a  social  stand-point,  in  that  he  has 

exceptions 

to  the  gen-  neither  robbed,  nor  murdered,  nor  sworn 

eral  sinful-  ri11  .......  .  r 

ness.  lalsely,  but  also  m  the  deep  moral  sense  oi 
the  word,  then  I  should  be  tempted  to  go  and  con¬ 
sult  his  wife,  his  children,  and  his  neighbors  ;  and  I 
would  feel  confident  of  learning  many  things  to  his 
disfavor,  and,  above  all,  that  he  was  intolerably  pre¬ 
sumptuous  and  arrogant.  When  Jesus  of  Nazareth 
pronounced  the  parable  commending  the  humble 
publican  who  smote  his  breast,  and  condemning  the 
Pharisee  who  thanked  God  for  his  many  virtues,  he 
did  so,  not  so  much  in  the  character  of  the  Son  of 
God,  teaching  us  unknown  truths,  as  in  that  of  the 
Son  of  man,  making  himself  the  organ  of  humanity, 


and  uttering  the  verdict  of  the  universal  conscience 
against  these  self-righteous  hypocrites,  who,  from 
the  sublime  height  of  their  imagined  virtues,  look 


The  Problem  of  Evil,  147 

down  with  disdain  on  the  corrupt  masses  about 
them* 

The  general  prevalence  of  suffering  and  sin  is  only 
too  evident ;  we  may  laugh  at  it  or  weep  at  it,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  spirit  that  we  are  of,  but  it  is  certain  that 
the  world  goes  wrong.  Now,  whence  is  this  uni¬ 
versality  of  evil  ?  The  individualistic  solution  of  the 
problem  of  evil  doubtless  appears  to  you  already  as 
very  insufficient  That  a  free  being  should  not  al¬ 
ways  choose  the  good  may  seem  natural ;  but  that 
among  the  thousands  and  millions  of  human  beings 
who  have  appeared  in  the  world,  every  one,  without 
exception,  should  have  chosen  evil  and  brought  upon 
himself  suffering,  and  that  none  should  have  uni¬ 
formly  chosen  the  good,  this  may  not  be  absolutely 
and  logically  impossible,  but  it  is  assuredly  very 
strange.  Our  most  honest  and  profound  conviction 
is  this  :  Not  only  do  we  believe  that  no  man  Humanity 

believes  in 

has  always  chosen  the  good,  but  we  believe  the  univer 
that  in  the  present  condition  of  humanity  an  °f 
absolutely  good  man  is  impossible.  No  one  thinks 
otherwise  ;  and  of  this,  I  could  ask  no  better  proof 
than  that  given  by  the  endless  controversies  which 
are  raised  and  perpetuated  by  the  question  of  the 
person  of  Jesus.  Those  who  hold  that  he  was  abso¬ 
lutely  good,  argue  without  hesitation  from  his  absolute 
goodness  to  his  divine  nature  ;  while  those  who  deny 
his  divinity  do  not  hesitate  to  deny,  in  consequence, 


148 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


the  historical  reality  of  his  absolute  goodness.  We 
believe,  also,  not  only  that  every  human  creature  is 
affected  by  suffering,  but  that  in  the  present  condition 
of  humanity  the  existence  of  a  man  entirely  free  from 
suffering  is  impossible.  Finally,  we  treat  as  chimer¬ 
ical  the  idea  of  a  man  entirely  exempt  from  error. 
We  believe,  therefore,  that  evil  is  inherent  in  human 
nature  under  the  threefold  form  of  sin,  of  error,  and 
Essentiality  °*  suffering.  This  is  what  I  call  the  essen- 

ofevi1,  tiality  of  evil .  I11  view  of  this  phase  of  the 

* 

question  the  individualistic  solution  will  appear  as 
manifestly  false — I  mean,  incomplete. 

(2.)  Essentiality  of  Evil 

Evil  is  essential  in  humanity  as  it  now  exists  ;  that 
is,  independently  of  our  personal  faults,  and  of  the 
sufferings  which  arise  therefrom  or  from  the  faults  of 
those  about  us,  there  is  in  all  men,  from  the  simple 
fact  that  they  are  men,  an  element  or  germ  of  suffer¬ 
ing  and  of  sin.  Mark  well  that  I  say  an  element  of 
sin,  not  necessarily  implying  actual  sin. 

It  is  easy  to  show  that  suffering  does  not  arise 
simply  from  the  individual  abuse  of  volition,  though 
this  produces,  in  fact,  a  large  part  of  it.  Let  us  revert 
to  the  facts  attendant  upon  the  transmission  of  life, 
inevitable-  Before  rejoicing  from  the  fact  that  she  has 

ness  of  suf-  . 

ferine.  brought  a  man  into  the  world,  woman  must 

n  O 

suffer  the  pains  of  childbirth.  And  when  the  child 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


149 


is  born,  what  is  the  uniform  herald  of  the  fact  ?  It  is 
the  cry  of  the  infant.  The  groans  of  the  mother 
cease  only  to  give  place  to  the  wails  of  the  new-born. 

And  how  many  infants  are  swept  away  almost  at 
their  birth  !  how  many  of  their  epitaphs  might  be, 
f‘It  cried  and  then  died!"  Pitiable  infant!  what 
fault  had  it  committed  ?  And  the  mother — were  the 
birth-pains  the  result  of  her  own  faults  ?  Are  they 
spared  to  the  pure  woman,  and  suffered  only  by  the 
guilty  ?  All  suffer  alike.  In  fact,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  suffering  seems  to  strike  at  hazard,  and,  with 
supreme  indifference  to  individuals,  to  impose  a  tax 
on  humanity  at  large.  A  portion  of  our  sufferings 
does  not  belong  to  us  as  mere  individuals,  but  as 
members  of  the  race.  The  proverb  is  *  not  without 
justification,  that  “to  live  is  to  suffer.” 

Let  us  pass  to  what  we  call  the  essentiality  of  sin. 
There  exists  in  human  nature  an  element  of  v  ..  ... 
sin  independently  of  the  fault  of  individual  01  sin- 
volitions  :  such  is  our  affirmation.  But  we  must  be 
well  understood,  for,  sin  being  a  quality  of  our  acts, 
and  every  act  being,  as  it  seems,  absolutely  individual, 
it  does  not  appear  easy,  at  first  thought,  to  under¬ 
stand  that  sin  may  belong  not  to  our  volition,  but  to 
our  nature  itself.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  use 
the  expression  element  of  sin,  and  we  shall  soon  see 
for  what  reason.  Volition,  reason,  and  conscience  do 
not  constitute  our  entire  spiritual  nature.  Volition 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


150 

is  not  the  sole  origin  of  our  acts.  We  are  impelled 
“Heart”  in  and  solicited  by  the  tendencies  of  the  heart. 

its  moral 

sense.  In  a  general  sense,  we  designate  as  heart 
the  spiritual  organ  of  all  our  desires  and  inclinations, 
of  every  thing  that  leads  us  to  action,  from  the  most 
disinterested  love  down  to  the  taste  we  may  have  for 
this  or  that  article  of  food.  When  man  suspends  the 
action  of  his  will-power,  he  acts  under  the  mere  im¬ 
pulsion  of  his  propensions,  and,  as  we  say  familiarly, 
he  goes  as  his  heart  leads  him.  The  heart  consti¬ 
tutes,  in  a  moral  point  of  view,  what  we  call  a  nature,  a 
nature  which  lies  at  the  base  of  the  soul,  and  back  of 
our  liberty.  In  the  presence  of  this  nature  the  free 
will  consents  or  resists  ;  it  can  consent  to  the  evil,  it 
can  resist  the  good.  A  large  share  of  our  responsi¬ 
bility  consists  in  our  consenting  to,  or  resisting,  the 
impulses  of  the  heart.  This  moral  nature  which 
weighs  upon  our  will  forever,  and  tempts  it  to  abdicate 
in  favor  of  the  heart — are  we  personally  responsible  for 
its  peculiarities  ?  Not  entirely,  as  we  shall  soon  see  ; 
though  we  are  so  partially,  as  must  not  be  forgotten. 

The  consequence  of  a  wrong  act  is,  that  we  are  in¬ 
clined  to  commit  it  anew,  if  some  bitter  experience 
Nature  and  or  the  power  of  repentance  do  not  counteract 

significance 

of  habit,  the  law  of  nature.  This  law  is,  that  the 
repetition  of  an  act  increases  our  inclination  to  persist 
in  doing  it.  Such  is  the  mysterious  effect  of  habit : 
the  employment  of  our  liberty  confines  itself,  so  to 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


I5i 

speak,  in  grooves  which  originally  proceed  from  our¬ 
selves.  This  is  very  evident,  for  example,  in  cases 
of  intemperance.  The  man  who  began  to  indulge  in 
drink  in  defiance  of  his  conscience,  and  with  a  con¬ 
sciousness  that  he  could  and  should  resist  it,  becomes 
step  by  step  the  slave  of  the  very,  misuse  which  he 
makes  of  his  own  will-power.  Finally,  after  having 
devoted  himself  to  evil  for  ten,  twenty,  or  thirty  years, 
so  that  his  will  has  become  incrusted  in  the  prepon¬ 
derance  of  his  appetites,  he  will  openly  declare  that 
nature  is  stronger  than  he.  And  perhaps  he  will 
speak  truly  ;  but  who,  other  than  himself,  has  created 
this  nature  ?  Thus  the  past  of  liberty  re-appears  in 
the  present  of  nature  ;  though  devoting  ourselves 
voluntarily  to  evil  at  first,  we  finally  become  its  un¬ 
willing  slaves  ;  we  ourselves  fabricate  and  rivet  the 
chains  of  our  own  servitude.  But  this  power  of  habit 
is  equally  effectual  in  regard  to  the  good.  v  help  to 
To-day  you  accomplish  a  good  action  with  Jlcf  an<1 . a 

J  J  1  0  help  to  Yir- 

efiort — perhaps  with  heroic  effort ;  to-morrow  tue- 
you  will  do  it  with  less  effort ;  finally  you  will  do  it  with¬ 
out  any  effort.  The  practice  of  the  good  will  have  be¬ 
come  easy  to  you  ;  the  employment  of  your  liberty  will 
have  inclined  your  heart  to  the  good,  and  the  past  of 
your  liberty  will  re-appear  in  the  present  of  your  na¬ 
ture  ;  that  is,  by  the  good  employment  of  your  will  you 
will  have  built  upon  your  primitive  nature  a  new  nature. 

There  is,  therefore,  in  our  actual  dispositions  a  por- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


K2 


tion  which  has  resulted  from  the  previous  use  of  our 
liberty.  But  is  that  all  ?  is  there  in  our  nature  noth¬ 
ing  other,  and  more,  than  what  we  ourselves,  or  others 
by  their  influence  on  us,  have  put  there  ?  Assuredly 
a  personal  there  is  more ;  there  is'  in  us  a  primitive  na- 

and  an  im- 

personal eie-  ture,  dispositions  which  are  born  with  us,  as 

ment  in  our 

heart.  the  etymology  of  the  word  7tat7tre  itself  im¬ 
plies.  The  personal  nature  of  each  individual  is 
largely  determined  before  the  action  of  his  will  and 
the  influence  of  his  fellows  by  inclinations  inherent 
in  his  organization,  and  which  are  transmitted  to  him 
by  his  family,  bis  nation,  his  race.  Nor  is  this  all  : 
below  these  special,  hereditary  transmissions  lie  the 
elements  of  human  nature  in  general.  In  the  har¬ 
monious  growth  of  body  and  soul,  the  elements  of  this 
nature  are  developed  and  gradually  disclosed  to  the 
eye  of  consciousness,  until  finally  they  constitute  that 
totality  of  inclinations  which  we  call  the  heart. 

Now'  the  heart  awakens  to  life  before  the  conscience. 


At  the  period  when  man,  taking  possession  of  himself, 
becomes  a  moral  being— a  point  of  time  which  varies 
Heart  much  with  individuals,  and  which  in  some 
awakes,  bo-  cases  seems  almost  never  to  arrive— the 

fore  cor*- 

will  finds  itself  in  the  presence  of  propensi- 


science. 


ties  of  the  heart.  Now,  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the 
w  nature  ”  of  our  soul  may  be  said  to  be  good  or  bad  ; 
it  is  in  this  sense  that  there  can  be  an  element  of 


good  or  an  element  of  evil  essential Iv  inhering  in 

o  C- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


153 

human  nature  under  its  present  conditions.  Though 
sin,  properly  so  called,  presupposes  a  necessarily  indi¬ 
vidual  act  of  the  will,  still  predispositions  to  evil  con¬ 
stitute  an  element  or  germ  of  sin.  Now,  what  is 
the  condition  of  humanity  in  this  respect  ?  When  a 
person  comes  into  moral  possession  of  himself,  does 
he  find  himself,  like  the  Hercules  of  the  fable,  called 
on  to  choose  between  the  good  and  the  evil,  which 
stand  before  him  under  strictly  equal  conditions,  the 
one  at  his  right,  the  other  at  his  left  ?  Are  the  scales 
of  the  balance  equally  charged  ?  This  is  the  heart  of 
the  question.  Very  certainly  the  scales  of  Heart  over- 

.  balances 

the  balance  are  not  equally  charged  :  the  conscience, 
heart  is  inclined  toward  evil.  It  is  true,  we  are  not 
naturally  inclined  to  grime  :  an  inclination  to  assassin¬ 
ation  and  to  acts  of  a  like  nature  is,  happily,  but  a 
terrible  exception.  Crime  is  the  accident  of  evil,  the 
paroxysm  of  the  malady,  as  heroism  is  the  exceptional 
form  of  the  good.  The  real  question  is  :  Which  is  the 
easier  for  us,  in  view  of  the  whole  extent  of  the  law, 
vice  or  virtue  ?  If  our  language  is  well  formed,  we 
need  but  propose  the  question  to  resolve  it ;  for  the 
word  virtue  signifies  primitively  force,  and  general 
usage  stigmatizes  vices  as  weaknesses.  Let  us  prove 
that  language  is  in  the  right. 

In  the  development  of  human  nature  the  lusts  of 
the  flesh  have  a  manifestly  abnormal  Influence. 
Every  man,  when  desiring  to  fulfill  the  law  of  the  spirit, 


154 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


finds  himself,  in  one  respect  or  another,  subject  to  the 
law  of  his  members,  without,  however,  being  able  to 
attribute  to  his  own  will — which  is  responsible  only 
when  it  yields  to  the  evil — the  origin  itself  of  the  bad 
passions  which  tempt  him.  In  his  relations  with 
others  he  may  have  a  tender  heart,  and  be  affected 
at  their  sorrows,  without,  however,  having  a  good 
heart.  In  general,  therefore,  can  the  human  heart 

be  called  good  in  the  deep  sense  of  the  word  ?  Are 

• 

we  naturally  inclined  rather  to  the  fulfillment  of  the 
law  of  charity?  or  to  that  indifference  which  takes  no 
thought  of  others  ?  or,  in  fine,  to  the  spirit  of  arrogance 
which  occupies  itself  with  others  only  to  dominate 
them  ?  In  order  to  recognize  what  are  the  facts  in 
this  respect,  suspend  for  awhile  the  activity  of  your 
will,  and  give  free  course  to  your  thoughts  as  associa¬ 
tion  may  call  them  up  ;  this  will  be  what  we  call  a 
state  of  revery.  In  this  state  we  lay  aside  the  reins 
_  ,  ,  of  self-control,  and  give  ourselves  over  to  the 

cy  in  revery.  free  current  of  human  nature,  as  it  exists 
within  us.  What  is  the  general  tenor  of  our  thoughts 
and  feelings  in  such  a  state  ?  Heaven  preserve  me 
from  denying  that  there  is  much  of  the  pure  and 
noble  in  the  reveries  of  many  young  women  and 
young  men  !  Yes,  our  souls  are  visited  by  brilliant 
flashes  and  splendid  gleams,  but,  alas  !  these  gleams 
and  flashes  serve  but  too  often  to  render  the  shadows 
more  visible.  What  is  the  testimony  of  literature 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


155 


and  popular  proverbs — mirrors  in  which  humanity 
sees  reflected  its  own  inmost  thoughts — in  regard 
to  the  purity  of  our  thoughts  when  unoccupied  ?  Is 
it  not  that  idleness  is  the  mother  of  all  the  vices  ? 
Now,  if  idleness,  which  is  simply  a  suspension  of 
effort,  generally  occasions  the  undisciplined  imagina¬ 
tion  to  wander  into  impure  scenes  of  vice  and  crime, 
it  is  quite  evident  that  our  nature  is  not  good,  and 
that  we  inherit  from  humanity  in  general,  if  not  sin 
properly  so-called,  yet  certainly  a  condition  of  heart 
which  inclines  us  to  wrong  acts  ;  that  is,  we  inherit 
an  element,  or  germ,  of  sin.  “  I  am  con-  x. 

— *  XtOUSSGclll  b 

vinced,"  wrote  Rousseau,  “  that  there  is  no  opmion' 
man,  however  honest  he  may  be,  who,  should  he 
always  follow  the  dictates  of  his  heart,  would  not  soon 
become  the  worst  of  wretches.” 

There  remains  yet  a  final  question  to  propose.  Is 
this  evil  nature  which  is  within  us,  and  which  each 
can  contribute  to  augment  by  his  own  volun-  Our  evil  na- 

,  1  •  i  i  r  ,  .  , .  ture  notac- 

tary  acts,  but  which  exists  before  the  inch-  counted  for 
vidual,  simply  the  result  of  the  accumulated  b>  here,llta' 
faults  of  generations?  The  hereditary  trans-  unsslon- 
mission  of  evil  tendencies  is  an  incontestable  fact 
which  of  itself  proves  the  insufficiency  of  the  indi¬ 
vidualistic  solution ;  but  the  mere  fact  of  hereditary 
transmission,  as  observed  in  history,  does  not  solve 
the  problem.  In  fact,  if  our  nature,  such  as  it  is, 
were  simply  the  result  of  the  accumulated  acts  of 


156 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


generations,  we  would  naturally  expect  to  find  history 
presenting  humanity  as  pure  at  its  beginning,  and 
as  corrupting  itself  continually  more  and  more  by  the 
faults  of  its  members.  It  would  be  like  a  stream  rising- 
pure  among  the  rocks  of  the  Alps,  and  losing  its  lim¬ 
pidity  as  it  gradually  approaches  the  plains.  But  is  it 
so  ?  Does  history  show  us  a  greater  degree  of  good 
the  further  back  it  leads  us  ?  I  do  not  speak  here  of 
religious  traditions  as  to  a  pre-historic  state,  a  Golden 
Age,  but  of  history  proper.  The  annals  of  all  nations 
uniformly  represent  the  earlier  civilization  as  very 
defective  ;  so  much  so  that  many  have  rashly  inferred 
that  the  savage  state  is  the  primitive  state  of  the 
race.  And  when  we  pass  beyond  the  period  of  history 
into  the  period  of  legend,  does  the  matter  assume  a 
more  favorable  phase  ?  What  is  the  state  of  morals 
as  presented  in  the  heroic  age  of  Greece  ?  How 
many  sad  parallels  might  we  find  to  the  stories  of 
Clvtemnestra  and  Agamemnon  !  Let  us  turn  now  to 
the  sacred  books  of  the  Hebrews.  Almost  on  the 
first  page,  we  find  the  earth  crying  for  vengeance  for 
the  blood  of  Abel.  Turn  over  a  few  pages,  and  you 
have  the  fearful  history  of  the  cities  of  the  plain. 
Lot  escapes  from  the  corruptions  of  Sodom  only  to 
become  a  victim  of  the  disorders  of  his  own  family, 
and  the  incestuous  father  of  the  accursed  races  of 
Moab  and  Ammon.  No,  no;  we  do  not  find  history 
presenting  humanity  as  proceeding  from  a  pure 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 57 


source)  and  then  degenerating  little  by  little  from 
the  mere  influence  of  individual  volitions. 

The  individualistic  doctrine  is,  therefore,  insuffi¬ 
cient.  It  does  not  account  for  the  hereditary  Insufficiency 
transmission  of  tendencies  from  one  genera- 
tion  to  another,  and  it  is  absolutely  dis-  solutlolu 
proved  by  the  presence  of  evil  at  the  very  outset  of 
history.  And,  in  fact,  those  who  maintain  this  doc¬ 
trine  come  finally  to  admit  its  insufficiency  in  spite 
of  themselves.  After  having  shown,  and  shown 
properly  enough,  the  share  of  evil  which  results  from 
the  action  of  individual  wills,  they  are  forced  to 
attribute  the  rest  either  to  the  influence  of  society, 
which  is  Rousseau's  theory,  or  to  a  certain  necessity 
of  things,  which  is  the  theory  of  a  large  number  of 
metaphysicians.  To  attribute  the  evil  to  so'ciety  is 
manifestly  fallacious,  for  whence  came  the  evil  into 
society?  To  place  a  portion  of  existing  evil  to  the 
charge  of  a  primitive  and  absolute  necessity  of  things 
is  not  to  solve  the  problem,  but  to  deny  it,  inasmuch 
as  the  very  fact  of  proclaiming  evil  necessary  is  to 
proclaim  it  good. 

How  far,  now,  have  we  advanced  in  the  solution  of 
our  problem  ?  Shadows  surround  us  on  every  side, 
and  we  seem  lost  in  labyrinths  without  issue.  We 
have,  however,  ascertained  some  facts  :  Evil,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  cannot  proceed  from  God,  for  the  good  and  the 
will  of  God  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  To  make 


158 


The  Problem  of  Evil ’ 


God  the  author  of  evil  is  a  logical  contradiction  ;*nor 
can  evil  proceed  from  an  eternal  principle  other  than 
God,  for  God  is  himself  the  universal  principle,  out¬ 
side  of  which  there  exists,  primitively,  none  other  ; 
he,  and  he  alone,  is  eternal.  We  are  therefore  forced 
to  look  for  the  origin  of  evil  to  created  wills.  On 
studying  the  individual  action  of  created  wills  we 
find  therein  an  explanation  of  a  considerable  portion 
of  existing  evil.  There  is,  however,  another  and  a 
large  portion  which  escapes  this  explanation.  An 
evil  influence  seems  to  weigh  down  upon  humanity 
throughout  all  the  pages  of  its  history,  and  from  the 
very  beginning  ;  or,  to  use  a  more  appropriate  figure, 
an  evil  principle  seems  to  have  infected  humanity  as 
a  whole,  and  to  exist  in  each  one  of  us  in  the  very 
heart  of  our  being.  But  what  is  this  principle  ? 
whence  can  it  spring  ?  To  answer  this  will  be  the 
purpose  of  our  next  lecture. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


159 


LECTURE  IV, 

THE  SOLUTION. 

We  are  seeking  for  the  origin  of  evil,  that  is,  of  a 
disorder  which  manifests  itself  in  humanity  under 
the  three  forms  of  error,  suffering,  and  sin.  We 
have  encountered  one  solution  of  the  problem— that 
which  attributes  sin  exclusively  to  individual  volition, 
and  regards  the  other  elements  of  evil  as  simply  the 
natural  consequences  of  individual  sins.  In  regarding 
error  and  suffering  as  sequences  of  sin,  this  theory 
satisfies  both  conscience  and  reason.  But  in  that  it 
attributes  the  origin  of  sin  exclusively  to  individual 
volitions,  we  have  found  it  insufficient.  It  cannot 
account  for  the  general  prevalence  of  suffering,  nor 
for  the  existence  in  humanity  of  an  all-prevalent 
element  or  germ  of  sin  antecedent  to  all  volition. 
There  exists,  as  we  have  said,  an  infectious  principle 
which  vitiates  all  hearts.  Whence  comes  it  ?  It  is 
of  great  importance  for  our  practical  life  to  recognize 
the  essential  character  of  evil.  If  we  ignore  the  fact 
that  humanity  is  in  a  state  of  fundamental  disorder, 
we  are  only  too  ready  to  regard  the  general  state  of 
things,  the  common  usage,  as  the  proper  rule  for 
that  which  ought  to  be,  and  from  this  results  a  great 


160  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

enfeebling  of  the  conscience.  The  question  as  to  the 
origin  of  this  wrong  state  of  humanity  appears  at 
first  glance  to  be  a  question  purely  speculative. 
And,  in  fact,  it  is  not  directly  practical.  As  soon  as 
we  admit  that  evil  ought  not  to  be,  it  follows  that,  in 
case  our  heart  is  evil,  it  is  our  duty  to  resist  it.  The 
whole  bearing  of  our  investigations  on  the  conduct 
of  life  is  contained  in  this  simple  maxim,  “  Abhor 
that  which  is  evil ;  cleave  to  that  which  is  good.” 
As  far  as  practice  is  concerned,  therefore,  it  would 
seem  that  we  might  here  pass  immediately  to  the 
subject  of  our  sixth  lecture,  which  is,  to  treat  of  the 
in  bow  far  conflict  of  life.  „W e  cannot,  however,  con- 

spocula- 

tionson  the  cede  in  an  absolute  sense  the  moral  indif- 

origin  of 

evil  are  of  ference  of  the  question  now  before  us.  If 

practical 

bearing.  we  have  no  definite  opinion  as  to  the  origin 
of  evil,  we  are  very  apt  either  to  regard  it  as  neces¬ 
sary,  which  enfeebles  the  conscience,  or  to  derive  it 
from  God,  which  seriously  violates  the  religious  senti¬ 
ment,  Without  being  directly  practical,  therefore, 
the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  evil  has  yet  a  real 
influence  in  the  sphere  of  morals.  Moreover,  as  the 
method  of  our  lectures  is  philosophical,  and  as  the 
peculiarity  of  philosophy  is  to  seek  for  a  solution 
wherever  a  problem  is  encountered,  we  must  here 
tarry  longer.  We  may  remark  in  passing,  however, 
that,  provided  only  you  fully  admit  the  obligation  of 
combating  error,  the  doubts  which  some  of  you  may 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  161 

entertain  as  to  the  solution  which  I  propose  will  in 
nowise  neutralize,  for  such,  the  value  of  the  subse¬ 
quent  lectures.  After  dissenting  for  awhile  on  the 
field  of  theory,  we  will  agree  again  when  coming  to  the 
practical  applications,  I  propose  now  to  submit  to  you 
what  seems  to  me  the  best  solution  of  the  problem 
of  evil,  then  to  indicate  its  historical  sources,  and 
finally,  in  developing  it,  to  signalize  the  inferences  to 
which  it  leads  us,  as  to  the  primitive  condition  of 
humanity  and  the  origin  of  its  actual  con-  GeneBa] 
dition.  The  order  of  our  thoughts  will,  ^fourth 
therefore,  be :  The  Solution  Proposed,  the  lecture’ 
Historical  Sources  of  the  Solution,  the  Primitive 
Condition  of  Humanity,  and  the  Origin  of  its  Present 
Condition. 

I.  The  Solution  Proposed. 

We  are  studying  the  problem  of  evil  in  a  general 
manner,  as  bearing  on  all  created  spirits  ;  but  as  hu¬ 
manity  alone,  of  all  the  families  of  spirits  whose  ex¬ 
istence  we  may  suppose,  lies  within  the  sphere  of  our 
observation,  we  will  apply  our  theory  as  to  all  spirits, 
to  mankind  in  particular. 

The  solution  I  have  to  propose  is  this  :  Humanity 
is  corrupted  because  it  has  corrupted  itself.  A 
primitive  act  of  humanity  has,  by  an  abuse  of  free¬ 
will,  by  a  revolt  against  law,  created  the  evil  heart  of 

humanity.  From  this  it  follows  that  in  each  indi¬ 
ll 


1 62 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

vidual  two  things  are  to  be  distinguished :  first,  his 

The  two  eie-  Personal  will,  which  is  responsible  for  his 
mentsmhu-  acj-s  anc[  for  his  consent  to  the  inclinations 

man  respon¬ 
sibility.  0f  nature ;  secondly,  the  human  nature  which 

is  in  him,  and  for  which  he  is  responsible  on  his  part, 
not  as  an  individual,  but  in  his  quality  of  human  being. 
There  are  here  two  affirmations  which  must  be  main¬ 
tained  with  equal  force  :  the  collective  responsibility 
of  humanity,  and  the  individual  responsibility  of  each 
of  its  members.  These  affirmations  do  not  contra¬ 
dict,  but  simply  limit  and  complement,  each  other. 
While  the  nature  of  the  problem  will  require  me  to 
insist  on  the  collective  Responsibility  of  the  race,  it  is 
essential  to  guard  intact  the  responsibility  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  We  will  be  careful  not  to  imitate  Luther’s 
drunken  peasant,  who,  in  his  effort  to  ride  upright,  no 
sooner  righted  himself  up  from  one  side  than  he 
found  himself  veering  to  the  other,  without  ever 
finding  his  proper  equilibrium. 

In  order  to  the  acceptance,  or  even  comprehension, 
of  the  solution  I  propose,  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
humanity  as  not  simply  a  collection  of  individuals, 
a  numerical  mass,  but  as  a  real  existence,  distinct  from 
the  individuals,  without,  however,  being  separate 
from  them,  and  which  may  be  the  object  of  moral  im¬ 
putation.  We  have  something  analogous  to  this  con¬ 
ception  when  we  speak  of  the  human  conscience  and 
consciousness  as  in  contrast  to  those  of  individuals, 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  163 

and  when  we  attribute  certain  sentiments  and  acts 
to  humanity  as  a  whole.  But  when  we  look  at  the 
matter  more  closely  we  are  apt  to  regard  this  as  mere 
figurative  speech,  and  to  conclude  that  it  is  only  the 
individuals  who  have  a  real  existence,  and  that  the 
word  humanity  is  a  mere  abstract  term  designating 
no  other  reality  than  a  collection  of  units.  This 
manner  of  thinking  has  in  its  favor  both  an  apparent 
plausibleness,  and  a  form  of  philosophy  which  readily 
obtains  credit,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  in  harmony 
with  first  impressions  in  this  regard.  The  theory 
which  I  present  conflicts  sharply  with  the  first  con¬ 
clusions  of  common  sense.  And,  in  view  of  the  diffi¬ 
culty  of  the  subject,  I  shall  here  propose  a  compro¬ 
mise.  I  pledge  myself  not  to  terminate  this  discussion 
with  a  triumphant  assumption  that  I  have  refuted 
every  objection  and  dissipated  every  shade  of  dark¬ 
ness.  On  the  other  hand,  I  ask  of  you  not  to  reject 
at  once  the  view  I  present,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
it  may  seem  new.  To  reject  every  new  thought 
would  be  to  close  the  way  against  progress.  Though 
my  view  may  seem  strange,  do  not,  therefore,  imme¬ 
diately  pronounce  it  absurd,  but  take  ample  time  to 
reflect  upon  it.  An  idea  is  a  life-germ.  Treat  my 
view  as  a  thought-germ  ;  let  it  grow  ;  nurture  it  by 
meditation,  and  pass  a  definitive  judgment  upon  it 
only  after  seeing  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  fruit 
which  it  may  produce.^  Moreover,  my  thoughts  are 


164 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


not  so  chained  together  but  that  those  who  may  not 
accept  their  whole  import,  will,  nevertheless,  be  able 
to  derive  some  profit  from  the  details  of  the  discussion. 

I -might  allege  with  strict  truthfulness  that  con¬ 
temporary  science,  especially  during  the  last  half 
century,  has  been  rapidly  leading  the  human  mind  to 
the  very  solution  which  I  have  proposed.  I  might, 
therefore,  appeal  to  your  taste  for  novelty.  I  might 
Modem  sci-  say  that  I  present  you  with  a  conquest  of 

once  favors 

the  view  of  science  which  is  not  only  modern,  but  which 

an  imper-  .  ’  . 

sonai  eie-  is  more  than  modern,  and  whose  role,  in  fact, 

man.  m  belongs  to  the  future.  But  while  in  one 
sense  it  is  new  in  science  and  philosophy — so  new 
that  it  is  as  yet  only  in  the  birth-stage  — -  still  in 
another  sense  it  is  ancient,  very  ancient :  it  is  one  of 
the  old  truths  of  humanity,  which  science  is  now 
seriously  beginning  to  spell  out,  and  will  finally  suc¬ 
ceed,  I  am  convinced,  in  fully  reading.  As  my  solu¬ 
tion  is,  therefore,  not  only  new  but  also  old,  it  is  proper 
briefly  to  refer  to  its  origin:  this  propriety,  however, 
is  only  historical,  but  not  essential. 

A  scientific  doctrine  is  a  supposition,  an  hypothesis, 
designed  to  explain  certain  facts,  and  which  is  versi¬ 
fied  in  proportion  as  it  explains  the  facts.  Its  historical 
origin  has  no  important  bearing  on  its  truth.  For  ex¬ 
ample,  the  law  of  gravitation  was  at  first  simply  a 
supposition.  This  supposition  has  finally  become  a 
law,  from  the  fact  of  its  rationally  accounting  for  the 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


165 


movements  of  celestial  and  other  bodies — from  this 
and  no  other  reason.  The  discovery  of  this  great 
lav/  has  been  attributed  to  Newton  ;  some  have  also 
attributed  it  to  Pascal.  This  dispute,  though  of  some 
historical  interest,  is  of  no  bearing  on  the  law  itself, 
as  its  truth  is  demonstrated  by  astronomical  observa¬ 
tions  and  by  calculations  quite  independently  of  the 
name  of  its  founder.  The  question  of  origin  is,  there¬ 
fore,  of  no  influence  on  the  proof  of  a  doctrine.  It  is 
usual,  however,  to  associate  laws  with  the  persons  or 
sources  from  which  they  were  first  derived.  In  the 
case  now  before  us,  it  is  quite  important  briefly  to 
glance  at  the  sources  of  the  solution  I  propose. 

II.  Historical  Sources  of  this  Solution. 

Our  solution  has  various  antecedents  in  the  history 
of  religious  doctrine.  It  has  always  been  in-  Historical 

.  sources  of 

eluded  by  implication  in  any  real  and  serious  tMssoiution. 
faith  in  God.  It  has  been  uttered  and  proposed  to 
the  world  in  a  positive,  though  not  scientific,  form,  in 
the  Christian  system.  The  sum  of  what  I  have  to  say  in 
solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  may  be  thus  expressed  : 

The  Christian  dogma  of  the  fall  of  man  contains 
the  philosophical  doctrine  which  best  accounts  to 
reason  for  the  facts  of  experience  involved  in  the 
problem  of  evil. 

The  importance  of  this  proposition  requires  that  it 
be  carefully  explained.  We  will,  therefore,  explain 


1 66  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

each  of  its  terms  :  Fall  of  humanity ,  dogma ,  philosoph¬ 
ical  doctrine. 

The  idea  of  -^nd  firsC  what  is  the  Christian  idea  of  the 
fall  of  man  ?  I  shall  explain  it  in  the  sense 
in  which  it  seems  to  me  as  common  to  all  the  great 
manifestations  of  Christian  thought.  The  affirmation, 
that  there  is  a  radical  disorder  in  human  nature,  is 
of  central  importance  in  the  organism  of  Christian 
doctrine  ;  it  is,  in  fact,  the  corner-stone  of  the  edifice. 
This  doctrine  contains  three  chief  thoughts :  the 
creation  of  the  race,  its  redemption,  and  its  moral 
restoration  or  sanctification.  The  object  of  redemp¬ 
tion  and  sanctification  is,  to  re-establish  the  primitive 
plan  of  the  creative  will  in  the  midst  of  a  world  in 
disorder.  If  we  deny  that  the  world  is  in  a  state  of 
radical  disorder  there  remains  no  place  for  redemp¬ 
tion  ;  there  is  no  occasion  for  a  restoration ;  there  re¬ 
mains  simply  the  doctrine  of  creation,  that  is  to  say, 
deism.  In  this  case,  those  who  still  claim  to  be 
Christians  are  utterly  unable  to  answer  the  deist 
when  he  exclaims,  “  What  an  idea  yoti  have  of  your 
God  !•  You  think  he  needed  to  intervene  in  the  world 
by  a  supernatural  act ;  surely,  therefore,  he  is  a  very 
unskillful  workman,  since  he  did  not  do  his  work  well 
at  the  first  attempt,  but  had  to  return  to  it.”  By  this 
objection  those  who  ignore  the  radical  disorder  of  the 
world  are  either  reduced  to  silence  or  involved  in  a  • 
series  of  contradictions.  Notwithstanding  this  these 


The' Problem  of  Evil. 


1 6/ 


Christians  will  continue  to  call  Christ  their  Saviour, 
and  to  use  the  words  salvation  and  restoration,  for¬ 
getting  that  only  that  which  is  lost  needs  to  be  saved, 
and  that  a  work  of  restoration  presupposes  a  pre¬ 
cedent  disorder.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  moment 
we  admit  that  human  nature  has  been  corrupted,  we 
understand  the  reason  of  the  intervention  of  God  for 
the  re-establishment  of  order  ;  an  intervention  which 
is  supernatural,  as  bearing  upon  our  fallen  nature, 
but  which  contemplates  only  the  re-establishment  of 
our  primitive  nature. 

A  radical  disturbance  introduced  into  the  plan  of 
creation,  being  the  corner-stone  of  the  Christian  sys¬ 
tem,  and  also  of  our  own  theory,  the  question  Vrt<li(.al(]i,_ 
arises,  From  whence  came  this  disturbance.  oraerinthe 

plan  of  ere  • 

If  it  were  required  to  believe  that  a  being  ation- 
like  one  of  us  had  sinned,  and  that  this  sin  was  im¬ 
puted  to  other  beings,  others  in  the  absolute  sense  of 
the  word  ;  if  it  were  required  to  admit  that  reinforce¬ 
ments  to  a  garrison  should  be  held  as  guilty  of  an  act 
of  sedition  which  took  place  before  their  arrival,  such 
a  view  would  so  directly  shock  the  sentiment  of  justice 
that  the  human  conscience  would  not  even  give  it  a 
hearing.  But  the  Christian  system  does  not  teach 
this.  Its  teaching  may  be  expressed  thus  :  The  act 
which  disturbed  the  order  of  creation  was  not  the  act 
of  an  individual,  in  the  sense  which  we  now  give  this 
term, ‘but  of  a  primitive  individual,  who  participated 


i6S 


The  Problem  of  Evil 

not  only  in  human  nature  as  one  of  us,  but  in  whom, 
because  of  his  primitiveness,  this  whole  nature  was 
concentrated.  His  acts  involve  two  characteristics 
which  ever  since  then  have  been  distinct :  they  were 
at  once  individual  and  human,  in  the  full  scope  of  this 
latter  term.  Entire  humanity  was  really  present  in  him 
who  fell,  and  who  was  its  head,  its  germ,  and  its  source. 

Now,  is  this  the  sense  of  the  Christian  system  ? 
It  is  a  cpaestion  of  fact.  Open  whatever  authorities 
you  please  :  turn  to  the  Catechism  of  the  Council  of 
Trent,*  the  Catechism  of  the  Orthodox  Church  of 

Corrobora-  the  East,f  the  Institutes  of  Calvin,  :t  and 

tive  author-  ..... 

ities  cited,  you  wilt  see  every-where  the  same  care  taken 
to  prevent  the  thought  that  sin  should  be  regarded 
as  passing  from  one  individual  to  others  who  did  not 
stand  in  an  essential  connection  with  the  first.  You 
will  every-where  notice  the  employment  of  the  images 
of  a  fountain,  a  germ,  a  source.  “God,”  says  Bossuet, 
contemplates  all  men  as  a  single  person  in  him 
from  whom  he  causes  them  all  to  spring.”  I  heard 

*  “  Adam  was,  as  it  were,  a  fountain,  a  principle.” — Chap,  iii,  i. 
t  “  The  stream  which  issues  from  an  impure  spring  is  very  naturally 
corrupt  likewise.” — Third  Article. 

X  “  On  ne  trouvera  nul  commencement  de  ceste  pollution,  sinon 
qu’on  monte  pusques  au  premier  pere  de  tous,  comme  a  la  fontaine. 

G 

Certainement  il  nous  faut  avoir  cela  pour  resolu,  qu’  Adam  n’a  pas 
seulement  este  pere  de  l’humaine  nature,  mais  comme  source  ou 
racine  :  et  pourtant  qu’en  la  corruption  d’iceluy,  le  genre  humain  par 
raison  a  este  corrompu.” — Institution  de  la  religion  chrestienne,  par 
Jehan  Calvin,  Livre  II,  chap,  i. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


'69 


M.  Charles  Secretan  once  observe,  while  beautifully 
commenting  on  this  thought  of  the  Bishop  of  Meaux, 
that  to  affirm  that  God  contemplates  any  thing  is  to 
say  that  that  thing  is  a  fact  in  the  highest  and  most 
real  sense  of  the  word.  Let  us  now  cite  the  authority 
of  a  contemporary,  one  who  is  now  most  successfully 
defending  the  Christian  cause  in  Germany,  “  The 
condition  of  all  of  us,”  says  Professor  Luthardt,  “  has 
been  determined  by  the  act  of  the  first  of  our  race  ; 
for  this  was  not  simply  the  act  of  an  individual,  but 
the  act  of  the  representative  of  all  men.  .  .  .  We  form 
collectively  a  great  unity.  Each  one  is  mysteriously 
involved  in  the  whole  ;  no  one  can  isolate  himself  and 
say,  What  does  that  concern  me  ?  ”  Such  is  the 
sense  which  we  attribute  to  the  words,  Fall  of  Man, 

But  what  is  a  dogma  ?  A  dogma  is  an  affirmation 
which  is  not  based  directly  on  reason,  or  on  The  nature 

,  r  .  1  •  .  1  1  •  r  of  a  dogma. 

experience,  but  on  laith  m  the  authority  01 
testimony.  If  we  take  the  term  in  its  widest  sense, 
we  would  have  to  say  that  our  ordinary  thoughts  are 
full  of  dogmas.  For  example,  how  do  those  who 
have  never  been  in  England  know  that  there  is  such 
a  city  as  London  ?  They  know  it  only  by  faith  in 
testimony.  Nevertheless,  their  belief  that  there  is 
such  a  city  is  perfect  and  absolute. 

But  the  word  dogma  is  generally  limited  Eeligic 
to  the  religious  sphere.  What  then  is  a 


!OUS 
dogmas. 


religious  dogma  ?  It  is  an  affirmation  which  is 


I/O 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


accepted  on  the  authority  of  supernatural  testimony, 
that  is  to  say,  a  testimony  based  on  facts  which  lie 
outside  of  human  power.  The  witness  of  the  facts 
may  be  a  mere  intermediary  agent ;  he  may  also 
know  directly,  and  by  virtue  of  his  own  nature,  the 
divine  world,  as  was  the  case  with  Christ  in  the  belief 
of  Christians.  A  Christian  dogma  is  an  affirmation 
based  on  the  authority  of  the  testimony  of  Christ, 
who  is  himself  the  dogma  of  dogmas.  By  its  very 
nature,  a  dogma  is  authority.  As  it  is  a  testimony 
rendered  in  the  sphere  of  history,  it  remains  un¬ 
changeable  in  its  character  of  historical  fact.  For 
such  as  accept  this  testimony  as  a  revelation  of  abso¬ 
lute  truth,  the  dogma  becomes  an  unchangeable  truth ; 
a  truth  which  may  be  understood  more  or  less  per¬ 
fectly,  and  whose  fuller  comprehension  may  be  attained 
to  only  progressively,  but  which  in  itself  remains  fixed 
and  immovable.  This  phase  of  the  matter  alienates 
many  minds  from  the  dogma,  because  the  authority 
which  is  inseparable  from  it  appears  to  them  as  a  chain. 
But  believers,  finding  their  strength  where  others  seem 

to  see  shackles,  do  not  think  it  best  that  all  bonds 

• 

should  be  broken.  They  take  courage  from  various 
analogies,  and  say,  for  example,  that  a  ship  bereft  of  its 
mast  and  helm  would  not  do  well  to  sever  the  cable 
which  attaches  it  to  the  succoring  steamer,  andjffiat 
the  steamer  would  not  do  well  to  throw  overboard  the 
chain  by  which  it  might  anchor  itself  in  time  of  storm. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


iyi 


The  authority  of  a  dogma,  as  it  rests  solely  on 

faith,  is  manifestly  void  for  any  but  believers.  Dogmas  val¬ 
id  only  for 

To  impose  the  authority  of  a  dogma  on  those  believers, 
who  disbelieve  it  is  irrational  and  immoral.  Men 
cannot  be  forced  to  believe  ;  at  furthest,  they  can 
only  be  induced  to  an  empty  outward  conformity. 
The* ignoring  of  this  has  brought  great  scandal  upon 
nominal  Christianity.  The  lingering  vision  of  the 
smoke  of  Inquisition  fires  obscures  still,  to-day,  the 
skies  of  many  a  soul ;  and,  to  pass  from  the  great  ex¬ 
ample  to  *a  little  one,  the  flames  which  devoured  a 
Servetus  have  not  attracted  many  hearts  to  the 
Protestant  Gospel.  The  confounding  of  the  authority 
which  the  dogma  has  for  a  believer,  with  the  au¬ 
thority  of  the  dogma  as  imposed  on  those  who  do 
not  believe  it,  was  the  scourge  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

But,  finally,  what  do  we  'understand  by  a  philo¬ 
sophical  doctrine?  What  is  philosophy  ?  a  philosoph¬ 
ical  doctrine, 

Philosophy  is  a  search  after  a*  general  ex-  as  distin- 

•.  .  r  .  .  ,  .  .  r  guishedfrom 

pianation  oi  the  universe,  under  condition  of  a  dogma, 
freedom  from  all  dogmatic  assumption.  No  science 
that  rests  on  a  dogmatic  assumption,  whether  it  be 
the  authority  of  Christ,  or  of  Mohammed,  or  of  any 
one  whomsoever  who  is  believed  to  be  an  organ  of  the 
Divinity,  can  be  philosophy.  But  shall  we,  therefore, 
say  that  philosophy  is  an  employment  of  reason  freed 
from  all  authority  whatever  ?  Certainly  not.  Such 
an  employment  of  reason  would  be  only  a  free  groping 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


in  litter  night.  Philosophical  speculations  are  sub¬ 
ject  to  the  authority  of  facts,  to  the  authority  of 
logic,  to  the  authority  of  natural  testimony ;  but  they 
never  appeal,  in  establishing  a  principle,  to  the  au¬ 
thority  of  a  supernatural,  divine  testimony. 

Having  now  explained  the  terms  of  our  fundamental 
affirmation,  we  reproduce  it  : 

The  Christian  dogma  of  the  fall  of  man  contains  the 
philosophical  doctrine  which  best  accounts  to  reason  for 
the  facts  of  experience  involved  in  the  problem  of  evil. 

I  presume,  now,  that  some  of  you  are  thinking  that 
I  have  forgotten  my  purpose,  of  treating  this  question 
from  a  philosophical  stand-point.  You  afe  saying 
within  yourselves,  that,  as  faith  is  the  domain  of  au¬ 
thority,  and  philosophy  the  domain  of  liberty,  there  is 
an  incompatibility  between  the  two. 

The  objection,  if  founded  in  fact,  is  weighty,  and  it 
is  important  to  understand  ourselves.  There  is  no 
place  for  the  authority  of  dogmas  in  a  philosophical 
discussion  ;  a  dogma  can  be  proposed  as  a  dogma 
only  in  a  society  which  is  based  on  the  assent  of  its 
members  to  a  common  faith,  that  is,  in  a  Church. 
Here,  therefore,  we  cannot  appeal  to  dogmas  for 
proof.  Should  we,  however,  find  in  the  language  of 
dogmas  a  solution  which  seems  to  us  plausible,  and 
if,  after  carefully  subjecting  it  to  the  ordeal  of  a  phil¬ 
osophical  examination,  that  is,  testing  it  on  its  own 
merits,  and  seeing  how  far  it  accounts  for  and 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


i/3 


explains  facts,  it  should  thus  commend  itself  to  our 
understanding,  I  see  not  why  we  might  not  adopt  it, 
without  for  that  reason  ceasing  to  discuss  The  dogma 
philosophically.  And  this  is  what  I  propose  ot\  the  fllj 
to  do.  I  am  not  going  to  introduce  the  au-  to  as  dogma, 
thoritp  of  a  dogma  into  this  discussion,  but  I  invite 
you  to  a  free  examination  of  a  philosophical  doctrine, 
stating  at  the  same  time  that  this  doctrine  is  actually 
found  among  the  Christian  dogmas. 

And  who  could  object  to  such  a  procedure  ?  Chris¬ 
tians  ?  But  is  it  not  plain  that  if,  by  means  of  a  free 
discussion,  it  can  be  shown  that  there  is  in  the  sphere 
of  dogmas  a  philosophical  doctrine  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  science  ;  if  it  can  be  thus  shown  that 
the  simple  words  of  Jesus  contain  a  solution  of  the 
great  problem  of  humanity,  which  the  wisdom  of 
Greece  and  of  the  Orient  did  not  succeed  in  solving — • 
is  it  not  plain  that  this  would  be  a  strengthening  of  the 
Christian  cause  ?  a  strengthening  which  could  proceed 
from  nothing  other  than  a  free  discussion  of  this  kind  ? 
But  is  it  perhaps  the  freethinkers  who  will  object  to 
the  course  I  propose  ?  Where,  then,  is  their  boast  of 
independence,  if  they  may  not  examine  and  discuss  a 
doctrine  simply  because  it  happens  to  coincide  with  a 
dogma  ?  This  would  be  to  show  themselves  guilty 
of  the  same  prejudice  and  intolerance  which  they  are 
so  generally  accustomed  to  attribute  to  those  who 
hold  to  the  Church. 


174 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


With  these  remarks,  I  hope  to  have  made  my  posi¬ 
tion  understood.  The  historical  origin  of  the  solution 
I  propose,  and  the  fact  that  it  coincides  with  a  Chris¬ 
tian  dogma,  are  circumstances  irrelevant *to,  and  with¬ 
out  bearing  on,  our  discussion.  I  frankly  mention  its 
historical  origin  just  as,  for  example,  in  the  discus¬ 
sion  of  a  doctrine  of  Plato,  I  would  attribute  it  his- 
0  . 

torically  to  him.  We  will,  therefore,  proceed  to  ex¬ 
amine  this  solution  independently,  and  on  its  own 
merits.  And  first,  let  us  inquire  what  was  probably 
the  primitive  state  of  humanity  ? 

III.  Primitive  Condition  of  Humanity. 


“  Every  thing  is  good  on  coming  from  the  hands 
of  the  Creator.”  This  phrase,  from  Rousseau,  shall 

Ail  is  irood.  be  our  Starting-point.  Every  thing  is  good ; 
primitively.  according  to  our  definition  of  the 

good,  it  corresponds  to  its  destination.  *  But  from  the 
fact  that  a  creature  is  good,  does  it  follow  that  it  must 

Though  not  be  Perfect,  in  the  sense  of  a  complete  and 
perfected.  t0l:a]_  realization  of  its  whole  destination  ? 

No  ;  such  a  view  is  false  even  in  regard  to  material 
creation.  In  regard  to  matter,  we  might  indeed  con¬ 
ceive  of  it  as  springing  in  a  complete  form  and  de¬ 
finitive  order  from  the  hands  of  the  Creator,  but  facts 
show  that  this  was  not  the  case.  Matter  appears  first 
True  even  of  under  a  crude  form,  and  is  constantly  trans¬ 
forming  itself  into  higher  forms.  Therevolu- 


inatter. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


tions  of  nature  are  not  definitively  fixed.  Does  the 
earth  in  its  motion  around  the  sun  uniformly  trace  the 
same  circle  ?  No  ;  for  the  sun  itself,  with  its  entire 
train  of  planets,  is  also  in  motion.  Probably  in  the 
whole  period  of  time,  from  the  beginning  of  creation 
to  the  end  of  the  present  order  of  things,  the  earth 
will  not  have  twice  intersected  the  same  line  in  space. 
And  this  revolving  earth  is,  within  itself,  a  theater  of 
endless  transformation.  It  is  not  now  what  it  was  at 
its  origin  ;  and  after  the  lapse  of  centuries  it  will  no 
longer  be  what  it  is  to-day.  In  the  presence  of  this 
general  revolution-  of  all  nature,  as  disclosed  by  mod¬ 
ern  science,  modern  poetry  has  taken  many  a  daring 
flight  in  search  of  an  answer  to  the  question,  Whither 
do  we  tend  ?  *  - 

*  For  example  : 

Seigneur  !  Seigneur  l  ou  va  la  terre  dans  le  ciel  ? 

Le  saurons-nous  jamais  ?  Qui  percera  vos  voiles, 

Noirs  firmaments  semes  de  nuages  d’etoiles  ? 

Victor  Hugo. 

Cependant  la  nuit  marche,  et  sur  1’abime  immense 
Tous  ces  mondes  flottants  gravitent  en  silence, 

Et  nous-memes,  avec  eux  emportes  dans  leurs  cours. 

Vers  un  port  inconnu  nous  avaneons  toujours. 

Souvent,  pendant  la  nuit,  au  souffle  du  zephyre, 

On  sent  la  terre  aussi  flotter  conune  un  navire. 

Soleils  !  mondes  flottants  qui  voguez  avec  nous, 

Dites,  s'il  vous  l’a  dit,  oil  done  allons-nous  tous  ? 

Quel  est  le  port  celeste  ou  son  souffle  nous  guide  ? 

Lamartine. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 76 

And  the  longing  of  poetry  is  also  the  longing  of 
reason.  For  who,  after  contemplating  the  spectacle 
of  the  universal  revolution  of  worlds,  could  suppose 
that  to  the  question,  Whither  go  they  ?  the  proper 
answer  would  be,  Nowhere !  Astronomers  do  not 
think  so  ;  they  would  be  most  happy  to  discover  the 
general  law  and  the  general  direction  of  the  move¬ 
ment  of  the  whole  celestial  system. 

It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  nature  has  a  plan,  and 
that  this  plan  is  not  at  once  realized,  but  that  nature 
is  ever  tending  to  its  realization.  Will  the  time  ever 
come  when  the  plan  of  nature  shall  have  reached  its 
ultimate  accomplishment  Will  the  celestial  globes 
finally  fix  themselves  in  a  uniform  motion,  and 
crystallize  themselves  in  the  immobility  of  perfection  ? 
Perhaps  the  question  transcends  the  sphere  of  human 
thought.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  nature  was 
made,  and  well  made  at  first,  but  that  it  was  not  made 
perfect. 

On  passing  to  the  world  of  spirits  this  order  is 
more  evident  still ;  for  it  is  impossible  to  conceive, 
Spirits  not  even  in  theory,  of  a  primitive  perfection  of 

perfect  at 

once.  the  spiritual  world.  The  destination  of  spirits 
is  the  good,  that  is,  an  order  of  relations  from  which 
happiness  arises.  Their  very  constitution  indicates 
this  end;  and  we  have,  in  this  respect,  the  guarantee 
of  reason  as  applied  to  the  idea  of  creation,  for,  as  we 
have  elsewhere  shown,  love  is  the  sole  motive  which 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


1 77 


we  can  conceive  of  as  having  induced  the  Supreme 
Being  to  the  creation  of  the  universe ;  and  the  good 
of  the  creature  is  the  sole  object  which  we  can  assign 
to  creative  love. 

To  correspond  to  its  destination,  a  spirit  must  nec¬ 
essarily  have  a  free-will  as  its  basis  and  essence,  an 
intelligent  conscience,  revealing  the  law  to  the  will, 
and,  finally,  a  pure  heart,  free  from  any  evil  predisposi¬ 
tion.  A  spirit  so  constituted  is  placed  in  the  presence 
of  law,  in  the  accomplishment  of  which  it  is  to  find  its 
happiness;  but  this  state  is  not  perfection.  To  think 
of  a  spirit  as  originally  perfect  is  a  contradiction.  A 
spirit  is  a  capacity,  a  potency,  and  its  law  is  to  realize 
itself  by  its  own  acts,  to  make  and  perfect  itself.  As 
we  find  in  nature  no  perfection  immediately  realized, 
so  in  the  spiritual  world  is  such  a  perfection  not  only 
not  discoverable,-  it  is  moreover  impossible  ;  for  a 
spirit  which  should  be  perfect  from  its  very  origin, 
and  should  not  have  developed  its  own  moral  charac¬ 
ter,  would  be  no  spirit  at  all-— would  be  an  absurd 
chimera.  The  primitive  state  of  a  spirit,  The  desti 
therefore,  is  that  of  a  being  with  a  free-will,  o!  a  spint' 
innocent  but  not  perfect.  The  earthly  paradise  of 
innocence  is  not  only  to  be  guarded,  it  is  also  to  be 
cultivated  by  the  created  will,  so  as  to  be  transformed 
into  a  celestial  Eden,  the  plan  of  which  is  revealed  to 
the  conscience  of  the  free  being  as  the  true  law  of  its 
destiny.  The  golden  age  is  the  gilded  dream  of  inno- 


178 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


cence,  contemplating  under  a  beautiful  symbolism  the 
destiny  set  before  it  by  eternal  love. 

The  perfection  of  a  spirit  must  be  the  product  of  its 
own  liberty  ;  to  ask  it  of  the  Creator,  is  to  ask  him 
to  not  create  free  beings.  But  can  this  liberty  itself, 
which  is  to  conduct  a  spirit  to  its  perfection,  be  per¬ 
fect  at  first  and  at  once?  No.  Liberty  in  its  first 
a  lower  and  stage  can  only  be  conceived  of  as  an  imper- 

higher  stage 

of  liberty.  feet  liberty.  It  must  pass,  by  its  own  action, 
from  an  inferior  to  a  superior  stage.  Let  us  give 
special  attention  to  this  thought. 

The  word  liberty  has  two  senses.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  the  faculty  of  choosing,  and  includes 
necessarily* the  possibility  of  evil.  In  another  sense, 
we  call  free  that  being  who  does  all  that  he  wishes. 
Note  carefully  these  two  ideas  ;  they  are  very  clearly 
distinct.  That  liberty  which  consists  in  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  choosing  between  alternatives  is  a  less  high 
form  of  liberty  than  that  of’  a  will  which  does  what¬ 
ever  it  chooses,  without  being  shut  up  to  a  choice. 
In  the  first  sense,  liberty  supposes  a  law.  A  finite 
power  (we  pass  over  the  mystery  of  the  liberty  of  the 
Infinite  One)  that  should  not  be  under  a  law  which 
it  could  obey  or  violate,  is  inconceivable  as  a  moral 
power  ;  such  a  conception  is  only  that  of  an  intangi¬ 
ble  caprice,  a  blind  farce,  yielding  to  impulses  from 
without,  and  having  within  itself  no  principle  of  self- 
determination.  There  must  be  a  law,  a  command,  to 


179 


The  Problem  of  EviL 

awaken  the  will,  and  to  reveal  to  it  its  liberty  of 
choice.  The  second  form  of  liberty  supposes  the 
absence  of  all  law.  These  two  notions  of 

The  two  sta* 

liberty  seem  contradictory.  They  are  not  so, 
however :  they  find  their  harmony  in  the  mys-  " heart;’ 
tery  of  the  heart.  The  mystery  of  the  heart  has  already 
been  discussed,  but  we  must  here  revert  to  the  subject. 

In  the  phenomena  of  habit,  repeated  volitions  trans¬ 
form  themselves  into  a  nature.  After  having  volun¬ 
tarily  ner formed  an  act  a  number  oi  times  this  act 
becomes  a  habit,  and  habit  begets  a  power,  a  propen¬ 
sion  ;  it  crystallizes  itself  in  our  heart,  so  to  speak, 
and  becomes  a  love,  in  the  most  general  sense  of  the 
word.  Now  what  is  the  working  of  love?  It  wills 
what  it  loves  ;  and  when  the  soul  works  by  love,  it 
does  all  that  it  wills,  inasmuch  as  it  wills  nothing  out¬ 
side  of  its  love.  For  him  who  loves  the  good,  there¬ 
fore,  the  law  requiring  the  good  disappears  as  law,  in 
that  it  dissolves  itself  in  love,  and  the  command  of 
the  conscience  assumes  the  form  of  an  impulse  of  the 
heart.  The  liberty  of  choosing  between  good  and 
evil  remains  thenceforth  simply  what  we  call  in 
philosophy  a  metaphysical  possibility ;  but  the  choos¬ 
ing  of  evil  has  become  morally  impossible.  To  the 
“Thou  shalt  not”  of  the  conscience,  corresponds  the 
non  possumus  of  the  heart.  Beginning  in  the  simple 
liberty  of  choice,  the  will  may  thus,  by  the  simple 
fact  of  choosing,  make  a  decision  which  will  become 


i8o 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


definitive,  and  the  struggle  will  cease  in  triumph. 
The  will  may,  by  its  own  action,  pass  from  the  in¬ 
ferior  forrg  of  liberty  (the  power  of  choice)  to  the 
higher  form  of  liberty,  (the  state  of  a  soul  which  does 
all  that  it  wills.) 

We  are  able  now  to  conceive  of  the  plan  which 
humanity,  manifesting  itself  in  individual  existences, 
but  maintaining  itself  in  harmony  and  unity  by  the 
common  purpose  of  executing  the  divine  plan,  was 
destined  to  realize.  Beginning  in  the  mere  possi- 
The  normal  bility  of  evil,  that  is  to  say,  in  a  state  of  inno- 

development 

of  virtue,  cence,  and,  by  the  effort  of  free-will  in  re¬ 
sistance  to  evil,  annihilating  even  the  possibility  of 
evil,  and  attaining  to  a  state  of  perfection,  or  holiness, 
characterized  by  the  fact  that  liberty  has  definitively 
given  itself  over  to  the  good  :  such  would  be  the 
normal  development  of  virtue.  If  the  will  does,  at 
each  moment,  what  it  ought  to  do,  it  obtains  finally  a 

in  what  sense  definitive  triumph  over  the  possibility  of  evil, 
sm  is  impos-  j7y[\  pas  not  appeared ;  it  has  become  im- 

ture  spirit,  possible  without  ever  having  been  destroyed, 
for  it  has  never  been  realized. 

All  this  is  difficult  to  understand,  because,  involved 
as  we  are  in  a  world  where  evil  weighs  upon  us,  it  re¬ 
quires  a  vigorous  effort  to  so  far  free  ourselves  from 
the  burden  of  a  bitter  experience  as  to  conceive  of 
this  passage  from  primitive  liberty  to  perfect  liberty, 
without  the  intervention  of  disorder.  However,  even 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 8  r 


in  our  actual  experience  there  are  some  analogies 
which  will  aid  us  to  appreciate  this  conception.  The 
two  senses  of  the  word  liberty  are  familiar  to  us,  as 
may  be  readily  illustrated.  Whom,  for  example,  do 
we  esteem  as  more  free  ?  that  young  merchant  who, 
for  the  first  time  entering  upon  business,  debates 
within  himself  whether  he  had  better  impose  on  his 
customers  or  engage  in  honest  dealing,  and  who,  in 
this  simple  hesitation  of  choice,  has  a  conscious¬ 
ness  of  his  liberty  ?  or,  is  it  not  rather  this  same 
merchant,  who,  after  having  grown  gray  in  honorable 
trade,  and  felt  himself  bound  by  the  reiterated  action 
of  his  will  to  the  law  of  integrity,  feels  himself  now 
henceforth  incapable  of  deceiving,  and  has  thus  by 
the  free  exercise  of  volition  made  himself  the  servant 
of  probity  ?  Surely  we  esteem  as  in  a  higher  sense 
free,  not  he  who  doubtfully  balances  between  good 
and  evil,  but  he  who,  by  a  reiterated  and  definitive 
choice  of  the  good,  has  raised  himself  beyond  the 
temptation  of  evil.  Obedience  in  the  face  of  con¬ 
quered  temptation  is  the  act  of  nascent  liberty  choos¬ 
ing  the  good  ;  and  when  temptation  is  definitely 
overcome  by  a  love  of  the  good,  liberty  becomes  per¬ 
fect  in  a  full,  joyous,  and  unhesitating  obedience. 
Thus,  even  in  the  midst  of  our  present  darkness,  we 
meet  some  luminous  traits  which  help  us  to  under¬ 
stand  the  transition  from  primitive  to  perfect  liberty, 
without  the  intervention  of  evil.  ^ 


182 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


But  has  this  programme  of  spiritual  development 
been  fully  carried  out  anywhere  ?  Lift  your  eyes  to 
the  heavens  ;  I  speak  of  the  heavens  of  astronomers. 
Are  there  The  universe  is  immense  ;  no  one  believes, 

sinless 

worlds  ?  I  presume,  that  the  whole  family  of  God  is 
confined  to  our  earth — that  the  Eternal  Shepherd  of 
souls  has,  under  his  crook,  only  our  little  flock.  We 
sometimes  smile  at  our  ancestors  for  having  made  of 
humanity  the  center  of  the  universe.  But  it  was  an 
incident  of  ignorance  rather  than  a  sin  of  pride  ;  it  was 
at  an  epoch  when  one  could  believe  that  the  sun  was 
only  a  great  torch,  and  the  stars  but  lamps  attached  fo 
the  solid  vault  of  the  sky.  But  what  shall  we  say  of 
certain  learned  men  of  our  day,  who,  now  that  science 
has  opened  the  immeasurable  depths  of  space  and 
peopled  them  with  worlds,  presume  still  to  think  and 
say  that  there  is  in  the  whole  universe  no  intelligence 
superior  to  that  of  man  ?  Look  then  up  to  the  skies, 
fix  your  eye  on  whatever  star  you  please — perhaps 
that  one  which,  shining  out  suddenly  between  the 
clouds,  awakens  with  its  light  a  ray  of  hope  in  your 
heart,  and  ask  yourself:  Is  there  not,  then,  somewhere 
a  happy  world  ?  Is  there  not  upon  some  one  of  those 

globes  which  gem  the  sky  a  family  of  intelligent  and 

' 

free  beings,  who  have  used  their  liberty  only  in  con¬ 
firming  themselves  in  the  good,  and  who,  growing 
continually  in  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  grow,  at 
the  same  time,  in  happiness,  and  wonder  each  day 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  183 

anew  at  the  increasing  depths  of  bliss  which  the  heart 
can  take  in  ?  Is  there  not  some  family  of  free  spirits, 
who,  when  presenting  themselves  before  God,  can 
commence  their  worship  without  the  confession  of 
original  sin,  and  can  chant  the  hymn  of  pure  thank¬ 
fulness  and  love  to  Him  from  whom  all  proceeds,  and 
by  whom  all  exists,  and  who  has  given  them  the  un¬ 
speakable  gift  of  life,  and  the  glorious  privilege  of  that 
liberty  by  which  they  have  realized  the  happiness 
for  which  his  eternal  love  destined  them  ?  If  I  should 
affirm  positively  that  such  a  world  does  exist,  I  would 
provoke  your  smile.  But  if  you  should  affirm  that 
such  a  world  does  not  exist,  I  should  indulge  in  a 
smile,  in  my  turn.  At  all  events,  that  happy  star  is 
not  our  planet ;  that  family  of  sinless  creatures  is  not 
the  human  race.  Let  us  return  to  humanity. 

IV.  Origin  of  the  Present  Condition  of 

Humanity. 

What  was  the  origin  of  evil,  according  to  the  solu¬ 
tion  which  I  indicate  ?  The  end  proposed  to  hu¬ 
manity  was  to  realize  the  harmony  and  happiness 
of  a  spiritual  community.  But  humanity  in  its  very 
source  and  origin  revolts  against  its  law ;  so  we 
assume.  The  created  will  desires  to  place  itself,  as 
regards  the  law,  in  a  state  of  complete  independence  ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  wishes  to  become  its  own  law.  What 
employment,  now,  will  it  make  of  this  independence  ? 


1 34 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Its  acts,  whatever  they  may  be,  will  be  acts  of  dis¬ 
order,  since  they  will  be  acts  accomplished  in  contra¬ 
vention  of  the  law  of  primitive  and  essential  order. 
Now,  this  order  being  the  submission  of  matter  to 
spirit,  and  the  submission  of  spirits  to  the  law  of 
charity,  the  disorder  will  manifest  itself  in  the  domina¬ 
tion  of  spirit  by  matter,  and  in  a  spirit  of  self-seeking 
and  of  domination  over  others,  which  will  give  rise, 
sensuality  as  society  develops  itself,  to  endless  strife 
twofol'mstf  instead  of  harmony.  Fleshly-mindedness 
sm-  and  pride  will  be  the  two  principal  forms  of 

the  revolt. 

The  human  heart  being  corrupted,  liberty  will  be 
compromised.  A  developed  evil  nature,  bom  primi¬ 
tively  of  the  will,  will  paralyze  its  exercise.  Domi¬ 
nated  by  his  propensions,  man  will  feel  himself  the 
slave  of  his  vices,  while  yet  preserving  in  remorse, 
the  witness  of  his  lost  liberty. 

From  the  perversion  of  the  heart  and  from  the  en- 
feeblement  of  the  will,  error  will  spring ;  and  error, 
beclouding  the  natural  light,  will  deform  the  con¬ 
science. 

Suffering  will  then  appear  as  a  punishment  in  the 
sphere  of  justice,  and  as  a  remedy  in  the  sphere  of 
goodness  ;  and  entire  humanity  havings  in  its  source, 
participated  in  the  primitive  revolt,  every  man  will, 
by  the  simple  fact  of  his  sharing  in  human  nature, 
be  subjected  to  the  consequences  of  this  revolt. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


185 


As  soon  as  these  views  are  admitted,  the  indi¬ 
vidualistic  solution,  which  we  have  had  to  reject  as 
incomplete,  becomes  so  supplemented,  as  to  llie  indivi(1_ 
cover  the  whole  ground.  For  what,  in  fact,  uahstlc  so' 
was  the  defectiveness  of  this  solution  ?  It  i|lementecL 
did  not  account  for  that  large  portion  of  evil  whose 
origin  cannot  be  found  in  the  merely  individual  action 
of  historic  volitions.  But  this  phase  of  evil  is  now 
explained.  At  the  origin  of  our  race,  and  before  the 
commencement  of  history,  an  act  of  humanity  cor¬ 
rupted  the  heart  of  the  race  ;  it  is  humanity  itself, 
that,  by  its  own  revolt,  has  precipitated  itself  into 
error  and  suffering.  The  all-prevalence  of  sin  is  ex¬ 
plained  by  the  existence  of  temptations  inherent  in 
the  human  heart,  and  by  the  enfeeblement  of  the  will 
produced  by  the  evil  inclination  of  the  heart.  We 
know  well  enough  the  all-prevalence  of  suffering. 
Great  mysteries  still  hover  about  the  share  of  suffer¬ 
ing  and  temptation  which  falls  to  the  lot  of  individu¬ 
als;*  but  we  have  made  important  steps  in  the  di- 

*  It  has  been  attempted  to  account  for  our  individual  lots  by  sup¬ 
posing  that  we  suffer  here  the  consequences  of  our  individual  acts  in 
a  previous  existence.  Cicero  mentions  this  doctrine  as  in  his  day 
already  ancient.  It  has  several  times  been  reproduced  in  our  day. 
I  cannot  discuss  here  a  theory  of  such  importance.  It  concedes  the 
Universality  of  suffering  and  sin,  and  maintains  intact  the  existence  of 
God  and  the  authority  of  conscience.  But  in  explaining  our  present 
state  by  a  primitive  individualism,  it  does  not  account  for  the  actual 
solidarity  of  the  race. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 86 

rection  of  light,  in  that  we  have  found  an  origin  for 
that  portion  of  suffering,  and  that  germ  of  sin*,  which 
observation  proves  to  exist  in  every  man,  by  virtue  of 
his  being  a  man,  and  independently  of  his  personal  acts. 

Evil  is  an  essential  part  of  our  world,  such  as  it  is, 

‘  such  as  the  revolt  of  the  creature  has  made  it ;  but 

the  evil  is,  in  itself,  accidental.  It  is,  but  it  ought  not 
to  be.  Its  possibility  is  the  condition  of  liberty;  but 
its  realization  is  directly  contrary  to  the  plan  of  the 
universe,  that  is,  to  the  divine  will.  Thus  the  cloud 
which  evil  interposes  between  God  and  us  vanishes 
away,  and  the  glory  of  the  Creator  shines  forth  in 
immaculate  purity.  Henceforth,  when  the  poet  shall 
ask  why  the  Master  created  evil  so  great,  we  will 

call  him  in  question,  and  reply  that  God  did  not 

create  evil  at  all. 

md  the  fail  The  idea  °f  a  primitive  fall  enables  us  to 
Nation  °to  anticipate  the  possibility  that  the  conse- 
natm-e  ~t  quences  of  the  revolt  of  the  created  spirit 
may  have  disturbed  its  relations  with  nature,  and  that 
nature  may  not  be  for  us,  now,  that  which  the  plan 
of  the  Creator  designed  it  to  be.  This,  it  is  true,  is 
but  a  single  door  opened  upon  the  darkness ;  still,  it 
is  an  open  door,  whereas  the  individualistic  solution 
offers  in  this  direction  but  a  closed  and  impenetrable 
wall.  It  is  certain  in  fact  that  the  historical  action 
of  individual  wills  can  offer  no  possible  shadow  of  a 
solution  for  this  phase  of  our  problem. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


1 87 


To  charge  the  creature  with  the  whole  origin  of 
evil  is  the  only  means  of  not  charging  it  upon  God  ; 
for,  what  we  call  the  nature  of  things  is  Tlie  whole 

blame  must 

either  God  or  it  is  nothing.  And  is  it  a  hu-  rest  on  man. 
miliation  for  the  creature  to  bear  the  whole  burden 
of  evil  ?  or  is  it  rather  a  glorification  !  It  is  a  glory 
shining  forth  in  humiliation  ;  it  is  a  humiliation  re¬ 
vealing  a  primitive  glory.  In  this  respect  our  solu¬ 
tion  comes  in  contact  with  two  contrary  sentiments  : 
on  the  one  hand,  with  that  pride  which  rejects  so 
high  a  responsibility ;  and  on  the  other,  with  a  morbid 
humility  which  shrinks  from  the  idea  of  so  great  a 
power.  The  solution  is  humiliating  and  exalting  at 
the  same  time  ;  it  brings  into  relief  that  two-fold 
character  of  human  nature  which  Pascal  has  traced 
in  immortal  words  :  its  greatness  and  its  misery. 

God  did  not  create  evil.  Between  the  Creator 

and  the  world,  as  it  now  is,  there  is  interposed  a  sad 

creation  of  the  creature.  This  doctrine  is  of  great 

shaping  influence  on  the  whole  drift  of  our  thinking. 

The  passing  immediately  from  the  world,  such  as  it  is, 

to  the  perfect  God,  is  the  source  of  the  gravest  errors 

in  philosophy,  as  well  as  of  many  other  misconceptions 

of  society  at  large.  It  is  by  this  leaping  from  Afaise meth¬ 
od  of  philos- 

this  imperfect  world  to  the  perfect  Creator  ophy. 
that  philosophy  is  led  to  the  negation  of  evil,  starting 
out,  as  it  does,  with  this  incontestable  axiom,  that 
whatever  proceeds  from  God  is  good.  It  is  on  the 


1 88 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


same  erroneous  method  that  are  based  many  pre¬ 
sumptuous  and,  sometimes,  evil-working  vindications 
of  Divine  Providence.  For  example,  if  you  impute  to 

inconsider-  ^ie  divine  will,  not  the  essential  and  constitu- 
atevmdica-  ent  }aws  0f  human  society,  which  are  truly 

tions  of  J  J 

Providence.  a  part  0f  the  plan  of  creation,  but  our  society 
as  it  is — if  you  attempt  to  repress  the  complaints  of 
those  who  suffer  from  real  social  abuses  by  urging 
them  to  bow  under  the  hand  of  Providence — you  vyPll 
seek  in  vain  to  clothe  the  evil  with  a  divine  sanction ; 
you  will  not  obtain  submission  ;  you  will  only  add  to 
revolt  against  society,  revolt  against  God.  It  is  by 
assuming  that  certain  general  and  permanent  facts, 
which  do  not  depend  on  individual  wills,  form  a  part 
of  the  original  divine  plan,  that  men  have  been  led  to 
apologize  for  war,  representing  it,  not  as  the  bloody 
sequel  of  sin,  but  as  one  of  the  primitive  and,  therefore, 
good  elements  of  the  universe. 

In  another  sphere  of  thought,  if  you  do  not  admit, 
despite  of  all  the  mysteries  that  surround  this  sub¬ 
ject,  the  possibility  that  a  perturbation  has  been 
introduced  into  nature,  your  apologies  for  Providence 
will  frequently  conflict  with  the  science  of  the  natural- 
-  ist,  and  sometimes  even  be  nonplused  by  the  simple 
questions  of  childhood. 

The  world  in  all  its  constituent  elements  is  the 
work  of  God  ;  and,  in  humanity,  all  that  normally 
constitutes  our  nature  is  good  in  itself.  The  heart. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


189 


as  the  power  of  loving,  is  good;  reason,  as  the  power 
of  comprehending,  is  good  ;  and  volition,  as  Humanity 

per  se  is 

the  power  ot  acting,  is  more  than  a  good,  it  good,  not- 
Ls  the  basis  and  condition  of  all  good.  But  the  fail, 
the  world,  as  it  is,  is  a  disordered  world  ;  and  between 
the  world,  as  it  is,  and  God,  there  lies  the  fall  of  hu¬ 
manity,  which  has  created  an  evil  potency  that  weighs 
heavily  upon  our  destinies.  A  fact  that  is  general, 
and  even  universal  may  be  evil,  for  it  may  be  the 
consequence  of  the  primitive  revolt  of  humanity 
against  its  law. 

Note  well  the  practical  importance  of  this  thought. 
If  you  ignore  the  fact  that  the  world  is  in  disorder, 
you  may  aspire  to  the  good  in  obedience  to  the 
natural  instinct  of  your  heart ;  but  on  coming  in  con¬ 
flict  with  real  life  your  heart  will  be  bitterly  disap¬ 
pointed.  If  you  mingle  in  the  life  of  society  with  the 
thought  that  human  nature  is  good,  you  will  very  soon 
feel  the  approaches  of  dejection,  and  a  misanthropic 
gloom  will  most  likely  take  possession  of  your  soul. 
But  if,  on  the  contrary,  you  act  on  the  conviction  that 
human  nature  is  fallen,  you  will  meet  without  surprise 
with  sin,  disorder  and  suffering  ;  and  you  will  combat 
them,  as  a  soldier  of  the  good,  with  a  firm  confidence 
in  the  final  triumph  of  your  cause. 

I  will  sum  up  these  considerations  at  the  same  time 
that  I  answer  an  erroneous  notion  that  is  quite  preva¬ 
lent  in  our  day.  You  often  hear  said  that  the  doc- 


1Q0  The  Problem  of  Evil 

trine  of  the  fall  is  the  religious  and  ancient  doctrine ; 
a  false  do-  whereas,  the  doctrine  of  progress  is  the  new 

tion  of  prog¬ 
ress.  and  philosophical  doctrine,  and  that  we  are 

forced  to  make  our  choice  between  these  two  irrecon¬ 
cilable  conceptions.  Progress,  it  is  said,  is  the  law 
of  the  intellectual  world,  as  gravitation  is  the  law  of 
matter.  Now,  the  law  of  progress  excludes  the  idea 
of  a  fall ;  for  a  fall  of  humanity  would  be  the  very 
contrary  of  progress.  This  manner  of  reasoning  rests 
on  a  radical  confusion  of  ideas  in  regard  to  the  word 
law.  A  physical  law  being,  as  we  have  said,  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  constant  facts  in  a  sphere  where  liberty 
does  not  exist,  every  such  law  excludes  its  contrary ; 
and  the  knowledge  of  the  true  law  justifies  the  denial 
of  every  fact  which  contradicts  it,  just  as  a  certain 
knowledge  of  a  fact  justifies  the  denial  of  the  pre¬ 
tended  law  which  would  deny  that  fact.  But  the 
moral  law,  being  proposed  to  free  beings,  may  be 
obeyed  or  violated  according  to  the  decisions  of 
liberty.  The  idea  of  progress  is  represented  as  con¬ 
flicting  with  the  idea  of  the  fall.  As  well  might  we 
say  that  the  fact  that  Nero  grew  worse  as  he  grew 
older  is  a  refutation  of  the  idea  of  progress  ;  for  if 
progress  in  humanity  is  a  lawT  which  is  always  realized 
with  the  strictness  of  physical  laws,  it  would  follow 
that  what  is  true  of  humanity  must  be  true  of  each 
of  its  members :  if  humanity  could  not  fall,  Nero  could 
not  grow  worse. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


191 


But  let  us  look  at  the  matter  in  a  more  general 
aspect.  Does  the  idea  of  progress  render  superfluous 
our  solution  ?  Progress,  it  is  thought  by  some,  is  in¬ 
consistent  with  the  existence  of  evil,  because  prog¬ 
ress,  a  primitive  law  of.  creation,  can  realize  itself  in 
the  exclusively  good.  True  progress  tends  from  im¬ 
perfection  to  perfection,  but  imperfection  is  not  evil. 
If  there  exist  disorder  and  evil,  it  must  be  because 
volitions  have  gone  astray.  If  progress  in  our  world 
appears  under  the  form  of  a  restoration  from  evil, 
that  fact  itself  is  a  striking  proof  of  the  doctrine  oi  the 
fall.  To  admit  that  progress  consists  in  overcoming 
evil,  and  that  it  is  a  fundamental  law  of  the  universe, 
is  to  admit  that  evil,  the  condition  of  progress,  is  a 
primitive  and  necessary  element  of  things ;  and  to 
make  evil  a  primitive  and  necessary  element  of 
things  is,  we  repeat  it,  to  proclaim  that  it  is  good, 
or,  in  other  words,  to  deny  its  existence.  There  is,  in 
fact,  no  need  of  choosing  between  these  two  ideas, 
progress  and  a  fall ;  they  are  both  true  ;  they  are 
both  necessary  to  account  for  the  present  state  of  hu¬ 
manity.  Man  started  out  in  a  state  of  innocence  in 
which  a  spiritual  heaven  was  present  to  his  mind  as 
the  goal  at  which  he  should  aim,  as  the  gift  of  the 
Creator  which  he  was  to  appropriate  by  the  use  of  his 
own  liberty.  But  heaven  became  vailed  from  the  eye 
of  his  conscience  by  the  consequences  of  the  fall  ; 
and,  nevertheless,  it  remains  still  the  object  of  his 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


192 

aspirations— the  ideal  after  which  every  soul  is,  in 
some  degree,  athirst. 

In  a  normal  state  of  things,  progress  would  be  the 
rising  from  imperfection  to  perfection,  or  from  a 

The  true  idea  lesser  perfection  to  an  ever  greater ;  in  the 
ot  progress.  present  abnormal  state  of  things,  as  intro¬ 
duced  by  the  fall,  progress  is  the  rising  out  of,  and 
triumphing  over,  evil,  and  the  ever  fuller  appropriation 
of  the  good. 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


293 


LECTURE  V. 

THE  PROOF, 

The  proof— -such  is  the.  title  of  our  present  lecture. 
It  will  consist  of  three  parts.  I  will  first  explain  the 
nature  of  the  proof  which  l  design  to  propose ;  I  will 
then  offer  my  arguments ;  finally,  I  will  try  to  solve 
the  chief  difficulties  which  the  subject  presents.  The 
order  of  our  thoughts  will,  therefore,  be :  Genera! 

heads  of  th«s 

Nature  of  the  Proof,  Presentation  of  the  fifth  i-ecture. 
Proof,  and  Solution  of  Difficulties. 


I.  Nature  of  the  Proof. 

Let  us  first  come  to  an  understanding  as  Process  of  & 

scientific 

to  the  nature  of  a  scientific  demonstration  ;  fie;  nous  tra- 
and  to  this  purpose  l  will  draw  an  analogy,  t!-tte<L1U& 
What  is  the  process  by  which  the  science  of  celes¬ 
tial  motion  has  come  to  its  present  stage  ?  The  move¬ 
ments  of  the  heavens  have  attracted  man’s  attention 
in  all  ages,  and  the  science  which  seeks  to  account 
for  them  is  one  of  the  most  ancient  For  a  long  time 
a  system  of  astronomy  prevailed  which  is  known  as 
the  Ptolemaic.  It  explained  celestial  phenomena  by 
assuming  that  the  earth  is  motionless,  and  that  the 

heavenly  bodies  revolve  around  it  in  circles  to  tffhich 

13 


194 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


various  movements  were  assigned,  according  to  the 
distances  of  the  lines  traversed  by  these  movements, 
and  according  to  the  velocity  itself  of  these  move¬ 
ments.  Copernicus,  a  Polish  priest,  came  to  think 
that  this  solution  of  the  problem  was  too  complicated 
to  be  true,  and  he  set  himself  about  searching  for  a 
simpler  one.  During  his  researches  he  found,  in 
certain  ancient  books,  the  notion,  once  sustained  by 
Pythagorean  sages,  that  the  sun  remains  motionless, 
and  that  the  earth  revolves  around  it  in  space.  Of 
course,  he  did  not  find  in  these  books  his  theory  in 
that  completed  form  in  which  he  afterward  proposed 
it  to  the  world  ;  he  found  simply  Its  germ.  Thus,  he 
did  not,  as  is  generally  supposed,  discover  the  true 
system  of  the  world  by  the  simple  inspiration  of  his 
genius.  He  found  aids  in  the  past ;  he  found  hints 
toward  it  in  Cicero  and  Plutarch ;  and  we  have  yet 
extant  from  his  own  hand  the  testimony  that  he  hon¬ 
orably  acknowledged  his  indebtedness.*  The  truth 
which  he  brought  to  light,  though  new  in  science, 

*  In  a  letter  to  Pope  Paul  IIP,  which  serves  as  preface  to  his  work 
De  Revolutionibus  Orbium  Ccelestium ,  Copernicus  explains  himself 
thus  :  “  After  having  reflected  a  long  while  on  the  uncertainty  of  the 
mathematical  traditions  relative  to  the  movements  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  I  began  to  be  chagrined  that  philosophers  who  scrutinize  so 
carefully  the  most  insignificant  things  in  the  universe  had  not  been 
able  to  fall  upon  a  more  certain  explanation  of  the  movements  of  the 
mechanism  of  a  world  which  was  created  for  us  by  the  most  perfect 
and  systematic  of  workmen,  ( ab  optimo  et  regularissimo  omnium 
opifice f*)  For  this  reason  I  undertook  to  reread  all  the  works  of 


The  Problem  of  Evil*  195 

was  yet  ancient  in  tradition*— in  a  tradition  which  had 
almost  disappeared. 

When  the  discovery  of  Copernicus  was  made  public 
it  excited  lively  opposition.  Its  adversaries  were 
numerous.  They  were,  on  the  one  hand,  the  learned 
defenders  of  the  old  idea,  who  could  not  so  readily 
discard  the  results  of  all  the  labor  they  had  given 
themselves  to  understand  and  further  perfect  the 
system  generally  admitted.  On  the  other,  they  were 
the  men  of  common  sense,  that  superficial  common 
sense  which  judges  things  by  first  appearances.  And, 
in  fact,  had  we  of  this  generation  not  been  taught 
from  our  earliest  school-days  that  it  is  the  earth  that 
daily  revolves,  we  also  would  not  be  readily  convinced 
of  the  fact.  We  can,  therefore,  easily  understand  the 
popular  applause  obtained  by  an  aged  doctor  of  the 
Sorbonne  while  ridiculing  this  day-dreaming  Coper¬ 
nicus,  who,  as  he  said,  taught  that  people  did  not  carry 
about  their  candles  to  light  their  houses,  but  that  they 
carried  about  their  houses  to  be  lighted  by  the  candles. 

And  to  all  these  obstacles  which  opposed  the  propa¬ 
gation  of  the  new  theory,  there  was  added  also  one 

philosophers  to  which  I  could  have  access,  in  order  to  see  whether 
some  of  them,  perhaps,  had  not  thought  that  the  movements  of  the 
spheres  are  other  than  those  assigned  to  them  by  our  professors  of 
mathematics.  I  discovered,  first,  in  Cicero,  that  Nicetas  had  believed 
that  it  is  the  earth  which  moves.  I  found  subsequently,  from  Plu¬ 
tarch,  that  some  others  had  had  the  same  opinion.  .  .  .  Upon  this  I 
began,  myself  also,  to  reflect  on  the  mobility  of  the  earth.” 


1 9 6  The  Problem  of  Evil 

of  the  most  memorable  pieces  of  folly  in  the  whole 
history  of  Catholicism.  The  theologians  of  the  Index 
condemned  the  new  system.  This  fact  had  its  im¬ 
portance  ;  though  it  had  far  less  of  importance  than 
anti-religious  passion  has  attributed  to  it.  The  com¬ 
mon  opinion  is,  that,  when  Copernicus  published  his 
discovery,  science  came  to  his  defense  while  theology 
undertook  his  ruin.  This  is  the  romance  of  the 
matter,  but  not  its  history.  As  confirmation  of  this 
hear  these  words,  which  date  from  the  second  half  of 
the  seventeenth  century:  “No  decree  of  Rome  as 
to  the  movement  of  the  earth  will  prove  that  the  earth 
remains  in  repose  ;  and  if  we  only  had  constant  ob¬ 
servations  to  prove  that  it  is  it  that  revolves ,  all  the 
men  in  the  world  would  not  hinder  it  from  revolving, 
nor  hinder  themselves  from  revolving  with  it.”  Cer¬ 
tainly  this  independent  spirit  was  little  daunted  by 
the  Roman  Index ;  and  he  was,  confessedly,  an  incom¬ 
parable  genius  both  in  the  physical  sciences  and  in 
the  mathematics  :  it  was  Pascal  At  the  time  when 
Pascal  wrote,  therefore,  science  was  still  hesitating  in 
regard  to  the  Copernican  system;*  even  the  most 

*  **  Pascal  ‘always  hesitated  to  venture  his  opinion  on  the  system 
of  Copernicus,  not  because  he  feared  the  Inquisition,  as  Condorcet 
hastily  says,  but  because  his  conviction  was  not  yet  formed.” — Note 
of  Fattger-e ,  in  his  edition  of  Pascal. 

“  Pascal  seems  positively  to  admit  (in  the  passage  referred  to  by 
the  note  of  Faugere)  that  it  is  the  heavens  that  revolve  about  the 
earth,” — Note  of  Havet ,  in  his  edition  of  Pascal. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


197 


free  and  enlightened  minds  were  still  doubting  whether 
the  number  of  constantly  verified  facts  was  sufficient 
to  confirm  the  theory  of  the  revolution  of  the  earth. 
It  is  only  since  the  time  of  Newton  that  Copernicus 
has  definitively  triumphed.  Now  the  discovery  of 
Copernicus  was  published  in  1543,  and  the  great  work 
of  Newton  dates  from  1687.  It  required,  therefore, 
one  hundred  and  forty-four  years  of  laborious  observa¬ 
tion  and  calculation,  and  also  the  aid  of  the  discoveries 
of  two  geniuses  of  the  first  order,  Kepler  and  Newton, 
to  enable  the  doctrine  of  Copernicus  to  take  place 
among  the  uncontested  theories  of  science. 

And  why  all  this  time?  To  verify  by  calculation 
the  consequences  of  the  new  doctrine,  to  compare 
these  consequences  with  an  ever-increasing  mass  of 
facts,  and  thus  to  overcome  by  demonstration  of  the 
truth  both  the  prejudice  which  clung  to  the  ancient 
ideas,  the  imprudent  decisions  of  the  Catholic  Church, 
and,  above  all,  the  first  impressions  of  a  superficial 
common  sense.  And  what  kept  up  the  courage  of 
the  partisans  of  Copernicus  in  all  this  memorable 
contest  ?  Study  its  history  in  the  original  texts,  and 
you  will  see  that  what  sustained  their  confidence  was 
a  profound  faith  in  the  wisdom  of  the  Architect  of 
the  universe,  a  serious  conviction  that  as  God,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  expression  of  Copernicus,  is  the  best  of 
workmen,  so  are  his  ways  simple  ones.  The  three  great 
founders  of  modern  Astronomy,  Copernicus,  Kepler, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


198 

and  Newton,  were  each  of  them,  in  the  highest  ac¬ 
ceptation  of  the  term,  adorers  of  God, — a  fact  forming 
one  of  the  most  glorious  pages  of  the  history  of 
science,  a  page  which  many  would  gladly  forget,  but 
which  no  hostile  power  can  efface. 

We  have  thus  shown,  by  means  of  a  notable  illus¬ 
tration,  the  nature  of  a  scientific  proof ;  let  us  now 
return  to  our  special  subject. 

We  are  in  the  presence  of  a  great  question.  We 
Application  wish  to  explain,  not  the  motion  of  the  heav- 

of  the  illus¬ 
tration.  enly  bodies,  but  this  fatal  movement  of  the 

human  soul  which  carries  it  toward  evil.  We  have 
examined  the  solution  most  prevalent  in  the  philoso¬ 
phy  of  the  day,  the  individualistic,  and  found  it  insuffi¬ 
cient  to  account  for  all  the  facts.  We  have  sought 
tor  another.  Where  did  we  find  it  ?  fdke  Coperni¬ 
cus,  in  an  ancient  book  ;  but  in  a  book  which  is  pecul¬ 
iar  in  this,  that  it  has  not  ceased  to  be  read,  that  it 
is,  in  fact,  continually  read  more  and  more  in  every 
region  of  the  globe,  and  that  it  has  passed  into  a  liv¬ 
ing  tradition,  permeating  and  modifying  the  highest 
civilization  of  the  race.  This  solution  is,  as  I  think, 
the  solution  of  the  future.  Ancient  in  tradition,  and 
in  that  science  which  expresses  and  seeks  to  justify 
the  tradition,  it  is  yet  new  in  philosophy,  properly  so- 
called.  Now,  if  it  should  require  as  much  as  one 
hundred  and  forty-four  years  fully  to  demonstrate 

its  truth,  would  there  be  any  reason  for  astonishment? 

-  «. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


199 


Would  it  be  surprising  if  it  required  as  many  years 
to  explain  scientifically  the  state  of  the  human  soul 
as  it  did  to  explain  the  march  of  the  stars  ?  To  study 
the  proposed  solution  in  its  consequences,  and  in  its 
bearing  on  the  best  observed  facts,  may  be  a  tedious 
labor  ;  but  it  is  a  labor  in  which  we  all  may  take  part. 
For,  after  all,  it  is  the  common  sense  of  mankind 
which  is  to  pronounce  in  the  last  instance  on  all  scien¬ 
tific  theories  relative  to  human  nature, — not  that  super¬ 
ficial  common  sense  which  judges  by  preju-  Genuine 

common 

dices  and  first  appearances  ;  but  that  deep,  sense  the 

ultimate 

serious  common  sense  which  discerns  and  test  of  psy- 
constantly  places  in  clearer  light  the  funda-  truth? 1Ca 
mental  laws  of  the  human  mind — I  mean,  in  a  word, 
reason,  as  God  made  it.  If  a  superficial  and  frivolous 
common  sense  is  the  pest  of  science,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  true  common  sense  in  which  humanity 
utters  its  honest  verdicts  is  the  legitimate  judge  of 
all  philosophical  attempts  to  account  for  the  state  of 
society. 

To  accomplish  the  \vork  to  which  the  subject  in¬ 
vites  you,  the  first  thing  to  be  done  is  to  observe  and 
reflect.  The  observation  of  moral  phenomena  re¬ 
quires  neither  a  laboratory  nor  costly  instruments  ; 
each  one  has  always  about  him,  both  his  soul,  which 
is  the  object  of  observation,  and  his  reason,  which  is 
its  instrument.  To  facilitate  your  study  you  may  de¬ 
rive  aid  from  writers  who  have  touched  upon  this 


200  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

problem..  I  will  limit  myself  to  a  few  suggestions. 
The  Thoughts  of  Pascal  would  greatly  aid  you.  If 
you  strip  this  book  of  a  few  traces  of  jansenist  ascet¬ 
icism,  and  of  a  few  hasty  sallies  which  the  author 
would  doubtless  have  modified  had  he  lived  to  review 
his  manuscripts,  you  will  find  abundant  proof  of  this 
proposition.  On  subjecting  the  state  of  the  human 
heart  to  a  careful  study,  we  can  find  no  satisfactory 
explanation  of  this  condition,  save  in  the  doctrine  of 
the  fall.  Among  contemporaries,  I  will  mention  two, 
from  whose  works  I  myself  have  greatly  profited, 
Julius  Muller,  and  my  friend  Professor  Secretan. 
After  these  explanations  relative  to  the  nature  of  the 
proof,  I  come  to  the  proof  itself 

II.  Presentation  of  the  Proof. 

The  establishing  of  a  scientific  demonstration  may, 
as  we  have  just  said,  require  the  lapse  of  much  time. 
But,  as  the  partisans  of  every  new  doctrine  might 
equally  appeal  to  the  future,  science  can  take  no  notice 
of  such  an  appeal  To  succeed  in  calling  public  at¬ 
tention  seriously  to  any  new  theory",  it  is  necessary 
to  show  at  once  that  it  accounts  for  certain  great 
facts  ;  as,  for  example,  Copernicus  showed  immedi¬ 
ately  that  his  theory  accounted  for  the  succession 
of  day  and  night,  and  the  changes  of  the  seasons. 
We  will,  therefore,  now  reproduce  our  solution, 
and  then  present  some  arguments  which,  without 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  201 

demonstrating  it  completely,  may  yet  render  it  quite 
probable. 

In  the  presence  of  the  absolute  moral  law  we  dis¬ 
cover  a  principle  of  evil  in  every'  heart,  that  Epstatemeiit 
is  to  say,  in  the  heart  of  humanity.  This  tJie  avi' 
principle  of  evil  is  essential  in  humanity. 

We  are  not  all,  however,  scoundrels  and  thieves  ;  there 
are  men  whom  the  instinct  of  shame  and  the  law  of 
chastity  preserve  from  sensual  indulgence ;  there  are 
men  who  remain  sober  ;  there  are  generous  and  com¬ 
passionate  men  ;  but  a  principle  of  evil  exists  in  all 
of  us,  in  that  we  are  all  naturally  inclined  to  violate 
moral  law.  Moral  law  requires  that  each  individual 
.  shall  have  for  his  object  the  general  good  of  all,  in 
which  good  each  finds  his  legitimate  share.  From 
the  stand-point  of  social  morality,  we  call  honest 
that  man  who  uses  his  liberty  without  directly  infring- 
ing  on  the  rights  of  others  ;  but  a  man  may  be  honest 
in  the  eyes  of  society  without  being  good  in  the  eyes 
of  the  moral  law ;  for  the  law  requires  not  only  to 
refrain  from  wronging  others,  from  stealing,  from  kill¬ 
ing,  from  calumniating ;  it  also  exacts  the  consecra¬ 
tion  of  each  individual  to  the  general  good  of  the 
whole.  Now,  in  studying  the  human  heart  we  recog¬ 
nize  in  it  a  tendency  that  is  constant  in  the  present 
state  of  things,  to  an  excessive  love  of  self,  which 
is  the  very  root  of  evil.  Pascal  says :  “  We  are 
born  unjust,  for  each  tends  to  himself.  This  is  con- 


202 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


trary  to  all  order ;  we  ought  to  tend  to  the  general ; 
the  tendency  to  self  is  the  commencement  of  all 
disorder.” 

Such  is  my  affirmation.  I  say  not  that  all  are  male¬ 
factors  ;  but  I  affirm,  that  there  is  in  every  man  a 
principle  of  egotism  which  is  the  essence  of  sin. 
Whence  this  evil  principle  ?  From  an  act  of  human¬ 
ity,  of  which  we  are  all  members,  in  consequence  of 
yvhich  act  we  receive  from  nature  a  corrupted  heart. 
Each  of  us  is,  as  an  individual,  simply  responsible  for 
his  personal  acts,  or,  to  speak  more  exactly,  for  the 
•  personal  part  of  his  acts.  But  each  of  us,  in  so  far 
as  human,  has  a  solidarity  in  the  fall  of  the  human 
race.  This  doctrine,  as  we  have  admitted,  conflicts  . 
directly  with  a  certain  kind  of  common  sense  ;  but 
the  question  is,  whether  it  is  with  that  superficial 
common  sense  which  judges  from  first  appearances, 
or  with  that  common  sense  which  is  the  expression 
of  human  reason,  and  the  judge  of  truth.  The  fol¬ 
lowing  considerations  will  aid  us  in  deciding  this. 

Let  us  indicate  some  great  fact  which  our  theory 
explains  so  well,  as  to  show  itself  worthy,  at  least,  of 
serious  examination.  I  choose  for  this  purpose  the 
The  twofold  fact  of  the  existence  in  man  of  a  double 

nature  of 

man.  nature,  a  fact  which  is  one  of  the  chief  feat¬ 
ures  of  the  problem  which  we  are  studying. 

Observe  the  manner  in  which  human  nature  devel¬ 
ops  itself.  A  child  is  born.  How  does  the  soul 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


203 


first  manifest  itself  in  connection  with  the  body  ? 
Before  exercising  the  power  of  thought,  -so  far  as  we 
can  see,  the  child  is  brought  into  contact  with  the 
spiritual  world  by  the  organs  of  sentiment,  the  look, 
and  the  accent  of  its  mother.  Before  understanding, 
it  feels  ;  it  feels  love,  and  it  is  by  the  heart  that  a 
makes  its  entrance  into  the  world  of  spirits.  Subse¬ 
quently,  by  teaching  its  lips  to  utter  words,  the  mother 
brings  it  into  connection  with  universal  tradition.  It 
accepts  this  tradition,  which  is  for  its  intelligence 
what  the  maternal  milk  is  for  its  body,  and  it  enters 
thus  into  communion  with  the  human  race.  The 
child,  therefore,  begins  its  life  by  believing  in  the 
good,  and  in  the  truth.  Hence,  the  great  Teacher 
of  men  proposed  as  a  model  for  the  perfect  man  the 
naive  faith  of  the  child,  which  doubts  neither  the  love 
nor  the  words  of  its  mother.  Infancy  is  pure.  Then 
comes  adolescence  ;  and  adolescence  is  the  period  of 
noble  impulses,  high  aspirations,  and  pure  desii^s. 

But  how  sad  the  change  !  I  appeal  to  those  of  you 
whose  soul  has  been  touched  by  the  sweet  and  melan¬ 
choly  spirit  of  poesy.  If  you  feel  like  weeping,  how¬ 
ever,  do  not  spend  your  tears  on  the  too-soon-with¬ 
ered  rose,  on  the  vanishing  mists,  on  the  fading 
leaves,  on  the  transient  spring-time,  on  the  zephyr 
which  passes  and  returns  no  more  ;  but  shed  them 
for  these  beautiful  flowers  of  humanity,  so  often,  alas ! 
withered  before  unfolding, — for  the  purity  of  infancy, 


204 


The  Problem  of  Evil , 


ms  fallen  and  the  sacred  aspirations  of  youth.  From 

developed  the  very  start  the  gnawing  and  blighting 
worm  is  there.  The  good  shows  itself,  it  is 
true,  but  it  is  only  like  a  fruit  im maturely  plucked, 
or  blasted  in  its  flower  by  a  hostile  breath.*  This 
subject  has  called  forth  from  the  poets  many  touch¬ 
ingly  sad  strains.f  But  others  of  less  noble  nature 
allude  to  it  only  with  a  bitter  smile,  and  speak  of  the 
baseless  dreams  of  infancy  and  the  illusions  of  youth. 
All  admit  in  some  form  that  evil  is  in  the  child  from 
the  start,  and  that  in  developing  itself  it  triumphs 
over  the  good.  But  some  say  that  the  purity  of  in¬ 
fancy  and  the  noble  impulses  of  youth  are  thwarted 
by  their  contact  with  our  evil  world,  as  if  all  evil 
came  from  without.  But  whence,  then,  does  this  evil 
world  obtain  its  recruits  ?  How  is  it  that  these  pure 
children  on  coming  into  society  with  each  other  uni¬ 
formly  become  such  impure  adults  ?  Strictly  speak¬ 
ing,  infancy  is  not  pure,  and  youth  is  not  holy ;  but 
there  never  was  a  human  being,  perhaps,  who  at  the 
threshold  of  life  did  not  have  day-dreams  of  purity, 

*  II  est  comme  le  fruit  en  naissant  arrache, 

Ou  qu’un  souffle  ennemi  dans  sa  fleur  a  seche. — -Racine. 

f  Oh  !  quand  ce  doux  passe,  quand  cet  age  sans  tache, 

Avec  sa  robe  blanche  ou  notre  amour  s’ attache, 

Revient  dans  nos  cheirfins, 

On  s’y  suspend,  et  puis  que  de  larmes  ameres 
Sur  les  lambeaux  fletris  de  vos  jeunes  chimeres 

Qui  vous  restent  aux  mains!— Victor  Hugo. 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  205 

love,  and  holiness.  Before  doing  the  evil,  we  see 
the  good. 

By  the  time  the  will  is  developed,  therefore,  and 
comes  to  self-consciousness,  that  is,  when  man  comes 
to  responsibility,  he  finds  already  within  himself  a 
double  nature.  It  is  because  of  this  fact  that  the 
smile  which  attends  the  sight  of  a  little  child  is  al¬ 
most  always  tinged  with  melancholy.  We  fear  for 
the  little  candidate  of  life  not  only  the  varied  acci¬ 
dents  of  existence,  but  we  also  have  a  presentiment 
of  the  struggles  and  sufferings  which  the  yet  inno¬ 
cent  little  creature  will  have  to  endure,  in  proportion 
as  the  fallen  nature  within  it  comes  to  development. 
It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  citations  from  literature 
in  support  of  these  thoughts.  I  might  cite  Conflrmato- 
the  Apostle  Paul,  and,  for  such  as  would  not  rycitations- 
prefer  that  authority,  the  Roman  poet,  Ovid.  I  might 
quote  from  the  Christian,  Racine,  and  for  those  of 
different  tastes,  from  the  Greek,  Euripides,  or  even 
from  Voltaire.  I  would  find  every-where  in  human 
letters  the  evidence  of  this  double  nature  which 
exists  in  each  of  us.  We  perceive  on  the  one  hand 
an  order  in  which  our  better  nature  delights  ;  on  the 
other,  we  groan  under  the  heavy  burden  of  a  disor¬ 
dered  nature  which  weighs  upon  our  will. 

Our  life  is  a  false  nature  ;  ’ tis  not  in 

The  harmony  of  things — this  hard  decree, 

This  ineradicable  taint  of  sin, 

This  boundless  upas,  this  all-blasting  tree, 


206 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


Whose  root  is  earth,  whose  leaves  and  branches  be 
The  shies  which  rain  their  plagues  on  men  like  dew— 
Disease,  death,  bondage — all  the  woes  we  see — 

And,  worse,  the  woes  we  see  not — which  throb  through 
The  immedicable  souls  with  heartaches  ever  new.* 

A  single  sentence  of  Pascal  sums  up  all  these 
thoughts  :  “  There  are  two  natures  within  us,  the  one 
good,  the  other  evil.”  But  without  accumulating  cita¬ 
tions,  I  prefer  to  appeal  to  your  daily  experience. 
That  there  are  within  us  two  natures,  the  conflicts 
of  which  often  rend  our  hearts,  no  one  denies. 

Our  solution  explains  this  great  fact.  Every  time 
that  a  new  representative  of  our  common  humanity 
appears  as  a  candidate  of  life,  the  true  use  and  pur¬ 
pose  of  his  liberty  is  clearly  enough  shown  to  him  by 
conscience.  The  golden  dream  is  experienced  ;  the 
celestial  Eden  is  caught  sight  of.  But  this  is  the 
work  of  that  part  of  our  nature  which  God  made,  of 
that  primitive  constitution  of  the  soul  which  makes 
itself  felt  at  the  very  outset  of  life.  The  other  phase 
of  our  nature,  the  evil,  is  the  man  as  made  by  human¬ 
ity  ;  it  is  the  sad  creation  of  the  creature,  the  result 
of  the  common  fall.  We  have  now  the  means  of  ex¬ 
plaining  the  presence  of  these  two  natures. 

We  have  also  the  means  of  explaining  why 

Why  the  fall-  1  &  J 

en  nature  the  evil  nature  gains  the  upper  hand  in  the  de¬ 
gains  the 

upper  hand,  velopment  of  life.  In  fact,  it  results  directly 


*  Childe  Harold. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


207 


from  the  idea.of  the  fall,  namely,  that  the  human  will 
is  not  in  its  normal  condition.  Liberty,  as  we  have 
said,  realizes  and  confirms  itself  in  giving  itself  to  the 
good  ;  but  it  enfeebles  and  ruins  itself  in  giving  itself 
to  evil ;  and  for  the  reason  that  the  good  is  our  law, 
whereas  evil  is  foreign  and  hostile  to  the  constitution 
of  the  soul.  Though  man  possesses  the  inestimable 
gift  of  liberty,  which  renders  him  capable  of  the  good 
and  of  happiness,  yet  in  itself  it  is  an  empty  gift, 
and  has  no  other  alternative  than  either  to  become 
the  free  servant  of  justice  by  the  practice  of  the  good, 
or  to  become,  by  yielding  to  evil,  the  slave  of  sin. 
The  revolt  of  humanity  has,  therefore,  resulted  not 
only  in  vitiating  the  human  heart  by  making  it 
the  seat  of  evil  solicitations,  but  also  in  paralyzing 
the  will. 

Our  solution,  therefore,  accounts  for  the  evil  prin¬ 
ciple  which  observation  discovers  in  the  heart.  What 
other  solution  does  as  much  ?  Evil  is  there  ;  it  is 
essential  in  humanity,  and  cannot  be  accounted  for 
by  individual  historic  volitions.  But  whence  comes 
it  ?  Will  you  say  that  it  is  necessary  ?  But  Eegtaternent 
this  is  to  deny  it ;  it  is  not  to  solve  the  01  posltion- 
problem,  it  is  to  destroy  one  of  its  terms.  Will  you 
refer  it  back  to  an  eternal  principle  ?  but  this  is  dual¬ 
ism,  a  system  which  the  advance  of  human  thought 
has  long  since  renounced.  What  alternative  is  then 
left  ?  To  seek  the  origin  of  evil  in  God  ?  But  this 


203 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


we  cannot  We  must,  therefore,  seek  the  origin  of 
evil  in  an  act  of  humanity.  Such  is  the  substance 
of  my  proof.  I  consider  as  worthy  of  serious  exam¬ 
ination  every  solution  of  the  problem  which  will  free 
God  from  the  responsibility  of  evil,  without  recurring 
to  the  idea  of  a  nature  of  things,  which  would  be  a 
second  principle  co-eternal  with  God ;  but  I  know  no 
other  than  the  one  I  propose  which  has  this  charac¬ 
ter,  and  hence  I  shall  cling  to  it  until  the  discovery 
of  some  new  light,  the  probability  of  which,  however, 
I  do  not  suppose. 

We  have  settled  at  the  outset  the  two  principles, 
that  the  good  is  that  which  ought  to  be,  that  is,  that 
it  is  identical  with  the  Divine  will ;  and  that  evil  is 
that  which  ought  not  to  be,  that  is,  that  it  is  the  con¬ 
trary  of  the  Divine  will.  To  maintain  these  two  defi¬ 
nitions  intact  is  for  me  the  test  of  every  theory  of 
evil  that  presents  itself.  To  reject  every  theory 
which  conflicts  with  the  moral  law,  or  a  faith  in  God's 
holiness,  is  my  uniform  rule.  Is  there  any  other  solu¬ 
tion  than  the  one  I  propose  which  does  not  violate 
this  rule,  and  which  at  the  same  time  accounts  for 
the  totality  of  facts  which  observation  reveals  ?  Let 
us  see. 

Do  you  say  that  the  moral  law  and  God  are  mere 
speculative  ideas  ?  and  that  the  matter  in  hand  is  not 
to  discover  a  new  doctrine  in  justification  of  precon¬ 
ceived  theories,  but  to  explain  facts  ?  Let  us  then 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


209 


examine  this  thought ;  and,  back  of  what  you  call 
theories,  let  us  go  directly  to  the  most  positive  of 
facts.  The  conception  pf  the  moral  law  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  the  expression  of  a  fact,  P^°i©gic- 
namely,  the  fact  of  the  sentiment  of  obliga-  as  rea?  as 

'  physical 

tion,  the  consciousness  of  duty.  Our  faith  fects, 
in  the  holiness  of  God  is  also  the  expression  of  a  fact, 
namely,  the  fact  of  the  profound  heartfelt  need  of 
worshiping.  Try  to  suppress  the  feeling  of  moral 
obligation,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  moral  and  social 
order  ;  undertake  to  suppress  the  instinct  of  worship, 
which  is  the  basis  of  all  religions  ;  silence  that  voice 
which,  in  the  presence  of  the  good,  utters  an  appro¬ 
bation,  and  in  the  presence  of  evil,  a  blame ;  silence 
that  voice  which  in  the  presence  of  some  great  in¬ 
justice  rises  often,  even  in  those  who  pretend  to 
disbelieve  in  God,  and  makes  appeal  to  a  Supreme 
Justice;  silence  all  these  voices  if  you  can,  and  we 
will  admit  that  the  moral  law,  and  God,  are  nothing 
but  theories.  But  this  cannot  be  ;  for  the  conscious¬ 
ness  of  duty,  and  of  a  divine  order,  are  fundamental 
elements  of  our  nature.  To  maintain  the  moral 
law,  and  the  holiness  of  God,  is  to  maintain  two 
ideas  which  are  the  immediate  and  direct  expression 
of  facts. 

But  we  meet  here  a  certain  form  of  science  which 
treats  this  class  of  facts  with  disdain,  stigmatizing 

them  as  matters  of  sentiment.  French  Positivism  de- 

14 


210 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


dared  the  other  day/ by  the  mouth  of  its  disciple,  M. 
Littre,  that  science  recognizes  nothing  but  matter 
and  the  properties  of  matter.  German  Materialism 
declares,  through  Professor  Biichner,  that  “  it  is  im¬ 
possible  long  to  resist  the  force  of  facts,”  Now,  in 
the  opinion  of  these  writers,  the  conscience,  the  in¬ 
stinct  of  worship,  and,  in  general,  all  spiritual  phe¬ 
nomena,  are  not  facts;  there  are  no  other  realities  than 
those  which  fall  under  our  senses.  If  they  had  said, 
the  science  of  matter  recognizes  nothing  but  matter 
and  the  properties  of  matter,  they  would  only  have 
said  a  commonplace  truism  ;  but  their  real  purpose 
is  to  force  upon  the  public  the  notion  that  the  science 
of  matter  and  its  properties  is  the  sole  and  universal 
science.  They  hold  that  all  that  exists  is  either 
matter  or  properties  of  matter. 

Let  us  examine  this.  The  properties  of  matter 
„  ...  .  exist  only  under  condition  that  matter  exists, 
criticised.  anq  ft  exists  only  under  the  conditions  of  form 
and  weight.  Please  then  tell  me  what  is  the  form  of 
honor,  and  what  is  the  exact  weight  of  infamy.  By 
what  instruments  shall  we  determine  the  geometrical 
dimensions  of  generosity,  and  measure,  in  all  its  de¬ 
tails,  the  shape  of  selfishness  ?  What  confusion  of 
ideas  we  are  involved  in,  what  thick  darkness  we  must 
call  up,  if  we  would  so  far  succeed  in  quenching  the 
natural  light  which  enlightens  every  man  who  comes 
into  the  world,  as  to  concede  that  vice  and  virtue, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


2 1 1 


honor  and  probity,  devotion  and  esteem,  contempt 
and  censure,  admiration  and  horror,  are  either  matter 
or  the  properties  of  matter,  or— nothing !  Let  us 
now  return  to  the  declaration  of  Buchner,  for  it  con¬ 
tains  a  direct  condemnation  of  the  very  materialism 
which  has  placed  it  in  our  hands,  “  It  is  impossible 
long  to  resist  the  force  of  facts  !’5  It  is  for  this  very 
reason  that  humanity  will  never  consent  to  erase  irom 
their  place  in  science  those  realities  which  are  the 
most  direct  manifestations  of  life,  realities  which  man 
knows  more  immediately  than  he  knows  matter ;  for 
matter  reveals  itself  to  our  senses  only  under  the 
condition  of  the  presence  and  action  of  his  spiritual 
nature,  * 

But  we  hear  it  affirmed  that  the  science  of  our  age 
is  inclining  more  and  more  to  materialism.  I  think, 
on  the  contrary,  that  it  is  already  on  the  point  of 
getting  out  of  it,  and  that  the  darkness  of  which 
men  complain  is  only  that  final  obscurity  of  the 
night  which  usually  seems  more  dense  just  before  the 
break  of  day.*  I  might  mention,  as  a  favorable  sign 
of  the  times,  the  general  interest  which  the  discussion 
of  moral  questions  now  excites  in  every  intelligent 
community,  an  interest  which  does  not  indicate  any 


*  M.  Felix  Ravaisson  has  just  signalized,  in  contemporary  philosophy, 
“  a  general  movement  of  thought  tending  to  get  the  mastery  once 
again,  and  from  a  higher  stand-point  than  ever  before,  of  the  doctrines 
of  materialism.” 


'y  T  ^ 

A  *mf 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


great  success  of  materialism  in  persuading  the  world 
that  the  conscience  and  the  heart,  sin  and  holiness, 
are  objects  unworthy  of  the  serious  attention  of 
reason. 


III.  Solution  of  Difficulties. 


Let  us  now  examine  some  difficulties  connected 
with  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  which  I  have 
proposed.  Our  object  has  been  to  find  a  system 
which,  while  satisfying  reason,  shall  maintain  and 
safeguard  the  conscience.  Now,  at  first  sight  our 
solution  seems  to  conflict  both  with  conscience  and 
with  reason.  Let  us  notice,  first,  the  rational  diffi¬ 
culties.  * 

It  is  impossible,  say  some,  to  conceive  of  sin  as 
How  can  originating  in  a  state  of  innocence.  That  we 
eni  ^nng  ourseives  d0  evil,  however,  is  perfectly  easy 

from  mno-  1  J  J 


cence 


to  understand,  as  we  are  a  prey  to  the  solici¬ 
tations  of  our  evil  heart,  and  to  the  temptations  of 
sense  and  vanity  under  all  their  phases.  Evil  being 
already  in  our  heart,  we  naturally  yield  to  its  seduc¬ 
tions  ;  but  take  evil  out  of  the  heart,  and  you  can 
never  explain  how  the  will  should  deviate  from  the 
good.  The  good,  in  fact,  exerts  of  itself  an  attraction. 
To  overbalance  this  attraction  there  must  be  a  tempta- 
tion  resulting  from  the  pre-existence  of  evil.  Without 
a  temptation  the  fall  cannot  be  explained  ;  and  to  admit 
a  primitive  state  of  innocence  is  to  exclude  all  tempta- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


213 


tion,  and,  consequently,  to  exclude  the  possibility  of 
evil.  Such  is  the  first  objection  we  meet. 

I  have  no  intention  of  answering  the  objection  by 
proposing  an  abstract  definition  of  liberty,  in  saying 
that  the  will,  being  free,  is  able,  from  this  very  fact, 
to  determine  itself  for  the  evil  without  any  solicita¬ 
tion.  I  concede  that,  in  the  absence  of  all  temptation, 
sin  is  inexplicable.  What  course  is  then  left  for  me  ? 
It  must  be  shown  that  there  exists,  in  a  state  of  entire 

purity  of  heart,  a  temptation  that  is  inherent  The  tempta¬ 
tion  of  lib- 

in  the  will,  and  which  cannot  be  suppressed  erty. 
save  by  suppressing  the  will  itself ;  so  that  on  the 
admission  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  of  absolute 
purity  of  heart,  this  temptation,  but  this  alone,  must 
also  be  admitted.  Now,  this  temptation  does  exist. 
But  what  is  it  ?  The  temptation  of  liberty. 

A  free  created  power  is,  as  a  power,  conscious  of 
originating  actions  ;  byt  as  a  creature,  it  cannot  be 
in  a  state  of  absolute  independence  ;  it  finds  itself  in 
the  presence  of  universal  law,  or  rather  of  God,  whose 
will  the  law  expresses.  Now  from  this  very  situation, 
there  results  for  the  created  power  the  temptation  to 
ignore  the  consequences  of  its  position  as  a  creature, 
and,  rejecting  the  law  which  subordinates  it  to  God, 
to  become  a  law  unto  itself.  This  is  the  temptation 
to  revolt,  pure  and  simple.  Is  this  incomprehensible  ? 
By  no  means.  Is  this  temptation  impossible  ?  Far 
from  it  ;  it  is  real,  it  exists  in  us  now.  This  tempta- 


214 


he  Problem  of  Evil. 

tion  is,  in  its  simple  form,  vailed  and,  as  it  were, 
choked,  beneath  the  enormous  mass  of  other  tempta¬ 
tions  in  our  fallen  nature  ;  and  when  we  do  evil  it  is 
more  frequently  because  we  yield  to  the  impulses  of  a 
vitiated  nature.  Still,  we  can  yet  recognize,  feeble 
though  its  influence  may  be  in  our  present  state,  the 
temptation  of  independence  per  se. 

Take  this  illustration.  You  desire  to  do  a  certain 
act.  Some  one,  who  has  no  legitimate  authority  over 
you,  comes  and  arrogantly  commands  you  to  do  the 
very  thing  you  were  intending  to  do.  Now,  what  is 
the  result  ?  Almost  certainly  you  will  rebel  against 
this  undue  command  ;  and  you  will  quite  likely,  if 
not  wisely,  at  least  very  naturally,  renounce  doing 
what  you  intended  to  do,  and  do  something  which 
you  had  no  desire  to  do,  simply  to  vindicate  your 
independence.  Your  resistance  will  be  legitimate  in 
this  case,  as  the  command  is  illegitimate.  But  this 
spirit  of  independence  exists,  likewise,  in  the  presence 
of  the  legitimate  authority  of  conscience  and  God. 
And  this  is  so  true  that  many  young  persons  who 
would  disdainfully  repel  certain  temptations  if  they 
were  directly,  presented  to  them,  yet  become  victims 
to  the  diabolical  cunning  of  those  who  awaken  in  them 
the  spirit  of  independence  in  order  to  lead  them,  little 
by  little,  to  do  that  for  which  they  originally  had  a 
horror.  Forbidden  fruit  is  of  savory  taste. 

Discard  this  notion  of  the  temptation  of  liberty. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


215 


and  evil  is  no  longer  possible.  But  where  evil  is  not 
possible,  there  liberty  is  not  possible.  The  Isthistemp_ 
elementary  form  of  liberty,  under  which  it  of 

must  begin,  and  out  of  which  it  must  rise  to  av0ldable? 
its  perfect  form  by  overcoming  the  possibility  of  evil, 

•  presupposes  the  power  of  choice.  Take  away  this 
power  of  choosing  between  obedience  and  revolt,  and 
you  have  suppressed  the  freedom  of  the  creature.  It 
has  sometimes  been  asked  why  God  did  not  create  a 
being  which  could  not  sin,  that  is  to  say,  which  should 
be  good  necessarily.  Those  who  so  ask  forget  that 
necessity  excludes  liberty,  and  that  where  there  is  no 
liberty  there  can  be  neither  good  nor  evil,  so  that  the 
notion  of  a  being  necessarily  good  involves  an  abso¬ 
lute  contradiction  of  terms. 

We  explain  the  primitive  fall,  therefore,  by  a  tempta¬ 
tion  which  is  the  sole  one  unavoidably  inherent  in  a  free 
being,  as,  also,  the  sole  one  which  can  exist  in  a  state 
of  innocence :  that  is  to  say,  the  sole  one  which  can 
find  an  echo  in  a  will  associated  with  a  pure  heart. 
This  temptation  may  be  thus  expressed  :  “  Thou  shalt 
be  a  God  unto  thyself.”  No  other  temptation  can 
come  until  after  this  one,  that  is,  until  after  the  will 
shall  have  already  enfeebled  itself  by  yielding  to  the 
temptation  which  is  inherent  in  liberty  itself.  It  was 
in  view  of  this  that  Milton,  when  attempting  to  go 
back  to  the  first  origin  of  evil,  assigned,  as  the  motive 
of  the  archangel  s  rebellion,  the  aspiring  to  a  position 


21 6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


in  which  he  should  be  a  law  unto  himselfr  the  wishing 
to  be  free  from  the  authority  of  the  Creator.  In  this 
he  showed  himself  a  good  philosopher  ?<s  well  as  poet. 

But  I  hear  some  one  object :  There,  you  have  evil, 
after  all,  at  the  very  beginning  of  things  ;  you  make  evil 
This  liberty  inherent  in  the  creatine  in  its  character  of 

is  not  a  germ 

©f  eviL  creature  l  No,  we  do  not  have  evil,  but  only 
its  possibility,  a  possibility  which  is,  we  repeat  it,  the 
condition  of  created  liberty.  Liberty  presupposes 
possible  evil,  and.  contains  a  temptation  without  which 
liberty  could  not  exist ;  but  the  sufficient  cause  of 
realized  evil  exists  nowhere — save  in  a  will  rebelling 
against  its  law.  All  confusion  on  this. point  may  be 
saved  by  recalling  the  saying  of  Shakspeare : 

7Tis  one  thing  t.o  be  tempted. 

Another  thing  to  falL5*1 

There  is,  therefore,  a  temptation  inherent  in  liberty 
independently  of  any  evil  proclivity  of  the  heart. 
Our  solution,  in  this  respect,  appears  as  perfectly 
reasonable ;  and,  on  dose  examination,  it  becomes 
even  quite  evident.  I  would  be  glad  if  I  could  say 
as  much  of  the  point  which  follows. 

When  we  once  have  admitted  that  the  fell  of  a  free 
being  is  possible  in  a  state  of  innocence,  a  new  diffi¬ 
culty*  more  formidable  than  the  first,  rises  in  the  face 
of  reason,  and.  seems  to  bar  its  way.  We  repeat,  that 
our  solution  does  not  affirm  that  a  first  man,  or  that  a 

*  Measure  for  Measure ,  Act  II,  Scene  I. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


217 


first  human  pair,  render  themselves  guilty  of  a  purely 
individual  sin,  and  that  then  other  individuals,  others 
in  the  true  and  absolute  sense  of  the  word,  bear  the 
consequences  of  this  sin,  which  is  not  their  own.  If 
our  solution  meant  this  it  would  be  false.  It  does 
not  affirm  that  we  all  participated  individually  in  this 
first  sin,  and  yet  it  does  affirm  that  we  did  In  what 
participate  really  in  the  common  fall ;  human-  sense  alb 
ity  revolted,  and  is  now  bearing  the  conse-  il)ated in the 

J  primitive 

quences  of  its  revolt.  In  this  sense  only  is  faU- 
our  solution  reconcilable  with  justice  ;  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  our  solution  alone  permits  the  recon¬ 
ciliation  of  the  idea  of  justice  with  the  facts  which 
experience  reveals.  There  are  not  two  justices  ;  it  is 
one  of  the  severest  things  that  can  be  reproached  to 
Pascal,  that  he  held  (without  mature  reflection,  doubt¬ 
less)  that  there  are  two  forms  of  justice,  human  and 
divine.  There  is  but  one  justice,  that  of  God  ;  and 
this  justice  we  see  in  brighter  light  the  more  we 
study  it.  We  are  accustomed  to  appeal  from  the 
injustice  of  men  to  the  justice  of  God  ;  but  to  wish 
to  separate  the  justice  of  God  from  the  justice  of  the 
conscience  would  be  to  precipitate  ourselves  inevita¬ 
bly  either  into  atheism  or  into  fanaticism.  Our 
solution  does  not  depend,  therefore,  on  a  particular 
definition  of  justice  ;  there  is  but  one  justice,  that 
which  Cicero  has  defined  thus  :  “To  concede  to  each 
his  rights.”  But  our  solution  turns  on  this  point: 


2l8 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Turning-  namely,  is  each  individual  of  the  race  other 

point  of  the  J  • 

solution,  than  his  fellows  in  an  exclusive  and  absolute 
sense  ?  Or  is  it  true  that  there  is  in  each  man  both 
a  personal  existence,  and  also  the  existence  of  hu¬ 
manity  ?  We  do  not  mean  that  humanity  is  to  be 
regarded  as  a  being  apart  from  the  individuals  ;  but 
we  hold  that  each  man  unites  in  himself  two  realities, 
which  are  distinct  without  being  separate,  and  thus 
presents  a  double  aspect :  namely,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
himself  in  his  personal  existence,  and  in  so  far  as  he  is 
man  by  the  presence  of  humanity  in  him.  After  these 
explanations  let  us  approach  the  difficulty. 

The  difficulty  is,  How  are  we  to  be  made  in  any 
sense  responsible  for  the  primitive  fall  of  our  race  ? 
You  will  now  object  that  we  have  no  recollection  of 
this  primitive  revolt;  you  object,  even,  that  we  had 
no  existence  at  the  time  when  it  occurred,  and  that, 
if  the  race  fell  at  all,  it  occurred  surely  before  we  ap¬ 
peared  on  the  stage  of  action  ;  and,  hence,  you  are 
tempted  to  say  with  the  lamb  of  La  Fontaine  :  c<*How 
could  I  have  done  it  if  I  was  not  yet  born  ?  ” 

You  did  not  exist?  in  no  sense  ?  is  that  beyond 
dh  we  aii  all  question  ?  The  difficulty  being  the  same 
SrltVuman  f°r  every  object  that  lives,  let  us  examine  it 
pan-?  jn  £}ie  case  0f  a  vegetable.  I  will  take,  for 
example,  one  of  our  forest  pines.  Whence  springs  it  ? 
Its  present  substance  came  evidently  from  the  soil 
and  the  atmosphere,  through  a  series  of  organic 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  2 1 9 

changes.  Recently  the  people  of  Geneva  heard  Pro¬ 
fessor  Candolle  explain,  in  the  light  of  recent  physics, 
the  entire  development  of  a  vegetable  from  the  mo¬ 
ment  when  germination  commences.  He  explained 
to  us  the  growth  of  the  plant ;  but  under  what  con¬ 
dition  ?  Under  condition  that  the  plant  is  already 
there,  living  in  its  germ.  Now,  the  germ  of  the  plant 
is  not  the  result  of  movements  in  matter  ;  a  living 
germ  is  not  an  aggregate  of  particles,  like  a  stone  or 
crystal.  Before  developing  itself,  therefore,  our  pine 
existed  in  its  germ.  But  whence  came  this  germ  ? 
Did  God  create  it  directly  ?  Does  God  create  direct¬ 
ly,  every  year,  the  infinitude  of  germs  which  are  scat¬ 
tered  abroad  in  the  whole  vegetable  kingdom  ?  In 
view  of  the  uniformity  with  which  the  same  plant  pro¬ 
duces  unceasingly  seed  of  its  own  kind,  and  of  the 
fact  that  God  so  uniformly  works  through  second 
causes,  we  cannot  believe  this.  No  one  believes  in  this 
infinite  multiplication  of  new  creative  acts.  The 
germ  of  the  pine,  therefore,  existed  in  the  pine  which 
produced  it,  and  this  in  another,  and  so  on  AMlogyofa 

1  vegetable 

from  pine  to  pine,  back  to  the  origin  of  the  pre-existing 

in  its  spe- 

species.  But  how,  and  in  what  sense  did  it  cies. 
exist  ?  Philosophers  say  that  the  germ  exists  poten¬ 
tially  in  the  life  of  the  individual  which  reproduces 
its  kind.  But  what  shall  we  understand  by  this  word 
potentially  l  Shall  we  attribute  to  the  vegetable  a 
will,  and  suppose  that  it  creates  the  germ  ?  No  one 


220 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


thinks  so.  The  germ  exists  before  it  appears  ;  and 
what  we  call  vital  force  in  this  case  does  not  create, 
but  simply  develops  that  which  already  was.  But 
how  are  we  to  conceive  of  this  ?  Shall  we  suppose 
that  the  whole  number  of  living  individuals  existed 
infinitely  small  in  the  first  germ  ?  Shall  we  assume 
that  the  first  pine-seed  of  all,  the  origin  of  all  other 
pines,  past,  present,  and  future,  having  been  opened, 
and  placed  under  a  microscope  of  infinite  power, 
would  have  revealed  all  the  pines  of  the  world  shut 
up  as  in  a  box?  You  smile;  and,  if  we  admit  the 
indefinite  reproduction  of  individuals,  metaphysics 
justifies  your  smile.  For,  in  fact,  this  would  require 
the  presence  in  the  first  germ  of  an  indefinite  num¬ 
ber  of  real  entities  ;  now,  every  number  being  essen¬ 
tially  determinate,  an  indefinite  number  is  no  number 
at  all.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  our  pine  existed  a 
hundred,  a  thousand,  ten  thousand,  no  matter  how 
many,  years  ago,  at  the  very  origin  of  its  species. 
No  matter  how  large  the  number  of  real  species,  our 
reasoning  remains  unaffected.  The  pine  existed  in 
its  species  before  its  individual  manifestation,  as  we 
have  two  reasons  for  believing.  The  first  is,  that  as 
it  now  exists,  and  that  as  it  is  not  a  simple  aggregate 
of  material  particles,  and  that  as  it  was  not  created 
individually,  it  must,  hence,  have  existed  at  the  origin 
of  its  species.  The  second  reason  is  based  on  the 
acknowledged  influence  of  soil  and  climate  in  modi- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


221 


fying,  under  condition  of  the  lapse  of  very  long  periods 
of  time,  the  peculiarities  of  natural  species.  To  ac¬ 
count  for  all  the  peculiarities  of  the  pine  in  question, 
we  would  have  to  go  back  to  the  influence  of  soil 
and  climate,  and  of  astronomical  and  geological  facts 
which  took  place  countless  centuries  in  the  past. 
Our  pine  was  being  modified  at  that  remote  epoch  ; 
it  must,  therefore,  have  then  existed,  for  it  could  be 
modified  only  on  condition  of  then  existing.  But 
how  did  it  exist  ?  How  does  a  vegetable  exist  in  its 
species  ?  In  form  and  substance  ?  No  ;  un-  Itexists’but 

in  a  manner 

less  it  existed  all  formed  and  in  miniature,  a  incompre¬ 
hensible  to 

supposition  which  we  have  excluded.  Nev-  us. 
ertheless,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  the 
existence  of  a  vegetable  save  under  the  double  con¬ 
dition  of  form  and  substance.  The  pine,  therefore, 
existed  in  a  manner  to  us  incomprehensible.  This 
is  simply  one  of  the  mysteries  of  all  life. 

Let  us  come,  now,  to  the  application  of  our  illus¬ 
tration.  Before  it  existed  individually,  the  tree  existed 
in  its  species,  but  in  a  manner  which  we  do  not  un¬ 
derstand.  Likewise,  also,  man  before  his  personal 
manifestation  existed  in  humanity.  But  how  ?  In  a 
manner  which  we  do  not  understand.  We  conceive 
of  the  existence  of  a  vegetable  only  as  possessing 
form  and  substance,  and  yet  reason  leads  us  to  admit 
that  it  exists  in  its  species  without  form  or  substance. 
We  conceive  of  the  existence  of  a  man  only  as  an 


222 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


individual,  and  yet  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  there 
is  for  him,  in  humanity,  another  mode  of  existence. 
It  is  with  him  the  same  as  with  the  pine.  One  of 
you  says  he  is  twenty  years  old  ;  another,  thirty,  fifty, 
sixty.  This  is  your  date  as  an  individual ;  but,  as  to 
your  date  as  man,  you  have  no  other  than  that  of 
humanity  itself— you  are  all  of  you  much  older  than 
you  think. 

The  objection  to  our  solution  arising  from  the 
thought  that  we  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the  sup¬ 
posed  fall  of  the  race,  disappears  as  soon  as  we  admit 
the  existence  of  each  in  humanity,  not  as  an  individ¬ 
ual,  but  as  man.  But,  in  order  to  the  admission  of  a 
so  is  man’s  more  than  merely  ideal  reality  of  the  species, 
the  species  it  is  necessary  to  overcome  the  whole  weight 

incompre-11  °f  appearances,  as  well  as  of  an  easily  ac- 
hensibie.  cepted  popular  philosophy,  which  has  appear¬ 
ances  in  its  favor.  And,  then,  it  is  necessary  to  be 
satisfied  with  a  conception  of  pu*e  reason,  which 
affirms  the  reality  of  the  species  without  being  able 
to  call  imagination  to  its  support.  Without  entering 
upon  all  the  difficulties  of  the  subject,  let  it  suffice 
here  to  cite  the  counterbalancing  fact,  that  some  of 
the  most  illustrious  representatives  of  reason  have 
found  the  difficulty  to  be  the  very  opposite  of  that 
which  we  here  consider.  Individuals  pass  away,  but 
the  species  remains.  Where  are  the  oaks  which  shad¬ 
owed  our  fathers  ?  Where,  in  a  few  years,  will  be 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


223 


the  birds  which  sing  in  our  forests  ?  the  sheep,  and 
the  cattle  of  our  fields  ?  Every  thing  dies,  and  dis¬ 
appears  from  the  surface  of  the  earth  ;  but  the  spe¬ 
cies  remain  :  the  oak,  the  ox,  the  horse,  still  continue, 
notwithstanding  the  incessant  destruction  of  the  indi¬ 
viduals  which  represent  them.  Several  philosophers 
have  been  so  vividly  struck  with  this  consideration, 
that  for  them  the  reality  of  the  species  was  the  over¬ 
shadowing  fact,  while  the  existence  of  individuals 
seemed  problematical. 

But  I  think  I  hear  some  of  you  accusing  me  of 
reasoning  very  poorly.  “  Comparisons  are  not  proofs,”  • 
say  you.  “  What  has  this  pine  to  do  here  ?  If  you 
mean  that  we  have  existed  from  the  origin  of  humanity 
in  a  metaphysical  sense,  as  every  living  thing  exists 
in  its  species,  very  well  ;  but  this  metaphysical  ex¬ 
istence  does  not  touch  the  question  ;  for  what  con¬ 
cerns  us  is  moral  responsibility,  which  is  not  imputed 
to  the  pines.  Surely  we  did  not  exist  before  our  birth 
in  a  form  which  involves  moral  responsibility.  A  moral  dif_ 
The  moral  difficulty,  therefore,  still  remains,  llculty‘ 
that  we  suffer  for  a  fault  which  is  foreign  to  us  ;  and 
that  is  unjust.”  Here,  therefore,  after  the  difficulty 
of  the  reason,  we  encounter  an  objection  of  conscience  ; 
it  merits  our  most  earnest  attention.  * 

The  basis  of  the  objection  is,  that  acts  of  volition 
are -exclusively  individual,  and  that  the  responsibility 
which  attends  them  is  of  the  same  character.  Let 


224 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


us  examine  these  two  ideas,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
individual  character  of  volitions  as  well  as  of  responsi¬ 
bility  is  to  remain  absolutely  intact,  even  should 
it  not  be  exclusive.  While  engaged  in  placing  in 
relief  one  of  the  phases  of  a  double  truth,  we  do  not 
desire  in  any  degree  to  deny  the  other,  or  throw  it 
into  the  shade.  But  is  it  true  that  volition  manifests 


Are  volitions  itself  only  under  a  purely  individual  form  ? 

exclusively  J 

individual?  There  are  some  reasons  for  doubting  it ;  I 
shall  indicate  three. 

If  we  are  to  believe  the  words  of  lovers,  the  senti¬ 
ment  which  animates  them  has  the  effect  to  melt  two 
wills  into  one,  to  cause  the  will  to  cease  in  some  de¬ 
gree  to  be  purely  personal,  the  two  concurrent  souls 

The  working-  f°rming  a  sort  of  unity.  Persons  unaccus- 
ot  love.  tomed  to  the  vivacity  of  the  passions  might 

be  tempted  to  question  the  testimony  of  lovers  ;  but 
serious  writers,  grave  observers  of  human  nature, 
likewise  affirm  that  deep  feelings  of  love  and  friend¬ 
ship  diminish,  so  to  speak,  the  separation  of  souls, 
taking  from  their  volitions,  not,  of  course,  their  indi¬ 
vidual  nature,  but  the  exclusive  character  of  that 
individuality.  This  is  my  first  remark. 

The  second  is  this  :  When  a  man  advances  alone 
in  the  presence  of  a  hostile  army,  when  he  braves 
certain  death  to  secure  an  advantage  for  his  fellows, 
of  en he  is  proclaimed  a  hero.  In  the  assault'of  a 
redoubt,  and  in  some  other  military  move- 


asm. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


225 


merits,  an  entire  corps  is  sometimes  sent  to  certain 
death,  as  bait  for  the  cannon,  and  in  many  cases  the 
victims  know  where  they  are  going.  These  poor 
fellows  are  swept  down  by  hundreds,  and  their  bodies 
are  thrown  into  forgotten  ditches.  Their  action  is 
none  the  less  heroic  because  they  were  many,  though 
very  few  or  none  of  them  would  have  had  the  courage 
to  do  alone  that  which,  in  a  body,  they  did  without 
hesitation.  This  fact  is  well  known  and  excites  no 
astonishment.  It  results,  we  are  wont  to  say,  from 
the  power  of  emulation,  from  example,  from  associa¬ 
tion  of  action.  It  is  doubtless  all  that ;  but  what 
does  that  mean  ?  It  means  that  the  concurrence  of 
volitions  creates  a  power  which  would  not  exist  if 
these  same  volitions  were  isolated.  In  the  accom¬ 
plishment  of  a  collective  action,  there  is,  therefore,  a 
power  which  manifests  itself  in  each  individual,  but 
whose  source,  however,  is  not  purely  individual  ; 
otherwise,  the  collection  of  individuals  would  not  have 
greater  power,  or  courage,  than  the  sum  of  their  per¬ 
sonal  volitions.  But  all  know  that  this  is  not  the 
case ;  all  admit,  without,  perhaps,  weighing  the  sig¬ 
nificance  of  the  fact,  that  concurrence  of  forces  is 
additional  potency.  • 

And  here  is  my  third  remark  :  In  the  phenomena 
of  habit,  we  see  the  will  creating  a  new  nature.  It  is, 
in  the  first  place,  the  person  that  produces  of  habit. 

the  nature,  and  then  the  nature  that  determines  the 

1 5 


226 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


acts  of  the  person,  (I  borrow-  expressions  from  St. 
Augustine).  Now,  in  this  power  of  habit,  we  have  an 
instance  of  a  will  manifesting  itself,  no  longer  ex¬ 
clusively  under  an  individual  form,  for  the  individual 
feels  this  power  of  habit  as  something  foreign  to  him¬ 
self,  although  proceeding  primitively  from  him  ;  and 
this  new  nature,  formed  by  habit,  transmits  itself 
hereditarily  from  one  individual  to  others,  and  loses 
thus  the  personal  character  of  its  origin. 

I  submit  to  you  these  observations,  which  it  will  be 
easy  to  illustrate  by  other  examples.  There  exist  moral 
phenomena,  obscure  and  little  studied,  which  enable 
us  to  catch  a  glimpse,  as  through  vails  of  mist,  of  an 
element  of  volition  whose  form  is  not  exclusively 
individual. 

The  idea  of  responsibility  calls  forth  similar  re- 
is  responsi-  flections.  The  notion  that  responsibility  is 
ciiisivei\X~  Purely  and  exclusively  individual  vanishes  at 
mdmduai?  once  on  serious  reflection.  You  influence 

one  of  your  fellows  by  words,  by  example,  by  looks  ; 
and  you  lead  him  into  evil.  You  know  well  enough 
that  you  are  responsible  for  those  words,  acts,  and 
looks.  But  you  know  also  that  you  have  likewise  a 
share  of  responsibility  in  the  act  itself  of  him  whom 
you  influenced  to  turn  aside  from  the  line  of  duty. 
Consider  carefully  that  which,  in  judicial  matters,  are 
called  extenuating  circumstances.  These  extenuat¬ 
ing  circumstances,  which  our  jurymen  sometimes  mis- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


227 


use,  are,  nevertheless,  a  serious  reality.  Can  we 
justly  disregard  them  in  our  moral  judgments  ?  A 
poor  girl,  born  in  dens  of  vice,  and  raised  in  the  midst 
of  infamy,  is  hardly  to  be  regarded  as  so  deeply  guilty, 
should  she  fall  into  a  disorderly  life,  as  a  better  raised 
young  woman  would  be  held,  for  the  same  conduct. 
Does  not  a  part  of  her  guilt  belong  to  those  who  per¬ 
verted  her  ?  If  a  boy,  raised  in  habits  of  begging 
and  theft,  should  afterward  deviate  from  the  la\fs  of 
strict  probity,  would  he  be  in  the  same  degree  guilty 
as  a  well-raised  son,  who,  in  order  to  yield  to  tempta¬ 
tion,  would  have  to  trample  under  foot  the  maxims 
of  his  father  and  the  example  of  his  mother  ?  Evil 
influences  are  often  an  exculpation,  as  no  one  denies. 
Now  the  exculpating  of  one  is  always  the  accusing  of 
another  ;  to  extenuate  the  wrong  of  an  act  by  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  evil  counsels  given  and  bad  examples 
followed,  is  to  throw  back  upon  the  authors  of  the  evil 
counsels  and  bad  examples,  that  share  of  the  responsi¬ 
bility  which  is  thrown  off  from  the  agent.  There  are, 
therefore,  in  the  same  act  different  concurrent  respon¬ 
sibilities  ;  responsibility  is  not  exclusively  individual. 
This  is  a  weighty  thought ;  it  addresses  itself  directly 
to  the  conscience.  Follow  out  the  consequences  of 
one  of  your  acts,  or  words.  You  exert  a  bad  influence 
in  a  certain  place  to-day,  and  to-morrow  this  influence 
is  extending  itself ;  thus  your  responsibility  is  impli¬ 
cated  in  actions  which  shall  be  committed  afar  off, 


228 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


and  after  a  long  lapse  of  time ;  in  these  actions  your 
share  will  be  real. 

Far  from  being  exclusively  personal,  responsibility 
presents  on  the  contrary  such  connections  with  the 
past  and  future  as  may  well  give  occasion  to  earnest 
meditation.  Xavier  de  Maistre,  an  eye-witness  of  the 
horrors  of  the  retreat  from  Russia,  exclaims,  while  re- 
niustration  cording  the  fearful  destiny  of  the  French  : 

fronffne  dis¬ 
asters  of  the  “  I  did  not  see  a  single  one  of  them  without 

itussia.n  °  thinking  of  that  infernal  man  who  had  led 
them  into  such  extremes  of  misfortune.”  I  do  not 
wish  to  blunt  the  point  of  this  sharpened  arrow  ; 
Bonaparte  was  doubtless  the  first  in  responsibility 
for  the  disasters  of  his  army.  But  trace  out  the 
origins  of  the  great  misfortune :  ask  yourselves  who 
had  brought  Napoleon  to  power,  and  thus  tempted 
him  to  seek  military  glory  as  a  necessity  of  his  posi¬ 
tion  ;  and,  without  excusing  his  excessive  ambition, 
you  will  see  that  the  responsibility  distributes  itself 
back  over  long  and  multiplied  cross-currents  of 
history. 

Responsibility,  and  volitions  which  are  its  condi¬ 
tion,  are  not,  therefore,  facts  of  an  exclusively  indi¬ 
vidual  nature.  Every  act  is  essentially  personal  in  its 
The  obiec-  accomplishment,  but  no  act  is  exclusively 

tions  disap¬ 
pear.  personal  in  its  origins.  These  considerations 

open  for  our  solution  the  door  which  seemed  closed 

against  it.  The  imputation  of  the  common  fall  will 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


229 


assume  a  character  of  justice  as  soon  as  we  admit 
that,  while  preserving  the  personal  part  of  our  re¬ 
sponsibility,  which  is  undeniable,.  wre  may  also  par¬ 
ticipate  in  the  collective  responsibility  of  the  race. 

The  idea  of  justice  presented  itself  as  an  objection. 
Now,  if  there  wrere  any  injustice,  is  it  our  doctrine 
that  is  responsible  for  it  ?  By  no  means.  The  in¬ 
justice  would  be  in  the  facts,  which  our  doctrine 
simply  seeks  to  explain.  This  is  easily  enough  seen 
from  a  glance  at  the  great  law  of  human  The  law  of 
solidarity.  The  one  suffers  from  the  faults  S° 
of  the  other  ;  one  enjoys  the  favorable  results  of  the 
good  actions  of  another.  The  distribution  of  goods 
and  of  evils  is  not  of  an  exclusively  individual  charac¬ 
ter.  It  is  not  our  doctrine  which  speaks  thus ;  it  is 
the  voice  of  facts  ;  and  none  can  dispute  their  number 
and  Importance.  I  will  call  to  witness  on  this  subject 
a  justly  celebrated  man,  one  occupied  with  an  entirely 
different  order  of  thoughts  from  those  which  now  en¬ 
gage  our  attention.  I  open  the  works  of  Frederic 
Bastiat.  This  economist  discusses  the  laws  of  the 
production  and  distribution  of  wealth.  Here  are  some 
of  the  thoughts  which  he  pens.  After  remarking  that 
the  idea  of  solidarity  was  rejected  by  the  philosophy 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  made  the  object  of  the 
raillery  of  Voltaire,  he  thus  proceeds  :  “  But  that  at 
which  Voltaire  mocked  is  a  fact  as  incontestable  as 
it  is  mysterious.  Why  is  this  man  rich  ?  Because 


230 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


his  father  was  active,  upright,  laborious,  economical ; 
the  father  practiced  the  virtues,  his  son  gathers  the 
advantages.  Why  is  that  other  man  suffering,  sick, 
feeble,  fearful,  and  unhappy  ?  Because  his  father, 
gifted  with  a  powerful  constitution,  misused  it  in  de¬ 
bauch  and  excess.  There  is  not  a  man  in  the  world 
whose  condition  has  not  been  affected  by  millions  of 
facts  to  which  his  own  volitions  are  foreign.  This 
ill  of  which  I  complain  to-day  was  caused,  perhaps, 
by  a  caprice  of  my  great-grandfather,  etc.,  etc.  We 
discover  solidarity  on  a  still  grander  scale,  and  at 
distances  more  inexplicable,  when  we  consider  the 
relations  of  different  nations,  or  of  different  genera¬ 
tions  of  the.  same  nation.  Look  at  our  public  loans. 
We  declare  war,  we  obey  barbarous  passions,  we 
destroy  thereby  precious  resources,  and  we  discover 
the  means  of  throwing  the  burden  of  this  destruction 
upon  our  sons,  who,  perhaps,  will  have  a  horror  of  war, 
and  be  unable  to  understand  our  contentious  passions. 
Civil  society  entire  is  but  a  totality  of  interwoven 
solidarities.  There  is,  therefore,  naturally  and  to  a 
certain  positive  degree,  undeniable  solidarity  among 
men.  In  other  terms  responsibility  is  not  exclusively 
personal 


The  moral  Bastiat  shows  the  law  of  solidarity  in  its 
phase  of  mi-  contributions  to  the  progress  of  social  har- 
iiarity.  rnony ;  we  are  here  to  consider,  however, 
its  darker  phase.  There  exists,  then,  a  general  law, 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  231 

which  observation  confirms  more  and  more  :  the  law 
of  solidarity.  And  while  social  science  is  continually 
placing  it  in  brighter  light,  our  increasing  civilization 
is  incessantly  contributing  to  its  far-reaching  applica¬ 
tions.  The  consequences  of  a  war  among  savages 
extend  but  little  beyond  the  forests  that  witnessed  it. 
In  the  civilized  world,  however,  war  cannot  break  out 
in  one  point  without  affecting  the  interests  of  the 
whole  society  of  nations. 

Human  justice  has  for  its  device,  and  properly  so, 
to  render  to  each  individual  his  dues,  and  to  inflict 
punishment  on  the  head  of  the  solely  guilty  one.  It 
aims  to  reach  this  point  as  far  as  possible,  but  it  is 
unable  to  reach  it  absolutely  ;  the  nature  of  Human  jus- 
things  forbids  it.  For  what  being,  indeed,  is  sldi/Tm-" 
so  isolated  that  the  sword  of  the  law  may  perIect 
strike  him,  or  justice  seal  him  with  the  stamp  of  in¬ 
famy,  without  causing  others  by  his  side  to  suffer  also  ? 

We  seek  in  vain  to  touch  but  one  individual ;  the 
individuals  are  never  isolated  ;  he  who  touches  one 
touches  also  another. 

Solidarity  is,  therefore,  a  very  general  law.  Shall 
we  consider  it  of  an  evil  nature  ?  Let  us  examine 
our  conduct.  Death  enters  a  certain  house.  Visitors 
repair  thither.  I  dp  not  mean  visits  of  cere-  Beneficent 
mony ;  friends  repair  to  the  house.  But  to  morai"^^ 
do  wrhat  ?  To  bear  their  share  in  the  suffer-  danty' 
ing  of  others  ;  for  if  sympathy  solaces,  it  solaces  only 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


232 

by  dividing  the  suffering.  Alexandre  Vinet  well  ex¬ 
presses  this  thought  when  he  says:  “Two  hearts, 
when  united,  can  brave  misfortune;  ity  at  least,  is 
common  to  both  of  them  ;  it  falls  on  each  with  but 
half  its  force/’* 

The  significance  of  compassion,  therefore,  is,  that- 
one  offers  on  the  score  of  another.  Now,  is  compas¬ 
sion  a  wrong  activity- of  the  human  heart?  Is  what 
we  call  a  tender  heart,  a  bad  heart  ?  The  Stoic  phi¬ 
losophers  thought  so.  They  may  have  been  person¬ 
ally  kind  and  compassionate  men ;  their  writings 
command  beneficence ;  but  their  doctrine  affirms  that 
the  true  sage  retires  entirely  within  himself,  and,  to 
use  their  own  expression,  that  he  becomes  round  and 
polished  like  a  ball  of  steel,  experiencing  no  influence 
from  without.  Can  you  thus  think  ?  can  you  place 

*  The  last  three  lines  of  these  stanzas  r 

Vois  ce  vieux  chene  abattu  par  Forage 
Et  sur  la  terre  etendu  sans  feuillage. 

II  etait  seal ;  le  voila  sous  nos  pieds. 

Vois  ces  ormeaux  qui  joignent  letrr  ombrage, 

Des  aquilons  ils  ont  brave  la  rage  ; 

Ils  etaient  deux ;  ils  se  sent  appuyes. 

Dans  le  malheur  ainsi  courbant  la  tetes 
Tu  cederas  aux  coups  de  la  tempete 
Si  pres  de  toi  tu  n’as  pas  un  ami. 

Deux  coeurs  unis  affrontent  Pinfortune  ; 

A  tous  les  deux  au  moins  elle  est  commune 
Et  sur  chacun  ne  frappe  qvda  demi. 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  233 

compassion  among  the  unhealthy  qualities  of  the  soul  ? 
You  cannot. 

And  what  of  sacrifice  ?  Leonidas  dies  for  Greece  ; 
Winkelried  sacrifices  himself  for  Switzerland.  But  let 
us  descend  from  the  sphere  of  great  men.  This  poor 
laborer,  who  scarcely  finds  in  his  ordinary  life  suffi¬ 
cient  time  for  sleep,  devotes  a  portion  of  his  already 
too  short  nights  to  advancing  the  work  of  his  com¬ 
panion  enfeebled  by  disease.  That  poor  mother  toils 
day  and  night  to  pay  the  debts  of  her  son — debts  con¬ 
tracted,  perhaps,  in  a  life  of  disorder.  All  devoted 
hearts,  all  those  who  practice  the  virtue  of  sacrifice, 
bear  the  burdens  of  others  :  is  this  wrong  ?  Note 
now  that  it  is  precisely  this  fact  which  is  declared  to 
be  unjust,  namely,  that  one  should  suffer  because  of 
another. 

But  I  hear  you  saying  within  yourself,  There  is  a 
sophism  in  this.  Devotion  is  beautiful  and  good  be¬ 
cause  it  is  voluntary  ;  but  it  is  manifestly  unjust  that 
one  should  suffer  on  account  of  another  without  will¬ 
ing  it.  My  reasoning,  however,  is  not  so  illogical  as 
you  think.  We  must  learn  whether  the  fact  To  suffer  for 

others  is  not 

that  one  suffers  for  another,  taken  in  itself  unjust, 
and  independently  of  our  will,  is  good  or  evil.  If  it  is 
evil  per  se,  then  our  intention  may  be  pure,  but  the 
object  of  our  volition  is  evilj  that  which  we  intend 
with  an  upright  motive  is  yet  the  realization  of  in¬ 
justice.  Compassion  and  devotion  would  then  be 


234 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


instances  of  perverted  conscience.  Now,  while  a 
certain  class  of  persons  think,  or  at  least  say,  that  de¬ 
votion  is  folly,  yet  to  lay  down  as  a  scientific  maxim 
that  the  fulfillment  of  the  law  of  charity  is  the  expres¬ 
sion  of  a  perverted  conscience,  is  what  no  sound  mind 
would  consent  to  do.  We,  therefore,  see,  not  only, 
that  solidarity  exists  in  fact,  and  is  revealed  to  obser¬ 
vation  as  a  fundamental  law  of  society,  but  also  that 
we  voluntarily  practice  this  law  as  often  as  we  enter 
upon  works  of  charity :  and  charity  is  good.  My  con¬ 
clusion,  therefore,  is,  that  if  the  practice  of  this  law  is 
good  it  must  also  be  just,  for  there  is  no  goodness 
without  justice. 

Let  us  understand  ourselves  well.  The  question 
here  is  as  to  that  absolute  morality  which  binds  us 
to  the  divine  law,  and  not  as  to  that  judicial  morality 
which  fixes  the  mutual  rights  of  individuals.  As 
bearing  on  the  mutual  rights  of  individuals,  the 
characteristic  of  charity  is  to  transcend  justice,  to  do 
voluntarily  more  than  is  required.  If  a  beggar  de¬ 
mand  your  help  as  his  right,  you  may,  with  all  jus¬ 
tice,  show  him  the  door  and  close  your  purse.  But  in 
the  presence  of  the  absolute  law  of  God,  we  never  do, 
in  the  accomplishment  of  duty,  more  than  we  are 
bound  to  do,  or  than  is  required  by  absolute  justice. 
It  is  in  God  only  that  charity  transcends  justice  ;  or, 
to  speak  more  strictly,  there  is  in  God  no  distinction 
between  justice  and  charity,  because  he  owes  nothing 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


235 


to  his  creatures  other  than  the  voluntary  debt  of  his 
free  and  eternal  love.  All  that  proceeds  from  God  is, 
as  to  us,  grace,  pure  grace.  All  that  proceeds  from 
us,  as  related  to  God  and  to  the  law  which  expresses 
his  will,  is  simply  duty  and  justice.  In  the  deep  and 
true  sense  of  the  word,  therefore,  that  charitableness 
which  bears  the  burdens  of  others,  is  simply  a  mani¬ 
festation  of  justice.  But  how  can  this  be  so,  unless 
it  be  -because  we  are  not  individually  segregated  from 
each  other  in  an  absolute  sense,  and  because  The  law  of 
there  exists  among  us  a  bond,  a  fundamental 
union — that  is  to  say,  because  the  human  race  “orf  tilJn 

J  ’  ideal  unity 

forms  a  real  though  mysterious  unity  ?  Aside  ol'mankin<r 
from  this  thought  there  is  no  justice  in  the  law  of 
solidarity 

J 

Should  this  reasoning  appear  too  subtle,  perhaps 
the  following  may  be  more  simple.  The  solidarity  of 
mankind  is  a  fact.  It  is  not  only  actual,  in  the  sense 
that  we  suffer  or  derive  joy  from  the  acts  of  our  con¬ 
temporaries  ;  but  it  is  also  hereditary :  we  experience 
in  good,  as  in  evil,  the  consequences  of  actions  com¬ 
mitted  by  generations  past ;  and  future  generations 
will  reap  the  heritage  which  our  conduct  is  sowing 
for  them.  These  are  facts  of  experience  which  no  one 
can  contest.  Now,  no  one  undergoes  justly  the 
moral  consequences  of  acts  which  he  did  not  accom¬ 
plish  :  such  is  an  axiom  of  conscience.  We  are  forced, 
therefore,  to  choose  between  these  two  alternatives : 


236 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


either,  we  suffer  for  the  faults  of  beings  from  whom 
we  are  totally  and  absolutely  separated — and  in  this 
case  injustice  would  be  at  the  foundation  of  the  uni- 

1 

verse,  sin  cesolidarity  is  a  general  fact — or  the  human 

1 

race  is,  under  the  diversity  of  its  individuals,  so  con¬ 
nected  in  a  real  unity,  that  there  springs  justly  there¬ 
from,  for  us,  a  collective  responsibility  in  addition  to 
our  personal  responsibility.  Such  is  the  alternative 
from  which  we  are  forced  to  choose,  unless  w£  give 
up  all  hope  of  solving  the  problem.  But  to  admit  that 
injustice  is  at  the  foundation  of  the  universe,  is  to 
violate  reason  and  to  destroy  conscience.  We  are, 
therefore,  forced  to  the  admission  of  a  human  unity, 
of  a  collective  responsibility ;  and  we  accept  it,  not¬ 
withstanding  its  obscurities,  as  the  sole  view  which 
reconciles  experience  and  reason,  the  facts  of  life  and 
the  utterances  of  conscience. 

Human  individuals  are  distinct,  but  they  are  not 
separate.  Isolation  is  the  watch-word  of  Cain ;  and  it 
is  also  the  cold  word  which  once  fell  from  Rousseau 
when  he  wrote  :  “  What  matters  to  me  what  becomes 
of  the  wicked  !  I  take  little  interest  in  their  fate.” 
Solidarity  in  But  the  supreme  law  of  the  spiritual  world, 

conflict  avith 

selfishness,  charity,  does  not  speak  as  Cain  and  Rous¬ 
seau.  Charity  practices  two  maxims.  The  first  is  this : 
Render  to  each  the  consequences  of  his  own  acts  ; 
none  can  throw  his  own  faults  upon  others.  This  is 
a  clear  oracle  of  conscience.  Charity  conforms  itself 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


23  7 


thereto,  for  true  charity  is  just,  and  it  cannot  be  truly 
good  save  in  being  just.  The  second  maxim  is  this : 
We  are  many,  and  .yet  we  are  one.  At  this  point 
the  heart  outruns  the  reason ;  and  to  arrive  at  the 
truth  in  the  case,  we  only  need  to  reduce  to  theory  the 
practice  of  the  heart.  Pascal  has  said  :  “  The  heart 
has  its  reasons  which  the  reason  understands  not ;  ” 
but  it  is  the  fault  of  the  reason,  for  an  essential  part 
of  its  duty  is  to  fathom  the  reasons  of  the  heart 

Place  yourself  in  front  of  an  edifice  in  construction, 
✓ 

and  observe  the  manifold  stones,  designed  for  it, 
lying  about  you.  You  will  often  notice  on  these 
stones,  certain  marks  intended  to  designate  the  place 
of  each  of  these  fragments  in  the  unity  of  the  rising 
edifice.  Now,  we  are  all  stones  for  an  edifice,  and 
the  heart  is  the  mark  which  fixes  our  destination. 
Our  diverse  individualities  are  to  conciliate  them¬ 
selves  in  the  harmony  of  a  whole,  that  is,  in  a  unity. 
God  designs  that  we  should  be  free  and  responsible 
persons  ;  but  he  also  designs  us  to  form  a  spiritual 
communion,  which  is  as  real  as  the  individuals  ;  since 
it  also,  as  well  as  the  individuals,  is  willed  by  God, 
and  since  the  will  of  God  is  the  supreme  expression 
for  that  which  is  and  for  that  which  ought  to  be. 

We  have,  therefore,  to  accept  and  to  main-  Two  funda- 

.  ,  ,  .  .  mental  pha- 

tain  two  truths  :  first,  our  personal  existence  ses  of  hu_ 
with  all  its  consequences,  the  most  important  mau  hte‘ 
of  which  being,  ^at  no  one  can  throw  off  the  responsi- 


238 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


bility  of  his  voluntary  acts  ;  and,  secondly,  our  col¬ 
lective  existence  with  all  its  consequences,  the  most 
important  of  which  being,  that  we  ought  to  bear  each 
other's  burdens.  The  one  of  these  truths,  our  per¬ 
sonality,  we  see  perfectly  clearly,  and,  in  many  cases, 
only  too  clearly.  But  the  other  is  obscure  to  us  :  we 
do  not  clearly  discern  the  spiritual  edifice  in  view  of 
which  we  exist,  and  which  is  to  realize  the  funda¬ 
mental  unity  of  our  nature,  But  why  so  ?  I  do  not 
presume  to  lift  the  vail  entirely,  but  only,  if  possible, 
to  brush  it  aside  a  little.  Why,  then,  do  we  not  see 
this  second  truth  ?  Is  it  not  egotism,  that  primitive 
form  of  sin,  that  is  here  also  the  essential  cause  of  our 
error  ?  And  is  it  not  the  elevating  influence  of  de¬ 
votion  and  sacrifice— -that  is,  of  those  elements  of 
charity  that  we  yet  retain — "that  dissipates,  in  some 
degree,  our  darkness  ?  Do  we  not  accept  solidarity 
in  the  limits  and  in  the  proportion  of  our  love  ?  The 
members  of  a  united  family  accept  and  practice,  with¬ 
out  thinking  it  strange,  the  solidarity  which  binds  them 
together.  The  citizen,  when  animated  by  warm  patriot¬ 
ism,  raises  not  the  least  doubt  as  to  the  legitimacy  of 
the  bond  which  attaches  him  to  his  nation.  Is  it  not 
safe  to  assume  that  in  growing  in  charity  we  will  grow 
in  the  truth,  and  that  we  will  succeed  in  understanding 
our  solidarity  in  the  fall  in  proportion  as  we  accept  the 
work,  proposed  to  each  of  us,  of  being  laborers  in  the 
common  work  of  the  restoration  of  the  human  race  ? 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


239 


Our  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  rests  on  two 
principal  ideas,  that  of  liberty,  and  that  of 
solidarity.  Up  to  our  own  day,  philosophy  two  ideas  of 
has  too  often  ignored  the  rights  of  liberty,  solidarity, 
which  alone  constitute  the  reality  and  dignity  of 
spirits.  But  one  of  the  chief  currents  of  contem¬ 
porary  thought  is  now  tending  to  lead  men  into  the 
opposite  error,  and  to  occasion  the  ignoring  of  the 
law  of  solidarity,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the 
spiritual  unity  of  mankind.  Writers  seem  frequently 
to  confound  man’s  individual  existence  with  a  mere  in¬ 
dividualism  which  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  things. 
“  Individuality ,”  says  Vinet,  “  is  not  individualism. 

The  latter  refers  every  thing  to  self,  sees  in  every 

0 

thing  nothing  but  self ;  individuality  consists  simply 
in  wishing  to  be  one’s  self  in  order  to  be  something. 
Individualism  and  individuality  are  two  sworn  ene¬ 
mies  :  the  former  is  the  obstacle  and  negation  of  all 
society  ;  the  latter  is  that  to  which  society  owes  all 
that  it  has  of  savor,  of  life,  and  of  reality.”  It  is  our 
duty  to  separate  ourselves  from  the  evil  current  of 
humanity,  and  to  become  personal  and  conscient 
beings,  not  in  order  to  remain  isolated,  but  in  order 
to  re-enter  freely  into  communion  with  spiritualized 
society.  Each  is  to  become  a  personal  self,  not  in 
order  to  keep  himself  for  himself,  but  in  order  to  con¬ 
secrate  himself  to  the  common  good  of  all,  in  har- 

4. 

mony  with  the  plan  of  the  universal  Father. 


240 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


Socialists  and  Individualists,  drawn  up  in  opposite 
The  errors  camps,  contend,  in  the  schools  and  in  the 
ists.  world,  with  the  disjointed  fragments  of  truth. 
The  fact  is,  the  normal  development  of  society  pro¬ 
motes  more  and  more  the  complete  formation  of  true 
individuals,  for  society  is  not  an  aggregate,  a  simple 
collection,  but  a  spiritual  organism  formed  of  wills 
which  control  and  unite  themselves  in  a  common 

purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  the  individual  cannot 

» 

.  exist  in  isolation,  but  develops  himself  normally  and 
harmoniously  only  in  realizing  by  his  freedom  the 
law  of  solidarity.  Harmbny,  as  Pythagoras  held,  is, 
in  fact,  the  solution  of  the  enigma  of  the  world. 

The  Swiss  have  a  beautiful  national  motto,  but  it 
is  not  to  Swiss  hearts  alone  that  it  speaks.  In  the 
solemn  moments  of  our  existence  it  stirs  the  man 
within  us  in  his  profoundest  depths,  for  it  is  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  the  supreme  law  of  the  universe  :  “  Each 
for  all ;  all  for  each.” 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


241 


* 


LECTURE  VI. 

THE  CONFLICT  OF  LIFE. 

The  title  of  this  lecture  will  surprise  no  one. 
Who,  in  fact,  does  not  know  that  life  is  a  conflict  ? 
The  majority  of  men  are  engaged  in  a  constant  strug¬ 
gle  in  order  merely  to  live,  to  gain  their  daily  bread, 
and  that  of  their  family  ;  they  struggle  against  ever- 
menacing  poverty.  Others,  free  from  these  material 
cares,  strive  for  place,  for  office,  in  order  to  obtain 
fortune  or  reputation  ;  they  seek  to  triumph  over  their 
competitors,  to  rise  above  their  rivals.  All  of  us  seek 
after  happiness  ;  and  in  this  seeking  we  have  to  strive 
daily  with  cares  and  chagrins.  Thus  we  succeed  in 
living ;  then  we  leave  something  behind  for  our  chil¬ 
dren,  a  fortune  greater  or  less,  a  reputation  more  or 
less  good  ;  and  then,  we  are  carried  to  our  graves. 

But  it  is  not  of  this  conflict,  the  object  of  which  is 
comfort  and  success,  that  we  are  to-day  The  couflicC 
to  speak,  and  yet  we  will  not  speak  of  any  lorthes°od* 
thing  else  than  of  our  every-day  life  ;  but  we  will 
speak  of  it  from  a  special  point  of  view  ;  we  will 
speak  of  the  good  conflict,  that  which  is  to  have  for 
result,  not  success  in  the  world,  but  the  realization 
of  the  laws  of  the  good. 

10 


24  2 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


The  conflict  which  we  are  to  engage  in  against 
evil  is  not  a  normal  phase  of  the  development  of  a 
rj h-  conrtict  spiritual  creature  ;  it  is  not  directed  against 

is  against  ° 

anabnor-  the  possibility  of  evil,  for  evil  is  already  ex- 

mal  state  of 

things.  tant,  real  and  powerful ;  it  has  its  armies 
and  fortresses,  and,  worst  of  all,  it  has  a  citadel  in  the 
heart  of  each  of  us.  Evil  being  already  real,  there 
is  in  the  struggle  which  we  have  to  sustain  some¬ 
thing  to  be  destroyed,  something  to  be  annihilated  ; 
and  though  man  may,  by  the  consciousness  of  per¬ 
formed  duty,  attain  to  a  feeling  of  peace,  yet  he  can¬ 
not  find  stable  and  permanent  repose  in  a  world  ruled 
over  by  disorder.  This  situation  is  both  astonishing 
and  discouraging  ;  hence,  we  are  sometimes  led  to 
shut  our  eyes  to  the  real  condition  of  life,  and  to  try 
to  persuade  ourselves  that  there  is  not  after  all  so 
Lamennais  much  to  do.  “  Indifference,  indolence,  the 
love  of  ease,  and,  above  all,  trembling  cow¬ 
ardice — such  are  the  influences  that  blind  and  corrupt 
the  feeble  consciences  of  so  many  men  who  go  about 
crying  with  feigned  security,  Peace,  peace!'  when 
there  is  no  peace.  They  are  fearful  of  labor,  of  con¬ 
flict,  of  every  thing  except  that  which  they  ought  to 
fear.  But  I  tell  you  there  is  an  Eye,  whose  glance 
falls  from  on  high  as  a  malediction  on  these  sluggards. 
For  what,  then,  can  they  believe  themselves  to  have 
been  born  ?  God  did  not  place  man  upon  this  earth 
to  repose  as  if  in  his  native  clime,  nor  to  dose  away  a 


The  Problem  of  EvlL 


243 


few  days  in  indolent  slumber.  Time  is  not  a  gentle 
breeze  which  caresses  and  fans  his  brow  in  passing, 
but  a  wind  that  alternately  burns  and  freezes  him,  a 
tempest  that  drives  his  frail  bark  rapidly  on,  under  a 
beclouded  sky,  and  across  dangerous  shoals,  He 
needs  to  watch,  and  row,  and  sweat ;  he  needs  to  do 
violence  to  his  nature,  and  to  bend  his  will  to  that 
immutable  order  that  harasses  and  hems  it  in,  inces¬ 
santly.  Duty,  stern  duty,  presides  at  his  cradle,  rises 
with  him  when  he  leaves  it,  and  accompanies  him  to 
the  tomb.”  These  words  of  Lamennais  are  a  vivid 
and  striking  picture  of  our  actual  condition. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  have  accepted  all  the  details 
of  our  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  in  order  to 
sympathize  with  the  considerations  which  I  shall  offer 
in  this  lecture  ;  it  is  enough  that  you  admit  that  evil 
ought  not  to  be,  and  that,  consequently,  its  general 
prevalence  in  no  wise  diminishes  the  obligation  to 
destroy  it.  To  do  away  with  evil  is  the  purpose  of 
the  good  combat  of  life. 

He  who  combats  is  a  soldier ;  and  every  soldier 
should  know  his  colors  and  receive  the  word  of  order. 
Our  colors,  the  banner  which  we  are  to  plant  on  the 
citadels  of  the  enemy,  is  the  Good.  The  word  of 
order  is  Victory.  The  supreme  commander  is  He 
whose  eternal  volition  is  identical  with,  and  the  sub¬ 
stance  of,  the  good. 

Let  us  inquire  what  should  be,  in  our  contest 


244 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


against  evil,  the  point  of  our  departure,  what  the 
scope  of  our  aim,  what  the  shoals  we  should  avoid, 
chief  heads  and,  finally,  what  is  the  true  plan  of  the  com- 

of  the  sixth 

lecture.  bat.  Our  topics  will,  therefore,  be:  Point 
of  Departure,  Scope  of  our  Efforts,  Shoals,  and  Plan 

of  the  Conflict. 

« 

I.  Point  of  Departure. 

What  is  to  be  our  point  of  departure  ?  how  are  we 
to  set  out  in  our  contest  against  evil  ?  What,  if  I 
may  so  speak,  is  the  condition  of  enrollment  into  the 
army  of  the  good  ?  Have  you  not  sometimes  started 
from  your  home  with  the  intention  of  repairing  to 
some  definite  point,  and,  after  walking  some  time, 
suddenly  come  to  the  consciousness  that,  because  of 
some  mental  preoccupation,  you  had  taken  the  wrong 
road  ?  At  the  moment  of  making  this  discovery  you 
see  at  once  that,  in  order  to  accomplish  your  purpose, 
you  must  turn  about,  and  perform  what  is  called  in 
military  style,  a  movement  of  conversion.  The  start¬ 
ing-point  in  the  contest  against  evil  is  a  movement 
of  this  nature.  As  we  are  naturally  in  a  state  of 
egotism,  our  volitions  are  naturally  directed  toward 
ourselves,  as  if  it  were  practicable  for  us  to  be  our 
own  goal,  and  our  own  center.  This  way  is  evil 
and  deceptive,  for  egotism  is  not  the  way  of  happi¬ 
ness.  We  have,  therefore,  to  turn  about  by  an  act 
of  conversion. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


245 


In  detailed  histories  of  the  retreat  which  followed 
the  disastrous  battle  of  Leipsic,  you  will  read  of  the 
formation,  on  the  outskirts  of  the  disband-  0ur  naturai 
ing  French  army,  of  a  terrible  swarm  of  iu”trate(iby 
frico tears .  Thus  were  called  those  soldiers  lhat1ot,  dly 

J  banded  sol- 

who,  abandoning  their  colors  and  the  orders  diers- 
of  their  officers,  had  dispersed  themselves,  some  to 
indulge  in  pillage  and  evil  passions,  others  from  sim¬ 
ple  indolence  or  cowardice,  and  who,  leaving  the  melt¬ 
ing  army  to  save  itself  as  best  it  could,  had  taken  for 
their  device,  “  Each  for  himself.”  Now  what  had 
this  class  of  men  to  do  in  order  to  return  to  order  ? 
Simply  to  rejoin  their  colors,  and  place  themselves 
under  legitimate  command  ;  to  abandon  the  evil  de¬ 
vice,  “  Each  for  himself,”  and  assume  this  device, 
which  alone  can  save  an  army  in  a  hostile  country : 
“  Each  for  all,  and  all  for  each.” 

Now,  we  also,  instead  of  being  united  for  the  strug¬ 
gle  against  evil,  are  all  of  us  by  nature  disbanded  ; 
we  seek  each  his  particular  interest  ;  w&  Method  of 
must  rejoin  our  colors,  and  put  ourselves  ^2'“ 
under  the  authority  of  the  Chief.  And  what  work' 
desires  this  Chief,  the  sovereign  Father  over  ajl  ?  He 
desires  not  the  exclusive  good  of  this  one  or  that  one, 
of  any  select  number  of  his  children  ;  he  desires  the 
good  of  all,  and  it  is  this  that  we  also  should  likewise 
desire.  We  should  aim  at  the  good  of  all,  and  in  this 
each  finds  his  own  share  ;  for  he  who  forgets  him- 


246 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


self  is  he  who  most  truly  cares  for  himself.  Our 
starting-point  in  the  good  struggle  is,  therefore,  to 
renounce  egotism,  which  leaves  us  a  prey  to  the 
strokes  of  evil,  or  which  is  rather  itself  the  essence 
of  evil,  and  to  turn  ourselves  back  toward  the  su¬ 
preme  law  of  charity.  But  this  point  of  departure 
*is  the  commencing  point  of  a  development  in  soul- 
life  which  deserves  our  special  attention. 

Human  life  begins  under  the  impulses  of  the  heart, 
apart  from  the  action  of  conscience.  At  first,  man 
follows  his  instincts,  then,  he  undergoes  the  influence 
of  those  about  him.  The  child  is  under  the  influence 
of  the  family  ;  the  adult,  under  that  of  society.  One 
may  live  thus  without  having  in  himself  any  princi¬ 
ple  of  action,  yielding  only  to  external  impressions, 
without  true  exercise  of  will  or  of  conscience.  Such 
a  man,  should  he  happen  to  be  among  the  Puritans 
of  England  or  America,  would  be  of  grave  demeanor, 
serious  words,  and  strictly  exact  conduct.  But  trans¬ 
port  him  into  a  frivolous  society,  and  the  same  man 
will  act  quite  otherwise.  Those  who  live  thus,  sim¬ 
ply  following  a  current  without  reacting  against  it, 
are  not  yet  born  to  the  moral  life  ;  and  from  this  point 
of  view  one  can  say  that  there  are  multitudes  of  men 
already  old  who  are  not  yet  born.  In  the  majority 
two  phases  0f  cases,  however,  the  conscience  makes  it- 

of  con¬ 
science.  self  heard  in  the  primitive  life  of  the  heart  ; 

and  conscience  presents  itself  under  two  forms.  It 


The  Problem  of  Evil .  247 

forbids  :  Thou  shalt  not ;  and  it  commands  :  Thou 
shalt. 

The  first  manifestations  of  conscience  are  uni¬ 
formly  of  the  first  form  :  Thou  shalt  not  lie  ;  thou 
shalt  not  steal.  If  a  man  has  elevated  instincts,  and 
a  well-balanced  temperament,  and  if  he  has  grown 
up  in  honest  society,  it  may  be  that  he  will  live  with¬ 
out  seriously  violating  any  of  the  restrictive  precepts 
of  conscience.  He  may  hence  imagine  that  he  is  a 
good  man,  or  that,  as  he  will  express  it,  he  does  wrong 
to  no  one.  Nevertheless,  in  this  observance  of  the 
prohibitory  rules  of  morality  such  a  man  may  remain 
supremely  selfish,  may  be  his  own  proper  center.  If 
he  is  content  with  avoiding  what  society  regards  as 
evil,  and  if  he  does  not  positively  work  for  the  good, 
it  is  vain  for  him  to  say  that  he  does  wrong  to  no 
one  ;  in  reality  he  does  wrong  to  every  body,  since  he 
does  not  employ  for  the  common  good  a  power  of 
which  his  fellows  have  need.  His  honest  life  is  only 
an  honest  egotism.  Moreover,  such  a  position  can¬ 
not  strictly  be  maintained.  If  the  power  which  is 
given  to  us  for  the  common  good  is  not  employed  in 
its  legitimate  direction,  it  becomes  corrupt.  One 
does  not  triumph  over  evil  by  simply  refusing  to  do 
it,  and  by  continuing  to  live  for  self.  In  strictness  of 
fact,  we  overcome  evil  only  by  good.  The  good  is 
not  simply  a  rule  of  prohibition  ;  it  is  a  positive  com¬ 
mand,  assigning  a  direction  for  our  powers,  a  goal 


248  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

for  our  volitions.  This  is  the  second  form  of  the  con¬ 
science  :  Thou  shalt. 

But  what  shalt  thou  do  ?  Good.  What  good  ?  All 
good,  without  exception  ;  it  is  the  very  nature  of  the 
good  to  be  obligator}7,  and  obligatory  in  its  totality. 
Now  what  is  the  good  ?  The  good,  in  the  full  sense 
of  the  word,  is  the  plan  of  the  Creator  for  the  happi¬ 
ness  of  his  spiritual  creatures.  To  accomplish  the 
The  (roal  of  good  is,  therefore,  to  put  harmony  into 
hfe*  the  universe,  and  work  the  happiness  of 
the  wrorld.  Such  is  the  purpos’e  proposed  to  our 
efforts. 

Let  us  pause  here  to  contemplate  the  bright  light 
which  this  thought  casts  over  life.  Let  us  take,  for 
example,  the  duty  of  labor.  Labor  is  a  law  of  nature 
which  presents  itself,  in  the  first  place,  under  the  form 
of  necessity.  To  the  one  it  says :  Labor,  to  avoid 
indigence,  that  scourge  of  the  poor.  To  another: 
Labor,  to  avoid  ennui ,  that  scourge  of  the  rich.  To 
the  one  it  says  :  If  thou  toil  not,  thou  wilt  lack 
bread  to  feed  the  body,  and  thy  children  will  starve.  - 
To  the  other  :  If  thou  toil  not,  thou  wilt  lack  happi¬ 
ness,  which  is  the  food  of  the  soul,  and  at  thy  fire¬ 
side,  however  well  it  may  be  warmed,  the  heart  of 
thy  children  will  be  cold.  Thus,  labor  appears  in 
the  first  place  as  a  necessity,  as  a  law  whose  violation 
entails  harsh  retributions. 

Let  us  notice,  now,  how  this  law  is  transfigured  by 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


249 


the  consideration  of  the  idea  of  the  good,  The  imm- 

blest  life 

that'  is,  of  the  consecration  of  all  volitions  transfig¬ 
ured  by  con- 

to  the  general  happiness.  Labor  is  a  uni-  scientious- 
versal  and  fundamental  law  of  the  spiritual 
world  ;  since  for  spirits,  whose  very  essence  is  free 
power,  to  live  is  to  act.  Now,  the  co-operation  of  all 
the  forces,  each  acting  in  its  legitimate  place  and 
direction,  would  produce  a  harmony  whose  fruit  would 
be  progress,  or  the  increasing  amelioration  of  society. 
When  this  thought  once  enters  the  understanding, 
then  even  the  gardener,  while  reposing  on  his  spade, 
the  artisan,  while  suspending  for  a  moment  his  work, 
in  fact,  all  honest  laborers,  may  say  without  presump¬ 
tion  that  they  are  no  less  necessary  agents  in  the 
general  march  of  society  than  the  men  whose  posi¬ 
tions  are  surrounded  by  the  greatest  pomp.  The  law 
of  labor,  then,  is  transfigured.  Under  the  form, 
Thou  shalt,  it  was  a  harsh  necessity  ;  under  the  form, 
Thou  shouldst ,  it  becomes  a  privilege,  sublime  in  pro¬ 
portion  as  we  penetrate  its  significance,  and  attractive 
as  we  come  to  see  that  its  foundation  is  goodness. 
Yes,  yes,  all  of  us — the  one  in  guiding  his  plow  in 
the  furrow,  the  other  in  handling  the  saw  or  plane, 
the  other  in  holding  the  square  or  file,  the  other  in 
settling  disputes  and  rendering  justice,  the  other  in 
administering  public  affairs,  the  other  in  instruction 
and  study — all  of  us,  are  contributing  to  shape  the 
destinies  of  the  world  ;  and  we  will  all  do  our  task 


250 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


joyfully,  as  soon  as  we  come  fully  to  understand  how 
high  a  privilege  it  is,  to  fulfill  the  common  law  of-laffor 
in  fraternity  of  love. 

Such  is  the  good.  The  goal  of  each  will  should 
not  be  the  individual  who  wills,  but  the  development 
and  harmony  of  the  common  brotherhood.  When 
this  is  once  truly  understood,  the  idea  of  self-seeking 
gives  place  to  the  idea  of  charity.  This  is  a  moral 
discovery,  analogous  to  that  of  the  astronomer 
Copernicus.  The  earth  had  been  saying :  I  am  the 
center  of  the  universe  ;  the  starry  heavens  revolve 
around  me,  and  exist  for  me  only.  But  science  came, 
and  said  :  Thou  art  not  the  center  of  the  universe  ; 
it  is  thou  that  revolvest  around  the  sun,  and  the  sun 
itself,  with  all  its  retinue  of  planets,  revolves  perhaps 
also  about  some  central  sun  in*  the  immense  system 
of  creation.  But  is  the  earth  humiliated  by  this  ? 
By  no  means  ;  it  is  simply  assigned  to  its  place  ;  and 
every  place  is  good  so  long  as  the  proper  circle  is 
traced,  so  long  as  the  true  orbit  is  not  abandoned. 
The  three-  To  substitute  the  idea  of  charity  for  the  idea 

fold  conver¬ 
sion.  of  self-seeking — such  is  the  conversion  of  the 

intelligence  ;  to  be  seriously  and  thoroughly  resolved 

to  do  duty — such  is  the  conversion  of  the  will ;  to 

love  the  duty  which  we  have  determined  to  do — such 

is  the  conversion  of  the  heart. 

g/ 

Such  is  our  starting-point.  What,  now,  should  by 
the  scope  of  our  efforts  for  the  good  ? 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


251 


II.  Scope  of  our  Efforts. 

Where  do  we  find  evil  ?  Every-where.  Where 
should  we  do  good  ?  Every-where.  In  the  presence 
of  all  good  whatever,  we  should  repeat  the  cry* of  the 
ancient  Crusaders  :  God  wills  it !  Let  us  beware  of 
that  narrow  and  empty  religion  which  would  admit  a 
distinction  between  the  cause  of  God  and  the  cause 
of  charity.  To  this  perverted  religion,  which  would 
assign  to  God  only  a  small  share  in  public  worship 
and  in  external  forms,  true  religion — -that  which 
should  be  the  center  of  our  existence,  the  inspiration 
of  the  whole  life — will  always  respond,  in  the  lan¬ 
guage  of  St.  James,  that,  “Faith  without  works  is 
dead.” 

Let  us  not  permit  the  good  to  be  limited  in  any 
such  manner.  There  is  no  sphere  of  human  activity 
into  which  it  should  not  enter  ;  there  are  no  u  evil  js 
walls  of  tradition  or  prejudice  which  it  should  eTiy" 

x  J  where,  so 

not  break  through.  The  contrary  opinion  is  should  it be 

J  combated 

an  error  not  less  frequent  than  deplorable.  eveix- 

where. 

Notice,  for  example,  its  workings  in  politics. 

Injustice  is  quite  revolting  in  the  relations  of  private 
life :  none  should  be  deprived  of  what  belongs  to 
him  ;  nothing  is  more  branded  than  theft.  And  yet 
have  we  not  seen  it  raised  into  a  maxim  of  interna¬ 
tional  law  that,  in  the  sphere  of  politics,  “  Might 
makes  right  ?  ”  “  Those  are  but  freaks  of  princes,” 


252  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

as  says  Andrieux  ;  “  they  respect  a  trifle,  but  steal  a 
province.”* 

But  how  many  private  citizens  indulge  in  similar 
freaks  !  It  is  not  less  obligatory  to  respect  our  neigh¬ 
bor's  reputation  than  his  material  possessions.  Now, 
in  politics,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  what  are  the 
usual  concomitants  of  a  democratic  election  ?  In  the 
case  of  a  candidate  of  the  opposite  party,  see  how 

ready  we  are  to  credit  every  scandalous  rumor  with 

« 

regard  to  his  life  and  motives  !  how  ready  we  are, 
even,  to  spread  them  abroad,  without  the  least  certain 
evidence  of  their  truth  !  And  why  all  this  ?  Because 
it  is  mere  politics  ;  and  morality,  as  we  practically 
say,  should  stay  within  its  own  sphere. 

Almost  every  profession  seeks  thus  to  establish  for 
itself  a  closed  field  into  which  common  morality  is 
not  to  enter.  It  is  wrong  to  lie  ;  but  what  of  a  law¬ 
yer  ?  Would  it  not  be  too  great  a  restriction  on  an 
advocate  to  require  him  always  to  tell  the  truth  ? 
And  what  of  commerce  ?  Is  it  not  a  usage  too  prev¬ 
alent  in  this  business,  to  take  for  granted  that  exact 
honesty  and  truthfulness  are  not  to  be  expected  ? 
in  art.  And  so  is  it  also  in  the  sphere  of  art  and 
literature.  Here  are  paintings  decidedly  lascivious, 
music  that  is  enervating,  poetry  whose  charm  is  mor¬ 
bid,  and  prose  which  will  leave -unfortunate  associa- 


*  Ce  sont  la  jeux  de  prince  : 
On  re?pecte  un  moulin,  on  vole  une  province. 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


^53 


tions  in  the  memory.  But  what  of  that !  exclaim  the 
artists  ;  provided  only  that  the  laws  of  beauty  are  not 
violated,  there  is  nothing  to  complain  of ;  let  us  have 
art  for  its  own  sake,  and  leave  morality  in  its  own 
domain ! 

It  is  thus  that  men  attempt  every- where  to  estab¬ 
lish  shadowy  regions,  to  hollow  out  caverns  from  which 
the  entrance  of  sunlight  is  interdicted.  And,  in  fact, 
the  light  does  retire  ;  but  with  what  sad  consequences  ! 
In  politics  men  deviate  from  morality  a  little  at  first, 
and  then  more  and  more,  until  finally  they  come  to 
the  maxims  of  Machiavelli,  maxims  which  are  prac¬ 
ticed  by  many  men  who  are  not  princes.  Politics, 
the  proper  business  of  which  is  to  promote  the  well¬ 
being  of  nations,  becomes  then  one  of  the  greatest 
scourges  of  mankind.  And  in  commerce  the  effect 
of  an  ever-increasing  departure  from  the  laws  of 
morality  is,  finally,  to  affect  trade  in  its  very  sources, 
namely,  confidence  and  credit.  In  those  great  crises 
which  afflict  society,  and  dry  up  the  sources  of  labor, 
a  share  of  the  embarrassment  is  doubtless  to  .be 
attributed  to  political  events,  to  the  choking  of  mar¬ 
kets,  as  well  as  to  causes  which  do  not  belong  so 
evidently  to  the  moral  sphere.  It  is  clear,  however, 
that  if  business  men  had  perfect  confidence  Haiw  ef- 

fects  of  a 

that  their  agents  and  correspondents  would  wider  appli¬ 
cation  of  the 

not  take  advantage  of  circumstances  to  vio-  moral  law. 
late,  to  their  disadvantage,  the  laws  of  strict  probity, 


254 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


trade  would  be  much  more  prosperous,  other  circum¬ 
stances  remaining  the  same.  And  is  it  not  evident 
that  public  finances  would  not  come  to  such  a  condi¬ 
tion  as  they  sometimes  do,  if  the  creditors  had  confi¬ 
dence  that  they  were  doing  business  with  perfectly 
upright  governments,  with  nations  that  would  impose 
upon  themselves  the  last  sacrifices  rather  than  pay, 
in  a  paper  currency,  sums  which  they  received  in 
solid  coin  ?  On  careful  reflection,  you  will  see  that 
it  is  never  safe  to  divorce  commercial  transactions 
from  ethical  principles.  And,  finally,  of  art.  I  know 
that  artists  are  not  moralists  by  profession  ;  I  know  that 
they  can  attain  to  true  beauty  only  under  the  impulse 
of  a  truly  free  inspiration,  and  that,  should  they 
directly  aim  at  a  moral  effect,  they  would  probably 
fail  in  art ;  but  I  know  that  artistic  inspiration  passes 
through  the  artist’s  heart,  and  thence  receives  a  par¬ 
ticular  direction.  If  the  artist  does  not  keep  his 
imagination  pure,  if  he  does  not  watch  over  himself 
to  prevent  his  passions  from  damagingly  affecting  his 
feeling  for  the  ideal,  and  if,  thereby,  he  comes  to 
create  immoral  productions,  it  is  surely  not  art  that 
is  responsible  therefor.  The  sad  effects  of  exclud¬ 
ing  morality  from  art  are  only  too  evident  in  many 
of  the  corrupting  productions  of  the  literature  of 
the  day. 

No,  no  ;  neither  politics  nor  the  diverse  professions 
of  private  life,  neither  art  nor  literature,  nor,  in  a  word, 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


255  ' 


any  thing  that  man  engages  in,  can  isolate  itself  from 
morality  without  bringing  upon  itself  ruin.  Let  us 
break  down  these  unjustifiable  walls.  Let  us  throw 
open  all  caverns  ;  let  the  light  of  the  good  reign  every¬ 
where,  not  under  the  form  of  a  narrow  and  cramping 
rule,  but  as  a  powerful  inspiration,  shedding  every¬ 
where  the  light  and  warmth  of  spiritual  truth. 

But  where  does  duty  cease  ?  Where  the  activity 
of  man  ceases,  and  nowhere  else.  There  exists  in 
human  life  no  phase  which  should  be  unaffected  by 
the  good.  When  may  we  cease  to  combat  evil  ? 
When  it  shall  be  destroyed,  and  not  sooner.  All 
good  is  obligatory ;  all  good  ought  to  be  ;  such  is  its 
very  nature.  Either  conscience  deceives  us,  or  we 
are  obligated  to  put  order  into  the  universe,  and  work 
the  happiness  of  the  world.  Such  is  the  object  that 
is  set  before  us,  and  toward  which  our  efforts  are  to 
aim.  But  here  is  a  danger. 

III.  Shoals. 

Our  programme  has  become  alarming  ;  and,  if  we 
consider  it  in  its  entire  scope,  it  is  absurd.  In  fact,  it 
really  seems  as  if  it  would  make  of  us  but  so  many 
Don  Quixotes  on  the  highways  of  life,  charged  to 
redress  all  wrongs,  to  repair  all  injuries,  and  to  restore 
order  every-where  ;  and  you  know  well  enough  how 
the  brave  chevalier  of  La  Mancha  succeeded  in  put¬ 
ting  order  into  the  world.  Don  Quixote  was  a  fool. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


256 

% 

But  he  was  a  good  fool ;  it  is  difficult  not  to  love  him  ; 
but  after  all  he  was  a  fool ;  and  our  programme  seems 
equally  affected  with  folly.  What,  in  fact,  would  be¬ 
come  of  a  ship  which  should  set  out  from  port  with 
the  purpose  of  seeing  every  thing,  without  having  any 
prescribed  plans?  From  the  very  fact  that  it  is 
destined  to  see  every  thing,  it  would  have  no  reason 
for  going  here  rather  than  there.  Opening,  therefore, 
its  sails  to  the  first  wind  that  blew,  and  using  neither 
helm  nor  compass,  what  would  become  of  it  ?  The 

The  danger  shoal  that  would  wreck  it  would  of  course 
of  dissipat-  ^  pe  far  0f£  And  such  would  also  be 

ing  our  lor- 

ces-  our  moral  destiny  should  we  launch  forth 
vaguely  in  the  pursuit  of  all  good  ;  we  would  be  seized 
by  the  current  of  dispersion  and  sadly  make  shipwreck 
011  the  shoals  of  discouragement. 

For,  in  fact,  how  boundless  the  work!  To  convert 
one’s  self  and  to  convert  the  world  ;  to  fulfill  our  du¬ 
ties  in  the  family,  and  in  the  exercise  of  our  profes¬ 
sion  ;  to  lead  the  blind,  to  succor  the  poor,  to  visit 
the  sick  ;  to  do  our  civic  duties  as  elector,  soldier, 
juryman  ;  to  busy  ourselves  in  reforming  institutions  ; 
to  ameliorate  that  which  already  is,  to  create  what 
ought  to  be ;  to  give  ear,  in  fine,  to  the  varied  and 
never-ending  appeals  for  works  of  charity !  calls  for 

charitable 

Of  these  appeals,  you  know  there  is  in  fact  works, 
scarcely  any  limit.  Here,  for  example,  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  cold  weather,  a  society  presents  itself  propos- 


The  Problem  of  Evil ", 


257 


ing  to  furnish  food  to  the  poor  at  the  lowest  possible 
rates  ;  the  thing  is  excellent,  hesitate  not  to  co-operate 
with  it.  And  here  is  another  society,  working  to 
spread  popular  instruction  ;  you  will  do  well  to  take 
part  in  it,  for  instruction  is  the  food  of  the  soul  And 
here  is  a  club  for  circulating  good  books ;  what,  in 
fact,  is  more  laudable  than  to  counteract,  as  much  as 
possible,  the  circulation  of  bad  books  ?  And  here  is 
an  institution  aiming  to  repress  the  nuisance  of  beg¬ 
gary  ;  and  who  is  not  interested  in  it  ?  who  does  not 
see  that  it  is  an  excellent  work  to  check  unworthy 
beggars,  and  to  provide  for  the  really  helpless  ?  And 
here  is  an  enterprise  to  furnish  cheap,  healthy  lodg¬ 
ings  for  the  poor;  surely  it  is  praiseworthy  to  furnish, 
as  fully  as  possible,  air  and  light  and  health  to  all ; 
we  cannot  refuse  ourselves  to  such  a  good  work. 
Elsewhere  there  is  an  effort  to  obtain  by  persuasion 
and  free  consent,  the  suspension  of  labor  on  Sunday. 
Let  us  hasten  to  second  this  effort ;  for,  as  much  as 
industry  is  desirable  and  profitable,  equally  so  is,  like¬ 
wise,  that  leisure  for  worship  which  is  necessary  to 
raise  mind  and  heart  to  the  true  dignity  of  manhood. 

To  all  these  enterprises  we  are  required  to  devote 
our  time,  our  counsels,  our  money.  We  must  give 
an  hour  where  we  cannot  give  a  day  ;  a  dollar  where 
we  cannot  give  ten.  Nor  must  we  allow  these  works 
at  home  to  make  us  forgetful  of  those  abroad.  A  fire 
consumes  a  village  in  Switzerland  or  on  the  French 


258  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

border  ;  we  must  subscribe.  In  this  or  that  manu¬ 
facturing  city  there  are  workmen  without  bread  ;  we 
must  help  to  save  them  from  starving.  The  negroes 
of  America  have  great  difficulty  in  passing  the  crisis 
of  their  emancipation  ;  we  must  interest  ourselves  in 
the  negroes  of  America.  Nor  must  we  forget  the 
heathen  to  whom  we  should  bear  the  benedictions 
of  our  faith  and  civilization.  What  work !  what 
work  ! 

And  yet  there  are  some  men  who  languish  and 
And  yet  complain,  because,  as  they  say,  they  have 

there  are 

sluggards,  nothing  to  do  !  There  are  men  who  seem 
to  see  in  the  improvements  of  modern  civilization  only 
so  many  multiplied  means  and  occasions  for  killing 
time — for  killing  time,  which  is  the  coin  by  which  we 
should  purchase  the  good  of  our  fellows.  In  the 
presence  of  the  boundless  proportions  and  ramifica¬ 
tions  of  evil  in  the  world,  this  misuse  of  time  is  as 

» 

bad  as  casting  grain  into  a  river  in  the  midst  of  a 
famishing  city  ;  it  is  the  throwing  away  of  all  the 
brighter  elements  of  life. 

But  let  us  return  to  our  subject.  We  cannot  too 
earnestly  remind  those  who  fold  their  arms  and  waste 
their  lives,  how  many  good  works  demand  their  help, 
how  many  harvests  are  waiting  for  reapers  ;  but  it  is 
a  different  phase  of  the  subject  that  now  calls  our 
attention. 

Our  perplexity  now  is  that  there  is  too  much  to  do. 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


259 


The  field  for  practical  charity  is  immense ;  and  prac¬ 
tical  works  are  not  half  our  task.  We  have  need  not 
only  of  boundless  knowledge,  but  also  of  boundless 
wisdom.  We  need  to  enlighten  the  conscience,  that 
our  motives  may  be  directed  toward  a  really  good 
object,  and  that  we  may  avoid  the  errors  of  misguided 
zeal.  ^Ve  need  to  enlighten  our  practical  understand¬ 
ing  ;  for  it  is  not  enough  that  the  intention  be  pure 
and  the  goal  good  in  itself  ;  we  need  wisdom  to  select 
appropriate  means  to  ends.  The  economist  Bastiat 
mentions  certain  philanthropic  and  social  enterprises, 
which,  while  springing  from  a  pure  intention  and  aim¬ 
ing  at  an  excellent  object,  yet  produce,  in  fact,  much 
evil,  because  they  proceed  on  a  misconception  of  the 
true  plan  of  social  harmony,  which  is  the  expression 
of  the  will  of  the  Creator,  and  tend  to  substitute  in 
its  place  an  unnatural  order  of  things  whose  conse¬ 
quences  would  be  disastrous.  A  like  danger  is  in¬ 
curred  in  every  sphere  of  human  activity ;  zeal  without 
knowledge  works  evil ;  to  act  effectually,  we  need  to 
know  the  object  to  be  attained,  the  means  to  emplof, 
and  the  obstacles  to  overcome.  The  work  of  con- 
science,  therefore,  needs  the  aid  of  the  reason ;  we 
must  unite  all  the  light  of  the  understanding  to  all 
the  ardors  of  the  will,  so  as  to  keep  upright  our  own 
heart,  to  combat  incessantly  within  and  without, 
to  do  all  and  to  learn  all,  to  have  an  opinion  on  all 
subjects,  to  exert  an  influence  in  every  sphere;  but 


260 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


Our 

ity. 


at  this  rate,  what  will  become  of  us  ?  We  are  already 
perplex-  drifting  away  on  the  current  of  dispersion. 
We  will  do  every  thing  but  by  halves ;  we 
will  abandon  one  good  work  for  the  next  one  that 
comes  offering  itself.  In  the  conflict  against  evil  we 
shall  act  like  a  soldier,  who,  raising  his  sword  against  # 
one  enemy,  should  turn  it  away  without  striking  him 
in  order  to  assault  another,  and  from  the  second  in 
order  to  pursue  a  third,  and  so  on,  without  ever  doing 
effectual  service.  Thus  we  would  be  engaged  in  a 
fruitless  agitation  for  the  good,  which  really,  however, 
would  only  further  the  evil ;  for  a  vague  and  undisci¬ 
plined  zeal  becomes  indiscreet,  and  introduces  trouble 
every-where,  and  order  nowhere.  It  is,  as  Fenelon 
has  said,  “  an  anxious  and  unquiet  ardor,  more  apt  to 
create  perplexity  than  to  enlighten  us  as  to  our  duties.” 

And  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  natural  tendency  of 
civilization  is  to  increase  all  these  dangers.  In  pro- 
And  the  portion  as  our  relations  are  multiplied,  and  as 

progress  of  _  • 

civilization  a  general  solidarity  of  cares,  interests,  and 

increases 

rather  than  works,  is  established,  in  this  same  proportion 
diminishes  ^ve  tend  to  lose  that  calmness  so  necessary 

to  the  sound  culture  of  the  heart,  in  that,  more  and 
more,  we  are  interested  in  every  thing  and  tempted 
to  participate  in  every  thing.  Every  day  a  new  call 
for  help  comes  from  one  end  of  the  world  or  the  other. 

If  we  yield  to  this  current  we  will  be  involved  in  an 
ardent  and  unquiet  agitation,  and  will  not  be  long  in 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


261 


exhausting  our  powers,  our  time,  and  resources  ;  na¬ 
ture  will  interpose  her  veto,  and,  overcome  as  well  by 
exhaustion  of  body  as  by  weariness  of  soul,  we  will 
stagger  and  disastrously  fall.  We  are  glad  to  say,  to 
the  honor  of  human  nature,  that  over  against  the 
millions  of  victims  of  sense,  vanity,  and  ambition, 
there  are,  in  fact,  some  victims  of  an  ardent  and 
disordered  zeal  for  the  good. 

The  prostration  springing  from  this  fatal  disper¬ 
sion  of  forces  appears  under  two  forms.  Twoformsof 
With  some,  it  is  a  noble  sadness  springing  <ynse(iuent 
from  a  sentiment  of  powerlessness,  but  with-  ment 
out  destroying  a  firm  and  persistent  confidence  in 
the  good.  With  others,  however,  it  is  a  sort  of  half 
persuasion  that  the  good  which  they  had  sought  with 
such  feverish  ardor  was,  'after  all,  only  a  delusion  ; 
they  conclude  with  Philinte,  in  Moliere,  that  it  is  the 
greatest  of  follies  to  undertake  to  put  to  rights  the 
world.*  They  adopt  as  device  the  favorite  saying  of 
an  Italian  statesman  at  the  beginning  of  this  century: 
The  world  goes  of  itself,  f  and  hence  there  is  no  need 
of  meddling  with  it.  Here  we  meet  in  fact  with  a 
stumbling-block,  with  danger  of  discouragement. 
But  what  is  to  be  done?  It  is  impossible  to  renounce 
the  fundamental  truth  that  all  good  is  obligatory ;  for 

*  “  Que  c’est  une  folie  a  nulle  autre  seconde, 

De  vouloir  se  meter  de  corriger  le  monde.” 

+  “  II  mondo  va  da  se." 


2  62 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


this  would  be  to  deny  the  very  essence  of  the  good. 
There  must,  therefore,  be  some  other  truth  to  com¬ 
plement  this  one,  and  by  the  aid  of  which  we  may 
form  a  rational  scheme  for  the  conflict  of  life.  This 
truth,  doubtless,  some  of  you  have  anticipated.  Let 

us  try  to  place  it  in  a  clear  light. 

♦ 

IV.  -Plan  of  the  Conflict. 

The  obligation  to  do  the  good  is  absolute  and  uni¬ 
versal  ;  but  this  universal  obligation  is  distributed  by 
the  Maker  of  all  among  all  his  creatures.  We  are 
all  called  to  contribute  to  the  general  good ;  but  no 
one  of  us  is  personally  and  exclusively  charged  with 
restoring  order  to  the  universe,  and  giving  happiness 
a  truth  com-  to  the  world.  This  is  the  fundamental  truth 

plemeutary 

to  the  obii-  which  we  have  left  out  of  consideration  in 

gation  to  do  .  , .  ,  .  T  ......  - 

aii  good.  the  preceding  observations.  It  will  help  us 
out  of  our  perplexity. 

Every  creature  has  a  definite,  providentially-as¬ 
signed  place.  Eliminate  from  the  circumstances  of 

each  of  us  all  that  may  appear  as  disorder,  all  the 

« 

evils  that  proceed  from  our  personal  will,  from  the 
Each  has  his  actions  of  others,  or  from  the  influence  of 

provideutial 

place.  bad  institutions,  and  it  will  still  be  true  that, 
while  normally  there  is  equality  of  duty  and  equality 
of  happiness,  there  will  yet  always  remain  diversity 
of  position.  Absolute  equality  cannot  exist  even  in 
the  material  universe.  Conceive  a  world  composed 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  263 

of  perfectly  similar  atoms  :  will  you  have  realized 
absolute  equality  ?  By  no  means  ;  these  atoms  will 
differ  in  the  positions  they  occupy,  as  they  will  neces¬ 
sarily  be  at  unequal  and  different  distances  from  the 
common  center.  The  same  diversity  must  exist 
among*  spirits  ;  this  diversity  is  the  condition  of  the 
existence  of  the  world.  Each  occupies  a  place  which 
falls  to  him  independently  of  his  will.  Our  first  duty 
is  to  accept  this  place  as  an  expression  of  general 
Providence.  Not  to  accept  this  place,  but  to  cast  a 
covetous  look  upon  the  position  of  others,  is  to  com¬ 
mit  the  sin  of  envy.  And  envy,  when  indulged  in 
freely,  finds  no  stopping-place  in  the  vast  universe  ; 
it  comes  finally  to  wish  to  usurp  the  place  of  God. 
It  is  the  primitive  temptation  which  explains  the 
origin  of  evil.  Envy,  which  brings  so  much  trouble 
into  society,  and  so  much  bitterness  into  souls,  is  the 
most  immediate  outgrowth  of  the  primitive  fall. 

But  do  not  fear  lest  this  thought  should  have  a  re¬ 
actionary  tendency.  Fear  not  lest  acquiescence  in 
our  providentially-assigned  sphere  should  lead  us  to 
sit  like  Turks,  with  arms  and  legs  folded,  and  await 
the  decrees  of  fate.  As  we  have  already  seen,  the 
law  of  every  moral  creature  is  continually  to  amelio¬ 
rate  its  condition,  and  thus  realize  true  progress. 
Every  place  in  the  world  of  spirits  has  its  special 
duties,  its  peculiar  works.  If  a  being,  called  to  de¬ 
velop  himself  as  a  free  power,  should  remain  stationary, 


264 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


this  would  not  be  to  stay  in  his  proper  place,  it  would 
be  to  desert  his  post 

We  have  here,  therefore,  the  light  which  we  needed 
in  order  to  lay  out  a  practical  plan  for  the  combat  of 

The  scale  of  From  the  diversity  of  positions  there 
duties,  results  a  graduated  scale,  a  hierarchy,  of 
duties.  No  one  person  is  the  center  of  the  world, 
and  no  one  should  be  the  goal  of  his  own  volitions ; 
but  each  one  is  a  center  of  personal  activity.  Con¬ 
ceive  of  each  will  as  a  point  from  which  power  radi¬ 
ates  ;  conceive  this  point  as  surrounded  by  a  series 
of  concentric  circles  ;  and  conceive  that  the  power  in 
developing  itself  is  not  to  pass  to  any  one  of  these 
circles  until  after  having  filled  those  which  are  nearer 
the  point  of  departure  :  and  this  will  be  an  apt  image 
of  the  normal  exercise  of  our  activity  in  the  practice 
of  the  good. 

We  mu£t  begin  .with  ourselves.  We  are  all  keepers, 
Our  first  the  ones  of  the  others  ;  nevertheless,  in  the 

moral  con-  .  r  .  .  ,  .  ... 

cem  is  for  order  oi  rrovidence,  each  is  more  especially 
charged  with  keeping  himself.  We  can  give 
an  excellent  interpretation  to  the  common  proverb  : 
“  Charity  begins  at  home.”  To  labor  for  the  good,  the 
first  requisite  is  to  be  good.  The  question  is,  here, 
not  of  an  order  of  succession  in  time,  but  in  causa¬ 
tion.  If  one  should  wish  to  be  good  before  doing 
good,  he  would  be  like  a  boy  unwilling  to  go  into  the 
water  before  having  first  learned  to  swim  ;  for  to  be 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


265 


good  and  to  do  good  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word, 
are  one  and  the  same  thing.  The  question  is  not  of 
an  order  of  succession,  but  of  an  order  of  importance. 
In  the  accomplishment  of  duty,  our  first  care  should 
always  be  directed  to  ourselves.  We  should  not  be 
of  those  who  preach  the  law  to  others  without  sin¬ 
cerely  trying  to  keep  it  ourselves,  or  bind  burdens 
for  the  shoulders  of  others  without  bearing  them  our¬ 
selves.  The  first  duty  of  each  is  to  restore  himself 
to  order ;  to  govern  his  actions,  feelings,  and  thoughts 
in  conformity  with  the  moral  law. 

m 

This  duty  includes  this  other  one,  namely,  of  pre¬ 
serving  ourselves  in  a  condition  to  accomplish  our 
part.  There  are  exceptional  cases  in  which  man 
should  be  willing,  without  hesitation,  to  sacrifice  his 
health,  or  even  his  life  ;  but  in  ordinary  cases  We  shoulrl 
it  is  our  duty  to  economize  our  forces  in  our  forces, 
order  to  be  capable  for  our  work.  Repose  is  neces¬ 
sary.  Amusements,  even,  and  pleasure  have  their 
place  in  a  well-regulated  life  ;  for  man  needs  recrea¬ 
tion.  The  spirit  which  should  regulate  this  order  of 
things,  is  suggested  by  the  very  word  itself.  Recrea¬ 
tion  should  recreate ,  that  is,  renew  our  forces  ;  its 
object  determines  its  legitimate  limits.  It  is  very 
evident  that  we  violate  the  law  of  recreation  when 
the  diversion  which  should  renew  our  forces,  con¬ 
sumes  them.  If  we  waste  body  and  soul  in  excessive 
eating  or  drinking — if  it  is  necessary  to  spend  the 


2  66 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


day  in  recovering  from  the  fatigues  of  a  night  spent 
at  a  ball,  or  theater,  or  club — it  is  very  evident  that 
the  order  of  nature  is  disturbed. 

But  what  is  even  more  important  than  recreation, 
we  should  for  the  health  <3f  the  moral  life,  is  the  habit 
"  °f  finding  moments  for  mental  repose,  for 
silence,  for  meditation.  In  a  world  where 
disorder  reigns  so  largely,  the  law  of  charity  becomes 
a  law  of  combat.  But  in  order  to  combat,  one  needs 
to  be  strong  ;  and  no  one  can  build  up  his  spiritual 
forces  if  he  does  not  manage  to  be  often  in  solitude, 
to  isolate  himself  from  the  tumult  of  life,  in  order  to 
nurture  his  mind  on  those  high  thoughts  which  secure 
against  dissipation.  We  never  act  more  effectually 
in  the  service  of  others  than  when  we  frequently 
withdraw  from  them,  in  order  calmly  to  contemplate, 
in  the  presence  of  the  universal  Father,  the  great 
laws  of  spiritual  order  which  bind  us  to  all  of  our  fel¬ 
lows,  and  to  *him,  the  common  center  of  all. 

After  having  been  busied  with  ourselves,  we  must 
We  must  re-  then  pass  to  others.  In  this  passage  from 
liberty  of  self  to  others,  there  is  one  feature  which 
deserves  careful  consideration.  To  do  good 
to  others  is  the  law  of  our  will ;  but  these  others  are 
our  fellows,  that  is,  they  have  wills  also,  and  we  are 
not  their  masters.  There  is  one  common  Master  of 
souls,  but  it  is  not  we.  Therefore,  after  having  ex¬ 
erted  our  legitimate  influence  on  others — an  influence 


The  Problem  of  Evil ’ ' 


267 


that  will  be  great  in  proportion  as  we  love  them — we 
should  stop,  and  respect  their  liberty ;  for  indiscretion 
is  here  fatal.  An  indiscreet  zeal  for  good  awakens 
man’s  instincts  of  independence,  and  thus  turns  to 
evil.  Under  the  general  law  of  solidarity  which 
makes  us  to  so  large  an  extent  one,  each  has  yet  his 
proper  responsibility  and  his  personal  affairs. 

A  good  rule  for  the  influence  which  we  ought  to 
exert  on  others,  is  suggested  by  the  above-mentioned 
concentric  circles.  Our  first  care  should  be  for  our 
own  family,  and  for  our  closest  natural  com-  Theprece- 
panions  in  the  journey  of  life.  This  rule  is  home  da- 
essential,  but  it  is  frequently  violated.  Here  ties‘ 
is,  for  example,  a  very  charitable  lady.  She  visits  the 
poor  very  often,  which  is  an  excellent  thing  ;  she  is  a 
member  of  all  the  benevolent  societies,  which  is  per¬ 
haps  too  much.  For,  in  fact,  my  good  lady,  on  the 
supposition  that  your  husband,  returning  fatigued 
from  the  toil  and  cares  of  the  day,  has  great  need  of 
finding  a  glowing  fireside,  a  repast  ready,  and  a 
cheering  welcome,  and  that,  instead  of  this,  he  learns, 
on  reaching  his  home,  that  Madam  is  gone  to  attend 
her  charity-meeting,  will  you  not  then  be  neglecting 
your  first  duty,  to  attend  to  a  work  which,  while  excel¬ 
lent  in  itself,  yet  becomes  evil  by  taking  a  place 
which  does  not  belong  to  it  ?  And  you,  sir,  also,  if 
you  are  needed  at  home  for  counsel,  for  making  a  de¬ 
cision,  for  a  necessary  virile  intervention,  will  you  do 


268 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


right  to  remain  from  home,  even  though  it  be  to  at¬ 
tend  a  meeting  of  public  utility  ?  If  the  wife  is  at 
her  charity-meeting,  and  the  husband  at  his  club, 
what  is  to  become  of  the  family  ?  the  children  ?  Is 
not  that  fire  of  wood,  or  coal,  that  is  smoldering 
when  it  ought  to  be  brightly  blazing,  the  symbol  of 
another  fire  whose  flame  also  is  lacking  ?  Are  you 
not  depriving  your  children  of  those  memories  of  the 
parental  fireside  which  ought  to  constitute  a  protec¬ 
tion  and  strength  in  your  sons  and  daughters  against 
the  seductions  of  life  ? 

And  our  professional  duties  fall  in  the  same  class 
And  profes-  with  those  of  the  family.  A  clerk  has  no 
tieSnal  dU  right  to  engage  in  philanthropic  works  if  he 
thereby  must  slight  his  duties  to  his  employers.  *A 
banker  has  no  right  to  engage  in  the  best  of  charities 
if  he  thereby  jeopardizes  the  interests  of  his  credit¬ 
ors.  And  we  who  fill  the  functions  of  citizens  in  a 
free  State,  we  have  no  right  to  help  our  neighbors  in 
the  best  of  enterprises,  if  thereby  we  must  neglect 
our  duties  as  electors. 

We  have  no  right  to  sacrifice  a  near  duty  to  one  that 
is  farther  off,  however  good  and  great  it  may  be.  Such 
is  the  general  rule  ;  by  it  we  can  avoid  the  shoal  of 
dissipated  forces.  This,  we  say,  is  the  ordinary  rule 
Exceptional  for  ordinary  lives.  There  are,  however,  spe¬ 
cial  vocations  which  have  special  privileges  ; 
there  are  persons  who  are  called  by  their  very  pro- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


269 


fes^ion,  to  break,  if  need  be,  the  bonds  of  family  and 
country,  in  view  of  a  general  interest  which  they 
have  accepted  as  their  first  duty.  There  are  also 
cases  of  urgency,  when  a  duty  which  is  usually  remote 
becomes  an  immediate  duty  for  every  body.  When, 
for  example,  a  conflagration  threatens  a  city  with  de¬ 
struction,  then  our  professional  and  domestic  duties 
yield  to  the  general  duty  of  preserving  the  city.  But 
these  are  exceptional  cases  ;  as  a  general  rule,  we  can 
labor  efficiently  in  the  cause  of  the  good,  only  by 
observing  the  place  providentially  assigned  to  us  in 
society. 

This  truth  is  important,  but  it  must  not  be  misap¬ 
plied.  There  is  nothing  more  elastic  than  the  forces 
and  opportunities  of  man  :  egotism  restrains  them, 
charity  augments  them.  However  exactly  you  may 
fill  your  immediate  duties,  if  you  are  yet  inclined  to 
disparage  those  who  do  more  than  you,  if  you  are 
always  ready  to  throw  your  little  vial  of  cold  water 
on  every  generous  impulse,  you  will  clearly  prove  that 
the  practice  of  your  own  duties  is,  at  bottom,  only  an 
intensified  egotism.  Let  the  immoderate  pursuits  of 
ambition  and  vanity,  the  unworthy  thirst  for  earthly 
pleasure,  and  the  temptations  to  idleness,  be  sup¬ 
pressed,  and  there  is  nobody  who  will  not  find  some 
time  to  do  good  works  outside  of  the  circle  of  his 
more  immediate  duties.  But  in  this  respect  there  is 
a  great  inequality.  Many  persons  are  able,  outside 


270  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

of  their  labor,  and  their  indispensably  necessary  fb- 
aii  can  find  pose,  to  accomplish  only  acts  of  individual 
somVforms  beneficence,  to  lend  a  hand  to  a  neighbor,  to 
of  charm.  a  traveier^  or  address  a  kind  word  to 

an  afflicted  one.  And  here  presents  itself  a  privilege 
of  the  wealthy  classes,  which  at  first  sight  seems 
immense,  the  privilege  of  being  able  largely  to  take 
part  in  works  of  public  charity.  Take  the  instance 
of  a  merchant  who  should  at  first  have  concentrated 
his  efforts  upon  his  business  in  order  to  establish  his 
family,  while  yet  also  doing  such  charity  as  he  could 
without  deviating  from  his  purpose.  Suppose  that 
this  man,  on  arriving,  by  toil,  at  an  affluence  limited 
within  reasonable  bounds,  should  retire  from  business, 
and  then  consecrate  his  whole  activity  in  aiding,  suc¬ 
coring,  and  consoling  others,  and  in  taking  part  in 
enterprises  of  general  utility :  and  you  have  before 
you  one  of  the  noblest  types  of  humanity — a  type 
which,  thank  God,  is  not  rare  in  Switzerland.  Also 
in  this  liberty  of  action  for  the  good,  which  results 
from  affluence,  there  is  need  to  guard  against  disper¬ 
sion  :  all  forces  are  increased  by  concentration.  Al¬ 
most  certainly,  ten  men  will  obtain  a  better  result  by 
giving  themselves  each  to  a  particular  work,  than  if 
these  ten  men  should  each  take  part  in  ten  different 
works.  The  Emperor  Marcus  Aurelius  gave  good 
practical  advice  when  he  said,  “  Do  not  meddle  with 
too  many  affairs.” 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


271 


It  seems,  at  first  glance,  that  this  liberty  of  devoting 
one’s  self  to  the  public  good  is  an  immense  The  privi¬ 


leges  of  all 
are  essen¬ 
tially  equal. 


privilege  for  a  generous  heart.  This  privi¬ 


lege  is  real,  but  it  is  not  as  great  as  it  ap-  ia  *  equa ' 
pears  ;  for  all  and  each  of  us  contribute  to  the  public 
good  by  fulfilling  faithfully  our  special  individual 
duties.  In  fact,  the  very  first  of  public  interests  is 
that  individual  duties  should  be  properly  fulfilled. 
There  exists  in  the  rural  districts  a  proverb  that 
might  be  applied  also  in  cities  :  “  Let  each  mind  his 
own  business,  and  the  cows  will  be  well  cared  for.” 
The  most  majestic  oak,  in  its  multiform  and  vigorous 
*  growth,  is  but  the  result  of  an  infinity  of  particular 
movements  of  little  currents  of  sap  in  very  little 
channels.  From  the  moment  that  individual  duties 
should  be  well  performed,  there  would  be  far  less  to 
do  in  what  we  call  public  charities,  a  large  share 
of  public  beneficence  having  no  other  object  than  to 
remedy  the  results  of  neglected  individual  duty.  Do 
away,  for  example,  with  indolence  and  drunkenness,  as 
well  as  inconsiderate  almsgiving,  and,  although  there 
may  yet  remain  poor  persons,  there  will,  however,  be 
nothing  more  to  do  in  repressing  the  abuses  of  men¬ 
dicity.  Establish  temperance  and  purity  of  morals, 
and  three  fourths  of  the  hospitals  are  at  once  emptied  ; 
and  thus  one  of  the  branches  of  charitable  activity  is 
greatly  reduced.  If  governments  and  nations  would 
obey  the  laws  of  justice  and  reason,  it  would  not  be 


272 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


necessary  to  found  associations  for  solacing  the  mis¬ 
eries  of  the  battle-field.  And  many  similar  illustra¬ 
tions  might  be  given. 

Such  is  the  plan  which  we  propose  for  the  combat 
of  life.  We  owe  ourselves,  our  whole  powers,  to  all 
The  practical  forms  0f  good,  but  only  in  the  order  of  the 
the  plan,  position  assigned  to  each  of  us  by  Provi¬ 
dence.  Thus  our  efforts,  being  guided  by  law,  will  be 
lasting,  because  they  are  guided,  and  they  will  be 
fruitful  because  they  are  lasting.  Harmonious  effort 
will  realize  the  order  of  the  spiritual  world.  In  the 
presence  of  the  armies  of  evil,  we  are  by  nature  in  a* 
disbanded  state  ;  and  this  is  our  weakness.  It  is  * 
egotism,  that  is,  it  is  the  maxim,  “  Each  for  himself,” 
that  disperses  us.  The  order  of  battle  for  the  good 
is,  for  each  to  turn  himself  about,  and  march  resolutely 
against  the  enemy,  following  closely  his  colors,  and 
each  preserving  his  own  place  in  the  ranks.  It  is 
beautiful,  this  marching  under  the  banner  of  the 
good,  and  beholding  the  humblest  duties  irradiated 
with  divine  light.  It  is  beautiful  to  take  part  in  the 
great  contest,  and  confidently  to  look  forward,  at  the 
close  of  the  struggle,  to  repose  and  harmony,  and  to 
the  regular  and  increasing  expansion  of  the  inner 
life.  It  is  beautiful  to  contemplate  yon  side  of  the 
anguishes,  disorders,  and  torments  of  a  world  dis¬ 
turbed  by  suffering  and  sin — “  a  heaven  of  free,  lov¬ 
ing,  and  reasonable  stars,  an  immutable  sky  filled  full 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


273 


of  serenity,  light,  and  love,  where  all  that  we  have 
hoped  for  shall  be  real”  * 

Such  is  the  work  which  is  to  be  begun  on  earth, 
and  to  be  prosecuted  in  the  endless  future.  Is  there 
any  one  who  finds  life  heavy,  existence  dull  The  worth 
and  wearying,  and  the  succession  of  days  of  llle' 
monotonous  ?  Let  him  but  comprehend  these  things, 
and  he  will  feel  that  life  is  worth  living.  And  if  there 
be  any  one  who  doubts  the  good  and  its  definite 
triumph,  for  the  reason  that  he  lacks  a  fixed  faith  in 
God,  I  would  say  to  him,  in  the  words  of  Socrates  : 

The  thing  is  worth  the  trouble  of  venturing  to  be¬ 
lieve  in  it ;  it  is  a  hazard  worthy  of  running  ;  it  is  a 
hope  with  which  we  should,  as  it  were,  enchant  our¬ 
selves.”  f 

Plato,  the  great  disciple  of  Socrates,  has  depicted, 

in  pages  which  will  be  read  as  long  as  human  letters 

endure. t  the  progress  of  the  soul  while  rising  The  aspira¬ 
tion  toward 

from  beauty  to  beauty,  up  to  the  contempla-  the  ideal, 
tion  of  that  supreme  beauty  which  is  infinite.  And 
who  of  us  has  not,  at  times,  cast  a  longing  desire 
toward  the  Supreme  ideal  ?  What  libertine  does  not 
feel  that  it  is  noble  and  beautiful  to  triumph  over, 
sense  ?  What  untruthful  man  does  not  feel  in  his 
conscience  the  worth  of  truthfulness  ?  What  faint¬ 
hearted  one  does  not,  from  the  depths  of  his  heart, 
admire  courage  ?  What  egotist  has  not  had  to  stifle 

*  Pere  Gratrv.  f  Phaedo.  t  In  the  Banquet. 

18 


274 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


the  voice  of  his  own  nature,  and  learn  to  despise  him¬ 
self,  before  he  could  turn  generous-heartedness  into 
derision?  Now,  the  good  is  the  truth;  for  it  is  the 
expression  of  the  Supreme  Mind  who  has  determined 
all  that  is,  and  all  that  ought  to  be ;  the  good  is  beauty, 
as  our  own  hearts  amply  evince,  in  the  simple  fact  of 
their  tending  to  it  by  all  the  purer  aspirations  which 
inspire  them.  The  good  stands  out  before  our  soul 
as  a  splendid  vision,  the  attraction  of  which  it  is  im¬ 
possible  not  to  feel.  We  go  forth  to  meet  it,  but 
come  into  conflict  with  evil ;  we  then  too  often  fall 
back  into  our  own  darkness ;  the  cloud  re-forms  before 
us,  and  we  ask  ourselves  whether  the  glorious  vision 
was  not  after  all  a  deceptive  illusion.  No,  no !  the 
vision  is  true ;  the  good  is  the  highest  reality  for  it  is 
an  outgoing  of  the  Sovereign  God.  We  behold  it 

The  -rest  c^earb' ;  what  hinders  us  from  grasping  it  ? 

°  • 

Lack  of  strength.  Is  there  a  remedy?  We 
will  try  to  suggest  one  in  our  closing  lecture. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


275 


LECTURE  VII. 

THE  SOURCE  OF  STRENGTH. 

What  we  lack  in  the  presence  of  the  good,  is  the 
strength,  the  ability,  to  accomplish  it.  Except  in 
cases  where  we  are  blinded  by  an  overpowering  pas¬ 
sion,  we  feel  and  know  well  enough  that  the  practice 
of  evil  renders  us  unhappy  ;  but  we  have  not  the 
courage  to  break  off  from  this  practice.  Where  can 
we  find  the  strength  which  we  lack  ? 

In  order  to  answer  this  question,  let  us  seek  for  a 
symbol  in  the  power  which  we  have  of  acting  upon 
our  body,  that  is  to  say,  in  physical  force.  An  analogy 

in  physical 

And,  in  fact,  we  will  find  here  more  than  a  force, 
symbol.  The  connection  of  our  two  natures  is  so 
intimate,  so  profound,  and  so  continued,  that  in  our 
whole  life  they  are  never  separated.  Our  spiritual 
life  manifests  itself  only  under  condition  of  the  ex¬ 
istence  of  the  organs,  and  by  their  instrumentality. 
Nothing  but  a  false  idealism,  the  result  of  an  erring 
philosophy,  could  ignore  the  moral  value  of  disciplin¬ 
ing  the  body.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  deny 
the  influence  of  morality  on  the  organic  functions  ; 
hygiene,  as  has  been  said,  is  more  a  virtue  than  a 
science.  He  who  has  a  will  firm  enough  to  govern 


2j6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


his  body  according  to  the  true  laws  of  nature,  will 
obtain  a  better  sanitary  result  than  he  who,  though 
directed  by  the  most  skillful  of  physicians,  yet  yields 
to  disorderly  proclivities.  Physical  force,  therefore, 
and  moral  force,  are  very  closely  related  ;  and  if  we 
take  into  consideration  the  influence  of  the  will  on 
the  organs  of  thought,  we  will  never  find  an  absolute 
separation  between  our  corporeal  and  our  physical 
natures.  But  without  following  further  this  analogy,  let 
us  simply  seek  in  bodily  force  a  symbol  of  moral  force. 

How  is  that  power  which  we  exert  in  muscular 
movements  kept  up  and  increased  ?  By  exercising 
it ;  it  is  for  this  reason  that  manual  labor,  prome¬ 
nading  and  gymnastics,  contribute  to  good  health. 
But  exercise  keeps  up  strength  only  in  expending  it, 
and  would  soon  exhaust  it,  were  it  not  nourished  by 
food.  We  partake  of  nourishment,  sometimes  solid, 
sometimes  liquid  ;  and  the  solid  portions  thereof  have 
to  be  liquefied  before  serving  for  alimentation.  Nu¬ 
trition  takes  place  through  a  marvelous  system  of 
digestive  and  circulatory  functions  ;  and  in  the  midst 
of  these  functions  there  is  one  primitive  phenomenon 
which  is  the  basis  of  all  the  rest.  This  phenomenon  is 
respiration.  The  necessary  condition  of  the  alimenta¬ 
tion  of  the  body  is  our  contact  with  the  vitalizing 
principle  of  the  atmosphere.  At  the  moment  when 
the  new-born  infant  is  to  begin  its  independent 
physical  life,  the  first  requisite  of  all  is  that  the  air 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


277 


shall  enter  its  lungs  ;  it  must  respire ;  it 'is  only  after 
having  respired  that  it  can  take  nourishment.  Such 
are  the  facts  in  which  we  shall  presently  discover  a 
symbol  of  the  alimentation  of  the  powers  of  the  soul. 
The  order  of  our  thoughts  in  this  lecture  General 
will  be;  Food  of  the  soul,  Prayer,  and  the  seventh ke- 
Question  of  Faith,  £ure’ 

I.  Food  of  the  Soul. 

Spiritual  strength  is  increased,  normally,  by  its  own 
regular  exercise.  Many  persons  find  themselves 
feeble  on  important  occasions  simply  because  they 
have  disdained  small  efforts  and  minor  virtues.  But 
this  strength,  which  is  kept  and  increased  by  its  own 
exercise,  has  also  need  of  nourishment ;  and  spiritual 
nourishment  consists  of  ideas  and  sentiments.  Ideas 
are,  in  some  sort,  the  solid  parts  of  the  food  of  the 
soul,  and  sentiments  the  liquid  parts.  Now,  just  as 
the  solids  do  not  nourish  the  body  save  as  they  are 
liquefied,  so  also  ideas  do  not  act  upon  the  will  until 
after  they  are  translated  into  sentiments.  Ideas  may 
remain  in  the  intelligence  without  any  practical  re¬ 
sults  ;  but  from  sentiments  we  receive  an  active  im¬ 
pulse  ;  they  influence  the  will. 

What  are  the  ideas  which  develop  the  power  of  the 
soul  for  the  accomplishment  of  good  ?  They  The  source 

of  helpful 

are,  mainly,  those  which  are  involved  in  the  ideas, 
contemplation  and  meditation  of  the  moral  law. 


2/8 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


Consider  the  different  classes  of  our  duties,  their  con¬ 
catenation,  almost  as  marvelous  as  that  of  natural  phe* 
nomenon,  their  relations  among  each  other,  and  their 
general  dependence  on  the  law  of  charity,  from  which 
they  all  spring,  as  light-rays  proceed  from  the  sun. 
Consider,  above  all,  as  a  protection  against  the  illu¬ 
sions  of  life,  the  inseparable  connection  of  duty  and 
happiness.  Learn  from  the  works  of  the  sages — for 
example,  from  the  thoughts  of  Socrates,  and  from 
some  of  the  admirable  pages  of  Cicero— that  all  search 
for  happiness  outside  of  the  laws  of  moral  order  is 
delusory ;  that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  labor 
procures  comfort,  veracity  gains  esteem  ;  and  that  in 
certain  cases  when  it  is  necessary  to  renounce  all 
these  goods,  there  is  in  this  very  sacrifice  to  duty,  in 
the  approbation  of  conscience,  a  joy  superior  to  all 
other  joys  :  learn  this  and  you  will  have  attained  to 
thoughts  which  will  give  you  real  strength  for  the 
struggles  of  life. 

As  to  the  sentiments  which  may  aid  us  in  the 

of  helpful  combat  against  evil,  they  are  first  and  mainly 

sentiments,  t}le  attraction  itself  which  the  good  inspires, 

an  attraction  resulting  from  the  thoughts  which  we 

* 

have  just  indicated.  The  contemplation  of  the  moral 
law,  when  engaged  in  in  calmness  and  in  the  silence 
of  the  evil  passions,  which  are  ever  ready  to  rebel 
against  order,  tends  naturally  to  awaken  a  love  of  the 
good,  which  is  a  real  power,  as  it  inclines  the  heart 


The  Problem  of  Evil  279 

« 

in  the  direction  of  conscience.  The  good  has,  in  fact, 
an  altogether  peculiar  beauty,  which,  as  soon  as  we 
have  learned  to  perceive  it,  transcends  all  others. 
This  we  can  illustrate  by  a  comparison.  On  leaving 
a  church  or  a  lecture-roem,  raise  your  eyes,  if  the 
night  is  serene,  and  contemplate  for  a  moment  the 
firmament.  You  will  perceive  at  once  that  the  sky, 
with  its  brilliant  setting  of  stars,  has  a  beauty  that  is 
calm  and  profound,  and  of  an  entirely  different  nature 
from  the  beauty  of  the  fairest  edifice  lighted  by  the 
flames  of  tapers  and  chandeliers.  Now,  the  contempla- , 
tion  of  the  moral  law  produces  a  sentiment  analogous 
to  that  inspired  by  the  firmament.  It  awakens  the 
sentiment  of  a  beauty  far  above  all  those  which  are 
met  with  in  the  spheres  of  passion  and  interest. 
This  accounts  for  why  these  words  of  Kant  have  been 
so  often  cited  and  admired  :  “  There  are  two  objects 
which  fill  the  soul  with  an  admiration  and  reverence 
which  are  ever  fresh,  and  which  increase  in  propor¬ 
tion  as  the  mind  more  frequently  returns  to  and 
meditates  upon  them  :  the  starry  heavens  above  us, 
and  the  moral  law  within  usd 

The  contemplation  of  the  good  awakens,  therefore, 
an  admiration  which  attracts  us  toward  it.  If  we 
more  frequently  meditated  on  the  wonders  of  the  law, 
we  would  be  less  feeble  against  evil.  This  resource 
is  real,  but  it  is  of  an  abstract  character.  We  have  a 
means  more  usual  and  more  efficacious  for  inclining 


280  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

our  heart  on  the  side  of  conscience.  This  means 
of  heipfai  consists  in  the  employment  of  personal  affec- 
affeetions.  ^ons>  Nothing  more  fortifies  the  heart  in 

struggling  against  temptations  than  the  influence  of 
personal  affections  which  coincide  with  the  love  of  the 
good  ;  and  this  influence  is  very  often  felt.  Suppose, 
for  example,  a  young  man,  raised  by  respectable 
parents,  (let  us  observe,  in  passing,  that  in  obedience 
to  a  profound  instinct  of  nature  many  parents  who, 
in  fact,  are  far  from  respectable,  strive  nevertheless  to 
.  show  themselves  so  in  the  eyes  of  their  children  ;) 
suppose  this  young  man  remote  from  the  parental 
fireside  and  in  prey  to  a  terrible  temptation.  His 
conscience  is  at  stake,  perhaps  also  his  honor ;  and 
he  is  on  the  point  of  falling.  At  this  moment,  the 
thought  of  his  home  comes  into  his  mind.  He  has  the 
power  to  turn  aside  from  this  salutary  image,  and  yield 
himself  to  the  imaginations  of  a  heart  fascinated  by  evil. 
But  if  he  profits  by  the  beneficent  light  which  has 
appeared  to  his  vision — if  he  clings  persistently  to 
the  thought  of  his  father,  and  of  that  mother  whose 
heart  he  is  about  to  break — is  it  not  clear  that  he  shall 
thus  ffy  an  act  of  the  will  give  himself  a  powerful  im¬ 
pulse  toward  the  good  ?  Personal  affections  are  hence 
a  great  help  in  the  combat  of  life.  And  for  this 
reason  it  is  very  important,  so  far  as  it  depends  on 
our  choice,  to  select  with  care  those  who  are  to  have 
a  part  in  our  affections,  so  that  these  affections  may 


2?  I 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


be  a  help  and  not  an  obstacle  in  the  work  of  the  moral 
culture  of  the  heart.  And  for  this  reason  also  it  is 
important  to  preserve  and  cultivate,  more  even  than 
we  cultivate  the  flowers  over  their  graves,  the  memo- 
ries  of  those  who.  after  having*  walked  before  us  in 

7  o 

the  good  way,  have  departed  from  this  life ;  so  that 
their  association  with  our  thoughts  mav  be  for  us  a 
salutary  power,  and  that,  though  dead  to  this  world, 
they  may  yet  speak  to  us,  and  come  to  our  help  in 
the  moral  crises  of  life.  And,  finally,  this  is  why  the 
moral  life  cannot  attain  the  plenitude  of  its  develop¬ 
ment  until  after  the  heart  has  opened  itself  to  the 
sentiment  of  divine  love,  and  thus  fixed  its  affections 
on  the  sole  Being  who  is  alwavs  and  in  everv  thin^ 
identical  with  the  good.  The  love  of  creatures,  even 
the  best,  is  always  liable,  in  one  respect  or  another, 
to  find  itself  in  conflict  with  the  law.  The  sole  love 
which  is  in  an  unfailing  harmony  with  the  conscience, 
is  the  love  of.  and  for,  that  One  who  is  the  principal 
of  the  conscience  and  the  author  of  the  law. 

Ideas,  sentiments :  such  are  the  aliments  of  the 
soul.  This  spiritual  food  is  offered  to  us}>  not  only  in 
the  relations  which  we  sustain  to  our  contemporaries, 
but  also  in  the  traditions  which  associate  us  with  the 
past  of  humanity.  These  traditions  are  all-prevalent. 
They  are  found  under  the  tent  of  the  Arab,  T  ..  . 
and  in  the  cabins  of  Alpine  shepherds,  under  andreadiDg* 
the  lorm  ot  verbal  and  chanted  recitals  ;  in  cultured 


* 


282 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

• 

society  they  chiefly  assume  the  form  of  reading. 
Reading  levels  for  us  the  barriers  of  space  and  time, 
and  places  at  our  disposal  the  collective  intellectual 
treasures  of  the  race.  How  great  the  variety  of  re¬ 
sources  which  it  offers  us  for  nourishing  the  soul  with 
noble  ideas  and  fortifying  sentiments  !  Study  the 
pages  of  history,  and  go  below  the  mere  surface  of 
dates  and  facts  ;  penetrate  to  the  great  laws  which  are 
revealed  in  the  march  of  human  affairs,  and  you  will 
see  that,  on  the  whole,  justice  is  vindicated.  Open 
books  of  biography,  true  biography,  books  which  pre¬ 
sent  men  as  they  really  were,  without  disguising  them 
in  false  drapery,  and  you  will  see  the  heroes  of  the 
good  often  a  butt  for  persecution  and  outrage,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  world  is  in  disorder  ;  but  you 
will  see  them  prefer  their  conscience  to  all  the  treas¬ 
ures  and  pleasures  of  earth.  You  will  also  see  great 
egotists  who  have  immolated  every  thing  to  the  gratifi¬ 
cations  of  their  passions,  and  who,  though  possessing 
wealth  and  power,  and  perhaps  though  seated  on  the 
most  illustrious  thrones  of  the  world,  have  yet  died 
in  disgust  with  life,  and  in  contempt  of  themselves. 

We  can  thus  derive  from  reading,  (not  to  mention 
the  books  which  preserve  for  us  the  prescriptions  of 
wisdom,  and  the  maxims  of  experience,)  thoughts  and 
But  reading-  sentiments  which  will  greatly  help  us.  We 
well  se-  must  not  forget,  however,  that  nourishment 
is  transformed  into  strength,  only  under  the 


28  3 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

double  condition  of  being  good  in  quality  and  suit¬ 
able  in  quantity.  If  you  read  books  which  fall  in 
with  your  passions,  and  which  will  redouble  their  vio¬ 
lence  ;  if  you  read  “  those  writings  which  are,  so  to 
speak,  the  sewers  of  the  human  mind,  and  which, 
despite  their  flowers,  contain  only  a  frightful  cor¬ 
ruption/’^  you  cannot  escape  damage.  As  to  the 
quantity  of  intellectual  nutriment,  these  sage  cautions 
were  given  by  Alexander  Vinet:  “Our  century  is 
sick  from  reading  too  much,  and  from  reading  poorly. 
Reading,  which  has  been  called  an  occupied  indolence , 
and  which  might  be  called  an  indolent  activity ,  is  the 
chief  occupation  of  a  large  number  of  persons,  whose 
mind,  incessantly,  but  feebly,  solicited  to  a  thousand 
different  points,  droops  like  a  plant  to  the  surface  of 
the  earth,  and  finally  loses  all  vigor,  spontaneity^and 
independence.  Unless  there  is  a  reaction  of  the  will 
of  the  reader  upon  the  thoughts  of  the  author,  read¬ 
ing  is  often  an  evil  rather  than  a  good.  It  And  well  di¬ 
profits  not  to  swallow  unless  we  digest.  Woe  gested' 
to  him  who  forgets  this  !  woe  to  him  who  is  guilty  of 
this  voracity,  or  of  indulging  this  imprudent  appe- 

m 

tite,  which  has  caused  our  age  to  be  compared  to  a 
boa-constrictor  gorged  with  stained  paper,  and  whose 
digestion  has  the  look  of  an  agony.  Read,  but  think 
also  ;  and  do  not  read  at  all  if  you  are  unwilling  to 
think  while  reading,  and  after  having  read.”  It  is 


*  From  Lacordaire. 


284 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 

not  only  the  culture  of  the  intellect  that  is  here  in 
peril,  but  also  the  force  of  the  will ;  for  by  as  much 
as  healthy  and  well-directed  thought  is  a  power  for 
the  good,  by  so  much  are  also  indecision,  hesitation, 
and  debility  of  thought,  causes  of  moral  weakness. 

True  ideas  and  pure  sentiments  are,  thus,  abun¬ 
dantly  at  our  disposal  for  alimenting  the  soul :  but  we 
often  have  the  misfortune  of  fortifying  evil  passions 
by  erroneous  ideas  and  guilty  sentiments.  Instead 
of  healthy  nutriment  we  take  poison  ;  or,  at  least,  we 
follow  a  very  unfortunate  moral  regimen.  This  bad 
regimen  debilitates  us,  and  we  then  complain  of  a  lack 
of  force.  But  whose  is  the  fault  ? 

These  considerations  are  important,  but  they  do  not 
go  to  the  bottom  of  our  subject.  On  the  supposition 
of  ^will  directed  toward  the  good,  we  see  well  enough 
how  it  may  be  strengthened  ;  but  it  is  this  will  itself, 
it  is  this  power  facing  toward  the  good,  which  we 
lack ;  our  will  is  debilitated,  It  seems,  therefore, 
that  in  appealing  to  our  will  in  order  to  strengthen 
our  will,  we  are  revolving  in  a  circle.  But  this  circle 
is  not  absolutely  vicious,  for  every  one  has  some  de¬ 
gree  of  will-force,  and  of  sensibility  for  the  good,  so 
that  to  know  the  means  of  augmenting  the  force 
which  we  already  have,  by  giving  it  a  suitable  direc- 
is  there  any  tion  ;s  no  little  help.  However,  there  re¬ 
means  of  mains  yet  this  important  phase  of  the  ques- 

strengthen-  ^ 

ing  the  will?  tion  :  Is  there  any  direct  means  of  augment- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


285 


ing  the  power  of  the  will  ?  Does  there  exist  in  the 
life  of  the  soul  any  primitive*  phenomenon  which  is 
analogous  to  respiration  in  the  life  of  the  body  ?  This 
question  brings  us  into  the  presence  of  the  problem 
of  prayer  ;  a  problem  which  is  far-reaching  as  well  as 
of  serious  import.  The  reflections  which  I  am  about 
to  present  have  a  general  bearing  ;  I  confine  myself, 
however,  more  directly  to  that  which  bears  on  the 
subject  in  hand,  the  inquiry  after  strength  of  will. 
May  we  demand  of  God  the  strength  of  which  we 
feel  we  have  need  ?  Are  we  reduced,  in  the  conflict 
of  life,  to  our  own  resources,  and  to  the  support  of 
our  fellows,  or  may  we  call  to  our  help  the  Almighty  ? 

II.  Prayer. 

Prayer  is  a  universal  fact.  But  in  prayer,  Prayer  uni_ 
as  in  every  thing  else,  we  see  traces  of  the  versaL 
essential  disorder  of  humanity.  A  brigand  of  Cala¬ 
bria,  it  is  said,  will  pray  the  Madonna  to  assist  him  in 
making  a  lucky  stroke  ;  the  Chief  of  a  State,  when 
on  the  point  of  undertaking  a  manifestly  unjust  war, 
will  institute  public  prayers  to  beseech  God  to  help 
in  the  iniquity :  these  are  instances  of  the  absolute 
perversion  of  prayer,  so  that  it  becomes  Perverted, 
prayer  for  evil.  There  are  persons  who,  like  that 
frank  Greek,  Ischomachus,  of  whom  Xenophon  has 
given  us  a  sketch,  ask  the  Divine  power  for  triumph 
over  their  enemies,  for  good  repute,  for  good  health, 


286 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


and  for  all  the  pleasures  of  earth.  Nevertheless  we 
find  also  every-where  and  always,  in  some  degree, 
true  spiritual  prayer,  prayer  which  asks  strength  for 
the  good,  of  Him  who  is  at  once  the  source  of  all  good 
its  true  pur-  aRd  °f  a^  strength.  This  prayer  you  will 
port‘  find  in  its  essential  traits  in  one  of  the  cele¬ 
brated  choruses  of  Sophocles  ;  it  commences  thus  : 
“  May  it  be  given  to  me  to  observe  strict  purity  in  all 
my  actions  and  words  !  ”  *  And  our  own  prayer  I 
mean  that  prayer  which  we  Christians  have  all  been 
taught  in  our  infancy,  what  is  its  purport  ?  What 
were  we  taught  to  pray  for  ?  “  Our  daily  bread,”  in 
order  to  remind  us  who  it  is  that  causes  the  grain  to 
grow  in  the  fields.  And  what  else  ?  That. the  name 
of  God  be  hallowed,  that  is  to  say,  that  all  men  be 
penetrated  more  and  more  with  the  fundamental  truth 
that  the  will  of  God  is  identical  with  the  good.  What 
else  do  we  pray  for  ?  That  his  will  be  done,  that 
the  good  be  accomplished,  and  that  we  be  delivered 
from  evil  by  pardon  and  assistance.  Such  is  spiritual 
prayer  in  its  majestic  simplicity  ;  it  is  prayer  for  good, 
and  it  is  of  this  that  we  are  to  speak. 

I  ought  here  to  dissipate  a  fear  which  some  of  you 
may  entertain.  Do  not  fear  lest  I  should  be  about  to 
undertake  to  penetrate  the  most  secret  mysteries  of 
soul-life,  and  introduce  into  the  delicate  functions  of 
the  soul  the  cold  and  relatively  rude  instrument  of 

*  CEdipus  Rex. 


The  Problem  of  Evil  2  87 

reasoning.  But  doubts  are  raised  as  to  the  value  of 
prayer ;  I  wish  to  examine  these  objections,  in  the 
hope  of  destroying  them  ;  that  is  all.  I  do  not  pro¬ 
pose  to  demonstrate  prayer,  but  simply,  if  possible, 
to  give  you  satisfactory  reasons  for  praying  in  peace 
according  to  the  dictates  of  your  heart. 

You  will  hear  it  said  that  prayer  is  a  characteristic 
of  the  infancy  of  humanity,  and  that  it  is  vanishing, 
little  by  little,  before  the  light  of  philosophy,  and  the 
results  of  modern  culture.  The  question  is  one  of 
fact  ;  but  I  do  not  see  that  the  fact  alleged  is  a  fact. 
The  instinct  of  prayer  seems  to  me  to  be  as  The  instinct 

of  OrBiV6r  qs 

intense  in  our  day  as  in  the  past.  Art  is  so  intense  now 
well  aware  of  this  that  it  continually  appeals  aso1  ul<L 
to  this  instinct.  In  order  to  eliminate  from  the  pro¬ 
ductions  of  art  the  idea  and  sentiment  of  prayer,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  destroy  the  most  beautiful 
pages,  I  will  not  say  of  Racine,  but  of  Victor  Hugo, 
of  Lamartine,  of  Musset ;  it  would  be  necessary  to 
efface  the  finest  canvasses  in  our  galleries  of  paint¬ 
ing  ;  it  would  be  necessary  to  impose  silence  on  the 
sublimest  expressions  of  music  ;  for  it  is  only  on 
attaining  the  accents  of  prayer,  that  music  rises  to 
the  loftiest  heights  of  art.  Observe  that  I  do  not 
refer  here  to  the  personal  sentiments  of  the  artists, 
but  to  a  general  sentiment  to  which  they  would 
assuredly  not  address  themselves  if  this  sentiment 
had  disappeared. 


288 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


But  is  science  in  contradiction  with  prayer  ?  If  it 
were  so,  Kepler,  it  seems  to  me,  would  have  surmised 
it,  Newton  would  have  suspected  it,  and  Faraday 
would  not  have  died,  leaving  to  the  learned  world  the 
example  of  a  piety  equal  to  his  genius. 

It  does  not  appear,  therefore,  on  consulting  facts, 
that  prayer  is  disappearing  before  modern  culture,  as 
some  affirm.*  But  the  chief  objection  to  prayer  is 
urged  in  the  name  of  philosophy.  It  is  said  that  in 
the  eyes  of  philosophy  prayer  is  irrational.  This 
statement  is  of  serious  import ;  for  though  we  are 
often  obliged  to  do  things  contrary  to  the  reasonings 
of  men,  we  ought  never  to  do  any  thing  contrary  to 
reason  in  its  primitive  and  true  form,  such  as  God 
Not  incom-  piacecj  fa  { n  Us.  But  is  there,  in  fact,  an 
philosophy,  incompatibility  between  philosophy  and 
prayer  ?  In  the  course  of  my  studies  I  have  made 
acquaintance  with  a  large  number  of  philosophers, 
both  of  the  present  time  and  of  ages  past.  I  find 
quite  a  number  of  them,  and  among  these  the  great¬ 
est  of  all,  who  were  pious  men,  and  who  prayed  as 
humbly  as  little  children — for  there  are  not  two  man¬ 
ners  of  praying.  This  very  day,  while  turning  over  a 
new  book,  I  fell  upon  an  account  of  the  death  of  a 

*  My  own  conclusion  is  affirmed  in  a  recent  work  of  M.  Juventin, 
entitled,  Etats  des  croyances.  The  author  says:  “All  sources  of 
information  agree  in  indicating  that,  under  different  tendencies,  the 
number  of  men  of  prayer  is  sensibly  increasing.”  The  cool  philo¬ 
sophical  method  of  this  author  gives  great  weight  to  his  words. 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  289 

celebrated  philosopher  and  bold  innovator,  Peter  Ram¬ 
us,  who  fell  a  victim  of  the  massacre  of  peter  iiam- 
St.  Bartholomew,  When  he  found  himself  us' 
fronted  by  the  assassins  who  had  just  broken  in  the 
door  of  his  work-chamber,  he  begged  for  a  single 
moment  of  delay,  and  pronounced  aloud  these  words 
of  prayer,  which  have  been  preserved  :  “  O  my  God, 
I  have  sinned  against  thee  ;  I  have  done  evil  in  thy 
sight.  Thy  judgments  are  justice  and  truth.  Have 
pity  on  me,  and  pardon  these  erring  men  ;  they  know 
not  what  they  do.” 

Descartes,  a  free  and  mighty  spirit  if  there  ever  was 
one,  when  undergoing  the  fatal  attacks  of  Descartes, 
his  last  sickness  fell  into  a  sort  of  delirium,  which 
did  not,  however,  disturb  the  regular  connection  of 
his  thoughts.  Those  who  he^rd  his  last  utterances 
were  astonished  to  hear  the  geometrician  and  meta¬ 
physician  discoursing,  not  of  the  sciences  which  had 
so  much  occupied  him,  but  of  the  greatness  of  God, 
and  of  the  misery  of  man. 

I  have  no  desire  to  multiply  these  examples,  and 
will  give  but  a  single  one  more.  There  is  a  philoso¬ 
pher,  to  the  life  and  works  of  whom  I  have  devoted 
long  study  :  Maine  de  Biran.  Maine  de  Bi-  Mainede 
ran  arose,  as  an  administrator  and  states-  Blran' 
man,  to  high  political  functions  ;  but  he  was  always 
attracted  by  an  irresistible  instinct  to  the  observation 

of  bis  own  mind  and  to  the  study  of  the  great 

19 


290 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


problems  of  human  destiny.  His  great  merit  m  the 

field  of  science  is  this  :  He  observed  and  recognized, 

better  than  any  had  done  before  him,  the  important 

role  of  the  will  in  alF  the  manifestations  of  human 

life.  He  discerned  the  influence  of  the  will,  not  only 

over  our  acts,  but  also  over  our  ideas,  over  our  senti- 
» 

ments,  and  even  over  our  bodily  sensations.  But 
at  the  same  time  that  he  determined  more  and 
more,  by  a  profound  analysis,  the  power  of  the  will, 
and  what  it  ought  to  be  in  the  life  of  man,  he  also 
learned,  by  a  prolonged  and  often  painful  experience, 
the  feebleness  of  the  will,  and  frankly  admitted  it. 
By  a  slow,  continued,  and  long-protracted  movement 
of  a  mind  which,  in  the  midst  of  uncertainties  and 
waverings,  had  always  been  fundamentally  directed 
in  one  course,  he  finally  turned  himself  to  God,  and 
died  a  praying  man. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  incompatibility  between  phi¬ 
losophy  and  prayer— no  more  in  our  own  age  than  in 
the  century  of  Descartes  or  in  the  days  of  Ramus. 

Now,  however,,. when  a  skeptical  doctrine  as  to 
prayer  has  once  taken  hold  upon  a  mind,  does  this 
doctrine  succeed  in  destroying,  in  the  soul  of  him  who 
The  instinct  professes  it,  the  natural  instinct  of  prayer  ? 

ot“  prayer  1 

ineradicable  No  •  this  also  is  a  question  of  fact.  Never 

by  skepti¬ 
cism.  did  the  philosophy  which  denies  all  personal 

Je» 

relations  between  man  and  God  develop  itself  with 
more  fullness  and  brilliancy  than  at  the  close  of  the 


291 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

last  century.  But  what  was  the  result  ?  It  is  said 
that  sailors  who  profess  to  be  impious  enough,  cast 
themselves  oil  their  knees  as  quick  as  other  men 
when  storms  threaten  them  with  death.  But  there 
are  other  storms  in  the  world  than  those  of  the  ocean. 
At  this  same  epoch,  also,  great  men  who  had  been 
nurtured  on  atheism,  and  who  had  long  professed  it 
openly,  discovered  anew  in  their  heart,  in  the  midst 
of  the  sufferings  and  convulsions  of  revolution,  the 

c 

instinct,  the  need,  and  the  words  of  prayer. 

And  here  is  an  analogous  fact,  which  occurred  un¬ 
der  less  sad  circumstances.  An  estimable  writer  of 
the  same  epoch  had  been  imbued  with  the  philosophy 
of  his  time  and  had  learned  to  deny  the  power  of 
prayer.  He  had  just  terminated  a  work  in  favor  of 
a  cause  which  he  had  greatly  at  heart ;  he  had  done 
all  that  was  in  his  power  to  do,  and  he  wrote  to  one 
of  his  correspondents  these  lines  :  “  It  is  for  God  to 
do  the  rest ;  I  have  prayed  him  for  it  with  fervor  and 
with  tears ;  a  thing  which  is  very  unusual  for  me, 
and  perhaps  inconsistent,  but  my  heart  was  full  and 
it  was  for  me  a  necessity  to  pray.” 

The  instinct  of  prayer,  therefore,  subsists  in  spite 
of  the  theories  which  deny  it.  It  is  not  even  necessary 
in  order  to  be  able  to  pray,  to  have  a  positive  faith  in 
God.  W  ho  are  those  who  can  pray  ?  Every  body, 
save  those  atheists  who  are  certain  that  God  does  not 
exist.  But  are  there  any  atheists  ?  Are  there,  I  do 


292  The  Problem  of  Evil 

not  say,  theories  of  atheism,  of  which  there  are  un¬ 
fortunately  many,  but  are  there  men  who  are  perfectly 
satisfied  that  God  does  not  exist  ?  We  may  well 
doubt  this  ;  many  fires  seem  extinct,  where  live  coals 
still  smolder  under  the  ashes.  Aside  from  a  sup¬ 
posed  real  atheism,  all  can  attempt  to  pray,  and  I  see 
nothing  to  object  to  in  the  reasoning  of  the  poet  who, 
after  having  exclaimed,  “  Believe  me,  prayer  is  a  cry 
of  hope  !  Let  us  address  God  that  he  may  answer  us !  ” 
seems  to  hesitate  and  question  whether  God  exists, 
and  then  continues  :  “  But  if  heaven  is  empty,  we 
shall  offend  no  one  ;  and  if  some  one  hears  us,  may 
he  have  pity  upon  us  !  ”  * 

Philosophy  in  general  is  not  incompatible  with 
prayer ;  those  systems  which  deny  the  intercommun¬ 
ion  of  God  and  man  do  not  destroy  the  instinct  of 
prayer,  even  among  their  followers  ;  and  no  doctrine, 
unless  it  be  atheism  properly  so  called,  legitimately 
interdicts  him  who  feels  the  need  of  being  Strength- 
Logical  ma-  ened  from  seeking  helpfc  of  God.  There  ex- 

teriahsm 

must  deny  ists,  however,  in  the  science  of  the  day,  a 

the  proprie- 

tyof  prayer,  considerable  current  which  bears  souls  away 
from  God,  a  current  which  has  been  increased  by  the 

*  Croyez-moi,  la  priere  est  un  cri  d’esperance  ! 

Pour  que  Dieu  nous  reponde  adressons-nous  tl  lui  ! 

Si  le  ciel  est  desert,  nous  n’offensons  personne  ; 

Si  quelqu’un  nous  entend,  qu’il  nous  prenne  en  pitie  ! 

Alfred  de  Musset. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


293 


writings  of  men  who  were  personally  pious,  and  whose 
systems  of  thought  did  not  harmonize  with  their  lives. 
There  is  a  very  extensive  phase  of  philosophy  which 
teaches  that  prayer  is  not  reasonable,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  it  is  forbidden  to  the  creature  who  makes 
use  of  his  reason,  to  seek  the  assistance  of  God.  But 
what  is  this  philosophy  ?  It  is  that  which  we  have 
already  encountered  and  characterized  ;  that  which 
denies  every  element  of  liberty,  and  sees  in  the  uni¬ 
verse  only  a  totality  of  phenomena  governed  by  the 
laws  of  absolute  necessity.  If,  in  fact,  every  thing  is 
determined  necessarily — if  there  is  no  principle  of 
liberty  in  the  world — there  is,  then,  nothing  to  pray 
for.  The  inference  is  just ;  but  when  I  add,  There  is 
nothing  to  be  done,  the  inference  is  equally  just. 
The  doctrine  which  denies  the  efficaciousness  of 
prayer,  denies  equally  also  the  efficaciousness  of  the 
efforts  of  man  in  labor.  This  is  the  sole  argument 
which  I  propose  to  develop.  It  is  objected  to  the  idea 
of  prayer  that  every  thing  is  fatally  determined  ;  I 
shall  try  to  show  that,  if  the  objection  is  valid,  it  is 
also  valid  against  labor. 

Do  you  believe  in  the  reality  of  human  But  it  m 
power  in  labor?  What  is  the  character  of  aJf0  d!“y  the 

r  emcacious- 

the  action  of  man  on  nature?  We  fertilize  ness of  Jabor- 
the  soil,  shut  in  rivers  by  dikes,  improve  the  species 
of  vegetables  and  animals  ;  or,  acting  in  another  di¬ 
rection,  we  exhaust  the  soil  by  imprudent  culture, 


2Q4 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


we  strip  the  mountains  of  trees,  so  that  the  unre¬ 
strained  water  inundate  our  valleys,  and  we  deterio¬ 
rate  the  animal  and  vegetable  species.  But  our  action 
on  nature  is  quite  limited  :  most  certainly  we  could 
not  cause  our  planet  to  deviate  from  its  orbit ;  an 
earthquake  annihilates  the  work  of  entire  generations  ; 
still,  our  power  over  nature,  though  limited,  is  real. 
What  are  its  precise  limits  ?  No  one  can  tell.  It  is 
not  likely,  however,  that,  realizing  the  dream  of  a 
modern  Utopian,  humanity  will  ever  succeed- in  chang¬ 
ing  the  ocean  into  a  basin  of  lemonade  ;  but  while 
good  sense  laughs  at  the  dreams  of  fools,  genius  has 
often  surpassed,  and  will  often  yet  surpass,  the  dreams 
of  lunatics.  We  exert,  in  fact,  an  undeniable  influ¬ 
ence  on  nature  ;  do  we  not  also  on  society  ?  Do  we 
not  act  on  our  fellows  by  words  and  by  looks  ? 
Could  we  arrest  an  engineer  who  purposes  raising  a 


dam,  or  a  gardener  who  is  trying  to  amelio¬ 
rate  his  products,  or  a  mother  who  is  trying 


Common 
sense  never 
accepts  fa¬ 


talism.  to  incline  the  heart  of  her  child  to  be  good, 
or  the  politician  who  is  attempting  to  bring  about  a 
reform  in  society,  by  saying  to  them :  What  are  you 
about  ?  do  you  not  know  that  every  thing  is  absolutely 
and  fatally  determined  ?  No  ;  in  the  matter  of  appre¬ 
ciating  human  power,  our  age  leans  rather  to  the  side 
of  presumption  than  to  that  of  discouragement.  But 
what  is  the  object  of  all  those  who  labor,  whether  in 
the  domain  of  matter  or  of  mind  ?  They  are  in  the 


The  Problem  of  Evil, 


295 


presence  of  an  order  of  things  which  they  are  attempt¬ 
ing  to  modify ;  they  do  not  think,  therefore,  that 
every  thing  in  the  universe  is  fatally  determined. 

You  see  the  drift  of  my  argument ;  and  you  think, 
perhaps,  that  I  am  venturing  upon  a  sophistical  un¬ 
dertaking.  You  admit  that  man  can  exert  an  influ¬ 
ence  on  nature  and  on  society ;  but  you  suppose  that 
the  action  of  God  is  fixed  and  immutable,  and  that,  con¬ 
sequently,  an  argument  based  on  the  efficaciousness  of 
human  action  could  not  lead  to  the  admission  of  the 
efficaciousness  of  prayer,  since  prayer  presumes  to 
modify  the  action  of  God.  The  objection  is  based  on 
the  assumption  of  an  absolute  distinction  and  Divinpaction 

co-operates 

separation  between  the  action  of  man  and  the  Avith  thatof 

man,  not 

action  of  God.  But  this  assumption  is  erro-  oniympray 

er,  but  also 

neous,  as  I  think  I  can  readily  make  clear.  elsewhere. 

What  is  it  that  man  does  when  he  acts  on  nature  ? 
This  action  consists,  as  Lord  Bacon  remarks,  in 
separating  or  in  uniting  portions  of  matter.  But  in 
what  more  than  this  ?  Nothing.  In  all  his  works, 
from  the  fabrication  of  the  most  diminutive  watch  to 
the  construction  of  the  grandest  cathedral,  man  never 
does  any  thing  more  than  to  bring  together,  or  sepa¬ 
rate,  portions  of  matter  ;  whatever  else  is  done  takes 
place  independently  of  him,  and  almost  always  by 
means  which  he  does  not  understand.  For  example, 
you  elevate  water  in  the  tube  of  a  pump,  and  you  say 

that  your  effort  has  raised  the  water.  ’  This  is  true, 
✓  7 


296  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

but  under  what  condition  ?  Under  condition  of  all 
the  natural  laws  of  water ;  under  condition  of  the 
attraction  of  the  earth  and  the  weight  of  the  atmos¬ 
phere.  When  you  elevate  water  in  a  pump,  heaven 
and  earth  co-operate  with  you  ;  all  the  powers  of 
nature  consent  to  undergo,  on  a  given  point,  and  con¬ 
trary  to  the  natural 'course  of  things,  the  influence  of 
your  will.  And  even  should  you  raise  the  water 
simply  with  your  hand,  the  fact  would  remain  the 
same  ;  for,  in  obedience  to  a  decision  of  your  will,  all 
the  forces  of  nature  have  been  active,  in  the  interior 
of  your  body,  in  transmitting  this  decision  to  your 
hand,  and  from  vour  hand  to  the  water  which  it  has 
raised.  That  philosophy  which  establishes  an  abso¬ 
lute  distinction  between  the  work  of  man  and  the 

work  of  God,  is,  therefore,  a  philosophy  without  depth. 

% 

It  supposes,  contrary  to  fact,  that  man  can  accom¬ 
plish  work  without  the  concurrence  of  the  forces  of  na¬ 
ture,  which  are  but  an  expression  of  the  will  of  the  Crea¬ 
tor.  The  natural  course  of  things  which,  in  fact,  is  the 
direct  working  of  God,  is,  therefore,  incessantly  modi¬ 
fied  by  the  labor  of  man.  But  shall  we  say,  now,  that 
by  our  work  the  designs  of  God  are  changed  ?  No ; 
for  God,  in  creating  us  free,  made  us  partakers  of  his 
power,  and  designs  us  to  be  laborer  together  zvitfz 
Him  ;  to  laboris  not,  therefore,  to  change  his  designs, 
but  to  accomplish  them.  Man  is  conscious  within  him- 
self  of  the  power  of  acting ;  he  acts ;  he  sees  and 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


29  7 


knows  the  results  of  his  acts,  and  takes  little  account 
of  those  theorists  who  affirm  that  every  thing  The  results 

J  of  labor  are 

is  determined  by  necessity.  manifest. 

The  question  which  here  presents  itself,  now,  is  : 
Is  prayer  a  power?  Have  we  the  privilege  of  deriv¬ 
ing  strength  from  the  source  of  strength,  of  seeking 
it  of  God  ?  We  have  the  instinct  of  prayer  as  well  as 
that  of  action,  and  God  who  made  us  actors  made  us 
equally  pray-ers.  But  there  are  so  many  men  who  do 
not  pray !  you  say.  And  I  answer :  There  are  so 
many  men  who  do  not  work  ;  or,  what  amounts  to 
the  same  thing,  who  work  only  under  the  iron  rod  of 
necessity !  As  the  fact  that  there  are  idlers  is  no 
proof  that  man  is  not  constituted  for  labor,  so  the  fact 
that  there  are  some  lips  always  closed  before  God,  is 
no  proof  that  man  is  not  constituted  for  prayer. 

We  have  the  instinct  of  prayer,  but  can  we  verify 

its  results  ?  Without  doubt.  Here  is  a  man  in  prey 

« 

to  some  severe  temptation.  Feeling  himself  The  insults 
on  the  point  of  falling,  he  cries  to  God  and  areEwise 
is  sustained.  -You  say,  perhaps,  that  he  is  a  mr‘m*est‘ 
man  of  strong  will,  and  that  the  result  would  have 
been  the  same  even  had  he  not  prayed.  But  are  you 
quite  sure  of  this?  Take  another  case:  an  epidemic 
has  broken  out  in  a  city.  The  physicians  and  civil 
officers  perform  their  duties,  the  special  duties  of  their 
profession.  But  here  are  men  and  women  who, 
without  being  obligated  by  any  special  office,  without 


298 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 

seeking  renown,  without  having  at  heart  the  interests 
of  science,  without  hoping  for  crosses  of  honor,  or 
other  reward,  consecrate  themselves  with  unfaltering 
devotion  to  the  alleviation  of  the  public  distress  ;  and 
they  are  praying  persons.  Perhaps  you  will  say : 
They  are  generous  natures,  and,  even  had  they  not 
prayed,  their  conduct  would  have  been  the  same. 
But  are  you  quite  sure  of  this  ?  These  persons  affirm 
that  they  found  strength  in  prayer ;  the  fact  transpired 
within  their  souls.  What  right  have  you  to  deny  it  ? 

To  labor  is  not  to  change  the  plans  of  God  :  it  is  to 
accomplish  them,  since  God  made  us  for  labor.  Prayer 
does  not  presume  to  change  the  plans  of  God  :  it 

simply  accomplishes  them,  since  God  constituted  us 

% 

with  the  need  and  instinct  of  prayer. 

Prayer  and  labor  are  liable  to  the  same  objections  ; 
but  these  objections  are  based  on  the  assumption  that 
The  objec-  there  is  liberty  neither  in  man  nor  in  God, 

tionsto  pray-  J 

er  vanish  as  that  the  universe  is  a  fixed  and  fatal  mechan- 

suon  as  we 

admit  the  ism.  From  this  point  of  view,  which  is  that 

liberty  of  t  . 

God.  ‘  of  open  or  disguised  atheism,  there  is,  in  fact, 
nothing  to  be  prayed  for ;  but,  likewise,  there  is  noth¬ 
ing  to  be  done.  The  doctrine  of  universal  fatalism 
is  so  contrary  to  our  immediate  sense  of  reality,  and 
to  the  common  consciousness  of  the  human  race,  that 
we  have  a  good  right  to  ask  of  it  proofs  of  its  truth. 
Now,  these  proofs  have  never  been  given,  nor  are 
they  ever  likely  to  be. 


2Q9 


The  Problem  of  Evil.  * 

Labor  and  prayer  have  many  points  of  resemblance  ; 
they  coincide  in  presuming  on  the  co-operation  of 
God  with  man.  The  contrast  has  been  made  in  more 
than  one  modern  writer,  that  prayer  was  the  practice 
of  ancient  times,  while  labor  is  the  virtue  of  the 
modern  world.  I  am  not  sure,  however,  that  the 
ancients  prayed  much  more  than  we  ;  and  I  am  of 
opinion  that  we  do  not  labor  much  more  than  they. 
As  to  instituting  a  contrast  between  prayer  and  labor, 
there  is  no  just  foundation  for  it,  though  it  is  often 
suggested  to  the  mind  by  the  abuses  of  a  morbid 
piety.  The  prayer  that  would  presume  to  Labor  and 
take  the  place  of  labor  would  be  a  mockery,  prayerform 

1  J  ’  no  proper 

and  almost  a  crime.  You  know  very  well  antagonism- 
the  fable  of  La  Fontaine  :  The  Rat  which  has  Retired 
from  the  World.  The  big  fat^rat,  superabundantly 
supplied  with  Dutch  cheese,  is  applied  to  for  help  by 
a  delegation  of  his  compatriots  of  Ratopolis,  who  were 
blockaded  by  the  cat-nation.  “  They  had  been  com¬ 
pelled  to  start  on  their  mission  without  money  be¬ 
cause  of  the  needy  condition  of  the  assaulted  city. 
They  asked  very  little,  confident  that  succor  would 
soon  be  at  hand.  ‘  My  friends,’  said  the  hermit,  ‘  the 
things  of  this  world  concern  me  no  longer ;  wherewith 
can  a  poor  recluse  be  of  help  to  you  ?  What  can  he 
do  but  pray  that  heaven  may  come  to  your  aid  ?  I 
hope,  in  fact,  that  heaven  may  preserve  you.’  Flaving 
spoken  thus,  the  new  saint  turned  and  shut  his  door.” 


300  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

This  is  a  saint  of  the  bad  type.  The  invalid  who 
has  neither  gold,  nor  silver,  nor  strength,  nor  even 
speech,  may  yet  give  his  prayers,  and  woe  to  him  who 
would  disdain  the  gift !  But  for  him  who  is  able  to 
act,  to  say  to  his  fellows  :  “  Brothers,  I  prefer  not  to 
trouble  my  repose  in  order  to  do  you  a  service,  but  I 
will  pray  that  God  may  come  to  your  help,”  is  mani¬ 
festly  to  mock,  at  once,  both  man  and  God.  Prayer, 
true  prayer,  ought  to  be  the  source,  the  main-springy 
of  our  action  for  the  good.  To  those  who  say,  Act, 
instead  of  praying !  we  should  always  be  able  to  an¬ 
swer,  I  pray  in  order  to  have  strength  for  acting. 

These  two  harmonizing  activities,  labor  and  prayer, 
have  the  same  condition,  and  the  same  limitation.  The 
The  condi-  condition  of  both  is  perseverance.  On  this 

tion  of  labor  .  ~  . 

aud  of  point  we  often  commit  an  error  which  occa- 
Pia-'er‘  sions  many  discouragements.  We  reason, 
and  we  act,  as  if  every  prayer  were  to  be  immediately 
and  fully  answered  ;  as  if  every  thing  should  be  Ac¬ 
complished  on  our  simply  once  asking  it  of  God. 
This  is  the  error  of  an  impatient  child  that  should 
want  a  work  to  be  finished  as  soon  as  it  is  com¬ 
menced.  If  prayer  is  a  natural  function  of  spiritual 
life,  it  is  from  that  very  fact  a  perpetual  function.  If 
prayer  is  the  respiration  of  the  soul,  it  ought  to  be 
incessantly  renewed.  Without  presuming  to  limit 
the  power  of  divine  grace,  we  yet  have  no  right,  for 
example,  to  expect,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  Provi- 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


301 


dence,  that  a  single  prayer  addressed  to  the  Master 
of  life  should  emancipate  the  will  from  the  fetters  of 
evil  habits  which  have  been  strengthening  themselves 
for  a  period  of  ten,  twenty,  or,  perhaps,  thirty  years. 
Perseverance,  therefore,  is  the  common  condition  of 
both  labor  and  prayer.  As  to  the  limits  of  these  two 
powers,  they  are  involved  in  the  inscrutable  designs 
of  Providence.  How  many  prayers  receive  no  ap- 
parent  and  immediate  answer  !  How  many  The  effects 

^  J  of  both  la- 

of  our  efforts  seem  to  fail  of  their  end  !  Sov-  tor  and 

prayer  lim- 

ereign  wisdom  reserves  the  privilege  of  fix-  itfid  by  the 

.  .  ^  .  ,  .  .  ,  ,  r  wisdom  ol 

mg  definitively  Doth  the  success  01  our  ood. 
efforts  and  the  results  of  our  prayers. 

We  have,  therefore,  found  the  direct  source  of 
strength,  of  that  strength  which,  when  once  obtained, 
we  are  to  nurture  and  increase  by  a  good  spiritual 
regimen.  But  is  that  all?  One  of  you  has  written 
to  me,  and  asked,  what  others  of  you  have,  doubtless, 
also  thought :  Are  we  not  going  to  speak  directly  of 
that  help  which  is  to  be  found  in  Christian  faith,  in 
faith  properly  so  called  ?  Is  there  not  a  The  qlles' 

r  r  J  tion  of  faith 

power  in  believing  in  God  as  revealed  in  ^  Christ. 
Jesus  Christ  ?  This  question  is  grave  ;  shall  we  enter 
upon  it  ?  We  shall  enter  upon  it,  and  that,  too,  with¬ 
out  in  the  least  transgressing  the  philosophical  limits 
which  we  have  laid  down  for  our  inquiries. 


302 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


IIL  The  Question  of  Faith. 

By  the  nature  of  this  discussion,  as  defined  from 
the  start,  it  was  to  be  a  philosophical  examination  of 
the  problem  of  evil.  That  is,  we  were  to  enter  upon 
it  without  any  other  condition  than  that  of  serious 
and  earnest  minds  in  search  of  the  truth.  We  are 
not  presumed,  while  here,  to  have  any  common  bond 
of  faith,  or  to  have  consented  to  any  one  form  of 
dogmas.  Under  all  the  diversities,  shades,  and  transi¬ 
tions  which  real  life  offers,  and  which  over-step  our 
abstract  divisions,  society  forms,  on  the  whole,  two 
distinct  classes.  The  ones  make  profession  of  the 
Christian  faith  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  accept  the  super¬ 
natural  testimony  of  Christ,  and,  if  they  are  consist¬ 
ent,  submit  to  his  authority  wherever  it  may  conduct 
them.  The  others  have  not  accepted  this  authority, 
and  can  be  addressed  only  in  their  quality  of  men,  with 
reason, “heart,  and  conscience.  Thus  far  I  have  ad¬ 
dressed  all  without  discrimination.  But  now  I  must 
distinguish. 

.  .  ni  .  As  to  us'  who  are  Christians,  at  least  in' 
tmns.  profession,  what  is  our  position  on  the  ques¬ 
tion  which  we  are  investigating  ?  We  affirm  that  it 
is  only  by  faith  in  the  Crucified  One  of  Golgotha,  and 
by  participation  in  the  grace  which  flows  from  this 
source  of  mercy,  that  the  soul  can  find,  through 
prayer,  the  strength  necessary  for  working  that 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


303 


change,  that  conversion,  which  extricates  it  from  the 
pursuits  of  egotism,  and  causes  it  to  enter  into  the 
paths  of  charity.  Those  of  you  who  are  believers, 
to  whatever  degree  it  may  be,  your  faith  is  your  treas¬ 
ure.  But  this  treasure  is  not  like  that  of  the  miser  ; 
he  who  possesses  it  ought  to  spread  it,  for  it  grows 
intense  within  us  in  proportion  as  it  is  propagated  to 
others  by  us.  You  have,  therefore,  to  bear  testimony 
of  your  faith.  You  are  to  call  the  attention  of  men 
to  the  source  of  the  strength  that  is  in  you,  by  the 
instrumentality  of  your  works  and  your  sentiments, 
that  is  to  say,  by  being  virtuous  and  joyous  ;  for  all 
true  faith  is  a  fountain  of  goodness  and  joy.  You 
are,  then,  to  add  words  to  example,  and  propagate 
your  convictions  by  argument.  Take  care,  however, 
not  to  wound  legitimate  sentiments.  Do  not,  by  your 
imprudence,  increase  the  difficulties  which  the  truth 
otherwise  meets  with  in  conquering  hearts.  In  ad¬ 
dressing  those  who  profess  the  same  faith  as  your¬ 
selves,  remind  them  frankly  of  the  rule  of  authority 
to  which  you,  as  well  as  they,  submit.  But  when  you 
are  to  give  a  reason  for  your  faith  to  those  who  are 
simply  your  fellows,  without  being  believers,  do  not 
forget  that  they  are  your  fellows,  that  is  to  say,  that 
they,  like  you,  have  a  will  that  belongs  to  God,  but 
which,  in  the  presence  of  men,  is  master  of  itself. 
Respect  in  all  things  the  liberty  of  others  ;  and,  to 
say  it  all  in  one  word,  if  you  wish  to  serve  efficiently 


304  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

the  cause  of  Christian  faith,  propose  it,  but  do  not 
impose  it. 

For  those,  however,  who  make  no  profession  of 

As  to  non-  being  Christians,  and  who  are  here  simply 
Christians.  to  investigate  a  philosophical  question,  the 

testimony  of  believers  is  a  fact  which  is  evident  be¬ 
fore  you,  and  of  which  you  are  called  to  estimate  the 
value.  You  could  not  neglect  this  without  violating 
the  conditions  of  honest  investigation.  Philosophy, 
in  fact,  is  a  pursuit  which  is  entirely  free,  that  is  to 
say,  which  is  limited  by  no  dogmatic  assumption  ;  it 
is  an  inquiry,  whose  object  is  universal ;  strictly 
speaking,  it  differs  from  the  special  sciences  simply 
by  the  universality  of  its  object.  Liberty  and  univer¬ 
sality  :  these  are  the  two  characteristics  of  philosophy. 
In  your  search  after  a  solution  of  the  problems  of 
humanity,  you  encounter  the  testimony  of  Christians, 
occupying  a  large  place  in  history.  What  is  to  be 
thought  of  the  fact  upon  which  their  faith  is  based  ? 
This  question  cannot  be  evaded  ;  are  you  forbidden 
to  examine  it  ?  If  so,  your  inquiries  are  not  free. 
But  is  this  question  foreign  to  you  ?  No  ;  for  by  their 
very  nature,  your  inquiries  are  universal.  In  either 
case,  you  would  violate  the  conditions  of  philosophy. 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  in  an  honest  and  truly  free 
investigation,  to  propose  directly  the  question  of 
faith  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  question  of  the  nature  of 
the  testimony  of  Jesus  Christ.  To  avoid  proposing 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


305 


it  on  the  pretense  that  it  is  already  solved  in  the  neg¬ 
ative,  would  be  to  act  under  the  influence  of  a  preju¬ 
dice  ;  and  this  prejudice  would  constitute  a  dogmatic 
pre-supposition,  which,  tor  being  contrary  to  that  of 
believers,  would  none  the  less  be  contrary  to  philo¬ 
sophical  procedure. 

The  question,  when  once  proposed,  is  capable  of 
two  solutions.  Is  the  testimony  of  Christ  a  T1f twopos' 
divine  testimony  establishing  a  legitimate  swers- 
authority  ?  If,  after  examination,  you  answer  nega¬ 
tively,  then  you  will  seek  some  other  basis  than  that 
of  faith  upon  which  to  construct  your  theory  of  life. 
But  if,  after  examination,  you  answer  affirmatively, 
then,  by  that  very  fact,  you  enter  into  the  very  sphere 
of  faith.  *  If  you  have  said  “No,”  then  either  Thene?a. 
your  search  will  continue  without  coming  to  tlve* 
any  result,  or  you  will  come  to  be  a  Positivist,  a 
Hegelian,  a  Deist,  a  Pantheist,  or  you  will  construct 
a  theory  of  your  own.  You  will  have  a  philosophy 
of  some  kind  ;  this  philosophy  may  be  even  Christian 
in  a  certain  degree,  in  that  you  may  accept  a  portion 
of  the  Christian  system  ;  but  the  doctrines  which 
you  may  thus  accept  will  remain  for  you  simply  doc¬ 
trines,  resting  on  no  basis  of« faith.  It  is  thus  that 
the  majority  of  contemporary  French  philosophers 
of  the  so-called  Spiritualistic  school,  have  introduced 
into  their  system  many  elements,  whose  historical 

source,  is  manifestly  Christian.  And  it  is  thus  that 

20 


30  6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


I  have  proposed  to  you  a  philosophical  solution  of  the 
problem  of  evil,  taken  from  the  sphere  of  theology, 
but  which  we  have  separated  therefrom,  and  which 
may  be  accepted,  if  it  is  thought  to  answer  well  its 
purpose,  without  accepting,  as  a  whole,  the  Christian 
system.  However  this  may  be,  if  you  have  given  a 
negative  answer  to  the  question  of  faith,  you  will  still 
remain  in  the  common  domain  of  philosophy,  properly 
so-called. 


But  if  you  have  answered  affirmatively,  if 
you  have  accepted  the  testimony  of  Christ 


The  affirma¬ 
tive. 


as  divine,  the  faith  which  therefore  ensues  will  be  the 
starting-point  of  a  new  process  of  thought,  for,  as  St. 
Anselm  has  said,  faith  seeks  to  justify  itself.  Taking 
the  Christian  doctrines  as  a  basis,  you  will  proceed  to 
organize  a  speculative  or  practical  theory  of  life.  If 
you  are  a  theologian,  you  will  construct  a  system  of 
theology.  But  if  you  are  not,  if  you  are  simply 
a  member  of  society,  desiring  to  be  able  to  give  a 
reason  for  your  faith,  you  will  adopt  what  may  be 
called  a  Christian’s  philosophy  ;  the  word  Christian 
preventing  all  misunderstanding,  and  giving  clearly 
to  understand  that  you  stand  no  longer  on  the  ground 
of  mere  philosophy  in  general,  but  within  the  pale  of 
faith.  Where  once  the  divine  testimony  is  accepted, 
there  the  inquiry  after  the  basis  of  truth  ceases, 
like  a  ship  casting  anchor  on  entering  a  harbor ;  and 
the  efforts  of  thought  assume  another  phase.  Though 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


30  7 


philosophy  proper  ceases  within  the  pale  of  faith, 
but  continues,  if  faith  has  been  rejected  after  rational 
examination,  yet,  strictly  speaking,  in  all  cases  where 
skepticism  as  to  faith  exists  before  such  examination, 
and  hence  can  only  be  the  result  of  prejudice,  wre 
cannot  admit  that  philosophy  proper,  which  by  nature 
is  impartial  and  absolutely  free,  has  either  ceased  or 
yet  continues,  for  it,  in  fact,  has  never  commenced. 

Is  it  not  perfectly  evident  that  a  mind  truly  honest 
and  free  could  not  pass  over  a  fact  as  important  as 
the  power  of  Christianity  in  the  world  without  sub¬ 
jecting  it  to  the  most  careful  examination  ?  Manjr think' 

J  +  ers  of  tlie 

Many  men,  however,  I  mean  men  of  science,  day  ignore 

Christian  - 

have  never  made  this  examination — -have  ity. 
never  thought  of  seriously  proposing  the  question  of 
faith.  But  why  is  this  ?  The  fact  depends  partly  on 
historical  causes,  into  the  details  of  which  I  cannot 
here  enter.  I  will,  however,  indicate  one  :  the  abuse 
of  authority,  and  the  interference  of  civil  And  why? 
powers  in  the  domain  of  faith.  At  the  time  when 
heresy,  as  detected  by  ecclesiastical  authority,  involved 
severe  temporal  consequences,  those  men  who  wished 
to  enjoy  independence  of  thought,  and  yet  had  no 
taste  for  martyrdom,  thought  of  no  better  stratagem 
than  to  declare  that,  absorbed  in  the  researches  of 
philosophy,  they  kept  themselves  entirely  outside  of 
the  religious  sphere,  and  meddled  themselves  not  in 
the  least  with  the  verities  of  faith.  It  was  under 


308 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


these  circumstances  that  sprang  up  the  strange  notion 
that  there  could  be  two  realms  of  truth,  to  the  one 
of  which  men  might  belong  as  philosophers,  and  to 
the  other  as  believers.  It  was  under  such  a  state  of 
things  that  the  Italian  Pomponazzi,  while  writing  a 
book  against  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  neverthe¬ 
less  affirmed  that,  in  his  quality  of  Catholic,  he  fully 
accepted  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life,  as  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  faith.  The  abuse  of  authority 
produced,  as  a  natural  consequence,  an  unwillingness 
to  examine  the  grounds  of  faith.  And  one  of  the 
causes  which  still  yet  hinder  the  propagation  of  the 
Christian  religion  is  the  fact,  that  many  men  are  de¬ 
terred  from  examining  such  questions  by  a  vague  and 
unnatural  trepidation  which  is  a  heritage  of  the  servi¬ 
tude  of  the  past.  But  the  epoch  of  liberty  has  now 
fully  arrived.  And  as  it  is  contrary  to  all  reason  to 
admit  that  one  truth  can  conflict  with  another,  it  is 
very  evident  that  true  liberty  of  mind,  and  independ¬ 
ence  of  spirit,  cannot  exist  in  that  man  who  does  not 
break  through  the  cloud  of  prejudices,  and  honestly 
contemplate,  along  with  other  problems,  that  pre¬ 
eminently  great  problem  which  is  involved  in  the 
origin  and  revolutionizing  power  of  Christianity.  But 
what  is  here  my  more  immediate  object?  Simply  to 
show  you  how  that  the  question  of  faith,  that  ques¬ 
tion  which  is  of  such  manifold  and  deep  bearing, 
rises  naturally  and  inevitably  from  the  discussion  in 


The  Problem  df  Evil  309 

which  we  are  engaged,  and  demands  of  us  a  positive 
answer,  one  way  or  the  other. 

The  good  has  a  history.  It  has  had  its  struggles, 
its  reverses,  and  its  triumphs.  Now,  in  the  history  of 
the  good,  there  is  one  name  which,  as  no  one  really 
denies,  occupies  an  altogether  exceptional  pre-emi¬ 
nence — Jesus  of  Nazareth.  Moral  truth,  it  is  true, 
had  been  largely  developed  in  the  ancient  world,  by 
the  patient  labors  of  sages  in  studying  the  voice  of 
conscience,  and  in  observing  the  laws  of  spiritual  life. 
But  at  the  same  time  that  moral  light  was  c'lmstiamty 

saved the eiv- 

’  dawning  more  clearly,  public  morals  were  ilized  worl(1 

from  moral 

degenerating  :  the  civilization -of  the  Roman  rum. 
world  was  characterized  by  a  frightful  mingling  of 
debauchery  and  cruelty.  There  seemed  to  be  a  pro¬ 
found  divorce  between  the  conscience  and  the  life  of 
humanity ;  and  the  more  clearly  the  sages  discovered 
the  ideal  of  good,  the  more  did  they  feel  their  inability 
to  realize  it  in  the  world. 

It  was  then  that  the  teachings  of  the  Galilean  were 
heard,  teachings  which  were  the  starting-point  of  re¬ 
generation  in  a  world  which  was  sinking  into  the 
abysses  of  corruption.  If  there  were  need  of  it,  I 
could  refer  you  for  confirmation  of  this  remark  to  a 
recent  work  which  will  not  be  suspected  of  partiality 
to  Christianity,  the  History  of  Moral  Ideas  in  An¬ 
tiquity,  by  M.  Denis.  M.  Denis  seems  to  design 
positively  to  deny  the  reality  of  a  supernatural  mani- 


3io 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


festation  in  Jesus  Christ.  He  collects  a  multitude 

of  texts,  designed  to  show  that  moral  light  had  con- 

• 

stantly  increased  through  the  researches  of  ancient 
philosophy.  And  he  proves  it ;  but  he  is  forced  to 
admit,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  depravity  of  morals 
increased  in  proportion  as  the  sages  saw  more  dis¬ 
tinctly  and  clearly  the  true  laws  of  human  nature  ; 
it  was  not  anq  pe  acknowledges  that  the  power,  the 
wanting,  but  strength,  which  has  begun  to  realize  the 
strength.  moral  law  in  society,  did  not  spring  directly 
from  the  labors  of  philosophers,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
from  the  preaching  of  Christianity.  And  we  see  not* 
how  any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  facts  can 
think  otherwise  than  M.  Denis.  We  say,  then,  that  it 
was  the  teaching  of  Christ  which  gave  birth  to  that 
progress  which  characterizes  and  constitutes  modern 
civilization  ;  those  even  who  do  not  admit  the  divinity 
of  the  Gospel  are  often  forced  to  admit  this  as  a 
historical  fact.  To  accept  this  fact  is  equivalent  to 
admitting  that  the  world  is  in  progress. 

Permit  me  here,  as  bearing  on  this  point,  to  intro¬ 
duce  a  piece  of  personal  experience.  I  know  that  it 
is  a  good  rule  to  speak  as  little  as  possible  of  one’s 
self ;  but  you  know  also  that  when  men  are  engaged 
in  an  interchange  of  thought,  the  recital  of  an  experi¬ 
ence  made  by  one  of  them  is  often  of  great  interest. 
Here,  then,  is  what  has  occurred  to  me  in  regard  to 
the  idea  of  progress. 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


311 

Every  man,  perhaps,  whether  because  of  circum¬ 
stances  attending  his  advent  into  the  world,  Personal  ex¬ 
perience  of 

or  because  of  his  own  peculiar  temperament,  the  author, 
is  naturally  inclined  to  look  with  especial  preference, 
either  in  the  direction  of  the  past,  or  in  that  of.  the 
future.  Personally,  I  have  always  had  a  predominant 
taste  for  the  past,  whether  because  of  the  general  cir¬ 
cumstances  which  I  have  just  mentioned,  or  perhaps 
because,  not  being  insensible  to  poetry,  I  found  more 
pleasure  in  the  rural  scenes  and  landscapes  as  they 
existed  in  the  days  of  our  fathers,  in  the  roads  wind¬ 
ing  along  between  hedges  and  following  the  meander- 
ings  of  our  native  brooks,  than  in  the  best  constructed 
of  our  railroads,  or  in  the  straightest  lines  of  tele¬ 
graphic  posts  ;  or,  finally,  perhaps  because,  in  the 
political  changes  which  Europe  has  presented  since* 
the  time  of  my  youth,  I  have  not  been  able  to  enter¬ 
tain  a  sentiment  of  respect  for  those  men  who  are 
ever  ready  to  welcome  every  thing  that  is  novel, 
taking  care,  at  the  same  time,  to  secure  for  themselves 
as  good  a  place  as  possible  in  the  new  order  of  things — 
for  those  men  who  turn  the  back  to  every  setting  sun, 
and  adore  ever}'  rising  star,  and  who  are  ready  to  ap¬ 
plaud  to-day,  after  its  success,  that  which  they  blamed 
yesterday  while  uncertain  of  the  result.  By  reason 
of  all  these  causes,  I  was  disposed  to  look  with  sus- 
picion  upon  all  innovation,  and  to  believe  very  little 
in  progress.  But  in  the  year  1854  I  was  called  to 


312 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


lecture,  in  Geneva,  on  the  subject  of  the  influence  of 
Christianity  on  the  destiny  of  society.  This  required 
me  to  embrace  under  one  point  of  view  the  entire 
development  of  the  history  of  the  last  eighteen 
centuries.  I  became  convinced  that  every  innovation 
is  not  progress  ;  that  in  the  march  of  civilization 
there  are  halts,  returns  backward,  darkenings  of  the 
public  conscience,  and  debilitated  states  of  public 
opinion  ;  but  that,  notwithstanding  this,  if  we  fix  our 
eye  on  the  great  movements  and  grand  outlines,  we 
discover  a  uniform  and  progressive  growth,  both 
legislatively  and  practically,  of  dignity,  justice,  and 
benevolence.  I  saw  that,  even  as  the  waters  of  all 
streams  flow  into  the  abysses  of  the  oc'ean,  so  the 
current  of  humanity,  though  often  eddying  backward, 
•  yet,  on  the  whole,  constantly  rises  toward  the  heavens. 
From  that  time  forth,  while  unwilling  to  welcome 
every  innovation,  or  to  renounce  my  inalienable  right 
of  exposing  hurtful  innovations,  and  protesting  against 
unjust  triumphs,  I  have  believed,  seriously  believed, 
in  progress ;  and  this  impression  has  never  been 
shaken.  I  was  conquered  by  the  truth. 

But  whence  springs  true  progress  ?  I  have  already 
explained  it.  The  soil  of  humanity  was  prepared  by 
the  labor  of  the  conscience^  and  the  reflec-  Trne  prog, 
tions  of  sages  ;  but  ancient  wisdom  found  ^.33(ilhb“sth 
the  light  without  discovering  the  power.  It  tiaility- 
did  not  succeed  in  furnishing  the  human  race  with  a 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


3  n 


lasting  principle  of  life.  The  germ  of  effectual  moral 
power  was  deposited  in  the  soil  by  the  words  of 
Christ.  From  that  time  on,  the  tree  of  good  has  been 
growing.  It  may  at  times  become  covered  with  moss, 
with  fungus,  and  with  dead  branches ;  but  the  sap  of 
eternal  youth  circulates  in  its  members.  To  those 
who  have  seen,  in  vision,  the  proportions  to  which  it 
is  destined,  the  tree  appears  as  yet  scarcely  started 
in  its  career  of  expansion  ;  and  those  who  despise  its 
shade  resemble  men  who  should  disdain  the  secular 
oak  which  shaded  their  fathers,  and  which  might 
generously  overhang  generations  to  come,  and  plant 
for  themselves  shriveled  acorns  in  arid  sands. 

We  have  in  us  two  instincts  :  love  of  the  past  and 
love  of  the  future  ;  and  these  two  instincts  are  equally 
true.  Without  indulging  in  illusions,  without  ex¬ 
pecting  from  earthly  progress  that  which  the  earth 
can  never  realize  ;  without  losing  sight  of  the  shocks, 
the  tempests,  the  catastrophes,  whiqji  may  fall  upon 
the  champions  of  religion,  and  which,  perhaps,  are  not 
far  distant,  it  must  be  admitted  that  human  society 
tends,  constantly  and  progressively,  to  present  a  less 
imperfect  reflection  of  the  kingdom  of  the  good.  But 
the  future  grows  out  of  the  past ;  progress  is  but  the 
development  of  the  pure  germs  deposited  in  the  tra¬ 
ditions  of  the  race.  Our  love  of  that  which  Conserva- 


was,  and  our  desire  of  the  new,  are  harmon¬ 
ized  by  our  fidelity  to  this  tradition,  as  main- 


tism  and 
radicalism 
reconciled. 


314 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


tained  and  purified  by  trial,  and  as  the  more  surely 
maintained  by  being  more  perfectly  purified.  The 
division  of  mankind  into  two  camps,  of  which  the  one 
aims  to  preserve  all  that  is,  and  the  other  to  destroy 
all  that  thus  far  has  been — the  division,  which  is  ob¬ 
servable  no  less  in  the  quarrels  of  a  village  than  in 
the  diplomacy  of  empires,  no  less  in  the  conversation 
of  two  individuals  than  in  the  greatest  conflicts  in  the 
world  of  ideas — is  entirely  unnecessary  and  unjustifia¬ 
ble.  That  there  should  be  a  contest  between  two 
exclusive  parties  is  perhaps  natural  to  our  evil  hearts  ; 
for  it  is  the  contest  of  interest  and  passion.  But  have 
you  not  caught  sight  of  the  day-dawn  of  better  times, 
as  often  as  personal  interest  and  passion  were  lost 
sight  of?  Innovators,  would  you,  then,  destroy  the 
good  of  the  past  and  renounce  the  heritage  of  centu¬ 
ries  ?  Conservatists,  would  you,  in  your  turn,  arrest 
the  work  of  the  present,  and  hinder  the  good  from 
growing  for  th«  future  ?  There  is  a  better  course  ; 
between  the  banners  of  these  two  hostile  factions 
there  exists  a  third,  that  of  the  men  who,  by  the  labor 
of  the  present,  are  striving  to  prepare  a  better  future 
by  the  development  of  the  good  that  was  in  the  past, 
and  by  the  progressive  elimination  of  the  evil.  This 
is  the  party  of  peace,  of  justice,  and  of  truth.  In  its 
hands  is  the  future,  that  future  which  we  hail  with 
confident  hope.  Cast  your  eyes  about  you,  now,  and 
say  whether  this  progress  toward  the  good  is  not  an 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


3T5 


outgrowth  of  the  past ;  say  whether  that  which  con¬ 
stitutes  the  solidity  and  glory  of  our  civilization  is 
not  the  development  of  Christian  thought ;  say 
whether  the  increasing  harmony  of  individuals  and 
nations  under  just  and  beneficent  law  is  not  the  work 
of  Him  who  manifested  his  glory  on  high  by  announc¬ 
ing  peace  and  good-will  among  men  ? 

Jesus  of  Nazareth  appears  in  history  as  the  source 
of  the  greatest  of  all  developments  of  social  good 
among  mankind.  This  is  assuredly  a  unique  Theunpara1' 
faCt,  and  worthy  of  the  most  serious  con-  ence  of 

Christ  on 

sideration.  It  seems  surprising  that  the  civilization, 
germ  of  universal  progress  was  deposited  in  the  soil 
of  humanity,  not  by  the  schools  of  Greece, *nor  by  the 
practical  wisdom  of  Rome,  but  by  a  citizen  of  Nazareth 
in  Galilee.  But  let  us  not  simply  consider  the  social 
influence  of  the  Son  of  Mary  ;  look  also  at  his  influ¬ 
ence  on  individuals.  Alfred  de  Musset,  a  victim  of 
passions  of  which,  even  while  yielding  to  0n  illustri_ 
them,  he  never  ceased  to  recognize  the  fatal  ous  men‘ 
character,  stopped  thoughtfully  one  day  in  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  the  grand  figure  of  St.  Augustine,  and  seeing 
how  this  ardent  son  of  Africa  rose  to  full  triumph 
over  passions  which  were  ruining  him,  he  wrote  this 
line,  which  is  not  among  the  feebler  tributes  which 
the  world  has  rendered  to  the  Bishop  of  Hippo :  “The 
most  manly  man  that  ever  existed,  St.  Augustine !  ” 
But  whence  did  St.  Augustine  obtain  power  to  tri- 


3  J6 


The  Problem  of  Evil. 


umph  over  his  passions  ?  He  himself  has  told  us  so 
clearly  that  all  the  world  knows  it.  And  shall  we 
again  refer  to  Pascal  ?  Pascal  was  of  such  feeble 
health  that  from  the  age  of  nineteen  he  never  passed 
a  single  day  without  suffering  in  his  body.  And  in 
this  ailing  body  there  was  lodged  a  soul  so  bold,  so 
proud,  so  ready  to  descend  into  the  deepest  depths  of 
thought,  that  he  was  also  acquainted  with  all  the 
torments  of  the  understanding.  But  it  was  Pascal 
who,  while  speaking  of  the  condition  of  his  own  soul, 
exclaimed  :  “Joy,  joy,  joy  !  and  weepings  for  joy  !  ” 
And  whence  came  to  him  the  power  of  triumphing 
over  suffering  ?  He  himself  has  written  it,  in  words 
which  will  not  be  effaced.  But  why  linger  about 
these  illustrious  names  ?  The  Christian  faith,  it  is 
true,  acts  too  little  for  the  good ;  and  this  is  the  fault 
and  shame  of  those  who  profess  it ;  but  it  neverthe¬ 
less  acts.  Consider  what  is  taking  place  in  the  world, 
far  and  near.  How  many  temptations  conquered ! 
on  the  how  many  lives  changed  !  how  much  sacri- 

hnmblest.  r  ,  .  .  .  ,  ,  . 

nee  !  how  many  tears  wiped  away !  how 
many  rays  of  hope,  beaming  even  into  the  anguish  and 
darkness  of  death  !  how  much  fortitude — fortitude 
against  suffering,  against  sadness,  against  disgust 
and  temptation  !  in  a  word,  how  much  strength  for  the 
good  has  been  produced  and  is  yet  every  day  pro¬ 
duced  by  this  single  name  Jesus  ! 

Suppress  this  name  if  you  can  !  If  you  could  efface 


The  Problem  of  Evil 


317 


it  from  the  memories  of  men,  what  gloom  would  cover 
the  earth,  what  thick  clouds  would  vail  our  sun  ! 
clouds  more  dark  than  those  which  brooded  over  the 
chaos  of  the  ancient  world,  because  the  shadows  which 
follow  after  light  are  more  dense  than  the  darkness 
which  precedes  it.  Every  serious  conviction  has  its 
rights,  and  should  be  respected.  If  a  man,  after 
having  considered  and  reconsidered  his  thoughts,  is 
well  convinced  that  the  Christian  faith  in  itself,  and 
independently  of  its  abuses,  is  hurtful,  he  has  the 
right,  and  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty,  of  working 
for  the  destruction  of  what,  in  his  eyes,  is  a  baneful 
superstition.  But  (and  I  say  it  not  only  in  the  name 
of  my  personal  convictions,  but  also  in  the  name  of 
the  most  evident  interests  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of 
untold  weaknesses  sustained,  and  sufferings  consoled), 
how  culpable  would  be  overhaste  in  this  matter  !  how 
criminal  would  it  be  to  trifle  !  how  confirmed  should 
one  be  in  his  convictions,. and  certain  in  his  negations, 
before  being  able  with  good  conscience  to  devote  his 
words  and  pen  to  banishing  faith  from  the  earth  ! 

But,  it  may  occur  to  some  of  you,  are  we  only  going 
to  consider  one  phase  of  the  question  ?  are  we  not 
going  to  supplement  our  survey  of  the  benefits  of  the 
Christian  faith,  by  an  examination  of  the  evils  with 
which  it  has  been  accused  ?  We  have  no  But  has  not 
desire  to  leave  in  the  background  this  phase  caused*™1^ 
of  the  subject.  But  what  are  the  accusations  much  evU? 


3 1 8 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


made  ?  That  under  pretext  of  religion,  men  seek, 
riches,  power,  and  earthly  interests.  That  in  the  name 
of  religion,  constraint,  oppression,  and  despotism  have 
been  so  much  practiced  as  to  throw  the  friends  of 
liberty  almost  inevitably  into  the  party  hostile  to  faith. 
In  a  word,  it  is  complained  that  religion  is  often  only  a 
cloak  to  cover  the  base  purposes  of  sensuality  and 
pride.  But  is  this  a  fact  ?  It  is  a  fact,  and  undenia¬ 
bly  so.  But  why  is  this  ?  ShalfVd  impute  it  to  the 
Christian  faith  per  se?  Do  you  suppose  that  the 
Brahmins  of  India  and  the  priests  of  Mongolia  never 
seek,  under  pretext  of  religion,  the  satisfaction  of  un¬ 
spiritual  interests  ?  Or  do  you  pretend  that  it  is  not 
simply  the  Christian  religion,  but  religion  in  general, 
that  produces  these  sad  results  ?  If  so,  then  I  ask  : 
Do  you  suppose  that  all  professions  of  patriotism  are 
perfectly  pure,  and  that  private  interests  never  lurk 
behind  the  broad  mantle  of  the  public  good?  You 
cannot  think  so  ;  for  there  are  few  so  little  acquainted 
with  the  world  as  not  to  know,  that-if  faith  has  its 
hypocrites,  politics  and  philanthropy  have  also  their 
quacks  and  Tartuffes.  There  have  been  dreadful  per¬ 
secutions  ;  but  would  you  charge  upon  the  Christian 
faith  the  orders  of  the  Roman  emperors,  in  their  efforts 
to  quench  in  blood  the  infant  Church  ?  In  India  the 
blood  of  the  followers  of  Buddha  has  been  freely  shed  ; 
but  is  that  the  fault  of  the  Christian  faith?  Nor,  to 
leave  out  of  the  account  Christianity,  can  we  fix  upon 


The  Problem  of  Evil  319 

religion  in  general  a  blacker  stigma  than  upon  other 
manifestations  of  social  life  ?  The  interest  of  mon- 
archs,  and  the  passions  of  nations,  have  created  in  the 
past,  and  still  yet  create,  untold  suffering  and  un¬ 
numbered  martyrs.  The  proscriptions  of  Sylla  were 
not  of  a  religious  origin  ;  and  the  bloody  excesses  of 
the  French  Revolution  cannot  be  charged  to  religion. 
Is  it  not  clear  that  the  world  is  full  of  passions  which, 
springing  from  man’s  evil  heart,  defile  every  thing 
with  their  contact  ?  To  charge  religion  with  the 
evils  which  have  resulted  from  its  perversion,  as  pretext 

but  not  as 

is  to  take  the  innocent  pretext  for  the  guilty  cause, 
cause.  If  passions  have  run  especially  high  under 
religious  pretexts,  it  is  simply  because  of  the  great 
importance  of  the  subject  of  religion  in  general.  But 
when  social  interests  predominate,  the  passions  of 
men  run  to  equal  extremes  in  this  respect.  Hypocrisy 
and  persecution  are  not  uncommon  in  the  sphere  of 
politics,  as  all  of  you  have  already  seen,  and  will 
doubtless  see  again.  But  let  us  meet  the  question 
squarely  and  directly. 

Is  Jesus  of  Nazareth  responsible  for  the  evil  that 
has  been  done  in  his  name  ?  Did  he,  for  example, 
commend  the  seeking  of  the  riches  and  power  of 
earth,  under  pretext  of  heaven  ?  You  know  very  well 
that  fanaticism  showed  itself  under  his  own  eyes,  and  in 
the  person  of  his  own  disciples.  What  did  he  say  to 
those  who  wished  to  call  down  fire  from  heaven  to 


320  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

Christ  the  consume  an  inhospitable  village?  “Ye 

first  to  pro-  r  & 

test  against  know  not  what  manner  ol*  spirit  ye  are  of.” 

tlie  abuse,  of 

his  truth.  And  what  to  him  who  wished  to  draw  the 
sword  in  his  defense  ?  “  Put  up  again  thy  sword  in 

its  place.”  And  what  to  those  who  supposed  him 
interested  in  earthly  glory  ?  “  My  kingdom  is  not  of 

this  world.”  Jesus  has  had  his  imitators,  and  he  has 
them  still.  For  three  centuries  his  Church  saw  no 
other  blood  flow  than  that  of  its  unjustly  persecuted 
members,  and  had  no  other  connection  with  prisons 
than  to  see  its  innocent  members  cruelly  shut  up 
therein.  P'or  eighteen  centuries  there  have  been, 
and  there  are  yet,  men  who  have  sincerely  sought  the 
good  of  their  souls,  and  renounced  the  pursuits  of 
selfishness.  Now,  I  ask  you,  you  who  complain  of  the 
evils  produced  by  religion :  Are  such  persons  the  real 
Christians,  or  is  it  the  other  class  of  merely  professed 
Christians  ?  Jesus  himself  foresaw,  and  condemned 
in  advance,  all  the  abuses  that  have  ever  been  made 
of  his  word.  No  single  protest  of  a  noble  heart,  or 
a  generous  conscience,  against  an  unworthy  use 
which  has  been  made  of  religion,  fails  to  find  in  the 
words  of  Christ  direct  approbation  and  sanction. 
Earth  has  had  its  impure  religions  ;  there  have  been 
pious  debauches  and  holy  cruelties  ;  vice,  armed  with 
divine  sanction,  descended  to  earth  from  Olympus, 
and  the  conscience  of  Socrates  was  purer  than  the 
sanctuary  of  the  gods.  But  in  the  Christian  world, 


The  Problem  of  Evil . 


321 


that  which  is  made  an  occasion  for  abuses,  will  al¬ 
ways  remain  a  living  principle  of  protestation  against 
these  very  abuses.  Whenever,  in  the  Christian  world, 
deplorable  instances  of  hypocrisy  or  fanaticism  come 
to  light,  as  they  constantly  do  come  to  light,  we  can 
always  appeal  from  the  temple  to  the  God  who  is 
there  adored,  and  from  the  priest  to  Him  of  whom 
he  claims  to  be  the  minister  and  servant.  The  Chris¬ 
tian  records  are  an  ever-flowing  spring,  fertilizing  the 
soil  of  humanity.  But  the  waters  of  this  spring,  in 
flowing  through  the  corrupt  heart  of  humanity,  be¬ 
come  mingled  with  impurity  and  uncleanness.  But 
what  of  this  ?  Turn  your  eyes  to  their  primitive 
fountain,  and  behold  how  it  still  flows,  perennially 
crystalline  and  pure.  Impute  not,  therefore,  to  it  the 
slime  and  impurity  which  become  mingled  with  it, 
and  which  it  sweeps  away  and  purifies.  Jesus,  I  re¬ 
peat  it,  is  the  greatest  of  all  actors,  an  actor  with 
whom  no  other  can  even  be  compared,  in  the  contest 
against  evil.  There  presents  itself,  therefore,  to 
every  earnest  and  impartial  mind,  this  ques-  The  question 

.  .  t  initsessen- 

tion  :  Who  was  this  man,  the  position  of  tni  form, 
whom  in  the  history  of  moral  development  is  so 
unique  and  exceptional? 

I  state  this  question,  but  do  not  discuss  it ;  this 
would  lead  us  outside  of  our  programme  ;  and  it 
merits  to  be  treated  apart.  Moreover,  we  have 

reached  the  close  of  this  series  of  discourses. 

21 


322  The  Problem  of  Evil. 

Before  opening  this  discussion,  I  received  from 
abroad  a  letter  dictated  by  an  artist's  taste,  and  occa¬ 
sioned  by  the  nature  of  the  subject  I  had  undertaken 
to  discuss.  I  was  asked  whether  the  contemplation 
of  the  beautiful  and  the  good  would  not  be  more 
salutary,  and  whether  it  were  not  dangerous  to  con¬ 
sider  too  attentively  the  evil.  “I  answer:  It  is  not 
well  to  look  long  at  evil ;  and  we  should  hasten  to 
turn  away  our  eyes,  if  we  feel  ourselves  feeble  in  its 
presence,  and  have  reason  to  fear  that,  instead  of  com¬ 
bating  it,  we  may  yield  to  its  solicitations.  But  evil 
is  so  intimately  inwoven  with  our  life  that  we  see  it 
without  needing  to  look  for  it  ;  and  I  think  with 
Pascal,  that  “  It  is  well  to  accustom  ourselves  to 
profit  by  evil,  inasmuch  as  it  is  so  generally  prevalent, 
whereas  the  good  is  so  rare.”  I  trust  that  we,  too, 
will  not  separate  without  having  derived  some  profit 
from  this  review  of  the  nature  of  evil. 

Let  us  sum  up  the  principal  points  involved  in  the 
discussion  which  we  are  now  closing : 

Remmi.  The  good  is  that  which  ought  to  be  ;  it  is 
the  will  of  God.  The  realizing  of  the  good  has  been 
committed  to  free  creatures ;  where  freedom  should 
be  lacking  there  could  be  neither  good  nor  evil. 
PVom  the  existence  of  free  creatures,  results  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  revolt  and  its  consequences.  A  revolt  has 
actually  taken  place  ;  the  human  race  violated  its 
law  bv  a  voluntary  act,  and  we  are  subject  to  the  con- 


The  Problem  of  Evil \ 


323 


sequences  of  the  common  fall  But  the  good  is  the 
cause  of  Him  who  is  almighty  ;  and  time  will  not 
fail  the  Almighty  for  accomplishing  his  purposes. 
The  source  of  our  discouragements  is  often  in  our 
impatience ;  we  would  measure  by  our  short  reed 
the  ways  of  Him  who  is  patient  because  he  is 
eternal 

The  evil  ought  not  to  be ;  God  wishes  it  not  to  be. 
To  name  it  is  to  proclaim  at  once  the  duty  of  com¬ 
bating  it,  and  the  bright  hope  of  triumphing  over 
it.  For  him  who,  admitting  the  authority  of  reason 
and  the  validity  of  conscience,  preserves  an  unshaken 
faith  in  the  goodness  of  the  Author  of  the  universe, 
the  good  beams  brightly  forth,  even  from  the  con¬ 
templation  of  evil,  and  all  complaints  and  sighs  of 
discouragement  are  finally  transformed  into  an  an¬ 
them  of  hope. 


INDEX 


Alexandrian  school,  the,  109. 

Altruisme,  the,  of  Comte,  36. 

Alzire.  the  play,  alluded  to,  46. 

Animals,  jealousy  among,  72  ;  have  they  true  self-consciousness?  77  ; 

souls  ?  78  ;  implicated  in  evil,  79. 

Asceticism,  19. 

Atheist,  an,  his  declaration,  130. 

Augustine,  St.,  226,  315. 

Bastiat  quoted,  229. 

Beranger  quoted,  122. 

‘‘‘Better”  and  “worse”  imply  an  absolute  standard,  49. 

Body,  the,  not  evil,  122. 

Buchner  on  “facts,”  210. 

Buffon,  76. 

Calvin  quoted,  168. 

Carnivora  before  the  fall,  72. 

Catholicism,  imprudence  of,  196. 

Charity  the  sum  of  moral  duties,  36;  “begins  at  home,”  264;  nu¬ 
merous  calls  to,  256;  all  have  some  time  for,  270. 

Chastity,  138  et  seq. 

Christianity,  the  only  progressive  religion,  46 ;  not  responsible  for 
its  abuses,  317  et  scq. 

Cicero  quoted,  31,  58,  136,  194,  217. 

Cid,  the,  alluded  to,  24. 

“  Cinna”  quoted,  47. 

Civilization,  its  potency  its  test,  44. 

Conscience,  40,  44;  not  comparable  to  wax,  4S  ;  never  utterly  silent, 
64;  two  forms  of,  246. 

Conflict  of  life,  the,  241  ;  abnormal,  242. 

Conservatism  and  radicalism  reconciled,  313. 

Conversion,  a  twofold,  250. 

Copernicus  quoted,  194  etseq. 


326 


Index. 


Death,  significance  of,  54. 

Deceptive  solutions,  121. 

De  Maistre  quoted,  73. 

Demonstration,  process  of  a.  193. 

Descartes,  75  ;  a  praying  man,  289. 

Dissipation  of  power,  danger  of,  236. 

Divorce,  Roman,  123. 

Dogma,  nature  of  a,  169  et  seq. 

Don  Quixote,  255. 

Dualism  in  Persia  and  Greece,  119. 

Duties,  three  classes  of,  35  ;  scale  of,  264 ;  professional,  268. 

Egotism,  23S,  269. 

Ennui ,  33,  248. 

Epictetus,  104. 

Epicureanism,  18. 

Ethics,  steady  advance  of,  43. 

Euripides  quoted,  65,  83. 

Evil  always  calls  forth  blame,  27  ;  defined,  68 ;  in  nature,  in  what 
sense,  69 ;  in  the  animal  world  a  mystery,  72  ;  to  be  studied  in 
man,  79;  threefold  form  of,  81;  negation  of,  95;  admitted  prac¬ 
tically-,  95;  denied  speculatively,  96;  “explained,”  98;  argument 
in  denial  of,  106 ;  absurdity  of  this  denial,  10S  et  seq.  ;  essentiality 
of,  14S  ;  not  accounted  for  by  hereditary  transmission,  155. 

Experience,  present,  not  all-embracing,  57;  a  Higher  form  of,  100; 
personal,  of  the  author,  31 1. 

Facts,  psychological,  as  real  as  physical,  209. 

Faith  versus  works,  251  ;  the  question  of,  302  et  seq.  ;  two  possible 
answers  to,  305. 

Fall,  the,  its  philosophical  significance,  166  et  seq.  ;  in  what  sense  all 
participated  in  it,  217. 

Fallacies,  80. 

P'anaticism,  64. 

Fatalism,  never  acted  upon,  294. 

Food  and  drink,  abuse  of,  143. 

P'ourierism,  122. 

Fricoteurs,  245. 

Generalness  of  error  and  sin,  135. 

God  primitively  under  no  obligation,  28 ;  has  obligated  himself,  29  ; 
the  only  guarantee  of  the  good,  59 ;  his  will  identical  with  the 
good,  157. 


T ndcx 


327 

Good,  the,  senses  of  the  word,  16  ;  of  the  conscience,  16  ;  of  the 
heart,  iS;  of  the  reason,  20;  implies  a  plan,  21  ;  of  the  reason, 
the  all  inclusive  form,  22  ;  always  implies  an  “  ought,”  23  ;  always 
calls  forth  praise,  27  ;  normally  loved,  by  the  soul,  31  ;  character¬ 
ized,  34  ;  the  goal  of  all  progress,  51  ;  the  plan  of  God,  61  ;  iden¬ 
tical  with  God’s  will,  63  ;  all  good  obligatory,  255. 

Greece,  morals  of,  in  the  heroic  age,  156. 

Habit,  significance  of,  150. 

Happiness,  an  object  of  duty,  24;  the  normal  fruit  of  duty,  25. 
Havet  quoted,  196. 

“  Heart  ”  in  its  moral  sense,  150  et  seq. ;  impersonal  element  of,  151s 
awakes  before  conscience,  152  ;  overbalances  conscience,  153. 
Hierarchy  of  being,  101  ;  judgments  of,  101. 

Hobbyists.  240. 

Homage  of  vice  to  virtue,  32. 

Home  duties,  precedence  of,  267. 

Hugo,  Victor,  quoted,  175,  204. 

Humanity  not  a  mere  numerical  mass,  162  ;  good  per  se,  189. 
Human  nature  back  of  all  evil,  126. 

Ideal,  attraction  of  the,  273. 

Impersonal  element,  an,  in  man,  164. 

Individualism,  133  ;  inadequacy  of,  157. 

Individuality  of  volition  not  exclusive,  224;  as  seen  in  love,  224;  in 
enthusiasm,  225  ;  in  habit,  226. 

“  Incomplete,”  not  bad,  108. 

Infancy,  sad  fate  of,  149, 

Institutions  not  a  sufficient  cause  of  evil,  122. 

Jealousy  in  animals,  172. 

Judgment,  the  “good”  implies  a  plan,  22;  “evil”  always  blame, 
23  ;  hierarchic  and  moral,  102  ;  harmonized  in  progress,  104. 
Justin  Martyr,  65. 

Kant  cited,  16,  279. 

Kepler,  197. 

Lacordaire  quoted,  141,  283. 

La  Fontaine,  76,  299. 

Lamartine  quoted,  175. 

Lamennais  quoted,  242. 


328 


Itidex. 


Law,  natural  ancl  spiritual,  137. 

Leibnitz,  113. 

Lever,  two  ways  of  viewing  a,  127. 

Liberty  as  real  a  fact  as  combustion,  131 ;  the  basis  of  possible  evil, 
132;  two  stages  of,  178;  harmonized  in  the  “heart,”  179;  a 
temptation,  213  ;  to  be  respected  in  others,  266. 

Luthardt  quoted,  169. 

Machiavelli,  253. 

Maine  de  Biran,  2S9. 

Man,  his  twofold  nature,  202  ;  why  the  lower  gains  the  upper 
hand,  206. 

Method  of  physical  science  not  applicable  to  liberty,  99;  a  falla¬ 
cious  one  of  philosophy,  187. 

Milton,  215. 

Minuti  Philosophic  the,  58. 

Material  conquest,  significance  of,  50. 

Moliere  cited,  261. 

Montaigne  alluded  to,  39. 

Moral  law,  the,  Sophocles  alludes  to  it,  32 ;  not  directly  assailed,  33  ; 
general  formula  of,  34;  its  invariablenesss  denied,  38;  its  germ  in 
all  souls,  43. 

Moral  sense  in  brutes,  does  it  exist  ?  74. 

Moral  views,  how  far  they  vary,  39 ;  accounted  for,  40. 

Moralists,  an  error  of,  123. 

Morality,  social,  41  ;  ethical,  144, 

Musset  cited,  14,  87,  292. 

Motto,  a  Swiss,  240;  an  Italian,  261. 

Nature,  the  ministry  of,  37  ;  how  far  hostile  to  man,  71 ;  how  far 
.  affected  by  the  fall,  186. 

Newton,  197. 

Non-development,  the  state  of,  not  an  evil,  fo6. 

Notes  of  Dr.  Whedon,  28,  30. 

Order  of  things,  the  true,  37. 

Pascal  cited,  39,  83,  101,  201,  206;  his  relation  to  the  Copemican 
system,  196;  his  “Thoughts,”  200;  his  indebtedness  to  religion, 
316. 

Phalansteries,  122. 

Plan  of  nature,  two  facts  as  to  it,  7c ;  of  life,  262. 


Index. 


329 


Pharisaism,  prevalence  of,  146. 

Plato,  his  “Just  Man”  alluded  to,  25  ;  quoted,  273. 

Plotinus  quoted  in  denial  of  evil,  109, 

Plutarch,  194. 

Politicians,  an  error  of,  124. 

Positivism  criticized,  210. 

Potential  pre-existence,  219. 

Prayer,  universal,  285  ;  its  true  purport,  2S6  ;  an  ineradicable  in¬ 
stinct,  2S7  ;  not  incompatible  with  philosophy,  288  ;  of  skeptics, 
290  ;  contrasted  with  labor,  293  ;  conditions  of,  300  ;  effects  of, 
limited  by  the  wisdom  of  God,  301. 

Pre-existence  of  the  soul,  an  ancient  doctrine,  1S5  ;  ours,  in  the 
race,  217;  illustrated  by  that  of  a  tree  in  its  species,  21S;  the 
“how”  a  mystery  in  both  cases,  221  et  seq. 

Pressense’s  estimate  of  this  work,  3. 

Privileges  of  all  at  bottom  equal,  271. 

Progress,  104;  not  metamorphosis,  105;  a  false  notion  of,  190;  true 
idea  of,  192;  real,  owing  to  Christianity,  312. 

Quinet,  Edgar,  113, 

Racine,  103,  204. 

Radicalism  and  conservatism  reconciled,  313. 

Ramus,  Peter,  prayer  of,  289. 

Rank,  blinding  to  the  moral  judgment,  103, 

Ravaisson  quoted,  211. 

Reading,  tendencies  of,  281  et  seq. 

Recipe,  Fourierite,  to  render  all  children  good,  123. 

Recreation,  duty  and  significance  of,  265. 

Rejuvenation  of  an  ancient  objection,  38. 

Reminiscence,  a,  of  the  author,  53. 

Remojse,  32. 

Responsibility,  two  elements  of,  162  ;  not  purely  individual,  228. 
Revery,  our  tendency  in,  134. 

Rousseau  quoted,  26,  134,  155,  174. 

Sacred  books  of  India  and  Persia,  the,  43. 

Scale  of  being,  102. 

Schiller  quoted,  30. 

Science  prone  to  hostility  to  religion,  129;  and  why,  307. 

Secretan,  200. 

Sexes,  normal  relation  of,  138;  well  understood,  140. 


330 


Index, 


Shakspeare  quoted,  216. 

Shoals,  255. 

Sin.  essentiality  of,  149;  when  impossible  to  a  moral  agent,  180;  two 
forms,  1S4. 

Sinless -worlds,  are  there  any?  182. 

Society  as  called  for  by  the  conscience,  52. 

Socrates,  an  error  of,  S3  ;  an  aspiration  of,  273. 

Solidarity,  the  law  of,  229  et  seq.  ;  happy  effects  of,  23 1. 

Solitude,  the  need  of,  266. 

Solution,  the  one  proposed,  161. 

Sophocles  cited,  2S6. 

Soul,  food  of  the,  ideas,  277  ;  sentiments,  278 ;  affections,  280. 
Spirits  cannot  be  created  in  maturity,  176. 

Stoicism,  unnatural,  94. 

Strength,  moral  source  of,  275. 

Suffering  apologized  for,  85  ;  devotees  of,  87  ;  three  favorable  phases 
of,  89  ;  warning,  89  ;  remedy,  90 ;  punishment,  90 ;  beneficial  only 
in  an  abnormal  state  of  things,  93 ;  inevitableness  of,  148. 

Theodicies,  inconsiderate  ones,  188. 

Theory  of  the  machine-animal,  75;  of  the  man-animal,  76;  true, 
not- absurd,  in  practice,  113. 

Tooth,  a  golden  one,  9S. 

Tradition,  281. 

Trappists,  self-denial  of,  87. 

Unchastity,  prevalence  of,  141  ;  ravages  of,  142. 

Valmiki,  the  poet,  cited,  43. 

Vinet  quoted,  232,  238,  283. 

Volition  the  sole  cause  of  evil,  132. 

Voltaire  quoted,  29,  116,  229. 

War  among  animals,  72;  apologized  for,  86. 

Womanhood  does  not  imply  manishness,  105. 


RELIGION  AND  THE  REIGN  OF  TERROR 


NOTICES  OF  THE  PRESS. 


A  BOOK  FOR  THE  GREAT  WAR  CRISIS! 


Religion-  and  the  Reign  of  Terror;  or,  The  Church  during 
the  French  Revolution.  Prepared  from  the  French  of  Ue  Pres- 
sensA  By  John  P.  Lacroix,  A.  M.  121110.,  pp.  416.  Price, 
Si  75  ;  for  which  it  will  be  sent  by  mail. 

What  will  become  of  the  French?  Can  they  sustain  a  Republic? 
Why  have  all  their  attempts  at  self-government  so  disastrously  failed  ? 
This  latter  question  M.  De  Pressense  has  honestly  and  fearlessly 
answered,  and  the  light  which  he  throws  on  the  past  of  France  illus¬ 
trates  her  present,  and  is  prophetic  of  the  future.  Pressense’s  great 
work  has  received  the  highest  commendations  from  the  secular  and 
religious  press  throughout  the  country.  We  present  the  following  as 
a  few  specimens  : 

This  elegant  volume,  translated  and  modified  from  the  French  of 
the  eloquent  Pressense,  comes,  by  permission  of  the  original  author, 
through  the  hands  of  the  Western  Professor  with  peculiar  propriety, 
being  himself  a  descendant  of  a  French  Protestant  ancestry.  It  is 
full  of  monitory  lessons. — Dr.  Whedon ,  i)i  the  Quarterly  Review. 

The  author  is  one  of  the  ablest  French  historians,  and  both  he  and 
the  translator  have  done  their  work  nobly. — Christian  Era. 

Professor  Lacroix  has  succeeded  admirably  in  preserving  the  fire 
and  force  of  style  for  which  the  eminent  French  divine  is  distin¬ 
guished.  It  is  really  one  of  the  most  interesting  books  of  the  time. 
The  thrilling  scenes  and  remarkable  personages  of  the  period  come 
under  most  careful  revision,  and  are  placed  in  lights  and  relations 
where  they  are  seldom  seen.  .  .  .  The  descriptions  of  the  book  are 
graphic,  and  its  lessons  impressive.  We  know  not  where  else  so 
many  pages  of  so  much  historic  interest  can  be  found  that  will  be 
read  by  Americans  with  so  much  of  profit. — North-western  Chris¬ 
tian  Advocate. 


Religion  and  the  Reign  of  Terror. 


This  new  work  is  worthy  of  Pressense’s  fame.  A  simple  book 
notice  cannot  do  it  justice.  It  must  be  read,  studied,  digested,  to 
be  appreciated.  It  is  a  book  for  Americans,  because  it  is  a  graphic 
picture  of  the  horrors  consequent  upon  the  struggle,  first  between 
free  thought  and  spiritual  despotism,  and  last  between  Christianity 
and  absolute  atheism,  or  a  philosophy  which  attempts  to  shut  out 
God  and  the  Gospel  as  living  forces  in  the  social  structure.  It 
is  an  eloquent  warning  against  the  cruelties  of  tyranny  and  the  cor¬ 
ruptions  of  the  Catholic  Church,  drifting  inevitably  at  last  into  the 
abominations  of  red  republicanism  and  infidelity.  .  .  .  Every  clergy¬ 
man,  every  Christian,  every  radical  and  bigot,  every  American  citizen, 
should  read  this  book. —  Universalist  Quarterly. 

It  is  a  resume,  of  the  leading  facts  of  that  strangest  of  epochs  in 
human  history,  the  first  French  Revolution,  in  their  religious  and 
ecclesiastical  relations.  It  is  less  a  history  than  a  dissertation  on  a 
great  historical  theme,  as  viewed  by  a  learned  and  philosophical 
Christian  Pastor  of  decidedly  evangelical  views  and  sentiments.  The 
story  is,  of  course,  a  fearful  one,  and  yet  the  troubles  of  the  times 
brought  into  view  many  rare  excellences  of  life  and  character  among 
both  priests  and  revolutionists  ;  and,  whatever  else  it  teaches,  it  shows 
very  clearly  that  civil  order  cannot  be  maintained  in  the  absence  of  a 
recognized  religion,  and  also  that  civilized  communities  will  not  con¬ 
sent  to  live  without  religious  institutions.  The  experiment  then 
made  was  a  costly  one,  but  the  world  has  profited  by  it. 

This  English  version  of  De  Pressense’s  larger  work,  made  by  our 
correspondent,  Professor  Lacroix,  is  less  a  translation  than  a  sum¬ 
mary,  though,  as  far  as  was  convenient,  the  author’s  own  language  is 
given  in  corresponding  English.  In  matter  and  spirit  the  translation 
is  faithful  to  the  original ;  but  in  style  and  the  use  of  idioms  it  is 
pure  English  and  not  Anglicised  French,  It  is  such  a  book  as  thought¬ 
ful  and  intelligent  readers  must  value,  and  the  reading  of  which  will 
do  good. — Dr.  Curry ,  in  Christian  Advocate. 

It  contains  a  terrible  illustration  of  what  men  may  be^.  me  when 
they  banish  God  from  their  creed  and  their  hearts. — Presbyterian. 

De  Pressense  has  filled  one  of  the  great  wants  of  literature  with 
a  book  of  moderate  size,  published  by  Carlton  &  Lanahan,  and  called 
“Religion  and  the  Reign  of  Terror.”  We  have  all  of  us  read  in  a 
crude  and  half  way  about  the  religious  principles  which  were  brought 
into  vogue  in  France  during  the  great  Revolution,  but  we  have  not 
had  la  ill  before  us,  at  least  in  America,  till  now,  any  clear,  accurate, 


Religion  and  the  Reign  of  Terror. 


and  readable  account  of  those  principles  till  Prof.  Lacroix,  of  Ohio, 
translated  Pressense’s  book,  and  spread  it  before  us.  We  have 
perused  its  pages  with  the  deepest  interest.  Though  the  style  has  a 
trace  of  that  turgidity  which  runs  through  nearly  all  French  authors, 
the  translator  has  been  very  happy  in  the  process  of  simplification, 
and  in  this  respect  the  work  improves  from  the  first  page  to  the  last. 
The  author,  De  Pressense,  is  the  most  prominent  Protestant  clergy¬ 
man  in  France,  and  his  works  on  “The  Life  of  Jesus,”  “The  Holy 
Land,”  etc.,  are  largely  known  and  admired.  We  commend  without 
reservation  this,  his  latest  work,  to  all  who  are  interested  in  the  great 
fermentation  and  clashing  of  religious  ideas  which  went  on  in  France 
during  the  French  Revolution.  The  growth  of  infidelity,  the  tem¬ 
porary  triumph  of  a  religion  of  reason,  the  decadence  of  Romanism, 
are  portrayed  with  great  power  and  candor,  and  altogether  the  work 
is  one  which  should  find  its  place  in  every  thoroughly  furnished 
library. — Dr.  Gage ,  in  The  Religions  Herald ,  Hartford. 

It  is  refreshing  to  read  the  author’s  vigorous  attack  of  the  empire, 
and  his  exposure  of  its  ruinous  policy. — Liberal  Christian. 

Every  young  man  especially  ought  to  read  it.  It  contains  highest 
lessons  most  pleasantly  conveyed. — Dr.  Warren ,  in  Zion's  Herald. 

Published  by  CARLTON  &  LANAHAN, 

80  5  Broadway,  New  York. 


NEW  BOOKS 

PUBLISHED  BY  CABLTON  &  HAWAIIAN, 

805  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK. 


Greek  Philosophy  in  its  Relations  to  Christianity, 

By  B.  F.  Cocker,  D.D.,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in 
the  University  of  Michigan.  12mo.,  pp.  531.  Price,  $2  75. 


This  work  comprises  a  profound  discussion  of  the  leading  philosoph¬ 
ical  and  religious  problems  of  the  day,  with  special  reference  to  the 
theories  of  Comte,  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Herbert  Spencer,  and  other 
great  thinkers  of  a  recent  period,  together  with  a  copious  exposition  of 
the  ancient  Greek  systems,  and  the  social  condition  of  Athens.  It  is  a 
work  of  rare  erudition.  The  writer  has  mastered  his  subject  and  the 
learning  which  pertains  to  it.  He  is  familiar  with  the  prominent  sys¬ 
tems,  and  well  understands  their  scope  and  bearings.  He  has  a  re¬ 
markable  talent  for  concise,  methodical,  and  exact  statements  on 
abstruse  subjects.  At  the  same  time  his  learning  does  not  oppress 
him— does  not  interfere  with  his  own  mental  action.  He  is  a  firm  and 
independent  thinker.  His  wcrk  forms  a  valuable  guide  to  the  history 
of  ancient  and  modern  speculation,  while  it  k  full  of  important  original 
suggestions.  Its  publication  really  forms  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
American  philosophical  literature,  and  elevates  its  author  to  a  high 
rank  among  the  philosophical  writers  of  the  age.  Every  philosophical 
student  in  the  country  will  find  it  a  treasure. — Harper's  Magazine. 


Rome  and  Italy  at  the  Opening  of  the  CEcumenical 
Council. 

Depicted  in  Twelve  Letters  written  from  Rome  to  a  Gen¬ 
tleman  in  America.  By  Edmond  De  Pressense,  D.D., 
Pastor  of  the  Evangelical  Church  in  Paris,  Author  of 
“Early  Years  of  the  Christian  Church,”  and  “Life  and 
Times  of  Jesus  Christ.”  Translated  by  Rev.  George 
Prentice,  A.M.  12mo.  Toned  paper.  Price,  $1  50. 

Of  Pressense  the  North  British  Review  says,  “  His  sentences  are  like 

cut  crystal.” _ In  the  present  work  he  gives  free  range  to  his  powers. 

He  expatiates  over  the  scenes  of  natural  beauty  which  wonderful  Italy 
spreads  before  his  eye.  He  lingers  in  delighted  yet  critical  enthusiasm 
among  her  multitudinous  works  of  art.  He  walks  the  Roman  streets, 
and  paints  the  monuments  of  the  past  and  movements  of  the  living 
present.  He  descends  into  those  wonders  of  subterranean  Rome,  the 
Catacombs,  where  lie  the  nations  of  the  dead  in  one  vast  monumental 
city,  cut  by  nine  hundred  miles  of  streets,  and  where  the  epitaphs  of  a 
whole  glorious  army  of  martyrs  reveal  to  us  the  wonders  and  glories 
of  the  early  faith.  In  the  great  pivotal  questions  of  the  age  he  is  at 
home.  He  understands  their  genesis  from  the  history  of  Europe.  Ills 
penetrative  eye  reads  Papal  Rome  through  and  through.  His  prescient 
eye  sees  hope  only  in  the  far  future  ;  a  period  of  blessed  sunshine  after 
Europe  has  tried  the  awful  experiment  of  utter  godlessness. — Methodist 
Quarterly  Review. 


NEW  BOOKS 

PUBLISHED  BY  CARLTON  &  LANAHAN, 

805  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK. 


Sermons . 

By  Rev.  Richard  Winter  Hamilton.  D.D..  LL.D„  Author 
of  ”  The  Doctrine  of  Regards  and  Punishments,”  “  Pastoral 
Appeals,”  etc.  With  a  Sketch  of  his  Life  by  Rev.  Bishop 
Simpson.  12mo,,  pp.  479.  Toned  Paper.  ..Price,  $1  75. 

Hamilton  was  celebrated  for  his  conversational  powers,  his  wide 
rang£  of  learning,  his  commanding  oratory.  His  sermons  remind  us  of 
what  we  heard  once  said  of  Dempster  in  his  younger  days  :  “He  laid 
his  foundations  in  the  skies,  and  built  upward.”  There  is  a  grandeur 
in  their  build,  there  is  a  largeness  in  their  component  parts,  that  re¬ 
minds  you  of  an  old  cathedral.  Of  all  American  preachers,  he  reminds 
us  most  of  Henry  B.  Bascom.  But  what  strikes  one  as  a  difference  is, 
that  with  Bascom  the  grand  pulpit  oration  was  the  end  ;  when  he  had 
finished,  and  received  the  assurance  that  his  sermon  was  an  oratorical 
success,  his  entire  object  seemed  gained.  With  the  burning  as  well  as 
the  lofty  soul  of  Hamilton  it  was  but  a  means,  an  instrument,  upon 
which,  as  a  production,  he  set  no  high  estimate,  since  he  was  looking 
to.  a  further  end — the  success  of  the  cause  for  which  he  wrought. . .  . 
His  sermons  cannot  be  recommended  as  a  model.  They  serve  as  a 
mental  stimulus.  They  are  grand  Miltonian  poems.  At  the  same  time 
they  are  rich  unfoldings  of  sacred  truths,  clothed  in  a  style  that  tasks 
our  language,  and  ennobling  conceptions  that  task  the  reader’s  imag¬ 
ination.— Dr.  W hedox,  in  the  Quarterly  Review. 

Principles  of  a  System  of  Philosophy . 

An  Essay  toward  solving  some  of  the  more  difficult  Ques¬ 
tions  in  Metaphysics  and  Religion.  By  A.  Bierbower, 
A.M.  16mo.,  pp.  240.  Price,  $1  25. 

This  is  a  small  but  very  remarkable  book.  It  is  seldom  that  we  find 
go  much  compactly  put  up  in  such  a  readable  form.  The  author  grap¬ 
ples  with  the  stupendous  problems  of  sin,  evil,  foreknowledge,  man’s 
responsibility,  God’s  authorship,  providence,  prayer,  and  it  seems  to 
us  that  he  should  have  touched  prophecy.  The'  foundation  principle 
of  the  book  3s  necessary  laws,  a  force  that  cannot  be  annihilated,  and 
contrary  to  which  nothing  can  be  created.  For  example,  God  himself 
could  not  make  a  triangle  with  but  two  sides,  nor  can  he  so  make  a 
triangle  but  that  the  three  angles  would  be  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
He  cannot  make  2x2=5.  He  cannot  make  a  free' moral  agent  without 
the  possibility  of  his  sinning.  Certain  evils  are  necessarily  incidental 
to  doing  the  best  tilings,  or  to  doing  any  one  of  several  things  that 
might  be  best.  God,  .therefore,  not  only  does  not  do  every  thing,  but 
cannot  do  every  thing,  and  so  neither  does  he  know  every  thing.  We 
are  exceedingly  thankful  to  our  Editor  and  Agents  at  New  York  for  a 
work  of  this  kind.  It  must  stir  up  thought,  and  give  clearer  views  of 
God’s  glorious  economy.  If  it  be  not  entirely  satisfactory,  it  will  con¬ 
tribute  something  toward  solving  the  most  difficult  problems  of  the 
ages.  We  advise  our  ministers  generally  to  purchase  this  work,  aDd 
read  it  with  care  from  end  to  end. — Rorth western  Advocate . 


NEW  BOOKS  BY  CARLTON  t  LANAHAN, 

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Problem  of  Evil. 

Translated  from  the  French  of  M.  Ernest  Naville.  By  Prof. 

John  P.  Lacroix.  12mo . 50 

Prince  of  Pulpit  Orators. 

A  Portraiture  of  Rev.  George  Whitefield,  M.A.  Illustrated 
by  Anecdotes  and  Incidents.  By  Rev.  J.  B.  Wakelev. 

Large  16mo .  1  25 

Wesley  His  Own  Historian. 

Illustrations  of  his  Character,  Labors,  and  Achievements. 

From  his  own  Diaries.  By  Rey.  Edwin  L.  Janes.  12mo. .  1  50 

Consecrated  Talents  ‘ 

Or.  The  Life  of  Mrs.  Mary  W.  Mason.  With  an  Introduction 
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Sacred  Memories  ; 

Or,  Annals  of  Deceased  Preachers  of  the  New  York  and 
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Aprils,  1S68,  together -with  the  Addresses  there  delivered. 

By  Rev.  W.  C.  Smith,  of  the  New  York  Conference.  With 


an  Introduction  by  Rev.  Bishop  Janes.  16mo .  1  25 

Garden  of  Sorrows  ;  or ,  The  Ministry  of  Tears. 

By  Rev.  John  Atkinson.  Revised  edition.  12mo. . .  1  50 

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By  Rev.  L.  R.  Dunn.  16mo . . .  1  25 

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Views  from  Plymouth  Rock. 

Bv  Z.  A.  Mudge.  Large  16mo, 

*  w 


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